Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 5-7-2021

Cultivating Eliot's Historical Sense: Eliotic Time and The Waste
Land's Response to Alienation
Thomas Ball

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
Part of the Aesthetics Commons

Recommended Citation
Ball, T. (2021). Cultivating Eliot's Historical Sense: Eliotic Time and The Waste Land's Response to
Alienation (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1960

This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

CULTIVATING ELIOT’S HISTORICAL SENSE:
ELIOTIC TIME AND THE WASTE LAND’S RESPONSE TO ALIENATION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Thomas Ball

May 2021

Copyright by
Thomas Ball

2021

CULTIVATING ELIOT’S HISTORICAL SENSE:
ELIOTIC TIME AND THE WASTE LAND’S RESPONSE TO ALIENATION

By
Thomas Ball
Approved February 26, 2021

________________________________
Tom Eyers
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Duquesne University
(Committee Chair)

________________________________
Jay Lampert
Professor of Philosophy
Duquesne University
(Committee Member)

________________________________
Martin Hägglund
Professor of Comparative Literature and
Humanities
Yale University
(Committee Member)

________________________________
Kristine L. Blair
Dean, McAnulty College & Graduate
School of Liberal Arts
Duquesne University

________________________________
Dan Selcer
Chair, Department of Philosophy
Associate Professor of Philosophy

iii

ABSTRACT

CULTIVATING ELIOT’S HISTORICAL SENSE:
ELIOTIC TIME AND THE WASTE LAND’S RESPONSE TO ALIENATION

By
Thomas Ball
May 2021

Dissertation supervised by Tom Eyers
In this dissertation, I argue that T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land marshals his account of
historical sense as a response to the problem of alienation in modernity. Eliot’s historical sense
depends upon an awareness of the endurance of the past, demanding a reorientation to the structure
of temporality. I interrogate the temporal ramifications of Eliot’s account, arguing that it resonates
with Henri Bergson’s durational theory of time. I ultimately investigate Eliot’s relationship to
Bergson, suggesting that Eliot intervenes in the Bergsonian framework by establishing duration as
a cultural, rather than individual or ontological, reality.
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INTRODUCTION

I. The Problem of Historical Sense
Historical sense is the concept at the heart of this project. In fact, this project developed as a
response to a cultural moment that strikes me as characterized by a lack of historical sense. But
this notion refers to many things. The historical sense with which I am concerned is not merely
knowledge about historical events. Nor is it exclusively, or even primarily, an attention to the
chronology of occurrences. If historical sense is reduced to an encyclopedic knowledge of
historical material or a facility with chronology, then my suggestion that we suffer from a loss of
it may appear patently ridiculous. We have an overwhelming supply of historical data at our
disposal. Indeed, the prominent methodological approaches of the digital humanities have
developed in response to this breadth of material, employing the techniques of data science to
illuminate temporally distant cultural moments. However, the historical sense of this project does
not lie in the availability of information about the past, nor does it treat the past as a distant object
of scholarly investigation. Rather, it concerns our relation to the past, taken both as a whole and in
the specificity of discrete moments. Thus the lack of historical sense I am circling has to do with
the relevance of the past, our past, to us. And so insofar as this project develops a notion of
historical sense that is tied to our own relations, it articulates a loss that is much closer to us, much
more present.
The notion of historical sense central to this project is derived from T.S. Eliot’s seminal
essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” In that essay, Eliot describes historical sense as
involving “a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence” and as being “a
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sense of the timeless as well as the temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together.”1 This
historical sense is “what makes a writer traditional,” but at the same time is “what makes a writer
most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity.”2 Eliot’s account of historical
sense animates this project’s investigation of his long poem The Waste Land. And indeed, the latter
half of this project is devoted to tracing the philosophical and literary implications of the notion of
historical sense and to arguing for its applicability beyond the more limited literary context in
which Eliot introduces it. When I claim then, speaking particularly though not exclusively about
the American context, that our cultural moment is characterized by a loss of historical sense, I
mean to highlight a failure of recognition, not a failure of knowledge. I am responding to what
strikes me as a failure to acknowledge the enduring effects of the past, a failure to recognize the
ways in which the past remains present.
I see this failing of historical sense manifest most viscerally in every attempt to
compartmentalize a recent tragedy as an isolated incident and an unforeseeable aberration. This
method of response is trotted out by talking heads to delineate the conditions according to which
a tragic event can be discussed, thereby circumscribing the appropriate response. Thus, mass
shootings in America are systematically framed as the lamentable acting-out of unhinged
individuals. The network of social conditions that make such events a common occurrence is
occluded, and instead the character of the perpetrator is endlessly litigated. Similarly, each time a
police officer murders a person of color, focus is diverted from the historical role of the police
force as a safeguard of white supremacy. We are instead distracted with endless inquiries into the
particularities of the deadly encounter and, inevitably, the demonization of the victim. We are told
to consider whether an entire institution should be judged according to the actions of one obviously

1
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deviant individual. The department representatives and public relations professionals who deploy
this tactic seem to recognize no irony in the frequency with which they make use of it. Each
instantiation of the pattern demands to be treated according to its own particularity, divorced from
the structural conditions that place it within an enduring network of historical causes. An analogous
impulse manifests in reactions to geopolitical antagonism that reify contemporary states of conflict
into eternal and inescapable conditions. Thus, the rhetoric of a clash of civilizations enshrines
particular cultural configurations, themselves historically determined, as manifestations of an
ahistorical explanatory framework.
These tragic events are, of course, disparate in their origins. They are implicated in myriad
causal structures, both competing and overlapping. They are overdetermined, as are the responses
to them that I have highlighted as problematic. My quarry here is not ultimately an analysis of the
causes of American violence or the shortcomings of our political discourse. I raise these examples
only to note the temporal logic that underwrites them. This logic divorces the present from the
past. When we limit our engagement with current events to an interrogation of the decisions or
characters of the specific actors involved, we sever the present from its historical relations. We
treat the present moment as hermetically sealed, divorced from a past that no longer exists. And
when we do this, we deafen ourselves to the ways in which history continues to echo through our
present experience. We deprive ourselves of the ability to reckon with the forces that shape us,
structures of power and experience that, though amorphous, can nevertheless exert profound and
enduring effects. We restrict our capacity to understand ourselves, each other, and the world
around us.
Though this project developed as a response to conditions that I maintain are characterized
by a failing of historical sense, it is not primarily an investigation of our contemporary situation.
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Rather, in this project, I undertake to explicate Eliot’s own deployment of the notion of historical
sense in The Waste Land. For The Waste Land, I argue, instantiates the synthetic capacity of
historical sense. It develops a poetic vision according to which an attunement to the enduring past
may safeguard meaningful human interaction. It does so by appealing to the past as the ground of
intersubjective relations. The poem, further, deploys this unifying power of historical sense as an
intervention into a social reality that it depicts as marked by a totalizing sense of fragmentation.
The individuals presented in the poem are cut off from each other, seemingly trapped in
disconnected worlds of private experience. Through its juxtaposition of these competing visions,
one of fragmentary and alienated social experience and one of a synthetic possibility grounded in
our relation to the past, the poem interrogates the epistemological and existential consequences of
the absence of historical sense. In doing so, it diagnoses our contemporary situation and speaks to
a condition that seems, to me, to be particularly relevant to our current historical moment.
The opening chapters of this project explicate the condition into which, I argue, the poem
intervenes. In the first chapter I frame this condition as a universalized state of alienation. I define
alienation as the subjective experience of the disintegration of the relations between individuals,
which results in a sense of being isolated within an enclosed and private perspective. I suggest that
many investigations of The Waste Land take this isolated condition to be the ultimate meaning of
the poem. Because the poem represents a universalized state of alienation, these interpretations
read it as endorsing that alienated condition as a fundamental truth of human existence. I argue,
however, that the poem represents this condition not to endorse it, but rather in order to announce
it as a problem. I develop this claim through an investigation first of the debates between Georg
Lukács, Bertolt Brecht, and Theodor Adorno regarding the productive possibilities of modernist
literary forms and then through an explication of the methodological intervention of The Waste
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Land itself. I take up Eliot’s appeal in a review of Joyce’s Ulysses to a mythical method that, he
claims, must adopted as a productive response to historical conditions strikingly similar to those
depicted in The Waste Land. I argue, further, that the poem employs this mythical method by
incorporating elements of the Arthurian Grail Legend. In doing so, the poem draws upon the Grail
Legend as a source that invests it with a structure, and this structure disrupts the totalizing sense
of fragmentation. I argue that The Waste Land does not incorporate the Grail Legend’s narrative
structure but rather inherits a mythical logic. According to this logic, the vitality of the land is
inextricably bound to the behavior and condition of the people who live on it. This logic reveals a
connection between the poem’s descriptions of desolate, arid landscapes and its representation of
human relationships characterized by detachment and isolation. Acknowledging the problematic
deployment of similar mythical frameworks in the twentieth century, I argue that Eliot does not
retreat into myth. Rather, he marshals this mythical logic to illuminate a more fundamental
epistemological framework. According to this framework, itself derived from Eliot’s philosophical
engagement with F.H. Bradley, the notion of a shared world depends upon the commensurability
of different perspectives. When individuals become increasingly trapped within their own private
perspectives, a condition The Waste Land appeals to through an allusion to Bradley, their shared
world disintegrates. This, ultimately, is the problem in which I claim The Waste Land intervenes.
In the latter half of this project, I develop the response I claim The Waste Land offers to
the problem of fragmented experience and disintegrating worlds. This response manifests formally
in the poem through the use of repetition and allusion. I argue that the poem employs these devices
as an engagement with Eliot’s notion of historical sense. The poem’s allusions to myriad texts
reveal continuities between the poem’s fragmented vignettes and a wider historical context.
Further, the repetition of these allusions fosters connections between those disparate vignettes,
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disrupting the sense of fragmentation that so strikingly characterizes the poem. Characters are
drawn into relations with each other through their mutual connections to a textual history
embedded in the poem. The poem, I argue, appeals to a past that endures in the present as a
synthetic ground. In doing so, it articulates a vision of historical sense, and presents this historical
sense as a response to the social disintegration that it diagnoses.
The Waste Land articulates a vision of experience animated by historical sense and presents
this vision as a response to the problem of alienation. To the extent that Eliot presents historical
sense as capable of synthesizing perspectives, I maintain it serves as a ground for the recovery of
a shared world in The Waste Land. This account of historical sense, however, depends upon a
model of temporality that treats the past as, in some sense, coexistent with the present. The
coexistence of the past with the present is suggested by Eliot both in the positive definition of
historical sense that he develops in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and through Eliot’s
juxtaposition of his approach to history with various deficient accounts. He excoriates these
accounts precisely for their temptation to treat the past either as a vestigial moment to be surpassed
or as a relic to be preserved. Eliot derides them for treating the past as divorced from the present
and irrelevant to it. The Waste Land reinforces this sense that the past coexists with the present by
incorporating voices from the past into the poem. Rather than merely depicting contemporary
personages quoting or alluding to historical material, The Waste Land has Philomel sing directly
into the text and appeals to the Greek prophet Tiresias as a figure who sees the substance of the
poem itself. The Waste Land thus seems to suggest that the past can serve as a synthetic force
precisely because it continues to endure in the present, providing the ground of relations.
I argue that The Waste Land depends upon an appeal to the past’s endurance in the present,
but I also acknowledge that the poem does not articulate an account of temporality that justifies
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this appeal. Indeed, when Eliot introduces the notion of historical sense in “Tradition and the
Individual Talent,” he promises to “halt at the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism,” leaving aside
the question of the structure of time as beyond his purview.3 Drawing again upon the critiques
leveled by Lukács against modernist literary forms, I argue that without a coherent account of
temporality, The Waste Land risks reinforcing the precise mode of alienation that it seems to
confront. For if the past cannot and does not actually endure in the present, then the cultivation of
historical sense as a response to alienation amounts to a retreat into a fantasy. The Waste Land,
then, would seem actually to be an artifact of the alienated condition that the traditional account
of the poem takes it to endorse. In response to this challenge, I explicate the temporal conditions
necessitated by Eliot’s appeal to historical sense. I further argue that the account of duration
developed by Henri Bergson satisfies the conditions of Eliot’s temporal framework, thereby
offering a potential ground for historical sense. I finally argue that Eliot does not uncritically
endorse Bergson’s account of duration. Nor, I claim, does he reject Bergson entirely, as some
scholars suggest.4 Rather, I argue that Eliot critiques, both in poetry and in prose, various
psychological and ontological ramifications of Bergson’s account. This critical engagement, I
conclude, leads Eliot to relocate the ground of duration. For Eliot, duration manifests neither as
the purely psychological experience of memory nor as a basic ontological principle. Instead, I
suggest Eliot enshrines duration as a temporal mode of social experience, thereby resolving his
disputes with the Bergsonian ontological framework while preserving duration’s capacity to
underwrite historical sense.

3
4

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 49.
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II. Methodology
In this dissertation, I develop a method of reading literary texts that emphasizes the reciprocally
beneficial relationship between philosophical and literary modes of interpretation. In doing so, I
argue for the capacity of works of literature to engage with philosophical problems, while also
emphasizing the need for philosophy’s resources to bring literature’s inherent richness to light. As
such, I see this project not only as an interdisciplinary exercise but furthermore as an argument for
the clarity that interdisciplinary methodologies afford. The method I develop investigates literary
texts not merely as cultural artifacts or vessels of ideology, but rather as responses to specific
cultural problems. This emphasis on the problems to which works respond in fact establishes the
capacity of literary works to speak beyond their specific historical contexts. If contemporary
society experiences problems analogous to those addressed in a work, then investigation of that
text may illuminate avenues of response. My method departs from dominant historicist
methodologies in literary studies that treat texts simply as artifacts which facilitate the
investigation of historical conditions. By emphasizing problems, I also position this methodology
against dominant philosophical methods of investigation which straightforwardly interrogate the
theoretical positions articulated in a text. Though I articulate an approach to literature that departs
from these dominant methods, I do not abandon them entirely. For sensitivity to context, akin to
the historicist model, enables one to identify the problems that a text addresses, while a
commitment to the coherence and rigor of response, as emphasized in philosophical discourse,
preserves the relevance of that response to contexts beyond its immediate historical situation.
The methodology of this project is grounded in a reading of literary form as responsive to
social conditions, and particularly problems, rather than simply as representational or
straightforwardly ideological. Reading literary texts as responsive in this way entails a host of
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subsequent questions. For, once the problem with which a text engages is identified, we may
proceed to ask what interventions the text makes into the problem and consider the resources it
marshals to do so. Pursuing these lines of inquiry, I highlight tensions between the elements of
form and content in The Waste Land, while remaining sensitive to the capacity of this tension both
to address the problems of the text and identify new avenues for investigation. In order to articulate
The Waste Land’s appeal to historical sense as a response to the particular condition of alienation
in modernity, I coordinate the poem with Eliot’s critical work and philosophical corpus. In doing
so, I illuminate the theoretical framework underwriting the response to alienation suggested in the
poem. Thus, while the dialectical tension between form and content raises alienation as a problem
and suggests historical sense as a response, the resonances between The Waste Land and Eliot’s
criticism allow me to argue for this response’s coherence. This final step is crucial because reading
the poem as an intervention into the problem of alienation brings it into conversation with the
alienated dimensions of our contemporary situation. If The Waste Land responds to a particular
problem, and if we share in that problem, then reckoning with the coherence and ramifications of
that response is crucial for appraising its relevance to us.
This project is, first and foremost, an investigation into the theoretical interventions of The
Waste Land. As such, my arguments in every chapter develop from and are grounded in close
readings of the poem itself. By close reading, I intend both a precise attention to the descriptions
presented in the text and an attunement to the formal elements of the poem that variously reinforce
those descriptions or call them into question. Thus, I highlight, along with many insightful readers
of The Waste Land, that the poem seems to universalize the condition of social disintegration that
it represents by reinscribing this condition at the level of the poem’s fragmentary form. Further,
with my argument that the poem uses allusion and repetition to develop a response to the
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fragmented experience that it depicts, I emphasize a poetic capacity to disrupt and interrogate the
representation of the world that it articulates. An attunement to a poem’s capacity to dialectically
engage with the conditions of its own production offers a corrective, I think, to dominant historicist
approaches to works of literature that treat them as representational artifacts that merely convey
information about their cultural contexts. The apogee of this tradition is, of course, the “distant
reading” approach to texts employed in the digital humanities. By reducing works of literature to
the content they contain that can be accommodated to the tools of data analysis, this methodology
proves incapable of fully reckoning with the formal features of a work that can generate productive
internal tensions. Further, by analyzing works of literature in order to glean information about their
historical contexts, these historicist methodologies risk unnecessarily establishing an unbridgeable
chasm between the historical text and our contemporary context. Works of literature become
incapable of illuminating our contemporary circumstances because they are restricted to an
extremely narrow and historically situated function.
Though the arguments of this project are grounded in an attention to the poem at the level
of the line, an attention championed most famously perhaps by proponents of New Criticism,
which counts Eliot among its forerunners, I do not adopt wholesale the methodological
commitments associated with that tradition. By focusing on the capacity of poems to raise and
intervene in problems, I highlight a crucial permeability between text and context. I argue, for
instance, that poems should be understood both as conditioned by the historical context in which
they appear and as forces that inform that context. With this approach I resist the New Critical
method of treating the text as a circumscribed whole, which Cleanth Brooks defends in “The New
Criticism” as a “preference for emphasizing the text rather than the writer’s motives or reader’s
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reaction.”5 Brooks offers a rebuttal to hyperbolic accounts of the New Critical method, helpfully
contextualizing the occasions in which he considered literary texts in isolation from their historical
contexts, but even in his defense he acknowledges the endurance of this perception. My aim here
is not to wade into old debates about the precise contours of the New Critical program. Rather, I
mean only to position my own method against a familiar, if caricatured, model of close reading.
With my own appeal to close reading, I maintain that we must appeal to the operation of a text
itself to discern the problems with which it is engaged. But I also acknowledge that those defining
concerns necessarily open on to a wider determining horizon. The assumptions and theoretical
orientation expressed in the poem, as well as the language that presents itself as adequate to the
poem’s project, are all features that speak to a world beyond the universe created by the work of
art. Framing this investigation around the poetic response to extratextual problems
methodologically inscribes a concern for the dialectical relationship between the literary work and
the conditions in which it intervenes while nevertheless deriving the interpretive frame from the
text itself.
This sensitivity to the permeability between text and context grounds, further, the
philosophical approach I employ in my explication of The Waste Land. I maintain that
philosophical methods can illuminate the complexities of aesthetic works because I take a
necessary facet of philosophical investigation to be the identification of the conceptual backdrop
against which a philosophical intervention appears. It seems to me that a basic methodological
commitment in the study of the history of philosophy is the recognition that philosophical
arguments and positions do not appear in isolation. Rather, arguments develop in relation to a
network of preexisting commitments and concerns, and they develop in response to discrete

5
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problems that are felt to be pressing enough to warrant engagement. Reckoning with a
philosophical intervention, then, requires excavating the theoretical framework that it assumes and
investigating the broader scope of philosophical conversations in which it is engaged. Applying
this approach to The Waste Land entails illuminating the conditions to which the poem responds
as well as the conceptual assumptions underwriting its deployment of the notion of historical sense.
For, though Eliot claims in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” to stop short of the boundary of
metaphysics, his appeal to historical sense is necessarily embroiled in a host of commitments
regarding the nature of time and the conditioning relationships that coordinate the identities of
individuals, cultures, and works of art. Explicating these commitments illuminates the contours of
Eliot’s intervention in The Waste Land and enables us to reckon with the poem’s radical theoretical
implications.
The philosophical approach I adopt in my investigation of The Waste Land therefore cannot
involve simply subjecting the poem to the conceptual analysis appropriate to philosophical
arguments. Though I do argue that some of Eliot’s poems, specifically “Rhapsody on a Windy
Night” and “Gerontion,” engage critically with Bergson’s account of temporality, even suggesting
that the poems together participate in a kind of destructive dilemma, I do not treat the poems as if
they should conform to the specific standards of deductive proofs. I hesitate to treat the poems I
explicate in this project as if they make straightforward truth claims that can be evaluated
sequentially and then collated into a series of inferences. They are poems, after all. Instead, I more
frequently treat the poems as developing holistic visions of reality. The visions of reality cultivated
in the poems I engage with here explore the ramifications of certain foundational commitments
and allow the reader to inhabit the perspective shaped by those commitments. Thus, when I note
that my investigations in this project all begin with and return to close readings of The Waste Land,
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I do not mean to suggest that I consider the truth of the poem’s statements line by line, as if such
a pursuit were productive or even possible. Rather, by attending to the descriptive and formal
nuances of the poem, I articulate the competing visions that it cultivates—one animated by
historical sense and one characterized by its absence. I further explore the theoretical ramifications
of these visions and of the productive tension through which The Waste Land develops them. In
doing so, I ultimately hope to provide insight into our own experience by attending to the
contemporary relevance of this appeal to a past that endures.
The method I adopt in this project is, then, primarily historical in orientation. My main
concern is to articulate accurately the theoretical intervention of The Waste Land and to explicate
the ramifications of its appeal to historical sense. Thus, when I discuss Eliot’s formative
engagements with other philosophers, I am ultimately less concerned with whether he represents
their positions correctly than I am concerned with how his analyses, accurate or not, inform his
poetic practice. Further, as a general methodological principle rooted in this historical orientation,
I ground my investigation in a consideration of the thinkers and problems that Eliot addresses
explicitly in his work or that are involved in the critical debates surrounding it. I avoid appealing
to philosophical accounts external to the context suggested by these texts, as I maintain that doing
so risks obscuring the concerns inherent to the work itself. Similarly, when I argue that the poem
addresses a problem and endeavor to explicate the contours of that problem, I do so in order to
illuminate the operation of the poem rather than to explore alternative ways to address the issue in
question. I am thus, for example, more interested in articulating the intellectual influences that
condition Eliot’s engagement with the problem of solipsism in The Waste Land than considering
whether Eliot’s formulation of the problem is preferable to other philosophical treatments of it.
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III. A Spectral Chorus
It is, perhaps, only fitting that a project that enjoins a sensitivity to the endurance of the past should
itself be haunted in some capacity. Various specters loom over this investigation, exerting effects
upon its arguments without always appearing explicitly. Hegel, in particular, echoes throughout
this dissertation, for the conflict that frames it, the conflict between Eliot’s literary modernism and
Lukács’ ideologically inflected critique of modernist forms, contains a latent tension regarding
Hegel’s reception. I briefly suggest that Lukács never fully abandons his roots in Hegelian
idealism, most evident in his early Theory of the Novel, even as that idealism is transmuted through
his extensive engagement with Marx and Marxism, a tradition itself indebted to the Hegelian
project. Lukács articulates a framework that foregrounds the notion of the social totality, both as a
regulative ideal, on the one hand, and as an immanently developing ground of social experience
on the other. In this, he seems to exhibit an enduring fealty to the Hegelian narrative of the
dialectical self-actualization of consciousness from the Phenomenology of Spirit. Eliot, at times,
seems also to endorse a regulative ideal of an integrated social totality, and he too presents this
ideal in language reminiscent of Hegel. Indeed, though I position Lukács and Eliot against each
other in the service of a productive antagonism, their analogous commitments to visions of a
vaguely Hegelian integrated totality suggest a significant point of reconciliation.
Hegel, then, appears as a background influence in this project, providing a framework that
illuminates the commensurability between its two primary interlocutors. This does not mean,
however, that Hegel’s specific conceptual apparatus is particularly useful for clarifying the
positions articulated throughout my investigation. The Hegelian aspects of Lukács’ and Eliot’s
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thought are filtered through their respective engagements with post-Hegelian traditions. Lukács,
for example, develops his Hegelian leanings in the service of a Marxist orthodoxy, imbuing
Hegel’s dialectical account of the development of spirit with a discrete historical content. His
analysis consistently returns to the material conditions of the proletariat’s coming to selfconsciousness. More importantly for this project, Eliot’s Hegelian lineage can be traced through
the work of F.H. Bradley, a scion of British Idealism. Eliot’s dissertation, Knowledge and
Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, offers an extended treatment of Bradley’s
epistemology, and he appeals to the substance of that work in his notes to The Waste Land. Central
to Bradley’s philosophical framework is his notion of the Absolute, a comprehensive perspective
that contains all limited perspectives. Sometimes in his criticism, Eliot aligns Bradley’s Absolute
with immediate experience, while at others he consigns it to the status of a transcendent regulative
ideal.6 Though Eliot resists developing an extended treatment of Bradley’s Absolute in his
dissertation, this concept motivates a number of the epistemological stances Eliot adopts in the
work I treat in this project. I engage with Bradley’s Absolute most extensively in my attempt to
identify the temporal foundations of Eliot’s historical sense, as I argue Bradley’s account entails
commitments that draw it into tension with the conditions Eliot identifies as necessary for
underwriting his engagement with history. Eliot’s Hegelian debt is, on this point, both particularly
pronounced and potentially a distraction. For though Eliot wrestles with a concept that can clearly
be traced to Hegel, appealing to Hegel’s own account of the Absolute does not prove fruitful for
illuminating Eliot’s critical engagement with Bradley. The paucity of Hegel’s direct contribution
to Eliot’s thought is suggested, for example, by the fact that, in his dissertation devoted to a
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philosopher in the Idealist tradition, Eliot mentions Hegel by name only once.7 Insofar as Eliot is
not particularly interested in articulating the historical provenance of Bradley’s account or judging
Bradley’s faithfulness to Hegel, this influence does not appear to be particularly fecund resource
for explicating Eliot’s own thought. Further, though appealing to a more orthodox Hegelian
idealism could, perhaps, resolve some of the critiques Eliot raises against Bradley, such an appeal
would not necessarily promote a more nuanced understanding of the ways Eliot’s critiques inform
the interventions he makes in The Waste Land. I propose, then, that Hegel proves an interesting
and useful touchstone in this project insofar as his work resonates with a number of the positions
that receive extensive treatment throughout it. This resonance illuminates points of
commensurability between the primary interlocutors in the project, suggesting fronts on which a
seemingly irreconcilable dispute might be resolved. I nevertheless maintain that the work of Hegel
himself lies beyond the purview of my work here.
Another figure may be noticeable for his relative absence from this investigation rather
than his presence. As one of the twentieth century’s most distinguished thinkers of both time and
alienation, Heidegger may seem particularly relevant to this project. For the most part, however, I
do not draw upon his work. While I do consider Heidegger in the opening chapter, I primarily
present him as a foil for developing Lukács’ critique of the ideological framework that he takes to
serve as the theoretical foundation of modernist literature. I ultimately dispute Lukács’ conclusions
about modernism, developing my own methodology in opposition to his ideological approach.
Nevertheless, with his concern for the social totality, Lukács proves a more helpful interlocutor
than Heidegger when considering the contours of alienation as it is depicted in The Waste Land.
As I argue in the second chapter of this project, The Waste Land exhibits an epistemological
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concern for the possibility of inhabiting a shared world, a concern for the unification of
perspectives. It presents a vision of reality in which this possibility is foreclosed and the shared
world seems to disintegrate. The conceptual apparatus Heidegger develops in Being and Time is
surely capable of illuminating the conditions elaborated in The Waste Land, but his approach does
not, it seems to me, speak organically to the social framework within which the poem operates.
Heidegger frames his investigations through a consideration of the phenomenological experience
of Dasein. This experience necessarily opens onto a social totality, but the investigations
themselves tend to resolve into treatments of the individual. Thus, for example, Heidegger
describes alienation as a state in which Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is
concealed.”8 Alienation, in this case, refers back to the individual’s relation to their own potential
rather than referring to the individual’s relation to a wider social totality. Heidegger’s account can,
of course, speak to the relation between the individual and the social, and his accounts of
thrownness, historicity, and being-in-the-world all speak to this relation. But I maintain that the
internal pressure to ground the investigations in the individual experience of Dasein renders
Heidegger’s account less immediately applicable to the mode of alienation to which The Waste
Land appeals. Similarly, insofar as the model of temporality that Heidegger develops is primarily
oriented around a concern for the future, as evidenced most evocatively in his account of Beingtoward-Death, it is not immediately useful for illuminating the structure of historical sense.
The shadow that looms largest over the project, however, is that cast by Eliot himself. The
legacy of Eliot is particularly vexed because tensions exhibited throughout his corpus result in a
temptation to treat Eliot as a fragmentary figure. Thus, it is not uncommon to see a modernist
concern for fracture reflected in engagements with Eliot. Robert Lehman in Impossible
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Modernism: T.S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and the Critique of Historical Reason, for example, reads
The Waste Land as a poem that speaks to a radical discontinuity, even heralding the end of history.
Eliot’s modernism, on this reading, depends upon a feeling that time is fundamentally out of joint
and appeals to a sense of novelty.9 To read the poem this way, however, Lehman must maintain a
rigid distinction between Eliot the critic and Eliot the poet. While he sees one side of Eliot as “on
the side of continuity” with his “valorizing of the tradition in his critical writings,” Lehman claims
The Waste Land is “on the side of rupture.”10 Stefan Collini complicates Lehman’s account in
interesting ways, highlighting in Eliot’s criticism an emphasis on degeneration akin to what
Lehman locates in Eliot’s poetry while simultaneously contextualizing this concern for
degeneration within an appeal to historical continuity.11 I argue, however, that he too readily
ascribes to Eliot a logic of degeneration that results in an apocalyptic appeal to the sterility of
modern sensibility, ultimately suggesting an emphasis on disintegration analogous to Lehman’s.
The appeal to modernist literature as signaling a radical historical break is not, I think,
unique or surprising. An emphasis on the discontinuity of modernist forms and on the historical
conditions to which they respond constitutes, after all, part of the self-mythologization of
modernist authors, captured most famously perhaps by Ezra Pound’s injunction to “make it new.”
I maintain, though, that accepting this account of modern rupture too readily as an explanatory
frame for The Waste Land risks obscuring the ways in which the poem appeals to and depends
upon a radical account of historical continuity. These appeals to continuity are further obscured
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when the modern sense of fragmentation is extrapolated to the figure of Eliot himself and it is
taken for granted that the project of the critic is distinct from the sensibility of the poet.
The polyvocality that results from the temptation to treat Eliot the critic and Eliot the poet
as separate entities is amplified by a complementary impulse to treat the intellectual development
of Eliot as a discontinuous process. Jewel Spears Brooker distills this developmental narrative in
“Substitutes for Religion in the Early Poetry of T.S. Eliot.”12 There Brooker frames Eliot’s early
work as an attempt to find a framework capable of satisfying the theoretical demands that
ultimately precipitate his conversion to the Anglican church in 1927. A relatively stable narrative
develops in Brooker’s treatments of Eliot. According to this narrative, Eliot converts to
Bergsonism early in his poetic career but becomes disenchanted with Bergson’s idealism and
abandons it for an commitment to Bradley.13 Eliot’s disappointments with Bradley lead him to
adopt the stance of a skeptical relativist, a stance taken to dominate the landscape of The Waste
Land and The Hollow Men. Then, with his second conversion in 1927, Eliot settles for the religious
solution he had actually been longing for all along.14 There is, of course, merit to recognizing the
shifts in Eliot’s ideological commitments and reckoning with the ways his shifting theoretical
frameworks manifest in both his critical work and his poetry. Many extremely insightful readings
of Eliot’s poems engage extensively with Eliot’s intellectual concerns and sympathies at the time
of their composition. The temptation to treat these phases of Eliot’s career as discrete and
incommensurable, a temptation evidenced by the appeal to conversions, results however in a
further multiplication of Eliot’s voices. Then, amidst this cacophony of voices, Brooker’s
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teleological frame allows the chorus to be subsumed under the unifying figure of the Eliot the
Christian, insofar as each of those previous phases is taken to have been striving for a Christian
conversion all along. On one hand, then, I maintain that appeals to irreconcilable rupture, either
with respect to Eliot’s poetic and critical output or with respect to the historical situation of
modernity, obscure the productive intervention of The Waste Land. On the other, I hold that this
analogous dissociation of moments in Eliot’s development, along with their teleological
subsumption under the person of Eliot the Christian, elides the theoretical fecundity of Eliot’s work
on history by assuming answers to the problems he takes up and deriving those answers from
circumstances external to the text.
Finally, the figure of Eliot casts another, significantly more troubling, shadow over this
project. Eliot’s politics and beliefs, particularly concerning issues of race, were often problematic,
to say the least. His status in the twentieth century as a champion of tradition, a term I hope to
complicate in this project, and an arbiter of taste becomes increasingly uncomfortable insofar as
the terms in which he expresses those tastes and appeals to tradition are consistently Eurocentric
and occasionally tinged with racial prejudice. While Eliot’s dogmatic conservativism becomes
more pronounced in his later criticism, his entire corpus is shot through with Eurocentrism and
racism. This racism appears most pronouncedly in the cringeworthy caricatures of his immature
“King Bolo” series of poems, but it haunts his more mature poems as well. “Gerontion,” which
will receive extensive treatment in the final chapter of this project, exploits antisemitic tropes,
while Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats leans upon racist descriptions in the service of dramatic
conflict in “Growltiger’s Last Stand.” The criticism I engage with most extensively in this project
does not, on the whole, contain anything so explicitly repugnant. This may in part be due to the
culturally myopic perspective Eliot adopts in much of his prose. Most notably, the historical sense
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to which Eliot appeals involves an awareness of increasingly capacious historical categories, like
“the mind of [the poet’s] own country” and “the mind of Europe,”15 but this expansion of
awareness stops at the border of the continent. The tradition that Eliot appeals to is definitively
and restrictively western, even as the logic Eliot develops entails an internal pressure to include
broader and more comprehensive perspectives. By explicating this logic, I develop a framework
for interrogating Eliot’s racist and xenophobic commitments from within his own theoretical
edifice. For, insofar as his response to the problem of alienation depends upon the expansion of
one’s perspective, xenophobia functions within this framework as both a symptom of and catalyst
for alienation.
The account of The Waste Land that I develop intervenes in each of these debates,
productively complicating some ossified narratives about the delineation of Eliot’s modernism
while also acknowledging the shortsightedness of some of Eliot’s opinions and pronouncements.
I argue that Eliot’s notion of historical sense suggests a corrective to what I find to be an
overemphasis on discontinuity in treatments of Eliot’s work. By highlighting the importance of an
awareness of the past’s contemporaneity with the present, Eliot frustrates the impulse to treat
history, either that of literary traditions or of individuals, as operating by discontinuous leaps.
Further, by illuminating the operation of this critical framework in Eliot’s poetry, I disrupt the
impulse to compartmentalize the different modes of Eliot’s creative production. I argue that The
Waste Land and the criticism contemporaneous with it actually cohere into a more unified
theoretical project that emphasizes historical continuity and the dialectical interaction of text and
context. In doing so, I dispute accounts that read The Waste Land as an appeal to an ineluctable
and ahistorical condition, while I simultaneously challenge the impulse to divorce Eliot’s poetry
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from his criticism. By focusing primarily on The Waste Land and criticism prior to or roughly
contemporaneous with it, I aim to bracket the question of Eliot’s conversion, thereby foreclosing
the possibility of reading the solutions Eliot comes to later in his life back into the problems he
takes up in his earlier work. Limiting my own critical scope allows me to consider the productive
possibilities of The Waste Land and its radical implications for our orientation to history according
to their own merits, rather than adjudicating the success of The Waste Land’s response to the
problem of alienation by referring to Eliot’s own satisfaction with the result. With my argument
that Eliot adopts a roughly Bergsonian account of temporality, I disrupt the narrative that would
treat Eliot’s intellectual development as a series of conversions. Indeed, if we take Eliot’s temporal
intervention seriously, we may consider the possibility that it would be appropriate to treat his own
development as durational. In the final analysis, the operation of Eliot’s intellect seems to me to
resemble uncannily his description of the mind of Europe with which he introduces the notion of
historical sense. This mind of Europe “is a mind which changes, and . . . this change is a
development which abandons nothing en route, does not superannuate either Shakespeare, or
Homer, or the rock drawing of the Magdalenian draughtsmen.”16 Even when Eliot seems to
transition from an engagement with one theoretical framework to another, he does not expunge the
previous position from his mind entirely. Rather, the embrace of a new framework reorganizes his
prior commitments, allowing him to use their resources productively to new ends.
Furthermore, by emphasizing the philosophical contribution of the poem and explicating
the theoretical foundations of that contribution, I work to untether somewhat the action of the poem
from the opinions of the poet. If, as I argue, Eliot employs historical sense to address a particular
problem, and if this engagement rests upon a coherent theoretical foundation, we may consider
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whether Eliot’s more problematic pronouncements are in fact commensurable with the conceptual
apparatus he develops. Thus, though Eliot introduces his account of historical sense in terms that
are unabashedly Eurocentric, the synthetic pressure of that concept, its function of unifying
perspectives into increasingly comprehensive wholes, implicitly condemns the limitations of the
terms in which it is first introduced. Explicating this more culturally capacious notion derived from
Eliot’s corpus provides a framework for developing an immanent critique of the problematic
aspects of Eliot’s writings and, indeed, of the conservative literary tradition that Eliot canonizes.
Further, by articulating the conceptual apparatus that The Waste Land develops to address a
particular historical problem, I am to illuminate the ways in which the poem may speak to our own
historical situation regardless of whether we subscribe to Eliot’s narrower aesthetic and political
pronouncements.
IV. Summary of the Argument
This project consists of five chapters, each of which presents a relatively self-contained
investigation of an aspect of The Waste Land while simultaneously serving as a step in a more
comprehensive argument. The first chapter frames the poem as an engagement with the problem
of alienation and in doing so establishes the methodological approach of the project as a whole.
The second chapter appeals to a pair of explorations of myth, cited by Eliot in his notes to The
Waste Land, in order to explicate a sympathetic logic that I claim structures the poem. This logic
further illuminates the problem of alienation that the poem addresses. In the third chapter, I offer
an extended treatment of Eliot’s notion of historical sense, which I argue motivates the poem’s
response to alienation. In the fourth chapter, I interrogate the theoretical ramifications of Eliot’s
appeal to historical sense and suggest that Henri Bergson’s account of memory offers a temporal
framework capable of underwriting this appeal. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I articulate the
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contours of Eliot’s intellectual debt to Bergson, arguing that he rejects Bergson’s ontological
framework without abandoning his account of memory. Ultimately, I suggest that Eliot resituates
Bergson’s account of memory by grounding duration in the operation of culture rather than treating
it as an ontological or merely psychological principle.
In the first chapter, I establish my interpretive methodology, framing my analysis of The
Waste Land as an investigation of the problem of alienation. Drawing on the work of Georg
Lukács, I define alienation as the individual experience of a felt disintegration of the social totality.
I suggest that the poem depicts this condition as not only common but ubiquitous. I further suggest
that a dominant interpretive approach to the poem takes it to endorse the inescapability of this
condition. Thus, the poem seems committed to a vision of failure according to which individuals
are ineluctably disconnected from each other and from a greater social world. This widely accepted
reading of the poem aligns with the model of modernist literature that Lukács critiques in his “The
Ideology of Modernism.” Next, I explicate this critique, which holds that the appeal to a universal
state of alienation obscures the historical causes of that condition and ultimately reinforces it, and
I contextualize this argument within the framework of Lukács’ more extended salvo against what
he identifies as irrationalist ideology. In doing so, I at once signal a challenge to The Waste Land
that will resurface throughout this project and identify a shortcoming that manifests both in
Lukács’ approach to modernism and in the traditional account of The Waste Land. On the one
hand, Lukács ultimately claims that, by representing isolation as a universal human condition,
works of modernist literature elide the conditions of their own alienation, which in turn leads them
to endorse a retreat into fantasy as a necessary response.
The claim that The Waste Land proposes a retreat into fantasy will motivate the later
chapters’ philosophical investigation of the theoretical framework underwriting the poem’s
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intervention. More immediately, however, I argue that this critique exhibits a shortcoming shared
by both Lukács and the standard interpretation of the poem. These approaches to The Waste Land
take it simply to endorse the vision of reality that it represents. Finally, I appeal to the responses
that Bertolt Brecht and Theodor Adorno offer to Lukács’ account of modernist art. I argue that
these responses signal an approach to literary forms that emphasizes a dialectical engagement
between texts and their contexts. According to this approach, works of art cannot necessarily be
reduced to their representational content. Rather, they can be more fruitfully interrogated as
interventions into specific problems. Thus, while The Waste Land may represent a ubiquitous
experience of alienation, it need not necessarily be understood as endorsing the inescapability of
that condition. Rather, we may consider how formal elements in the poem complicate or
problematize this representation, even offering a response to it. The subsequent chapters of this
dissertation will be concerned with explicating the substance of this response.
In the second chapter, I illuminate more precisely the terms The Waste Land uses to develop
the problem around which it is organized. I do so through an interrogation of Eliot’s claim that the
structure of the poem can best be clarified by considering it in light of Jesse Weston’s From Ritual
to Romance and James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough, which both investigate the structures
of fertility rituals in various contexts. In order to reckoning with Eliot’s use of these investigations
of myth to organize his poem, I consider Eliot’s own critical appeals to myth in his review of
Joyce’s Ulysses. For, in that review, Eliot claims that Joyce pursues a mythical method that marks
a “step toward making the modern world possible for art.”17 I consider Eliot’s justification for this
fairly radical claim in order to illuminate his own appeals to the Grail Legend in The Waste Land.
I conclude that, with his appeal to Weston and Fraser, Eliot signals that The Waste Land employs
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a mythical framework adopted from their investigations, and further that this mythical framework
serves to provide unity to the poem’s fragmented form. The use of a mythical method allows the
poem at once to engage with an felt experience of disintegration while simultaneously preserving
the unity of the work of art.
I argue that the disparate myths that Weston and Frazer investigate exhibit a shared
sympathetic logic. According to this logic, the health of the land is dependent upon the health and
behavior of its inhabitants. Thus, in the fertility rituals catalogued by Frazer and Weston, the
actions of those performing the rituals are meant to safeguard the health of the land because the
land will reflect those behaviors. For example, “in Thüringen, the man who sows flax carries the
seed in a long bag which reaches from his shoulders to his knees, and he walks with long strides,
so that the bag sways to and fro on his back.”18 In turn, the flax crop is meant to sway to and fro
in the breeze. The substance of the Grail Legend, which is the object of Weston’s investigation
and which The Waste Land incorporates explicitly, exhibits precisely this logic, for the quest for
the Grail is motivated by a desire to cure an ailing king and in so doing restore the vitality of a
wasted land. By incorporating the symbols of the Grail Legend, I argue, The Waste Land locates
itself within the tradition of this sympathetic logic and integrates that logic into the poem. By
incorporating this tradition, the poem suggests a connection between the alienated condition of its
personages, the arid landscapes it represents, and the fragmentary structure of the poem itself. The
alienation of the characters, it seems to say, manifests in the disintegration of the world.
Finally, though I argue that the poem is organized around this mythical logic, I maintain
that it does not suggest a retreat into myth. Indeed, I acknowledge that the sympathetic logic
exhibited by The Waste Land has a particularly troubling history, and if the poem embraced this
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myth straightforwardly as a unifying principle, we would have cause to be extremely suspicious
of the result. I argue, however, that the poem uses this logic to illuminate a more fundamental
epistemological framework. Drawing on Eliot’s engagement with Bradley in his dissertation, and
The Waste Land’s appeal to Bradley’s epistemological framework in its final section, I argue that
Eliot’s account of the problem of solipsism establishes a link between individuals and the world.
According to the framework Eliot articulates, a shared world exists because it is intended by
multiple people. Once individuals cease to intend the same world, that world disappears. The
alienation of individuals, a condition that manifests in their inability to unify share their
perspectives, thus results in a wasted world. I argue, then, that the poem incorporates the mythical
logic of fertility rituals as an organizing principle that diagnoses the epistemological foundation of
the problem of the disintegration of the shared world.
Having suggested that The Waste Land engages with a condition of alienation grounded in
an inability to unify perspectives, I argue in the third chapter that Eliot identifies a synthetic faculty
capable of addressing this problem. In The Sacred Wood, Eliot identifies this capacity as “historical
sense,” which he defines as an “awareness not only of the pastness of the past but of its presence.”19
It is an awareness of the ideal order formed by the totality of existing works of art, and a sensitivity
to the changes that the appearance of new works of art effect in that pre-existing order. Crucially,
Eliot appeals to this historical sense as a capacity for synthesis. It facilitates the recognition of
structural relations between the discrete work of art and more expansive literary and historical
contexts, facilitating a vision of increasingly comprehensive and unified wholes.
After explicating Eliot’s account of historical sense and defending my suggestion that he
appeals to it as a synthetic faculty, I turn my attention back to The Waste Land. I argue that The
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Waste Land employs this notion of historic sense as a force that unites disparate perspectives
within the poem. I ground this claim in close readings of the depiction of Philomel in the second
section of the poem and her reappearance in the third section. I argue that the appearance of
Philomel, a character from Ovid’s Metamorphosis who transforms into a nightingale after being
raped and silenced by her brother-in-law, coordinates scenes of sexual violence in the poem.
Though the characters depicted in these scenes are presented as radically isolated, their shared
connection to Philomel suggests a nascent relation between them. Generalizing this account, I
argue that The Waste Land uses the formal techniques of allusion and repetition throughout the
poem to reveal structural relations that undermine the sense of fragmentation and disintegration
that it cultivates representationally. Thus, I claim, attending to the poem’s appeals to a textual
tradition suggests a response to the condition that it depicts, and further, this response depends
upon our awareness of our shared relations to a past that continues to exist.
Having defended the synthetic function of historical sense in The Waste Land, I turn in the
fourth chapter to the conceptual challenges that this concept poses. I argue that Eliot’s conception
of historical sense makes fairly radical demands on our understanding of temporality, even if Eliot
does not explicitly delineate these demands himself. I maintain that this line of inquiry is necessary
because if the synthetic faculty Eliot appeals to as a response to alienation depends upon an
incoherent account of temporality, the intervention offered by The Waste Land falls prey to the
critique voiced by Lukács in the opening chapters of the project, which holds that modernist
literature retreats into fantasy. To articulate the temporal conditions of Eliot’s historical sense, I
explicate the comparison Eliot draws between the approach to the past exhibited by his notion of
historical sense and the attitudes exhibited in two alternative approaches to tradition that he deems
deficient. This juxtaposition yields three conditions that the temporal framework underwriting
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Eliot’s account must accommodate. This framework must be able to account for the independent
existence of the past as an ideal order. It must further accommodate the intervention of novelty
into this ideal order such that the present intervenes in reconfigures the relations constituting it.
Finally, the framework must accommodate the past’s preservation in and immanence to the
present, insofar as the present is the continuing development of the past.
With these conditions established, I devote the rest of the chapter to identifying an account
of temporality that can satisfy the demands of historical sense. I argue first that linear models of
temporality are incapable of satisfying the criteria. I consider two alternative linear accounts of
temporality. The first identifies the endurance of the past with the endurance of its effects, resulting
in the ideal order constituted by the literary tradition being preserved by the continued existence
of literary artifacts. I argue that the operation of the past in The Waste Land provides evidence
against such a linear framework, for the poem represents the continued activity of the past in
multiple different ways. Most importantly, the poem does not merely represent the traditional
voices that it incorporates, as when Philomel is introduced as a figure in a painting adorning the
background of a scene, but it also allows the voices of that tradition to speak directly into the poem.
For example, Tiresias narrates a section of “The Fire Sermon” while Philomel sings directly into
the poem itself. I argue that linear accounts of temporality based on the endurance of artifacts
struggle to accommodate the operation of the past in this way. I turn then to the account of
temporality advocated by F.H. Bradley, one of Eliot’s most significant intellectual influences. I
argue that Bradley’s account of temporality fails to meet the second criterion of historical sense,
as his ideal temporal order contains all of time. New artistic interventions cannot reconfigure the
enduring order of tradition because, fundamentally, novelty is meaningless. Ultimately, I argue
that a more promising temporal framework can be found in the work of Henri Bergson. Bergson’s
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account of duration establishes the past’s continued existence, while his appeal to the cone of
memory clarifies the sense in which the present intervenes in and reconfigures the past. Finally,
his ontological turn at the end of Matter and Memory offers a suggestion of the ramifications of
Eliot’s appeal to a past that is immanent to the present. Not only, then, does Bergson’s account of
duration satisfy the conditions of historical sense, but it also illuminates the theoretical
consequences of Eliot’s deployment of that concept.
In the final chapter, I consider Eliot’s own engagement with Bergson. Though he
profoundly affected Eliot’s intellectual development, Eliot’s relation to Bergson is not marked by
straightforward acceptance. In proposing that Bergsonian duration can serve as a temporal ground
for Eliot’s historical sense, I must consider the critiques of duration that Eliot raises in his essay
“Some Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” I argue that Eliot’s challenge to Bergson does not
amount to a straightforward rejection of Bergsonian temporality. Rather, Eliot engages more
extensively with Bergson’s ontological commitments, taking issue with the priority Bergson
affords to qualitative difference. This results in Eliot rejecting Bergsonism while leaving the
psychological account of a durational experience of memory intact.
I subsequently argue that Eliot’s “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion” offer
complementary investigations of duration in light of the structure of Eliot’s critique. Indeed, I
argue that the poems together articulate a destructive dilemma. On the one hand, “Rhapsody on a
Windy Night” provides a phenomenological exploration of durational memory. The poem seems
to suggest that, when the treatment of duration is limited to its psychological manifestation,
memory throws up a wall between the individual and objective reality. The past in “Rhapsody on
a Windy Night” seems to function as a force that isolates the individual, rather than serving the
synthetic function it does in The Waste Land. “Gerontion” similarly provides a poetic exploration
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of a set of philosophical assumptions, though this time the framework aligns more with the position
of a “Bergson Resartus” outlined by Eliot at the end of his critique. The investigation yields similar
results, however, as the speaker of the poem becomes lost in an abstract perspective that elides all
identity. I argue that these poems amount to a destructive dilemma because each investigates the
phenomenological effects of untethering Bergson’s account of psychological duration from its
ontological framework and each results in an inescapable sense of alienation. Finally, I claim that
The Waste Land intervenes in this dilemma by resituating the ground of duration. By locating
duration in culture rather than in an abstract idealist Absolute or in the experience of the individual,
Eliot resolves the issues identified in the earlier poems that result in solipsism. The contribution
of The Waste Land marks, then, an attempt to marshal the past to safeguard the possibility of
meaningful human interaction by reinscribing duration at a communal level. Doing so establishes
the past as a force that conditions individual identity through relations to a shared past.

xxxix

A VISION OF FAILURE
ALIENATED MODERNISM AND THE PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF LITERARY FORM

Introduction
T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land presents a vision of modern society marked by an inescapable sense
of disintegration. The mosaic form suggests a state of fragmentation, and the poem resists any
attempt to fashion a coherent narrative from its disparate pieces. This sense of fragmentation
manifests further in the interactions between characters within the poem. These interactions are
dominated by misunderstanding and violence, foreclosing the possibility of genuine connection.
The poem even seems to attribute this condition to the reader, as the speaker of the poem asserts
“Son of man / You cannot say, or guess, for you know only / A heap of broken images.” 1 A
dominant tradition in Eliot scholarship reads the poem as an endorsement of the fundamental and
inescapable truth of its vision of disintegration. This tradition holds that The Waste Land commits
to a pessimistic view of social and epistemological reality. The terms in which this position is
reconstructed vary, with some identifying religious categories, such as acedia, as the operative
framework, others employing the language of alienation, and still others the epistemological
language of solipsism. Despite the differences in diagnosis, members of this interpretive tradition
tend to agree that The Waste Land itself does not suggest a response to the condition that it
diagnoses. If Eliot identifies an alternative at all, he does so only in his later work, after his
Christian conversion. The message of The Waste Land, then, is taken to be that individuals are all
alienated from each other, isolated in their own fragmentary experiences of reality. As I will
ultimately dispute this ubiquitous account of The Waste Land, my first task in this chapter is to
reconstruct it.

1

Eliot, The Waste Land, 21–22.
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Georg Lukács, in “The Ideology of Modernism,” critiques modernist literature in general,
and Eliot in particular, for what he takes to be a shared commitment to the universality of
alienation. In doing so, he suggests that Eliot is not unique in treating social reality as irrevocably
fragmented. Rather, according to Lukács, Eliot participates in a literary movement committed to
the inescapability of alienation. This literary tradition, he claims, finds philosophical expression in
the work of Martin Heidegger. Thus, he grounds his critical investigation of literary appeals to a
state of alienation in a philosophical account of the structure of experience itself. Lukács does not
stop at identifying alienation as a dominant motif in modernist works, however. He argues that the
literary commitment to an ineluctable condition of solitude is not an adequate depiction of reality
but is instead an expression of the alienation of the authors themselves. This alienation expresses
itself in a pathological inwardness that further divorces them from objective reality. Insofar as
modernist literary works seem compelling in their depictions of inescapable solitude, they are, in
fact, alienating. They misrepresent the relation between the individual and the objective world by
effacing the historical forces that condition their own sense of disintegration, thereby effecting the
fragmentation that they purport to diagnose. Lukács develops this critique further in The
Destruction of Reason, where he articulates a genealogy of the philosophical framework that he
takes to serve as the theoretical ground of modernist literature. Lukács identifies this philosophical
tradition as “Irrationalism,” and argues that it leads to a schism between subjective and objective
reality. This schism results first in the elision of the historical developments that condition our
experience in the social sphere and, ultimately, in a retreat into self-serving ideologies grounded
in myth. If, then, the prevailing account of The Waste Land is correct in treating the poem as the
articulation of a vision of inescapable and ahistorical social fragmentation, then Lukács’ critique
suggests the poem should be treated with skepticism as, at best, the symptom of a decadent,
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reactionary culture and, at worst, a force that reinscribes the mythical sense of alienation that it
seems to diagnose.
Ultimately, I will argue that both Lukács and the scholarly tradition are wrong in their
assessments of The Waste Land’s engagement with alienation. Drawing on Bertolt Brecht’s
responses to Lukács’ critiques of his own work, as well as the Aesthetic Theory of Theodor Adorno,
I argue that Lukács and the traditional account of The Waste Land too readily identify conditions
presented within the poem as the ideology of the poem itself. The impulse to extract the ideology
of the poem blinds them to the ways in which formal elements of the poem oppose its depiction of
alienation. Brecht argues convincingly that literary form can be used to identify and address
problems rather than merely express an ideology. Crucially, formal techniques can also be used to
intervene in the problem identified, thus facilitating a transformation in the audience. Disputing
the terms of Lukács’ contrast between realist and modernist literary forms, Brecht ultimately
suggests that realist art has an imperative to intervene in society through artistic form. Adorno,
too, shifts interpretive emphasis from ideological content to art’s engagement with the conditions
of its own production. He argues that engagement with emerging social problems is essential to
art and is the vehicle for artistic development. An attempt to give an account of a work of art, then,
without considering its engagement with, and intervention in, the social context from which it
arises, fails to adequately respect the dialectical exchange between artistic production and social
forces.
This is precisely the failure that I maintain undermines the dominant interpretations of The
Waste Land. The poem does not endorse an account of the human condition as fundamentally
alienated. Rather, it identifies alienation as an overwhelming social problem. Brecht’s account of
the productive possibilities of literary form, however, necessitates an investigation of formal
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elements of The Waste Land to consider how it responds to the alienated condition it identifies.
Indeed, I will argue through the rest of this project that the formal structure of The Waste Land
presents the cultivation of a particular awareness of history as a response to alienation and, indeed,
works to develop precisely this orientation to history.
I. The Dissolution of Social Totalities
I.1. Disintegrated Civilization
The Waste Land articulates an overwhelming vision of disintegration. The poem invokes this
process of disintegration in myriad, seemingly disparate ways. But each of these deployments
participates in a consistent structure. Disintegration is marked by the fragmentation a relatively
unified or coherent whole into increasingly particular elements. This process further results in the
elimination of the relations between those fragmented elements and, ultimately, in the
unrecognizability of the whole and the figures that constitute it. The sense of unity at stake in this
account of disintegration is necessarily capacious, as The Waste Land appeals to forces of
fragmentation at a variety of distinct registers. In the poem, this sense of disintegration
characterizes social relations, individual personalities, the natural environment, temporal
processes, and the poetic form itself. Often, however, the once-unified structure becomes more
legible through the absence effected by its fragmentation.2 Most immediately, for example, the
mosaic and fragmentary form of The Waste Land itself inspires a longing for the traditional
narrative and lyric forms it disrupts.3 The poem does not follow a protagonist, nor does it focus on
a single poetic object or event. Rather, it juxtaposes disparate vignettes, often introducing them
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Lukács appeals to precisely this dynamic as a feature of the epic world in Theory of the Novel. For, according to his
account, though the epic provides an answer to the question of how life can “become essential,” this answer “ripened
into a question only when the substance had retreated to the far horizon” (Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 35)
3
I engage extensively in the second chapter of this project with various attempts, grounded in Eliot’s appeals to the
Grail Legend, to excavate a crypto-narrative from the fragments and vignettes of The Waste Land. I argue there that
this impulse is misguided, as the poem derives a logic from the Grail Legend rather than a specific story.
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without context. Similarly, passages are cut off before the scenes they depict come to a resolution.
In the first stanza, for example, a character identified as Marie offers an extremely specific series
of recollections. She describes taking coffee in Munich’s Hofgarten and summer “coming over the
Starnbergersee,” before shifting her attention to sledding with her cousin, the arch-duke, when she
was a child.4 These memories, themselves only loosely connected by their seasonal focus, are
interrupted by an abstract voice that describes a desolate but general landscape. 5 The sudden
transition from particular to general and from personal to impersonal frustrates any nascent attempt
to construct a unified narrative from the disparate recollections of the first stanza.6 This disruptive
effect manifests throughout the poem, though it does not characterize every passage. Long scenes
occupy multiple stanzas in “A Game of Chess,” for example, while the opening stanzas of “The
Fire Sermon” exhibit tonal and allusive continuity. The formal disintegration of the poem is not
even, it seems, consistent enough to function as a truly unifying feature.
Disintegration, expressed formally in the poem’s juxtaposition of fragmented stanzas as
well as its appeals to decontextualized lines borrowed from works that remain unidentified, also
characterizes The Waste Land’s representation of contemporary social reality. The personages in
the poem exhibit a nearly universal inability to connect with each other. The vignettes depict
attempts at communication that are marked by misunderstanding and negation. The interlocutors
of the first part of “A Game of Chess,” for example, respond to each other’s utterances with non
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Eliot, The Waste Land, 8–18.
Robert Lehman provides a compelling reading that focuses on the seasonal disruption of this opening stanza in
Impossible Modernism: T.S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and the Critique of Historical Reason. His account amplifies the
sense of disintegration to which I am appealing, for he highlights that this first stanza, by transitioning from April to
winter to summer to winter again, breaks the natural seasonal cycle. The poem seems to appeal to a disintegration of
the natural order. I will engage more extensively with Lehman’s account, and particularly its focus on disruption, in
the second chapter of this project.
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In “Improper Desire: Reading The Waste Land,” Harriet Davidson reads this transition in the first stanzas as
announcing a tension between propriety and impropriety that persists through the poem. Though her account helpfully
illuminates a tension that certainly functions in the poem, its focus on unresolvable dichotomies results in a onesidedness that I will argue is endemic to readings of The Waste Land.
5
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sequiturs and condemnation. One speaker accuses the other of knowing nothing, seeing nothing,
and remembering nothing, while in response the other just cryptically responds with lines of
Shakespeare, on the one hand, and “that Shakespeherian Rag” on the other.7 The subsequent
discussion depicted in “A Game of Chess” removes the voice of the interlocutor entirely, as only
the repeated background call of “HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME” proves capable of interrupting
the gossiping narration of the speaker.8 Similarly, the description of a date in “The Fire Sermon”
cannot accommodate the presence of multiple perspectives, resulting in the removal of the
woman’s voice from the scene entirely.9 The poem seems to provide a formal articulation of the
account of individual experience to which it subscribes in its final section, when the abstract
speaker describes hearing “the key / Turn in the door once and turn once only / We think of the
key, each in his prison / Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison.”10 The poem, then, seems to
present an atomistic account of experience, according to which individuals are radically
disconnected from each other. Yet the fraying of the social fabric exhibits its own further
disintegrating effects upon the individuals presented in The Waste Land. The poem depicts these
personages, locked inside their own perspectives, as evacuated of character. Some can only
“connect / Nothing with nothing,” describing themselves as “neither living / Nor dead.”11 Others
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Eliot, The Waste Land, 115–138. I offer an extensive reading of this section in the third chapter of this project,
focusing on how its depiction of interpersonal negation develops the representation of the myth of Philomel that
introduces the scene. This scene, I argue, engages the notion of historical sense that, I posit, Eliot appeals to as a
response to the condition of disintegration that the poem articulates.
8
Eliot, The Waste Land, 139–172.
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Eliot, The Waste Land, 215–255.
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Eliot, The Waste Land, 411–416. This passage proves central to investigations of The Waste Land oriented around
the concept of solipsism. One such account will receive extensive treatment in this chapter, and I will raise the problem
of solipsism again in the second chapter of this project.
11
Eliot, The Waste Land, 301–302, 39–40. Those these lines are spoken by different characters and appear in different
contexts in the poem, their speakers are nevertheless connected through their engagement with “nothing.” One speaker
connects “nothing with nothing,” while the other “knew nothing.” This use of “nothing” to invoke the evacuation of
character also appears in “A Game of Chess.” The state of living death, too, recurs throughout the poem: it is
announced as early as the opening lines of the poem and most forcefully highlighted in the description of “Unreal
City” from the final stanza of “Burial of the Dead,” in which the speaker marvels as a “crowd flowed over London
Bridge,” unable to comprehend that “death had undone so many” (1–7, 60–65).
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reify themselves, adopting mechanical movements, as when the woman whose date constitutes the
content of Tiresias’ vision in “The Fire Sermon,” “smoothes her hair with automatic hand / And
puts a record on the gramophone.”12 The poem depicts the personages in it as divorced not only
from the world and each other, but also from themselves.
I take this condition, in which the bonds between individuals are severed and the possibility
of communication is foreclosed, to be a state of alienation. More precisely, I take alienation to
identify the individual experience of the disintegration of the social totality, such that individuals
feel trapped within their own perspectives, foreclosing the possibility of communication. This
experience of alienation, further, effects an analogous disintegration of individuals themselves.13
Unable to connect to a world outside of themselves, those trapped within an alienated perspective
exhibit a disintegration and evacuation of character, ultimately resulting in their succumbing to a
state of reification. This account of alienation depends upon the notion of a social totality
susceptible to disintegration, yet the concept of a social totality itself so far remains a cypher. My
use of the framework of the social totality is indebted to Georg Lukács, whose deployment of the
term both resonates with Eliot’s appeal to the chaotic experience of modernity and motivates the
methodological intervention in the third part of this chapter.14

12

Eliot, The Waste Land, 204–205. Michael Gillum explicates this passage as evidence for his appeal to the relevance
of the concept of alienation to The Waste Land. I will engage with his account extensively in the third chapter of this
project. Briefly, however, I will note that while I agree with his assessment that alienation proves to be useful
conceptual framework for understanding the poem, I reject his conclusion that the poem endorses an account of
alienation as an inevitable and inescapable feature of human existence.
13
In the second section of this chapter, I will appeal to Georg Lukács’ critique of modernist literature to explicate the
logic that explains how the disintegration of the bond between individuals and their social reality results in the
evacuation of those individuals themselves.
14
In the second chapter of this project, I will investigate the conceptual contours of Eliot’s appeal to an experience of
anarchy. Particularly, I will address the way Eliot marshals the Grail Legend in The Waste Land to frame what I refer
to here as the disintegration of the social totality as the loss of a shared world. In doing so, I will illuminate a point of
contact between the epistemological framework employed by Eliot and the notion of totality developed Lukács, who
will reappear throughout this project as an argumentative foil.
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In “Integrated Civilizations”, the first chapter of his Theory of the Novel, Lukács develops
an evocative appeal to the ideal of a closed totality in order to distinguish the novel form from the
epic. He describes the age of the epic as precisely such a totality. It is an age in which “the world
is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature
as the stars.”15 This homogeneity of the soul and the world is such that, though the individual and
the world are distinct, “they never become permanent strangers to one another.”16 Because the
individual and the world are homogeneous, the world is legible to the individual. For this
individual, “the mind’s attitude within such a home is a passively visionary acceptance of readymade, ever-present meaning.”17 The closed totality of Theory of the Novel appears then as a
horizon that circumscribes the world of experience, delimiting the realm of possible relations
while, at the same time, imbuing them with a sense of meaning. Insofar as this horizon conditions
the possible networks of relations, it simultaneously coordinates the identity of each term through
its relations to the others. Identity, then, becomes dependent on the relation of the individual to
this totalizing system. In Theory of the Novel, Lukács claims that because “our world has become
infinitely large” under the conditions of modernity, the possibility of a closed totality has been
foreclosed.18 A conditioning horizon can no longer neatly be drawn around reality, and thus the
“circle whose closed nature was the transcendental essence of [epic Greek] life has, for us, been
broken; we cannot breathe in a closed world.”19 Taking this rupture as his point of departure,
Lukács argues that the novel form can be understood as an attempt to “uncover and construct the
concealed totality of life.”20
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Lukács presents the closed totality of the epic in starkly utopian and, as David Cunningham
frames them, “mythical” terms.21 Indeed, as Cunningham notes in “Capitalist and Bourgeois Epics:
Lukács, Abstraction and the Novel,” the account of the ancient world that Lukács develops in
Theory of the Novel is “apparently bereft of any specific historical detail in either social,
technological or economic terms,” while the modernity juxtaposed against it “would seem no less
mythical in its form than in its projection of a lost ancient ‘happy age’ of perfect and unthinkable
completion.”22 Though Lukács will come to disavow the more romantic and idealist formulations
of Theory of the Novel, this mythical formulation of the closed totality nevertheless enjoys
something of a latent afterlife in Lukács’ later corpus.23 The persistence of this romantic
conception of the closed totality contributes to a productive ambiguity with respect to his
deployment of the notion of the social totality in general. On the one hand, Lukács continues to
appeal to the structuring and meaning-granting power of the totality. And further, in his more
polemical or ideological moments, he seems to suggest that the conditions of a closed totality can
be recovered through the development of the proletarian consciousness as a historical subject.24
On the other hand, however, Lukács develops a more capacious account of the social totality in
History and Class Consciousness. This account does not deal in the absolute terms of Theory of a
Novel, according to which the closed circle can simply be broken as the world exceeds its limits.25
Rather, Lukács casts the social totality as an enduring but dynamic epistemological principle. The

Cunningham, “Capitalist and Bourgeois Epics,” 51.
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only implicitly announced in the body of the book” (Eyers, “Form and Formalization in/against Theory of the Novel,”
90).
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notion of totality no longer operates as a fixed condition that is simply present or absent. Lukács
presents it instead as the historically developing ground of experience. Thus, because it is no longer
presented as subject to radical fracture, the concept of the social totality preserves its capacity to
condition meaning and identity. This transformation of the account of social totality necessarily
reframes the modern feeling of homelessness described in Theory of the Novel as a description of
subjective experience rather than objective conditions.26
In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács displaces the complete totality of History of
the Novel with the notion of a concrete totality. In contrast to his ahistorical account of the epic
situation, Lukács grounds his appeal to the concrete totality in social conditions that are historically
located and perpetually shifting. “Every object of cognition,” according to Lukács, is determined
“in relation to the whole,” with the result that “every substantial change that is of concern to
knowledge manifests itself as a change in relation to the whole and through this as a change in the
form of objectivity itself.”27 Lukács here appeals to a social totality that is no longer mythical or
utopian, but that nevertheless preserves its conditioning and meaning granting functions. Lukács
claims that “this dialectic conception of totality can enable us to understand reality as a social
process.”28 The conditions of fracture articulated in Theory of the Novel become meaningless
according to this revised totalizing framework. For the social totality unceasingly shifts but, as a
condition of experience, cannot be destroyed.29 Nevertheless, the individual conditioned by the
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Ben Parker articulates this transition particularly effectively as part of his argument that the aesthetic category of
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social totality can still, according to Lukács, experience reality as fragmented or reified. This is
precisely the claim that Lukács articulates in the essay “Reification and the Consciousness of the
Proletariat.” There he argues that the relations governing the social totality under capitalism
obscure their historical origins and establish themselves as formal laws. Thus, the commodity
relation transforms into “a thing of ‘ghostly objectivity’” and, further, “stamps its imprint upon the
whole consciousness of man.”30 Through this process of reification, individuals experience
themselves as detached from the historically developing totality, committed instead to what they
take to be the natural laws of reified commodity relations. Though the social totality persists, and
continues to condition the identity and experience of the individual, the experience of individuals
within that totality is marked by a sense of disintegration.31
When I appeal to alienation as the condition articulated in The Waste Land, I mean to
identify a breakdown of the sort articulated by Lukács in the reification essay. The Waste Land, I
maintain, articulates a vision of the disintegration of the relation between the experience of the
individual and a shared social reality. I take this shared social reality to be a totality of mutually
determining forces that condition the identities of particular entities, as well as the limits of
possible experience, within a comprehensive whole. For the moment, I will set aside the question
of whether this totality is itself subject to disintegration, as Lukács presents it in Theory of Novel,
or whether the sense of disintegration is a matter of subjective experience, as in History and Class
Consciousness.32 Here I raise the issue of disintegration of the totality in order to unify the
experience of alienation as it appears in The Waste Land. To the extent that the poem presents a
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radically atomistic account of experience, according to which “we think of the key, each in his
prison / thinking of the key each confirms a prison,” it seems to divorce individuals from a shared
social totality.33 Because this shared totality conditions the identity of the individual, as under the
logic of the totality all things become legible through their relations to the whole, the disintegration
of this bond effects an evacuation of the individual’s identity. Finally, because The Waste Land
seems to suggest that this alienation form the social totality is universal, it forecloses the possibility
of productive or genuine relationships. Lacking identity and divorced from a shared reality, the
characters in the poem are incapable of meaningfully relating to each other. Thus, the various
modes of disintegration depicted in the poem resolve into an account of the comprehensive sense
of alienation that results from the experience of a dissolution of a shared social reality.
I.2. Visions of Failure
Though the vocabularies employed in discussions of the social landscape depicted in The Waste
vary extensively, there is general and longstanding agreement that the sense of alienation
developed in the poem represents an account of reality that Eliot, or at least the poem, endorses.34
Interpretations that promote this position consistently seem to align with the methodological claim
of J. Hillis Miller that “Eliot’s early poetry is a dramatization of the situation in which there is a
‘circle described about each point of view.’”35 By describing Eliot’s early poems as dramatizing a
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situation, Miller suggests that their descriptions of individuals should be understood as articulating
a more general problematic. In one sense, this framing of Eliot’s poetic practice productively
captures the poems’ relationship to the philosophical and cultural material with which they engage.
The poems do not present an argument for the situations they describe. They do not provide
premises and lead the reader to draw conclusions. Rather, by providing what Miller calls a
dramatization, these poems articulate a vision of the ramifications of that philosophical situation
as it pertains to lived experience.36
Miller’s appeal to dramatization offers a helpful corrective to the possible temptation, on
the one hand, to read Eliot’s early poetry as a collection of mere character descriptions without
wider significance or, on the other, to use its engagement with philosophical material as an
occasion to approach the poem with the tools of philosophical argumentation that are not entirely
appropriate to it. Framing The Waste Land as a dramatization nevertheless, however, commits
Miller to a methodological dead end that, I maintain, is endemic to interpretations of The Waste
Land, and against which I will argue in the third section of this chapter. Though the language of
dramatization suggests a capacity to accommodate change within the poetic form, the account of
the poem that Miller develops is ultimately representational. According to accounts like the one
Miller presents, Eliot’s early poems provide a representation of reality conditioned by the
philosophical problem underwriting the poetic vision. Further, these accounts take the poems to
endorse the conditions they describe and, implicitly, the theoretical framework that underwrites
their representations. So, if The Waste Land depicts a solipsistic or alienated reality, then the poem
is taken as an endorsement of the truth of alienation as a fundamental human experience. Finally,

By endorsing this account of Eliot’s early poetry, I do not mean to say all poems must engage with philosophical
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and most crucially, because these interpretations treat the poem’s conceptual intervention as
belonging exclusively to its representations, then if the poem contests the alienated or solipsistic
condition that it dramatizes, it will have to do so by representing that rejection.37 I will ultimately
argue that these interpretations fail to provide compelling accounts of The Waste Land, and they
all suffer from analogous shortcomings. As a result of their inattentiveness to the ways in which
formal elements of engage with the conditions those poems represent, these accounts of The Waste
Land are incapable of adequately reckoning with its response to alienation.
While I have interrogated the ramifications of a methodological commitment that Miller
gives voice to, the treatment of Eliot’s poetic development that Miller provides warrants its own
discussion. Miller’s engagement with Eliot’s poetic development, and particularly the function of
his conversion to Christianity, is paradigmatic of the general developmental narrative underwriting
what I take to be a broad consensus concerning the vision of reality endorsed by The Waste Land.
Miller reads Eliot’s poetic corpus as an evolving response to a problem that Eliot introduces most
explicitly in his dissertation, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley. Miller
identifies this problem motivating Eliot’s early poetry as “man’s inescapable exclusion from
absolute experience,” and Miller situates this absolute experience as both the fundamental reality
and as pure immediacy.38 Thus he claims that, for Eliot, the reality that underwrites all appearance
is an experience that “is incompatible with consciousness, and, paradoxically, is not experience at
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all.”39 Because immediate experience “is prior to any thinking or sensing,” then “if there is an ‘I’
to think at all, that ‘I’ may be sure that its existence proves its alienation from fundamental
reality.”40 For a subject to appear at all, it must within a limited perspective that is divorced from
immediacy. Yet, according to this account, insofar as each subject is trapped within its own limited
perspective, it is incapable of entering into relations with other subjects. It can only relate to the
appearance of other subjects within its own circumscribed perspective. It can incorporate the
appearance of these perspectives, but this does not guarantee a real relation. Each subject remains
confined to its own prison, as the final section of The Waste Land proclaims.
This condition of alienation from others and alienation from fundamental reality, the
fundamental disintegration of unified experience into discrete and unreconcilable perspectives,
characterizes the personages of Eliot’s early poetry, according to Miller.41 In “The Love Song of
J. Alfred Prufrock,” for example, “no other mind is present to violate the integrity of Prufrock’s
isolation,” with the result that “everything in the poem expresses the texture of Prufrock’s mind.”42
The Waste Land seems to merely rearticulate Prufrock’s imprisonment as a universal condition.
Miller claims that, with his notion of the mind of Europe, Eliot attempts in his early poems and
criticism to develop an account of history capable of providing the resources to overcome this
condition of alienation.43 Yet, Miller claims, this appeal to history fails because “the life of the
mind of Europe is exactly the same as the experience of the solitary ego.”44 Ultimately, according
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to Miller, Eliot only satisfactorily resolves the problem of the circumscribed perspective when,
with his conversion, he embraces “the presence of God in history, of the timeless in time.”45
According to this account, then, The Waste Land engages with a philosophical problem,
represented as alienation from reality, or solipsism. It endorses this problem as an epistemological
reality and dramatizes the experience of that reality by representing a world populated by
individuals who cannot escape their own perspectives. Though the poem attempts to recover a
unifying perspective in the historical activity of the poet, this attempt ultimately relocates the
epistemological problem to the level of culture. Only after he converts is Eliot able to resolve his
problem. The answer is, like the problem, represented in the content of Eliot’s poetry, as Four
Quartets dramatizes the logic of incarnation, the “presence of God in history, of the timeless in
time,” with its attempt to capture the “still point of the turning world.”46
In contrast to Miller’s epistemological framing of The Waste Land, in “This Twittering
World: T.S. Eliot and Acedia,” Susan Colón argues that the dominant feature of The Waste Land
is acedia, a spiritual condition that amounts to a “lack of care for God and others.”47 More
specifically, acedia is “a boredom with, or distaste for, the vigilance and receptivity to grace
required by the love of God and neighbor.”48 Colón locates this condition most concretely in the

45

Miller, Poets of Reality, 189.
Miller, Poets of Reality, 188. Miller only turns to Four Quartets and the logic of incarnation at the end of his essay,
appealing to it as a solution to the problem motivating Eliot’s development. G. Douglas Atkins offers a much more
comprehensive treatment of Eliot’s incarnational thinking in Reading T.S. Eliot: Four Quartets and the Journey
towards Understanding.
47
Colón, “This Twittering World,” 69. In doing so, she presents the religious turn, which Miller appeals to as the
ultimate response to Eliot’s problem of circumscribed perspectives, as already latent in Eliot’s early poetry, even if he
was incapable of recognizing its potential. I will argue momentarily that this frame is unsatisfying insofar as it
surreptitiously imports an unjustified teleology with respect to Eliot’s intellectual development.
48
Ibid. 70. Colón’s analysis of acedia is not my quarry here, nor are the details of her specific application of this theory
to The Waste Land. As such, I will not engage with the theological concepts she deploys in the service of her account
of the poem. Rather, I appeal to Colón as paradigmatic of a basic interpretive impulse that I take to be widespread
among accounts of The Waste Land. This interpretive framework assumes the poem’s depiction of a disintegrating
social reality is an endorsement of the inevitability of that disintegration. The final section of this chapter will be
devoted to articulating an alternative to this method of textual interpretation
46

55

image of a horde of commuters traversing London Bridge to in “The Burial of the Dead.” The
members of the crowd are described as simultaneously living and dead, as the speaker of the poem
remarks “I had not thought death had undone so many.”49 This line, further, evokes Dante’s
depiction of the “’neutrals,’ unworthy even of Hell because of their aimless, uncommitted lives.”50
The commuters are zombified. They do not recognize each other, much less connect to each other.
Colón argues that this appeal to Dante identifies the specifically religious condition of acedia,
rather than the secular ennui, “so central to the fin-de-siècle and early twentieth-century literary
developments of aestheticism, symbolism, and modernism.”51 Acedia does not appear merely in
this opening vignette, Colón clarifies. Indeed, the condition also dominates the second section of
the poem. Colón notes that “another offspring vice of acedia is loquacity,” and suggests that the
wife in “A Game of Chess” “babbles incessantly to distract herself from the emptiness of her
relationship with her husband.”52
The prevalence of this inability to establish connection is, in fact, more pronounced in the
second section than Colón proposes. The husband in the opening scene, though laconic, exhibits
the same state of living death that Colón explicated above. Further, the sense of loquaciousness
established in the opening dialogue is amplified in the subsequent pub scene. Through its use of
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reported speech, this scene effects a doubling of the eliding capacity of loquaciousness. In this
scene, the speaker reports a conversation that she had with Lil, and in both her report and the
conversation itself, her interlocutor is effaced. Lil speaks in only 4 lines of the 31-line scene. The
interlocutor ostensibly participating in the scene never speaks at all. Though Colón argues that
Eliot does present a remedy for the condition that his early works thematize, like Miller she claims
that he only develops this remedy in his post-conversion works. She notes that “What the Thunder
Said” possibly suggests “that relief from the soul-oppressive conditions of modernity might be
found in stopping, thinking, and silence.”53 However, she maintains that it does so only negatively
through its descriptions of conditions that are foreclosed in the waste land. Thus, Colón concludes,
“the waste land is precisely the place where even thought, silence, and stillness cannot be had.”54
According to this account, the condition of acedia is, to the author of The Waste Land, universal
and irreversible, resulting in a reading which takes the poem to claim that human connection is
impossible.
Like Colón, Devin Jane Buckley, in “T.S. Eliot’s Aesthetics of Solipsism,” sees Eliot’s
later work as offering the key to revealing the structure of his early work. And, like Colón, Buckley
suggests that the condition raised in the early poetry is only ever resolved in the post-conversion
work. Rather than investigate Eliot’s texts through the theological concept of acedia, however,
Buckley identifies the epistemological problem of solipsism as the central concern uniting Eliot’s
corpus. Buckley argues that “the early poems give us a phenomenology of solipsism from which
we can infer two things: (1) the origin of the solipsistic predicament, one that is existential and
spiritual, not merely psychological; and (2) what would be required to escape solipsism.”55

Colón, “This Twittering World,” 74.
Colón, “This Twittering World,” 74
55
Buckley, “T.S. Eliot’s Aesthetics of Solipsism,” 3.
53
54

57

Buckley locates both of these elements in the prisoner passage of The Waste Land.56 The “prison”
of this passage is “the condition in which human experiences are self-contained and unknowable
to one another.”57 This definition of solipsism, and its relevance to the passage in question, are
both suggested by Eliot’s note to line 417. The note itself is a quotation from Bradley’s Appearance
and Reality, and concludes “in brief, regarded as an existence which appears in a soul, the whole
world for each is peculiar and private to that soul.”58 Further, the shift from the singular “I” to
plural “We” universalizes the condition in which “each confirms a prison.”59 The universality of
this situation suggests that it is an ontological condition, rather than the merely psychological
disturbance of a single speaker.60 Buckley argues, against J. Hillis Miller, that while this passage
raises solipsism as a problem, it also identifies the framework through which solipsism is
overcome. In the poem, the passage appears after an injunction to compassion which is, “if the
allusion to the Upanishads is to be taken seriously, a command from God.”61 True compassion is
impossible in the self-enclosed world of solipsism. Thus, Buckley argues, the passage both
presents a command that is impossible to adhere to unless there is a transcendent, unifying entity
and appeals to a transcendent God, precisely the type of being that is capable of unifying
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perspectives, as the figure delivering this injunction.62 God, according to Buckley, is Eliot’s
solution to the problem of solipsism. And while this solution is only obliquely suggested in The
Waste Land, it appears more explicitly in his later poetry.63
These scholars all present similar accounts of Eliot’s early work. They all suggest the early
poetry is concerned with a condition which leaves individuals incapable of connecting with each
other. Though the cause of this condition differs between the accounts, they all identify the same
progression in Eliot’s response to this condition over the course of his career. They agree that the
early works gesture towards the possibility of human connection, but they claim that this
possibility remains undeveloped because it requires a transcendent reality that Eliot, at this stage
in his poetic career, is unable to realize. Only in the later works is this connective force found in
the church. These scholars see Eliot struggling in his early poetic work to become a Christian.
They take his solution to the problem of solipsism to be consistent throughout his corpus,
maintaining that Eliot was simply incapable of either fully recognizing or fully embracing it before
1927. Thus, the early poems remain thoroughly pessimistic.
The methodology behind such an interpretation is, I maintain, rather dubious. In defense
of the attempt to read Eliot’s conversion back into his early work, Buckley, drawing on the work
of Jewel Spears Brooker, appeals to Eliot’s own account of his intellectual development from a
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1936 letter.64 There, Eliot interprets his graduate studies, including his engagement with Bradley,
as a “religious preoccupation.”65 Eliot himself, then, seems to endorse the attempt to read his early
work teleologically. According to these accounts, he was developing a religious perspective all
along.
In T.S. Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development 1909–1922, Piers Gray, one of the most
incisive readers of The Waste Land, articulates an account of Eliot’s approach to religion during
his graduate studies that frustrates this teleological interpretation of Eliot’s early work. In the
chapter “The Incoherence of the Aesthetics of Coherence,” Gray illuminates Eliot’s approach to
religion by investigating his review of Clement C.J. Webb’s Group Theories of Religion and The
Religion of the Individual. This review articulates two competing accounts of religion: “on the one
hand…the French sociologists (and with them Bergson) against, on the other, the ‘Oxford
tradition’ represented by Webb himself.”66 Webb presents religion as a “satisfaction of intellectual
demands,” particularly the need for, in Webb’s words, “the aspiration after a knowledge of a single
ground of all things or of an all-inclusive unity.”67 The French sociological tradition that Eliot
associates with Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim, by contrast, treats religion as an irrational development
which addresses the social need for communion and “drives us to act in harmony, and express in
rituals our ‘common sentiments’”68 In this case, religion is interesting not because it provides truth,
but rather because of the social function that it fulfills. Religion provides a stable framework
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through which individuals understand their relationships to each other. Importantly, however,
because the sociological perspective takes religion to be an explicitly irrational satisfaction of
social needs, questions of truth are not at all appropriate to an investigation of religion. Gods are
born and gods die according to the needs of a group. This birth and death of gods signals the
transformation of the social order and admits the “radical disintegration of the continuity of human
experience.”69
Gray argues that Eliot rejected both of these accounts. The purely pragmatic interpretation
of religion that Eliot attributes to Durkheim results in a relativistic account and, as such, culminates
in precisely the solipsistic predicament that Eliot seeks to combat. The Oxford tradition, which
maintains “that the Christian religion actually realizes here and now this harmony of the individual
and the group,” equally fails.70 Because the Christian tradition demands that we “accept a miracle,
and accept it as fact,” and particularly because it privileges this fact above the “whole course of
history,” it is incapable achieving complete coherence.71 It cannot “achieve the all-embracing
whole which will unify our modes of ordering the world.”72 Like the positions Eliot assembles
into his category of the French sociological tradition, the orthodox Christianity represented by the
Oxford tradition fails to provide a coherent perspective capable of unifying disparate points of
view. If this is the case, then Eliot’s “preoccupation with religion” was not necessarily in the
service of developing a religious sensibility.73 Rather, Eliot’s investigation of religion, like his
interrogation of Bradley’s idealism, reveals the intellectual demand that Eliot attempts to satisfy
in his work. This demand is revealed only negatively, however, through the failures of both religion
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and idealism. Thus, the inclination to read Eliot’s post-conversion religious conclusions back into
his pre-conversion work is dubious.
Gray offers compelling evidence against blindly accepting Eliot’s own teleological reading
of his poetic trajectory. Yet despite this methodological dispute regarding how to engage with the
Christian trajectory of Eliot’s development, Gray endorses much of the account of the early poetry
developed thus far. Like Buckley, Gray understands the early poetry to engage extensively with
the problem of solipsism. And though he adroitly attempts to derive a response to this condition
from The Waste Land, I maintain that he ultimately is forced to endorse a pessimistic account of
the poem that takes this response to be unsuccessful. The problem of solipsism is amplified by
Eliot’s frustrations with Bradley’s account of an Absolute perspective. The Absolute, for Bradley,
is a perspective capable of transcending “differences and distinctions,” in which the multitudinous
perspectives are “brought into a harmonious and all-embracing whole.”74 Yet, this Absolute
perspective fails to satisfy Eliot because it “is an imagined state, a logical necessity which we can
(and must) admit in principle,” but that eludes us in practice.75 Gray presents Bradley’s
commitment to an Absolute perspective as the result of the following argument: In order for
knowledge to be possible, one perspective must unify all disparate points of view. Without this
perspective, “we would not order our world.”76 Since Bradley is committed to the project of
ordering the world, he must consequently accept the existence of a transcendent, complete
perspective. The Absolute, then, serves as the theoretical ground for the possibility of knowledge.
Yet this argument for the existence of an Absolute perspective fails to explain whether such a
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perspective can be attained and what it would be. Indeed, in the account provided thus far, the
adoption of such a perspective seems to be a logical impossibility. Further, as Gray notes, “if the
isolated worlds of finite selves cohere ultimately in theory, then equally, in theory, in so far as they
all fall short of the ultimate they are separate.”77 Bradley, then, offers a formal solution to the
problem of solipsism. But this solution does not practically resolve the ethical problem of the lived
solipsistic experience. Responding to this problem, Eliot attempts to “satisfy the demand for the
Absolute, here and now.”78 He does this, Gray argues, by attempting to “create a language capable
of realizing coherence, of ordering the fragments of experience within the whole.”79 While
Buckley argues that Eliot’s resolution to the problem of solipsism is suggested through appeals
within the poem to a transcendent deity, Gray, by contrast, argues that Eliot attempts to cultivate
this transcendent perspective through formal techniques structuring the poem.
Ultimately, Gray concludes that Eliot’s attempt to develop a complete and coherent
perspective fails. The poetic language of The Waste Land and “Gerontion” only manages to
“acknowledge such an end.”80 Gray arrives at this conclusion through a labyrinthine analysis that
amounts to a destructive dilemma. Either, Gray claims, the attempt of the poetic voice to synthesize
a coherent perspective fails productively by directing the reader to this perspective, or the poem
works ironically by calling attention to the futility of its own project. The latter horn of the dilemma
is suggested by the antepenultimate lines of the poem: “these are the fragments I have shored
against my ruins / Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe.”81 Gray argues that the apparent
confession of purpose of the first line, the attempt to construct unity out of fragments, is undercut
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twice in the second. The future tense of “Why then Ile fit you,” Gray claims, suggests an
intentionality that “is immediately questioned by the very nature of its tense, given the past” tense
of the previous line.82 The identification of madness further problematizes the statement of
purpose, casting the whole project into doubt. Gray suggests that the double “dislocation” in these
antepenultimate lines renders the final lines ironic.83 Thus, according to Gray, “we can infer that
the demands of speculation…the demands for a comprehension of the universe which is not
piecemeal, or by fragments, is a form of intellectual madness.”84 The poem ends with a declaration
of its own futility.
Gray develops the alternative horn of his dilemma through an analysis of the poetic form
of The Waste Land. Considering the problematic appearance of bad passages of demotic text in
early drafts of The Waste Land, as well as a similarly bad “pastiche of Augustan satire” in early
versions of “The Fire Sermon,” Gray suggests that the form proper to the text is “metaphysical
tragical satire.”85 Because satire is precisely “a hotchpotch which is nonetheless unified,” it
suggests the possibility of a poetic capacity to develop coherence from incoherent perspectives.
The poetic form promises to accomplish what poetic language seems incapable of.86 Yet Gray
identifies a mythical journey to nowhere as the theme around which this tragical satire is
constructed. Thus the promise of the poetic form to provide a unifying perspective resolves into a
situation in which the characters of The Waste Land are “ironically bound together by the one sure
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fact of history:” death.87 If the poem offers an alternative to this unity in “a handful of dust,” it
comes in the final lines which “would have the soul content itself and others” through the
commands to give, sympathize, and control.88 Yet, Gray argues, “the irony of the last line rests in
the fact that neither within the poem…nor within the notes, can it achieve the clarity of definition
needed.”89 Rather than end with the commands to give, sympathize, and control, the poem
concludes with the untranslatable “Shantih, shantih, shantih,” which Eliot glosses in his notes as
“The peace which passeth understanding.”90 The attempted unity of perspective is, Gray argues,
removed beyond the discursive language of the poem itself. It is located, instead, in a realm beyond
the understanding. The partial coherence of perspectives in the satire form along with the poem’s
gesture towards a truly coherent perspective beyond the understanding may seem like a productive
failure. The poem does not accomplish the goal of developing a language capable of satisfying
“the demand for the Absolute, here and now.”91 Rather, it suggests a program for the development
of such a perspective, and ultimately asserts that such a perspective exists. Gray takes this account
of the poem to be preferable to the conclusion that the pursuit of coherence is a form of intellectual
madness.
Yet this account of the poem commits Eliot to precisely the position that, if we follow
Gray, his poetic project was motivated against. For the inability of the poem, expressed in the
untranslatable final lines, to “achieve the clarity of definition needed” amounts to an assertion of
the existence of a theoretical principle capable of overcoming solipsism that is yet
“unimaginable.”92 And the assertion of an unimaginable theoretical principle is, effectively, a
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commitment to Bradley’s Absolute. Ultimately, the dilemma set up by Gray is entirely destructive.
The poem ostensibly attempts to develop a coherent perspective capable of overcoming the threat
of solipsism. Either it adopts a straightforwardly ironic voice that ridicules such a goal as folly, or
the satire form intimates this coherent perspective, but the poem removes it to the realm of the
unimaginable. In both cases, the practical result is a collapse back into solipsism. The poem fails,
leaving the reader isolated, with commands to compassion which cannot be obeyed and a promise
of unification only in the inevitable fact of death.
II. Georg Lukács and Modernist Alienation
II.1. The Aesthetics of Solitude
Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, particularly upon Eliot’s relationship to
Christianity, the interpretations of The Waste Land provided by Miller, Colón, Buckley, and Gray
cohere into a consistent account.93 The Waste Land presents a vision of complete disintegration.
Modern individuals are incapable of forging genuine connections. They are incapable even of
escaping their own limited perspectives. Their detachment leaves them capable only of connecting
“Nothing with nothing.”94 Compassion disappears and is replaced by loveless and violent sex. The
inhabitants of The Waste Land are automata, neither living nor dead. Trapped in discrete fragments
of consciousness, they become isolated from the objective world. And in their isolation, they are
empty. If The Waste Land endorses this account of reality, as has been suggested by proponents
of the account developed thus far, then it is a paradigmatic example of the modernist ideology that
Georg Lukács critiques in “The Ideology of Modernism.” In this essay, Lukács argues that
modernist literature is committed to an ideology of solitariness. Modernist literature does not
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merely describe the conditions of alienation in society. Rather, it asserts the inescapability of these
conditions, positing them as universal and ahistorical. Lukács develops his critique of modernist
literary forms by drawing a distinction between two modes in which the condition of “solitariness”
might appear in literary texts. Doing so allows him to distinguish between realist engagements
with a condition of alienation and a modernist ideology of alienation. This distinction results in a
dual nature in Lukács’ use of the term “solitariness,” and this duality is crucial for properly
developing an account of The Waste Land’s engagement with alienation and its standing in relation
to Lukács’ critique.
Drawing on Thomas Wolfe’s use of the term, Lukács identifies solitariness as a condition
in which one “may establish contact with other individuals, but only in a superficial, accidental
manner.”95 This solitariness, however, may be attributed to the individual in multiple ways.
Further, the mode of attribution is crucial to identifying the ideology grounding a text, and hence,
for Lukács, its legitimacy. The “individual solitariness” of realism appears in the “particular
situation in which a human being may be placed, due either to his character or the circumstances
of his life.”96 In these cases, the individual mode of solitariness manifests as a chasm between the
character and the social context, preventing the character from meaningfully engaging with the
community. This chasm, however, does not merely emphasize the solitariness of the individual. It
also reinforces the existence of an objective reality. For, while the individual is unable to interact
with members of the community, “the common life, the strife and togetherness of other human
beings, goes on as before.”97 In a realist approach to solitariness, then, this alienated condition is
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“a specific social fate, not a condition humaine.”98 Because the realist account of solitariness
presents the condition as particular to the individual, or, perhaps, to certain types of individuals, it
does not deny the possibility of meaningful interaction entirely. Further, because this condition
appears within specific social organizations, even if an entire community experiences this
condition of solitariness, such communal experience would not entail the impossibility of
communication. The condition is neither universal nor eternal. The conditions might change, and
reintegration might occur.99 Indeed, the appropriate response to such a condition may be the active
attempt to reorganize social relations. This account of the solitariness expressed in the realist
tradition is the primary sense of alienation in “The Ideology of Modernism.”100
The competing account of solitariness, which Lukács ascribes to the ideology of
modernism, is also captured in his appeal to Thomas Wolfe. According to Wolfe, solitariness “is
by no means a rare condition, something peculiar to myself or to a few specially solitary human
beings, but the inescapable, central fact of human existence.”101 This account of solitariness shares
with realist accounts the feature of an inability to engage with others. Yet, rather than recognize
this condition as historically determined, the modernist ideology establishes solitariness as
universal. In so doing, it forecloses any possibility of meaningful social interaction. Further, when
solitariness is established as a universal condition, each individual is “confined within the limits
of his own experience.”102 As individuals is trapped within the limits of their experience, a fissure
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forms between subjective and objective reality. This fissure renders the discussion of objective
reality useless and ultimately amounts to a rejection of it.103
Lukács argues that this commitment to the isolation of individuals actually renders them
devoid of character. They become empty shells. In order to draw this conclusion, Lukács appeals
to a distinction between abstract and concrete potentiality. Abstract potentiality is the subjective
potential of an individual. It comprises the limitless possibilities that appear to that individual,
regardless of the plausibility of their actualization. Concrete potentiality, conversely, consists of
the possibilities that are actualized in objective reality. As an individual acts in the world,
possibilities that previously were simply abstract become concrete. The concretization of abstract
potentiality allows for the development of individuals. As individuals actualize their potential, the
facts of their existence change. Indeed, external reality changes with them, through their effects
upon it. The distinction between abstract and concrete potentiality preserves a dialectical
relationship between the individual and the world.104 An account of the human condition in which
each individual is “confined within the limits of his own experience,” however, elides the
distinction between abstract and concrete potentiality.105 Further, because “individual character
manifests itself in moments of decision,” if individuality is aligned purely with subjectivity and
these “moments of decision” are rendered suspect, human character itself disintegrates.106 Abstract
potentiality is infinite. As such, the abstract potentiality of every individual is equivalent.107

movement, I intend to explicate his account of that philosophical trajectory and assess his arguments against it,
particularly in The Destruction of Reason. These arguments should help illuminate the conceptual framework that
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Lukács, in fact, appeals to Eliot to describe the situation in which the possibility of actualizing
abstract potential has been denied. He claims Eliot “describes this phenomenon as: shape without
form, shade without color, / paralyzed force, gesture without motion.”108 Reduced to endless
subjectivizing, the individual is evacuated of all character.
This ideology – which identifies human nature as essentially solitary, reduces concrete
potentiality to abstract potentiality, and disintegrates the objective world as well as individual
character – is the second mode of alienation that I take Lukács to identify. It is, of course, related
to the first mode. This ideology is the universal attribution of the experience of solitariness
grounding the previous account. Indeed, the impulse to universalize the experience of alienation
underwrites Lukács’ critique that the ideology is, itself, alienated. For, Lukács notes, the
experience of solitariness presents itself as fundamentally ahistorical.109 From within this
experience, an alternative to alienation seems impossible. Thus, the experience of alienation
contains the impulse to universalize the experience. The ideology that follows from this
universalization is, therefore, alienated. As such, art committed to this ideology is similarly
alienated. When Lukács uses the categories of solitarniess and alienation as a critique, then, he
uses them to identify a set of ideological commitments regarding the accessibility of objective
reality and the possibility of meaningful human interaction.
One might object that Lukács does not adequately engage with the theoretical framework
underwriting the ideology he attributes to modernist literature. Though Lukács identifies the
effects of a commitment to universal alienation, he does not show that this commitment is false.
Lukács, “Ideology of Modernism,” 25. While this passage from The Hollow Men captures nicely the condition that
Lukács is attempting to articulate, he too readily attributes the voice of the speaker to Eliot himself. Lukács makes a
similarly hasty attribution to Eliot in his subsequent discussion of The Cocktail Party. The task of locating Eliot’s
voice in his work is, I think, too complex to be resolved with an argument by assertion. Further, while these lines do
seem to capture an evacuation of personality, it is not immediately obvious that they are meant to be a description of
a universal, human condition. Indeed, I think the rest of the poem belies Lukács’ claim.
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Lukács does, it is true, introduce Heidegger as the exponent of a philosophical system capable of
grounding the appeal to alienation as a fundamental human condition. Yet his critiques of
Heidegger are either question begging or ad hominem, attacking him on the grounds of his
association with the Nazi party.110 Because Lukács does not offer a robust response to Heidegger
or other proponents of modernist philosophical frameworks, a defender of modernism may accept
the formal implications of Lukács account of modernism while rejecting the evaluative claims.
Modernist literature may, indeed, present an account of the individual as fundamentally alienated.
It may in fact universalize this condition. Following from this commitment, it ceaselessly
interrogates subjective experience, devaluing a relation to objective reality or denying its existence
entirely. This procedure is not considered problematic, however. Rather it is a legitimate
engagement with the truth of reality. For, within a Heideggerian framework, society is
fundamentally alienating. It tempts us into negating ourselves.111 We can only, then, arrive at
legitimate knowledge through an investigation of subjective experience. For example, this
investigation, when turned upon the experience of Angst, reveals Angst as disorienting mode of
being in the world that “discloses Dasein as a ‘solus ipse.’”112 The experience of solipsism is not
problematic, but rather “brings Dasein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and
thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world.”113 Furthermore, despite the temptation to lose
oneself in social being, “the physiological triggering of Angst is possible only because Dasein is
anxious in the very ground of its being.”114 The world-disclosing loss of world and the revelation
of existential solipsism are not pathological experiences. They are, instead, fundamental
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experiences of the reality of Dasein. If modernism privileges subjective investigation over the
representation of social experience, this is because subjective analysis reveals the truth of the
individual while social experience obscures it.
II.2. The Critique of Historical Elision
Lukács may merely offer an analysis of the literary ramifications of this account of universal
alienation in “The Ideology of Modernism” and, as such, fail to fully discredit its legitimacy. He
argues more extensively against the philosophical ground of this ideology in The Destruction of
Reason, however. These arguments particularly bolster Lukács’ description of the dissolution of
objective reality resultant from a commitment to the universality of solitariness. Further, they offer
a historical critique of frameworks that affirm the truth of such a dissolution. Specifically, Lukács
argues that the impulse to reject a relationship between subjective and objective realities is, itself,
conditioned by certain objective, social facts. In The Destruction of Reason, Lukács traces the
development of a movement he calls philosophical irrationalism, which he identifies as a
reactionary bourgeois response to dialectically evolving social-historical conditions.115 Despite
differences in the particular conditions eliciting an irrationalist response, Lukács suggests that the
manifestations of irrationalism exhibit fundamental similarities. Nearly all irrationalisms are
committed to the “disparagement of understanding and reason, an uncritical glorification of
intuition, an aristocratic epistemology, the rejection of socio-historical progress, <and> the
creating of myths.”116 These characteristics appear, at first, to be individual manifestations of a
general disposition. The structure of Lukács’ critique, however, reveals that these commitments
are coextensive, each tenet following necessarily from the last.
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Lukács’ account does not merely illuminate the interrelation of these seemingly distinct
commitments, rather it wields this discovered unity against the theoretical positions at which it
takes aim. As such, the register of Lukács’ critiques fluidly shifts between ostensibly theoretical
analysis and more unabashedly polemical political critique, with the result that his theoretical
pronouncements fail to meet the standard of rigorous exposition and analysis. While
acknowledging these shortcomings in the specifics of Lukács’ arguments, I maintain that they
nevertheless contribute to a more serious challenge with respect to the theoretical foundations of
modernism.117 This challenge emphasizes the importance of the historical and social conditions
that contribute to the perspective developed in works of art and problematizes the potential of those
works to elide the conditions to which they respond. I take pains to articulate this structure of
Lukács’ critical framework because the final section of this chapter will engage extensively with
the question of how works of literature, particularly those that Lukács inveighs against in “The
Ideology of Modernism,” can in fact respond to the social totality that conditions them.
Lukács’ critique develops from his identification of two reactionary impulses guiding
irrationalist philosophies.118 The primary reactionary tendency that Lukács identifies is purely
political. As class relations develop, dominant classes resist the changes that inevitably threaten
their privileged position. In this light, for example, Lukács suggests that “Heidegger’s complicated
trains of thought, his laborious phenomenological introspections” are a response to “bourgeois
man’s sense of becoming inessential, indeed a nonentity,” which was “a universal experience
among the intelligentsia of this period.”119 This line of critique is, in itself, rather weak and is an
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example of the ad hominem attacks for which Adorno excoriates Lukács in “Reconciliation under
Duress.”120 Indeed, Lukács’ critique of Heidegger here on primarily formal grounds seems to
reveal an unwillingness to engage seriously with Being and Time on its own terms. Lukács does
not offer an immanent critique of Heidegger’s position, but rather seems to psychologize it
according to an ideological rubric.121 Argumentative shortcomings of this sort manifest throughout
The Destruction of Reason, and, taken at face value as attempts at exegetical critique, they threaten
to undermine the coherence of the work itself. A consideration of the place of these critiques within
the structure of Lukács’ more general argument, however, reveals a methodological integrity that
is somewhat obfuscated by the overtly polemical nature of his ad hominem attacks.
This line of critique targeting a fundamental conservative bourgeois tendency in the
thinkers he investigates is omnipresent in Lukács analysis, though it does not always receive his
primary attention. Lukács devotes more descriptive attention to a correlated reactionary tendency,
one that is explicitly intellectual rather than primarily social. Developments in the sciences, he
claims, facilitate an expansion of our understanding of the material world. Yet these developments
also, inevitably, reveal problems for reigning intellectual paradigms. These problems appear at
first as challenges to the capacity of understanding to attain knowledge of objective reality.
Confronted with these challenges, the intellectual reactionary takes the appearance of difficulty to
be proof of the incapacity of reason to adequately engage with objective reality entirely. János
Kelemen, in The Rationalism of Georg Lukács, identifies this process as “evasion,” citing it as “the
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moment which explains irrationalism substantively.122 Such reactionaries then argue for the
establishment of a competing organizing principle which is, inevitably, subjective.123
Lukács explicates this framework in his chapter “Vitalism in Imperialist Germany,” which
traces what Lukács calls a vitalist thread through more than one hundred years of philosophical
development in the German context.124 Perhaps begging the question uncharitably, Lukács defines
vitalism as the substitution of a principle of experience, such as “life” or “intuition,” for
understanding as the primary principle organizing engagement with reality.125 According to
Lukács, vitalism satisfied an ideological need resultant from two forces operating in tandem. The
first was a gradual bourgeois admission of the need for a Weltanschauung to compete with the
developing working-class worldview. As the working-class gained “strength and awareness and
became better organized,” that dominant neo-Kantian stricture against questions of worldview
ceased to satisfy philosophical needs.126 The second force governing the development of vitalism
was the commitment to an anti-materialist epistemology which maintained the “unknowability,
indeed the non-existence, the unthinkable nature of an objective reality independent of
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consciousness.”127 Vitalism, which promoted the category of “experience” as an organizing
principle of intuition, “could conjure up all the necessary elements of Weltanschauung…without
revoking that denial of a reality independent of consciousness which had become crucial to antimaterialism.”128 Vitalism served bourgeois ideological needs by frustrating the advance of the
proletariat materialist framework while also installing a principle of which the bourgeois claimed
sole possession. Thus, to preserve ideological hegemony, subjective experience displaces
investigation of objective reality. This causal relation reveals the connection between the
aristocratic epistemology, the disparagement of rationality, and the glorification of intuition, which
Lukács claims is shared by all irrationalisms. Further, the glorification of the subjective over the
objective results in a split forming between the individual and reality. This split inevitably leads
to the predominance of myth, as the grounds for distinguishing myth from reality are eroded.
A paradigmatic example of the mechanics of this subjective displacement of objective
reality appears in Lukács treatment of Heidegger and the existentialist tradition of the twentieth
century, which he identifies as a late, and indeed terminal, form of vitalism. Lukács traces multiple
lines of this displacement through Heidegger´s Being and Time, but his general critique is
consistent. Heidegger, he claims, attempts an investigation of objective reality, a concept which
Lukács seems to take for granted as uncontested and which he aligns primarily with social reality.
Despite Heidegger’s appeals to objectivity, however, Lukács maintains that the content of his
treatment is in fact radically subjective. While in earlier vitalists “there are at least glimmers of
objective social reality… in Heidegger this reality is reduced to purely a series of spiritual states
described phenomenologically.”129 Lukács claims polemically that “what Heidegger termed
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phenomenology and ontology was in reality no more than abstractly mythicizing, anthropological
description of human existence.”130 Not only does this bait and switch, according to Lukács,
replace the objective with the subjective, but it does so in such a way that suggests the futility of
objective categories entirely. In proclaiming the objectivity of these subjective concepts,
Heidegger seems to suggest that there can be no objective term. Even the seemingly objective
reveals itself, ultimately, to be subjective.
Lukács claims this procedure is at work in a number of concepts central to Being and Time.
Initially, Lukács targets Heidegger´s methodology. Heidegger presents his project as an
investigation of Being. He “claimed to be arguing an objective doctrine of Being, an ontology, but
he then defined the ontological essence of the category most central to his world on a purely
subjectivistic basis.”131 As such, Heidegger’s investigation of the general category of Being
transforms into an investigation into the being of Dasein. Thus, it inevitably becomes an
investigation of subjective experience. The substitution of Dasein for Being captures particularly
well the epistemological commitment to the “unknowability, indeed the non-existence, the
unthinkable nature of an objective reality independent of consciousness.”132 The subjective
category does not merely replace the objective. Rather, it does so in such a way as to deny the
legitimacy of the objective altogether. Thus, an account of history or an “illumination of existence
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can only come from within,” and an investigation into Being can only be an investigation of
Dasein.133
Lukács identifies a similar, though less extreme, denial of objective reality in Heidegger´s
distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of existence.134 Lukács claims that the
inauthenticity “of everyday existence…is caused by social being,” as “social existence signifies
the anonymous dominance of ‘the one.’”135 In this respect, every “objectively directed perception
brings about a casting down, a state of surrender to the ‘one’ and inauthenticity.”136 Heidegger,
Lukács claims, derides engagement with social reality and “as a consequence the primary
phenomenon of history was, for him, existence, i.e., the life of the individual.”137 Analogously,
Heidegger redefines temporality such that it acquires a primarily subjective connotation.138
Historical time, “the accepted one that knows past, present, and future,” is identified as “fallen.”139
The subjective experience of time, particularly the relation of Dasein to its own death, replaces
clock-time as the truly authentic temporality.140 The distinction between authentic and inauthentic
modes of existence achieves, Lukács claims, a more socially pernicious result than the mere
privileging of the subjective over the objective. Heidegger’s subordination of social reality as
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“inauthentic” absolves the individual of any responsibility to engage with social-historical reality.
Indeed, Lukács notes, “it comes as no surprise when [Heidegger] strongly denies that ‘resolution’
in respect of man’s surroundings might bring about even the slightest change.”141 Alterations in
the social arena have no effect on one’s authentic or inauthentic engagement with the world.
Instead, “the road to Being means a casting aside of all objective conditions of reality in order that
man might escape the power of ‘the one’ that rendered him unauthentic and took away his
essence.”142 Lukács identifies here the philosophical substitution of abstract for concrete
potentiality. With this, Heidegger eliminates any apparent moral responsibility, or even capacity,
to alter one’s society. In place of those social commitments, he presents a mythicized, pseudotheological doctrine of individual salvation.143 This mythical turn in Heidegger’s system
introduces the final component of irrationalism. Once objective history is devalued, it can be
replaced by any account. Because these accounts are divorced from objective reality, they are
necessarily mythical in nature. Not only are they mythical, but they prioritize emotional categories,
such as “care, despair, and so forth,” which can ultimately be manipulated with catastrophic
consequences.144
Lukács’ analysis of the positions he adduces to support his narrative in The Destruction of
Reason is, to say the least, uneven. The ambitious scope of the account he attempts to develop
results in limitations concerning the degree of close investigation Lukács can devote to any of the
figures he considers. Thus Lukács claims that Heidegger prioritizes the individual at the expense
of the social conditions that inform that individual while failing to acknowledge the elements of
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Heidegger’s account, such as his notion of historicity, that engage with precisely such a
conditioning relationship.145 These apparent shortcomings in Lukács’ attempts at explication are
exacerbated when he resorts to offering causal accounts grounded in an interrogation into the social
backdrop from which a theoretical position develops rather than appealing to the internal logic and
contradictions of the position itself. In his essay “Reconciliation under Duress,” Adorno highlights
these shortcomings. He claims, not entirely unfairly, that “in a highly undialectical manner, the
officially licensed dialectician sweeps all the irrationalist strands of modern philosophy into the
camp of reaction and fascism.”146 In “Lukács’ Rationalism: In Defence of The Destruction of
Reason,” János Kelemen also acknowledges the “one-sidedness of [Lukács’] general historical
picture,” though he claims that this one-sided picture does not “compromise the Lukácsian critique
of most of the authors treated by him.”147 By undertaking the project announced by the title of his
essay, however, Kelemen does acknowledge that Lukács’ arguments are in need of defense.
Kelemen provides a helpful framework for reckoning with the argumentative stance that Lukács
maintains. By uncritically endorsing Lukacs’ descriptions of the specific authors that he addresses,
however, Kelemen ultimately fails to appreciate the more nuanced approach that Lukács actually
adopts. In so doing, Kelemen ultimately defends a rather defanged version of Lukács’ position.
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Kelemen highlights a distinction between rationale and causes that proves central to his
defense of Lukács. Rational beliefs, Kelemen claims, can be analyzed according to their “rationale,
that is their epistemological grounds or reason,” and they can be analyzed according to their
“genesis or cause.”148 Interrogating the internal consistency of a position, or tracking its
explanatory power, involves assessing its rationale. Indeed, a rationalist mode of discourse
involves explicating and debating the reasons for a position, and, Kelemen adds, we “are rational
if we accept a belief based on rational arguments.”149 With irrational positions by contrast,
Kelemen claims, “these two distinct modes of analysis are not possible.”150 Kelemen leaves this
claim woefully undefended, taking it to be self-evident that irrationalist positions are not ultimately
referable to rational defense. With this assumption, Kelemen seems to endorse uncritically the
inaccessible position Lukács ascribes to irrationalism, divorcing it from discursive reason entirely.
Kelemen highlights, then, that Lukács does not endeavor to offer an analysis of the rationale behind
the irrationalist positions he interrogates in The Destruction of Reason, as Kelemen seems to
suggest that such an analysis would be a fool’s errand. Indeed, he cites Lukács’ claim that “the
choice between ratio and irratio is never an ‘immanent’ philosophical question. It is not chiefly
intellectual or philosophical consideration which decide a thinker’s choice between new and old,
but class situation and class allegiance.”151 According to Kelemen, because Lukács does not take
the basis of the commitment to irrationalism to be a question accessible to philosophical
adjudication, he instead traces the explanatory causes behind the development of the positions he
takes as his quarry.
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With this intervention, Kelemen helpfully shifts the rubric according to which Lukács’
appeals to the reactionary impulse of irrationalist philosophies should be judged. Kelemen’s
attempt to defend Lukács purely by appealing to his prioritization of causal explanations above
rational critique is ultimately underwhelming, however. On the one hand, it takes for granted that
Lukács adequately characterizes the positions he aligns with irrationalism, an assumption I have
already suggested should be treated with skepticism. More damningly, Kelemen’s straightforward
acceptance of Lukács’ explanatory project leaves him seeming to defend either a version of Lukács
committed to a genetic fallacy or a version of Lukács who develops a sweeping narrative in support
of the relatively anodyne conclusion that “it is in itself irrational to believe in irrationalism.”152 In
the first case, Kelemen would commit Lukács to appraising positions simply according to the their
historical origins in a particular social order.153 In the latter case, Lukács’ defense of reason
amounts to a negligible tautology.
In contrast to this attempt to read Lukács’ penchant for causal explanation as a response to
the fundamental inaccessibility of irrationalist positions to discursive argumentation, I maintain
that Lukács does, in fact, refer his explanations back to a critique of the irrationalist position as
self-contradictory and, as such, false. Throughout The Destruction of Reason, Lukács appeals to
an impulse among the subjects of his investigation to obscure the historical contingency of their
own positions.154 Insofar as he aligns vitalist philosophies, for example, with an appeal to the
“unknowability, indeed the non-existence, the unthinkable nature of an objective reality
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independent of consciousness,” he seems to suggest that they render the conditions of their own
development illegible.155 Similarly, by impugning Heidegger for substituting the investigation of
the phenomenological experience of Dasein for an investigation of Being, Lukács seems to suggest
that Heidegger obscures the historical situation of his own method. If Lukács is right that the
various positions he identifies as irrationalist yield to a mythologizing, ahistorical impulse,
appealing in various degrees to the fundamental inaccessibility of an objective reality that
conditions their own appearance, then causal explanations of the development of those positions,
grounded in appeals to motivating class sympathies, amount to a demystifying refutation of the
irrationalist position. Thus, the arguments that Lukács adduces which seem weak precisely because
they approach a philosophical position from vantage external to it actually participate in a more
comprehensive argumentative structure that gives the lie to the foundational mythology of the
irrationalist position as he defines it. Lukács may, in fact, fail to adequately establish that the
positions he investigates yield to the ahistorical impulse, which would render his ultimate
conclusions unjustified. The argumentative structure could, however, remain valid, and I have
belabored the articulation of this structure because it is precisely the argumentative tack Lukács
takes in his engagement with modernist literature. Furthermore, Lukács’ failure to adequately
engage with the ramifications of this approach, which appeals to the historical forces conditioning
the development of a theoretical position, ultimately results in his inability to successfully reckon
with the formal interventions of modernism.
When Lukács, in “The Ideology of Modernism,” identifies a kinship between the
philosophical project of Heidegger and the modernist literary tradition, he implicitly extends his
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literary critique beyond the purely aesthetic sphere.156 Lukács identifies the ideology underwriting
modernist literature, but he also associates that ideology with a longer tradition of irrationalism.
Wolfe’s account of the universal experience of solitariness is neither the mere expression of an
aesthetic orientation nor a claim to a simple fact. Rather, Lukács claims that the account is a
response to a specific matrix of social-historical developments. Particularly, it is a response to the
dissolution of the social fabric under modern capitalism, such that individuals cease to identify
themselves as part of a coherent social framework.157 Rather than engage with these alienating
objective developments, the proponents of modernism, he claims, retreat into a reactionary
position. They represent their alienation not as a particular social problem, but as the truth of
human existence. Doing so allows them to privilege the investigation of subjective experience over
the interaction between individual and world. Indeed, it absolves them of the need to engage with
the world at all. Concern for abstract potentiality dominates the actualization of concrete potential,
just as Heidegger’s authentic possibilities eclipse social interactions, which are inevitably cast as
inauthentic. The modernist reactionary response to alienation is, according to this account, a
radical manifestation of the irrationalist impulse. In The Destruction of Reason, Lukács explicates
the bourgeois reaction through which an intuitive principle displaces the rationalist commitment
to understanding. This reaction, however, initially appears as an attempt to preserve a specific
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social configuration. Even if the irrationalist attempt to posit an intuitive principle capable of
mediating subjective and objective realities is doomed to fail, it still belies a commitment to social
reality.158 When proponents of modernism universalize alienation as the unifying force, they
retreat into precisely the problem that elicited their response. Rather than posit a mediating
principle, they commit to radical solipsism. The modernist response neither addresses nor ignores
alienation. Instead, it seems that, according to Lukács, modernist literature glorifies the isolation
that it initially experienced as problematic and revels in its own alienated condition.159 This retreat
forecloses the possibility of an alleviation of alienation, and thus ultimately propagates the
problematic condition.
Lukács mentions Eliot only twice by name in “The Ideology of Modernism,” and does not
address The Waste Land at all. The consensus account of The Waste Land developed thus far,
however, depicts it as a paradigmatic target for Lukács’ critique. The Waste Land addresses the
specific problem of the disintegration of social relations. This disintegration manifests in
interpersonal relationships, as in “The Game of Chess,” as well as in the relations between
individuals and the greater social framework, as with the commuters traversing London Bridge.
The ubiquity of the alienated experience in the poem suggests the universality of this condition.
By the end of the poem, this universality is confirmed, as the prisoner passage reveals alienation
to be the result of epistemological solipsism, rather than specific social conditions. The affirmation
of solipsism exacerbates the sense of alienation present throughout, casting doubt upon the extent
to which any of the characters engage with reality beyond of their own consciousness. Limiting
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individual experience to subjectivity ultimately renders the figures “automatic” and devoid of
character or possibility.160 This account of the poem aligns it closely with the ideology that Lukács
presents in both “The Ideology of Modernism” and The Destruction of Reason.161 Indeed, the
trajectory is identical. The problem, alienation, is universalized, resulting in the overthrow of
objectivity by subjective investigation. This reduces individuals to their abstract potential,
ultimately evacuating them of identity. Eliot’s poetic vision of failure, then, appears not only
despairing but pernicious. Rather than address the problem of alienation, Eliot mystifies the origins
of the condition, thereby resinscribing the problem’s insolubility.
III. The Social Interventions of Literary Form
III.1. Moving Beyond Representation
Despite sharing a number of Lukács ideological commitments, Bertolt Brecht argues against his
approach to literary analysis. Presented in the article “Against Georg Lukács,” Brecht’s arguments
follow two primary trajectories. Both tracks, however, identify Lukács’ one-sided emphasis on
ideology as the weakness in his account. This ideological orientation results in an overly narrow
and prescriptive account of literary realism. While granting Lukács’ commitment to the importance
of realism, Brecht challenges the monopoly on realism that Lukács attributes to the nineteenth
century novel form. Simultaneously Lukács’ prioritization of ideology eclipses the possibilities of
experimental techniques. This second line of attack subverts Lukács’ identification of a necessary
connection between modernist formal techniques and a reactionary ideology. Ultimately, Brecht’s
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critiques of Lukács reveal productive possibilities for modernist formal techniques without
dismissing the danger of a retreat into subjective fancy. Theodor Adorno, in his Aesthetic Theory,
presents an account of artistic production that accommodates Brecht’s appeal to the capacity of
work to intervene in the problematic conditions of external reality. While Brecht frames his
account through a commitment, shared with Lukács, to the political possibilities of literary realism,
Adorno identifies the relationship between the work of art and external reality as central to artistic
production as such. Thus, Brecht’s account reveals the productive possibilities of modernist formal
techniques, while Adorno’s account enjoins the reader to consider these productive possibilities or
risk fundamentally misunderstanding works of art. This is, in fact, precisely my complaint against
the traditional reading of The Waste Land outlined above.
Brecht launches his critique of Lukács by disputing the parameters of literary realism.
Indeed, he directly critiques Lukács’ programmatic identification of literary realism with the
nineteenth century novel form. Against this rigid identification, Brecht maintains that “in no
circumstances can the necessary guide-lines for a practical definition of realism be derived from
literary works alone.”162 An account of realism must be developed from an investigation both of
literary techniques and the historical conditions to which they respond. Lukács, Brecht suggests,
correctly identifies the nineteenth century novel as a literary mode that exhibits a realist
comportment. In the terminology that Lukács employs, the nineteenth century novel form
maintains a commitment to the relationship between subjective consciousness and objective
reality. Indeed, it proceeds by interrogating that relationship. Yet Lukács overstates the
relationship by suggesting that the nineteenth century novel is the only, or best, form capable of
representing it. Brecht paraphrases this prescriptive dimension of Lukács’ approach as enjoining
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the aspiring author to “be like Tolstoy – but without his weakness! Be like Balzac – but up to
date!”163 He argues, instead, that the nineteenth century realist novel form in question responds to
a specific set of social and historical conditions. So long as these conditions persist, the nineteenth
century novelistic techniques may continue to adequately capture them. But because the conditions
of twentieth century modernity differ from those to which that novel form responded, simply
adopting its formal conventions will fail to depict the world realistically. Brecht appeals to the
privileged position of character in the nineteenth century to illustrate this point. Lukács highlights
the importance of character to the novel form and, particularly, to the work of Balzac. Yet, Brecht
argues, “we know something about the bases on which the cult of the individual, as practiced in
class society, rested. They are historical bases.”164 The individualistic orientation of the nineteenth
century novel reflects the “primeval forest of early capitalism [in which] individuals fought against
individuals, and against groups of individuals…This was precisely what determined their
individuality.”165 As social conditions have changed, new struggles have unseated old and these
new struggles are “just as fierce, but perhaps less individualistic. Not that they have no individual
characteristics, for they are fought out by individuals. But allies play an immense part in them,
such as they could not in Balzac’s time.”166 As such, it is “absolutely false to say that one should
take a great figure and allow it to react in manifold ways, making its relationships with other figures
as fleeting and superficial as possible.”167 The conditions of social reality may instead demand
technical innovation. Indeed, the mutable nature of social reality necessitates the development of
new forms capable of engaging with emerging problems.
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Brecht does not merely present a negative account of realism in “Against Georg Lukács.”
In addition to the negative claim that “whether a work is realistic or not cannot be determined
merely by checking whether or not it is like existing works, which are said to be realistic, which
were realistic in their time,” Brecht offers a more capacious definition of realism which admits the
possibility that techniques paradigmatic of realism in one context might be thoroughly unrealistic
in another.168 In this definition, he identifies five characteristics of realistic literature. Though
distinct, these five characteristics operate in tandem to present a revolutionary account of realism.
The first two criteria present complementary revelatory aspects of realistic literature. In the first
case, “realism means: discovering the causal complexes of society” and “unmasking the prevailing
view of things as the view of those who rule it.”169 Realistic art subverts dominant paradigms by
revealing obvious “truths” to be products of political reality. Simultaneously, it juxtaposes that
paradigm with the actual causal structure of that reality. The third criterion reinforces this
juxtaposition, demanding that realist literature write “from the standpoint of the class which offers
the broadest solutions for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught.”170 In Brecht’s
context, or at least in his own art, this class is taken to be the proletariat. Finally, realistic art cannot
be content to simply illuminate the political structures of society, but it must also emphasize “the
element of development” and make “possible the concrete, and [make] possible abstraction from
it.”171 Realism, then, reveals structural problems endemic to a society in order to intervene in them.
The formal devices that Brecht employs in his own art reveal the ways in which his
definition of realism accommodates experimental techniques. Paradigmatic of these experimental
techniques are Brecht’s Verfremdung (estrangement) effects, “which were designed to actively
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overcome Entfremdung (alienation).”172 With these effects, Brecht “attempted to shock his
audiences out of their involuntary adjustment to lives ‘reified into things.’”173 Thus, when “the
actor speaks…as if he reciting someone else’s words” or when the action of a performance is
“stopped or interrupted and even frozen into a tableau vivant,” the audience is forced to become
aware of its own position relative to the action of the play.174 In forcing audience members to
acknowledge their own distance from the play, these estrangement techniques disrupt the passive
reception of an individual reduced to thinghood in the state of capitalist alienation. Rather than
simply depict the condition of alienation to passive audiences, Brecht “directed his ‘estrangement’
devices against a merely empirical perception of contemporary reality,” and demanded the viewer
“complete the demystifying process through political action.”175 Because these effects disrupt the
continuity of the aesthetic experience, they may seem to depart from a realist approach to artistic
production. They conform, however, to Brecht’s account of realism. By shocking the audience into
an active relation to the play, the work simultaneously unmasks “the prevailing view of things”
and incorporates the “standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions for the pressing
difficulties in which human society is caught.”176 The estrangement effects unmask the prevailing
view of things by shocking the audience into a recognition of how that prevailing view results in
their own alienation. In cultivating an awareness of the audience’s subjectivity, Brecht’s
experimental techniques furthermore emphasize the “element of development.”177 Thus, despite
disrupting the continuity of the representational experience, Brecht’s formal techniques conform
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to his account of realism.178 Because of the way in which the condition of alienation appears to the
alienated subject as both universal and natural, a dynamic which Lukács illuminated in his critique
of modernist experimental forms, artwork that seeks to engage with alienation may need to employ
precisely these disturbing effects to bring that condition into view. In producing contemporary
realist literature, one may, in fact, need to “wear masks of a grotesque kind” in order to “present
the truth.”179
Theodor Adorno cultivates a similar attentiveness to the interplay between artistic form
and social problems in his Aesthetic Theory. In his account, however, Adorno is not specifically
addressing the terms of Lukács’ critique of modernism.180 He does not restrict his discussion to
the category of realism, but rather develops a more general account of artistic production. With
this, he suggests the possibility of the wider application of an approach to literary texts grounded
in their responses to specific problems. Adorno claims in the opening chapter of Aesthetic Theory,
“Art, Society, Aesthetics,” that any definition of art must be dynamic because “art is what it has
become,” and as such, “its concept refers to what it does not contain.”181 Instead of a stable,
unchanging definition of art, Adorno insists that art “must be understood according to its laws of
movement…It is defined by its relation to what it is not.”182 The incorporation of externality into
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the definition of art occurs, for Adorno, in two distinct but mutually reinforcing ways. Indeed,
through this mutually reinforcing dynamic, Adorno accounts for the capacity of works of art to
respond to the problems of external reality.
Adorno identifies artistic tradition as the first sense in which the concept of art depends
upon what it is not. He clarifies that art is necessarily developmental. New forms develop out of
an artistic tradition, and this tradition includes both the traditional forms being rejected in novel
developments and the historical circumstances that engendered those forms. Thus, Adorno claims,
“the definition of art is at every point indicated by what art once was,” yet he further notes that
“much that was not art – cultic works for instance – has over the course of history metamorphosed
into art; and much that was once art is no longer.”183 A rigid distinction between artistic tradition
and empirical history cannot be maintained because works of art lose their artistic value and
become artifacts. Similarly, historical artifacts may be re-appropriated and become part of the
artistic tradition. The second, and more extensively developed, sense in which the concept of art
contains its other depends upon the relation between the work of art and empirical reality. Initially,
the relation of the work of art to empirical reality seems purely antagonistic as “artworks detach
themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical
world as if this world too were an autonomous entity.”184 Yet despite the attempt to establish an
autonomous reality apart from the empirical world and step “outside of the constraining spell it
casts…concretely unconsciously polemical towards this spell at each historical moment,” that
empirical world is inevitably brought into the work of art as content.185 Thus, given the “dissolution
of the high-bourgeois nuclear family and the loosening of monogamy,” the theme of adultery has
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become extinct and lives on “distorted and impoverished…only in illustrated magazines.”186 The
theme of adultery, Adorno claims, is only approachable in a society organized around high
bourgeois mores. Without a grounding in this empirical reality, “it is scarcely possible to
empathize directly with this literature.”187 This simultaneous rejection of and dependence upon
empirical reality is precisely, for Adorno, what generates the formal tension in a work of art. For
the “unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form.”188 How a
work of art develops these formal concerns, then, amounts to a response to empirical reality.
Adorno claims, in the midst of a discussion of the demands of empirical reality upon modern art’s
comportment to tradition, that “the socially most advanced level of the productive forces…is the
level of the problem posed at the interior of the aesthetic monad.”189 Indeed, “in their own
figuration, artworks indicate the solution to this problem, which they are unable to provide on their
own without intervention.”190 Despite the attempts of the work of art to establish its own, selfcontained reality, external reality is reflected in, and central to it. The formal techniques of the
work of art respond to the problems of that external reality. Reckoning with this formal response
to external reality is therefore central to an understanding of the work of art.
An analogous sympathy to the tension between the reality created by a work of art and the
external reality conditioning its production suffuses Adorno’s critique of Lukács in
“Reconciliation under Duress.” Adorno does not merely wield this insight against Lukács as a
competing approach to literary interpretation. Rather, he articulates it by identifying a failure on
the part of Lukács to apply his own method consistently. Adorno identifies the primary critique of
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modernist literature developed by Lukács as the charge of “’ontologism,’ which, if sustained,
would allow him to pin the whole of modernist literature onto the archaic existential notions of
Heidegger.”191 This charge, I’ve suggested, not only aligns modernist literature with Heidegger’s
“theory of man’s existential forsakenness,” as Adorno describes, but more fundamentally identifies
a shared ahistorical impulse.192 The modernist appeal to a universal condition of solitariness,
according to Lukács, is grounded in the specifically Heideggerian theoretical apparatus that, while
acknowledging the historicity of Dasein, universalizes its theoretical position, thereby obscuring
its own historical conditions. I have argued that Lukács’ critique of Heidegger is formally indebted
to this charge of ahistoricism. His frequent ad hominem attacks against Heidegger’s social standing
and the imputed culturally reactionary force of his philosophy become legible as an attempt to
illuminate precisely those historical conditions that Lukács claims the philosophical position itself
elides.
This is the point, I maintain, on which Adorno crystallizes Lukács’ shortcomings in his
engagements with modernism. For, though Lukács wields the charge of ahistorical ontologism
against modernism by attributing to proponents of modernist literature the view that “‘man’ means
the individual who has always existed, who is essentially solitary, asocial and – ontologically –
incapable of entering into relationships with other human beings,” he fails to acknowledge the
ways in which this view, itself, is historically conditioned.193 Given his commitment to thinking in
“radically historical terms,” Adorno argues, “Lukács of all people ought to know that in an
individualistic society loneliness is socially mediated and so possesses a significant historical
content.”194 By treating modernist literary forms effectively as vessels of ideological content,
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Lukács fails to appreciate the same fluidity of text and context that employed in his critique of the
Heideggerian position upon which he claims that ideology is grounded. He fails to recognize the
extent to which an effective literary engagement with alienating conditions might exhibit the sense
of a profound ahistorical loneliness cultivated by those conditions.195 If conditions are experienced
as fundamentally isolating, then interrogation of those conditions may, in fact, demand the
investigation of experience that presents itself as radically subjective. Thus, for example, Adorno
claims that “Proust decomposes the unity of the subjective mind by dint of its own introspection:
the mind ends by transforming itself into a stage on which objective realities are made visible.”196
This leads Adorno to conclude that “his individualistic work becomes the opposite of that for
which Lukács derides it: it becomes anti-individualistic.”197 In his engagement with modernist
literature, Lukács erroneously treats texts as atomistic entities whose success depends upon their
capacity simply to reflect an accurate vision of objective reality. In doing so, he fails to account
for the literary artifact as always already embedded in and determined by a historical context. By
treating the work of art merely as a reflection of an ideological perspective divorced from the
historical conditions that make that perspective possible, Lukács succumbs to the same ahistorical
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impulse he accuses his targets of endorsing. Indeed, to put the issue in somewhat incendiary terms,
in his analysis of modernist forms, Lukács perhaps could have benefitted from applying his
historicizing method from The Destruction of Reason more liberally.
Brecht and Adorno both, then, respond to Lukács’ critique of modernist literature by
illuminating the capacity of experimental forms to engage with and intervene in the conditions of
modernity. Brecht, on the one hand, develops an account of realism capable of accommodating
experimental forms in the service of revolutionary ends. This account is like Lukács’ insofar as it
prescribes political ends for legitimate art and appraises a work of art by the degree to which it
achieves those ends. For Brecht, the legitimacy of a literary form is not inherent to the form itself,
but rather derives from the problem that the form addresses as well as its intended effect.198 Yet,
because their accounts depend upon specific political agendas, critics may object that the
legitimacy of both Brecht’s and Lukács’ accounts stand or fall with the merits of that political
position. By identifying the dialectical relationship between the work of art and external reality as
central to the concept of art, Adorno, in contrast to Brecht, broadens the applicability of his
account. One seeking to develop an account of a work of art must grapple with the societal
conditions to which it responds. One must do so not simply to appraise its value according to a
specific political ideology. Rather, one must grapple with the dialectical relationship between
external reality and the work of art in order to sufficiently understand it. Thus, if an interpretation
fails to address not only the external conditions motivating a work but also the manner in which
the form of the work offers a response to those conditions, it fails to adequately engage with the
work of art as such.

As further evidence of this latter point, Brecht claims that “the means must be questioned by the ends they serve”
(Brecht, “Against Georg Lukács,” 51). See also Lunn, Marxism and Modernism, 88.
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III.2. Reading The Waste Land as a Response
The critical accounts of Brecht and Adorno challenge the ideological emphasis that both dominates
Lukács’ methodology and finds expression in the traditional reception of The Waste Land. Lukács
introduces his critique of modernism with a statement of his intention to “concentrate on the
underlying ideological basis of” the “two main trends in contemporary literature.”199 Lukács
justifies his valuation of ideology above form by suggesting that “it is the writer’s attempt to
reproduce this [ideology] which constitutes his ‘intention’ and is the formative principle
underlying the style of a given piece of writing.”200 The emphasis upon the reproduction of
ideology leads Lukács not only to prioritize the ideological position of the author above the form
of a text, but also to accept statements made in the text as straightforward declarations of the beliefs
of the author. Thus, Lukács takes the lines, in Eliot’s “The Hollow Men,” “Shape without form,
shade without colour, / Paralysed force, Gesture without motion,” to be a representation of Eliot’s
commitment to the actuality of the “disintegration of personality” which is “matched by the
disintegration of the outer world.”201 Lukács does not clearly present the argument justifying his
identification of these lines as an encapsulation of the ideological position of Eliot himself. Yet
the suggestion seems to be that, if literary texts are simply reproductions of the ideology of the
author, then claims made in those texts may be taken to represent that ideology. The effect of
formal techniques can only be analyzed once the ideology underwriting a text has been determined.
As such, according to Lukács’ methodology, modernist formal techniques will never complicate
the relation between claims made in the text and the beliefs of the author producing the text.

Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism,” 17.
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Brecht and Adorno shift the interpretive priority from the ideology of the author to the
problem with which a text engages. In doing so, they disrupt the hermeneutic logic that facilitates
the straightforward attribution of claims made within a text to its author. Thus, in approaching a
literary text, rather than interrogating the content of the work to discern the ideology that it
reproduces, one should instead attempt to identify the problems with which the text engages. Doing
this raises the subsequent question of identifying the response that the text offers to those problems.
This response, further, may be appraised on its merits.202 An incoherent response may suggest a
flight into subjective fancy of the sort that Lukács derides. Indeed, investigating a text’s response
to the problem with which it engages may reveal a nihilistic, alienated, or simply false ideology
underwriting that response. Thus, an approach to literary texts grounded in their engagements with
problems does not foreclose the possibility that they represent or reproduce ideological positions.
It demands, however, that the identification of those ideological positions develop through an
active engagement with the organic tensions within the text. This engagement requires careful
attention to the ways in which claims found in a given text may be called into question by formal
elements structuring that text because this tension between discursive affirmation and formal
negation may reveal the empirical reality engaged by the text, rather than an ideology promoted
by it.
The debate between Brecht and Lukács, when considered alongside the methodological
contributions of Adorno, illuminates a discussion of The Waste Land in three profound ways. First,
Lukács’ critique of modernism identifies the political and theoretical dangers of a text that
advocates either a retreat into subjectivity or appeals to the dissolution of objective reality entirely.
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For Brecht, the merits of a response are appraised according to the extent to which it promotes revolutionary ends,
while for Adorno, the merits are determined according to the extent to which thematic material is integrated into the
law of form internal to the work of art (Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 8).
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As he argues in “The Ideology of Modernism,” the retreat into subjectivity cannot, in fact, be so
easily distinguished from a commitment to the dissolution of reality. Further, as he argues in The
Destruction of Reason, detachment from objective reality conjures the possibility of a retreat into
mythical fantasy. This critique questions the value, indeed the legitimacy, of The Waste Land as it
is commonly interpreted. The nihilistic message of the poem seems to endorse just such a
dissolution of objective reality decried by Lukács, while the self-conscious appeals to fertility
rituals seem to promote the mythmaking Lukács associates with the late stages of irrationalism.203
Second, Brecht’s intervention in the debate challenges the interpretive framework grounding
Lukács critique. This suggests the possibility of an interpretation of The Waste Land that does not
subjugate its formal elements to ideological commitments derived primarily from the descriptive
content of the text. Instead, the form and the content may be seen to both raise and address a
problem. This approach, which prioritizes the identification of the problem addressed by a text,
suggests the possibility that the condition of alienation which Lukács misidentifies as the ideology
of The Waste Land is, instead, the problem to which the poem responds. A thorough analysis of
The Waste Land cannot stop, then, with the identification of the social reality that the poem
describes. Rather this analysis must also consider how the poem addresses that social reality and
intervenes in the problems identified. Brecht’s challenge to Lukács’ methodology, and the
suggestions of an interpretive procedure focused on problems, does not, however, entirely negate
the force of his critique. For if the response to the problem of alienation proposed by The Waste
Land amounts to a retreat into subjectivity, or the endorsement of a false ideology, then Lukács’
critique retains its force. The poem may yet commit to a highly problematic account of reality.
Finally, Brecht’s definition of realism brings the dual nature of literary production into focus.

Making sense of The Waste Land’s use of fertility mythology in light of Lukács’ critiques of mythical language
and logic will comprise much of the work of the next chapter.
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While Lukács presents works of literature primarily as mere products of social forces, Brecht’s
emphasis on the political possibilities of realism illuminates the way in which literary texts are,
themselves, social forces. They are shaped by culture, and they shape culture.204 Not only do they
identify and respond to cultural problems, but they also have the capacity to transform the social
landscape in which those problems appear, as Brecht’s verfremdung effects were designed to do,
for example.
These considerations suggest the conclusions of this chapter, as well as a preview of the
argument of the chapters to follow. The standard interpretation of The Waste Land, as outlined in
the opening section of this chapter, identifies an issue central to the text. The condition of alienation
dominates the poem. This alienated condition manifests, as Gillum argues, in objectifying
descriptions of the characters. One woman is reduced to her hair which “spread into fiery points,”
while another disappears from her own “seduction” and reappears as an “automatic hand.” 205 As
Buckley and Gray both argue, alienation also manifests in the poem through appeals to
epistemological solipsism, which presents individuals as trapped within their own limited
perspectives. While this account of the poem successfully identifies a problem central to the text,
it too readily ascribes the condition of alienation represented in the text to Eliot himself.206 Thus,
the appeals to epistemological solipsism are taken to amount to the message of the poem. These
accounts claim that The Waste Land commits to a vision of reality in which objective reality is
inaccessible. We are all, ineluctably, trapped within ourselves. In identifying the reality
represented in the poem with the ideology to which the poem is committed, this interpretive

This point will be crucial in considering Eliot’s account of tradition.
Eliot, The Waste Land, 109, 235–255. Gillum, “Ennui and Alienation in Eliot’s Poetry,” 392–393.
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tradition shares a methodological error with Lukács. The methodology developed by Brecht in his
response to Lukács illuminates the ramifications of this error. Works of art need not
straightforwardly reproduce the ideology of their authors. Instead, they may represent a social
condition in order to identify it as problematic, or even to exert an effect upon it. As such, I
maintain that the condition of alienation depicted in The Waste Land is not presented as an
ineluctable condition, but rather one to be reckoned with. In the following chapters, I will argue
that the text itself presents a program for overcoming this alienated condition and re-establishing
social relations. Indeed, with Brecht’s account of literature’s capacity to exert effects upon
political reality in mind, I will argue that The Waste Land not only presents a response to alienation
but exerts an aleatory effect upon the alienated culture it identifies. If, as I will show, The Waste
Land contains a response to alienation, then it must not endorse epistemic solipsism, as Buckley,
Gillum, et. al. suggest.
Articulating the manner in which The Waste Land responds to the problem of alienation is
sufficient to show that solipsism is not the epistemic position underwriting the text. Doing so does
not, however, entirely respond to the charge of irrationalism raised by Lukács. As Lukács argues
in The Destruction of Resason, the retreat into subjectivity proposed by various forms of vitalism,
and subsequently promoted in works of literary modernism, results in a disavowal of the
relationship between experiencing subject and objective reality. Attempts to address the condition
of alienation through the investigation of subjective experience ends up reinforcing precisely that
condition. Similarly, attempts to address alienation grounded in a false account of reality amount
to a retreat into fancy. Again subjective experience is afforded a privileged position above
objective reality, and again the relationship between subject and world dissolves. This critique
necessitates an investigation of the theoretical framework underwriting The Waste Land’s response
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to alienation. If The Waste Land responds to alienation by suggesting a total retreat into
subjectivity, or if depends upon an incoherent account of reality, then the ideology of solitariness
reappears as the central framework of the poem. Thus, in what follows, I will not only argue that
The Waste Land confronts an alienated culture and disrupts this condition of alienation, but I will
also endeavor to articulate a coherent philosophical framework capable of underwriting the
therapeutic work of the poem. In doing so, I will determine that The Waste Land does not subscribe
to Lukács’ “Ideology of Modernism.” It does not present a vision of failure.
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THE WASTING OF THE WORLD AND ELIOT’S TURN TO MYTH

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued against a prominent approach to The Waste Land that takes the
poem to endorse the reality of the social condition that it depicts. I engaged extensively with Georg
Lukács as a critic who excoriates modernist literature from precisely such a vantage, claiming that,
through its depiction of alienated social experience, modernist literature commits to an ideology
of universal and ineluctable solitariness. I further noted that even scholars more sympathetic to
The Waste Land read the poem as an appeal to the fundamental inescapability of alienation.
Though they do not share in Lukács assessment of The Waste Land, they nevertheless exhibit an
analogous interpretive framework. Against these accounts, I argued for the productive capacity of
works of literature to engage with the problems they identify. I claimed that works of art do not
simply reproduce, but are instead necessarily responses to, the material conditions of their creation.
With this account, I suggested that The Waste Land should not be understood as an endorsement
of the social reality it depicts at all. Rather it should be reckoned with as an intervention into a
problem that its depiction of social conditions illuminates. In this chapter, I will pursue this line of
inquiry further by articulating a logic that structures the poem, a logic that itself reveals the
fundamental problem to which The Waste Land responds.
Though The Waste Land initially seems to instantiate its own description of “a heap of
broken images” and “fragments shored against my ruins,” T.S. Eliot identifies an inspiration for
the “plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism” of The Waste Land in the first of the notes
appended to the poem.1 In his note, Eliot does not clarify the precise debt he owes to Jessie
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Weston’s From Ritual to Romance. He merely suggests that, if the reader wishes to attain a better
understanding of his poem, they should first consult her work, as well as The Golden Bough by
James George Frazer. These two works of anthropology, Eliot suggests, are capable of “elucidating
the difficulties of the poem” much better than his own notes.2 In this chapter, I will argue that
Weston’s investigation into the Grail legend and Frazer’s collection of fertility rituals both develop
a logic that The Waste Land incorporates as a unifying principle. Weston and Frazer both
interrogate a ritual tradition animated by a sympathetic logic according to which the health of the
land is associated with the health of the people living on it. This logic provides the motivating
structure of the Grail legend. In that legend, the hero’s quest involves the restoration of a wasted
land through the recovery of the Grail, which is meant to heal the region’s ailing king. Through its
references to the Grail legend, The Waste Land incorporates this sympathetic logic, providing a
framework for approaching the sense of total disintegration exhibited in the poem. Ultimately,
however, I will argue that The Waste Land’s appeal to this mythical logic does not result in the
endorsement of a fantastical return to the fertility rituals catalogued by Weston and Frazer. Instead
The Waste Land marshals this logic to illuminate a more fundamental epistemological framework
that accounts for the disintegration of a shared social world.
In order to develop this account of The Waste Land’s engagement with Weston’s work on
the Grail legend, I will first investigate the concerns that lead Eliot to promote appeals to myth in
the first place. Eliot articulates these concerns in his review of James Joyce’s Ulysses, where he
champions Joyce’s mythical method as “akin to a scientific discovery.”3 Following Jewel Spears
Brooker, I will locate the significance of this discovery in the mythical method’s capacity to
resolve a tension inherent to artistic production under the conditions of modernity. I will also seek
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to contextualize Eliot’s account of these conditions, arguing that he does not treat modernity as an
ahistorical or fundamentally unprecedented moment. The chaos Eliot ascribes to his moment in
fact appears throughout his corpus in varying aspects. This context clarifies that the mythical
method need not be understood as an attempt to escape history into a mythical logic that defies
temporality. Instead it offers the possibility of mooring a particular set of chaotic cultural
conditions to a history with which they are continuous, facilitating the recovery of a coherent,
though not totalizing, perspective.
In the second section of this chapter, having addressed the problem that necessitates Eliot’s
turn to the mythical method, I will investigate the mythical elements of the Grail legend that The
Waste Land develops. Some prominent scholars, such as Grover Smith, have attempted to identify
the Grail legend as a source of a crypto-narrative undergirding The Waste Land. Others, perhaps
most notably Jewel Spears Brooker, treat The Waste Land’s debt to Frazer and Weston as purely
methodological. Against these common interpretations, I maintain that The Waste Land makes use
of more than just the method employed by Frazer and Weston. The poem incorporates the
sympathetic logic of the fertility ritual that their works explicate. This logic begins to offer a
unifying perspective of the poem, for its seemingly disconnected depictions of desolate landscapes
and alienated individuals begin to form a unity when approached through a logic that identifies the
health of a land with the health of its people.
The appeal to this sympathetic logic as a unifying frame for the poem culminates in a
challenge to the promise of The Waste Land’s response to conditions of cultural disintegration.
The third section of this chapter will be devoted to overcoming this challenge. If the poem suggests
that we should embrace the sympathetic logic of fertility rites as a response to a chaotic historical
situation, then it appears to endorse a retreat into fantasy. Thus, Eliot’s poem seems to commit to
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the denial of reality that Georg Lukács lambasts modernist literature in general for perpetuating.
Further, in The Destruction of Reason, Lukács articulates the gruesome history of the coronation
of fantasy, and particularly of a fantasy grounded in sympathetic logic, in Nazi Germany. If The
Waste Land does, in fact, endorse the sympathetic logic of the Grail legend as a perspective to be
adopted, Lukács provides both conceptual and historical arguments that caution us to eye this
endorsement with skepticism. I will ultimately argue, however, that The Waste Land does not
endorse a retreat into a worldview animated by sympathetic logic. Instead, I claim that it marshals
this sympathetic logic to illuminate an epistemological problem. This problem manifests most
clearly in Eliot’s engagement with F.H. Bradley’s response to the challenge of solipsism.
According to the account Eliot develops, a shared world exists only so long as multiple individuals
intend it. If they cease to perceive this shared reality, it ceases to exist. The threat of such a
dissolution characterizes the historical conditions to which Eliot champions the mythical method
as a response. This threat of dissolution, further, manifests in the cacophonous misunderstandings
and fragmentations of The Waste Land. The Waste Land, then, does not commit itself to a mythical
logic. Rather, it employs this mythical logic as a frame that ultimately resolves itself into a more
fundamental epistemological problematic, revealing a structure of experience that is at risk of
being elided in overdetermined cultural conditions.
I. The Chaos of Modernity and Eliot’s Mythical Method
The Waste Land confronts its reader with a cacophony of voices. The interactions in the poem are
nearly all characterized by personages attempting to engage with distant or inattentive
interlocutors, and these failed interactions amplify the sense of discord. Further, each passage in
the poem is laden with disparate allusive material, and this material calls the reader’s attention
away from the poetic moment, heightening the disorienting effect of the poem’s fragmentary form.
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For example, a coincidental meeting “Under the brown fog of a winter dawn” finds one character
calling out to “one [he] knew…Stetson! / You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!” 4 And
though he receives no reply, the speaker presses this acquaintance and concludes his interrogation
of Stetson with the borrowed phrase from Baudelaire, “You! Hypocrite lecteur! – mon semblable,
– mon frère.”5 In this brief exchange, the time and place of the poem become disjointed, as the
speaker invokes twentieth-century London, the First Punic War, and Baudelaire’s Paris of the
nineteenth century.6 The form of the poem reinforces this sense of dislocation, as disconnected
and fragmentary vignettes frustrate any attempt to derive a structuring narrative logic. The
polyvocality finds expression in a ruinous and chaotic landscape, with “hooded hordes swarming
/ over endless plains…Falling towers / Jerusalem Athens Alexandria / Vienna London / Unreal.”7
As the poem draws to a close with London Bridge “falling down falling down falling down,” the
litany of discordant and dislocated voices that constitute the poem resolve into mere
“fragments…shored against [the] ruins.”8
In the first of his notes that he appended to The Waste Land in the December 1922 edition
of the text, Eliot specifically identifies two works as profound influences on the organization of
the poem.9 First, Eliot cites Jessie Weston’s From Ritual to Romance as the source of “not only
the title, but the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism of the poem.” 10 Indeed, with a
mischievousness characteristic of the poem’s explanatory appendix, he claims that “Miss Weston’s
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book will elucidate the difficulties of the poem much better than” even his notes will.11 In addition
to From Ritual to Romance, Eliot cites James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough as a work to
which he is “indebted in general.”12 Eliot’s appeal to Frazer should not, perhaps, come as a
surprise. For Eliot is not alone in acknowledging that Frazer has “influenced our generation
profoundly,” as Weston herself cites Frazer as a source of inspiration for her investigation in From
Ritual to Romance.13 Both The Golden Bough and From Ritual to Romance undertake
anthropological investigations into diverse mythical traditions, preserved variously in records,
legends, and folk practices, in order to examine the hypothesis that these disparate practices share
a common source. The methods that Weston and Frazer employ, and the mythical material that
they investigate, will prove to be central concerns of this chapter, particularly insofar as I will
argue that scholars, in focusing extensively on the methods Eliot inherits from his sources, have
systematically overlooked the importance of the structuring content of the mythical fertility rites
that The Waste Land incorporates. Yet a more fundamental question forestalls an explication of
the “certain references to vegetation ceremonies” that appear throughout the poem. 14 For though
he highlights the central role that the vegetation ceremonies analyzed by Frazer and Weston play
in The Waste Land, Eliot neglects in his notes to articulate why he deemed it necessary to structure
the poem around a myth in the first place. Nor does he explain just how this mythical framework
is meant to elucidate the difficulties of such a fragmented text.
Though Eliot’s note leaves opaque the function of the references to the Grail legend in The
Waste Land, his 1923 essay “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” offers some insight into the ends to which
The Waste Land marshals the mythical constellation articulated by Frazer and expanded by
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Weston. In “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” Eliot endeavors to defend James Joyce’s Ulysses in the
face of scathing criticism leveled against it in a review by Richard Aldington.15 In response to
Aldington’s suggestion that Ulysses is “an invitation to chaos, and an expression of feelings which
are perverse, partial, and a distortion of reality,” Eliot argues that Joyce’s method, “the parallel to
the Odyssey, and the use of appropriate styles and symbols to each division,” is akin to a scientific
discovery.16 Eliot claims that this methodological discovery is so significant that “in using the
myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr. Joyce is
pursuing a method which others must pursue after him.”17 Eliot concludes his essay with an
injunction to emulate Joyce because his mythical method marks “a step toward making the modern
world possible for art, toward that order and form which Mr. Aldington so earnestly desires.”18 By
appealing to the work of Weston and Frazer to organize The Waste Land, Eliot seems to be engaged
in precisely this project of employing mythical material to make contemporary experience legible
by imposing order upon it.
A seeming digression that Eliot embarks upon, in which he professes general alignment
with Aldington regarding the value of the disputed artistic category of “classicism,” promises to
clarify Eliot’s insistence that this new method is, in fact, necessary. Eliot claims that he and
Aldington “are more or less agreed as to what we want in principle, and agreed to call it
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classicism.”19 Yet, Eliot notes, there are at least two ways to define classicism.20 One attempt to
be “classical” entails “turning away from nine tenths of the material which lies at hand, and
selecting only mummified stuff from a museum.”21 This brand of classicism installs the ancient
above the contemporary as a locus of value and deems only the former to be valid material for
artistic endeavors.22 Restricting the material suited for creative work to the traditional in this way,
however, disconnects that material from the present insofar as it involves “turning away” from
current conditions.23 The classical material is preserved, but at a detached remove, disconnected
from the context of the moment. Alternatively, Eliot claims that one can be “classical in tendency
by doing the best one can with the material at hand.”24 Here, Eliot provides a somewhat aberrant
definition of classicism. Indeed, he may be accused, perhaps fairly, of shifting the goalposts.25 But
by reconstructing the notion of classicism in this way, Eliot also reframes the methodological
intervention of Ulysses. Ulysses, according to Eliot’s revised model of classicism, is not classical
because it references Homer. Rather, Ulysses is classical because it engages with the “material at

Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 477.
As Lehman notes, Eliot gestures towards still other accounts of classicism, but these appeals do not rise to the level
of a definition. Eliot merely dismisses the notion that classicism can be defined negatively as an alternative to
romanticism (Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 477. Lehman, Impossible Modernism, 90).
21
Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 477.
22
Insofar as Lukács excoriates those promoting a retreat into myth, he seems to be casting them as classicists in this
derogatory sense. They seek simply to replace the contemporary situation with a romanticized classicism. I will argue
in what follows that attempts to raise such a critique against The Waste Land fail to appreciate the distinction made
here between valuable and mummified forms of classicism.
23
Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 477. Eliot is not concerned merely with the dichotomy between traditional and
modern material. Insofar as he argues that the mythical method should replace the novel as a literary form adequate
to contemporary experience, he also intervenes in debates concerning the legitimacy of formal traditionalism. Indeed,
the importance of this dual facet of Eliot’s intervention, insofar as it concerns both classical material and traditional
forms, will prove integral to the later stages of my argument.
24
Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 478. Though it cannot be addressed here, Eliot’s claim that this material includes
the “emotions and feelings of the writer himself, which, for that writer, are simply material he must accept” illuminates
the limit of his claim that the poet should remain impersonal (Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 478).
25
Regardless of whether the approach that Eliot appeals to in this account may justly be called classicism, the
conceptual distinction that he draws illuminates the value that he locates in Joyce’s work. His equivocation around
the term “classicism” is cause for care when appealing to the term itself, but I believe that, even if we reject the notion
that it should be called classicist, the position Eliot juxtaposes with the antiquated mode of classicism is worthy of
consideration as a guiding principle for Eliot’s aesthetics.
19
20

110

hand.”26 This material includes the “emotions and feelings of the writer” as well as world-historical
events, and Eliot claims it is material for which the traditional novel form may not be suited. 27
According to the structure of Eliot’s distinction, Ulysses is thus, perhaps counterintuitively,
classical because it engages with contemporary experience, and it is modern because it does so by
deploying a new method that manipulates “a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and
antiquity.”28
For Eliot, the problem for the artist, the problem that necessitates the adoption of Joyce’s
mythical method, results from a tension between two competing aesthetic criteria. Eliot articulates
this tension more explicitly in his contrast between Elizabethan literary forms and an alleged
Romantic and contemporary formlessness in “The Possibility of Poetic Drama,” an essay collected
in The Sacred Wood. According to Eliot, “the nineteenth century had a good many fresh
impressions but it had no form in which to confine them.”29 These poets did not suffer from a
dearth of poetic material. Rather they had to grasp about for a form that was adequate to this
material. In contrast to the Romantics, the Elizabethan period was “able to absorb a great quantity
of new thoughts and new images, almost dispensing with tradition, because it had this great form
of its own which imposed itself on everything that came to it.”30 This question of form is critical
for Eliot because he claims that “permanent literature is always a presentation: either a presentation
of thought, or a presentation of feeling,” and this act of presentation entails a refinement or
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informing of the material.31 Thus Eliot clarifies that a work of art must have a principle of order
that structures its material, and he does so by appealing to an Aristotelian hylomorphic paradigm.
Matter, such as the thoughts, ideas, images, or emotions that provide the substance of a work of
art, is not alone sufficient for artistic production. This matter must be unified under a form by the
artist.
In his juxtaposition of the Romantics with Elizabethan dramatists, Eliot specifies the
second criterion underwriting the tension that necessitates the turn to Joyce’s method. He claims
that, in contrast to Keats and Shelley, who were “certainly obliged to consume vast energy in this
pursuit of form,” Shakespeare “was very fortunate” because he inherited “a crude form, capable
of indefinite refinement.”32 This was an advantage because “to create a form is not merely to invent
a shape, a rhyme or rhythm.”33 Instead, creating a form involves the “realization of the whole
appropriate content of this rhyme or rhythm,” which entails the realization of a “precise way of
thinking and feeling.”34 Thus, when Shakespeare inherited a nascent form, this did not merely
involve the bequeathal of a stock of familiar patterns. He also had access to this framework of
thought, which manifested itself in “the half-formed ͑υλή, the ‘temper of the age’…a habit on the
part of the public to respond to particular stimuli.”35 Eliot seems to suggest here, as he implies
elsewhere in this discussion, that the matter that the poet works with – from the feelings and
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impressions to historical events and cultural habits of thought – itself suggests a form that is
appropriate to it. The “temper of the age” is precisely this material habit to respond to particular
forms, and this habit expresses itself in shared patterns of thought and feeling. Form is not arbitrary
and cannot be applied indiscriminately, but rather must be adequate to the historical material that
it shapes.
On the one hand then, to be intelligible, to attain a degree of permanence, a work of art
must have a principle of order. It must be coherent. Eliot does not appeal specifically to this
criterion of aesthetic order when he suggests this alternative model of classicism in “Ulysses,
Order, and Myth,” but his claim that the mythical method is “a step toward making the modern
world possible for art, toward that order and form which Mr. Aldington so earnestly desires”
suggests implicitly that this revised mode of classicism entails the need to impose order on the
material.36 On the other hand, however, the criterion of classicism that Eliot outlines in the review
of Ulysses and the explicitly hylomorphic account developed in “The Possibility of Poetic Drama”
requires that the work of art be adequate to its historical context. Precisely because Eliot claims
the contemporary experience is characterized by chaos, the material available to the modern artist
is incommensurable with the internal order that Eliot’s aesthetics demand. Jewel Spears Brooker
distills the essence of this tension when she notes that Eliot “claimed that to be true to history, art
must reflect the world in which it is produced; and to be true to itself, art must be unified.”37
Joyce’s mythical method is laudable for Eliot because it mediates these two competing artistic
criteria. It captures and responds to the chaos of contemporary experience while simultaneously
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providing the artist with tools to control and order that experience, “giving a shape and significance
to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.”38
In her chapter from Mastery and Escape: T.S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism on
“Substitutes for Religion in the Early Poetry of T.S. Eliot,” Jewel Spears Brooker contextualizes
this appeal to “the panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history,” which Eliot
leaves unjustified.39 Spears Brooker follows Auden in identifying “the problem of religion and its
substitutes as the modern problem,” and she situates Eliot’s early poetry as a response to this
problem.40 She claims that Eliot treats religion as “a scheme, a system of ideas, an abstraction,
which allows one to make sense of the universe and to maintain values.”41 The world-historic
moment into which The Waste Land intervenes, however, is characterized, according to Eliot, by
the breakdown of religious belief.42 If religion is a force, and indeed the historically dominant
force, that promotes the epistemic stability that underwrites a shared worldview, then the
breakdown of religious belief threatens to render the world illegible. The death of belief, which
Spears Brooker suggests Eliot takes for granted, radically reshapes the situation of the poet. Poets
in such circumstances must formulate their own schemata to “make sense of the universe and to
maintain values.”43
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Though Spears Brooker identifies one feature of contemporary experience to which Eliot
undoubtedly responds with his appeal to the mythical method, her account does not adequately
address the breadth of Eliot’s claims to various forms of cultural disintegration. As such, it risks
amplifying Eliot’s polemical appeals in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” to the radical novelty of the
situation of the poet, despite Eliot’s own subsequent acknowledgement that these appeals are
somewhat immoderate.44 In fact, Eliot addresses a number of cultural developments in The Sacred
Wood that add further context to, and justification for, his appeal to a fundamentally chaotic
modern experience. Simultaneously, however, he also acknowledges disparate historical situations
that resemble those he attributes to modernity. In “The Perfect Critic,” for example, Eliot identifies
a pair of destabilizing developments that he claims are ubiquitous. The first is a pernicious
verbalism, which Eliot defines as a “the tendency of words to become indefinite emotions,” that
he claims is characteristic of, but not unique to, post-Hegelian philosophy.45 He suggests that the
result of this verbalism is that “words have changed their meanings,” though “what they have lost
is definite, and what they have gained is indefinite.”46 Eliot does not defend this claim. Indeed, he
does not even adequately explain it, and without further elucidation, there are grounds to treat it
skeptically. I am less concerned here, however, with the veracity of Eliot’s account of
philosophical developments than I am with the social conditions that Eliot takes himself to be
responding to. In these conditions, the definitional consistency of language has been compromised
as discrete definitions become subtly loaded with emotional content, resulting in the destabilization
of their meanings. Eliot identifies a complementary development that arises from the “vast
accumulations of knowledge – or at least information – deposited in the nineteenth century.”47 The
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explosion of information resulted in a consequent proliferation of “fields of knowledge in which
the same words are used with different meanings.”48 The chaotic experience that Eliot appeals to
in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” need not be reduced to an isolated event like the death of God,
which appears ahistorical in its sheer novelty, as Spears Brooker would have it. Rather, Eliot
appeals to destabilizing cultural dynamics that develop over time. Eliot’s sense of the diminishing
capacity of religion to provide a stable source of shared meaning surely contributes to his appeal
to an anarchic modern experience. But so, too, do the proliferation of specialized fields of
knowledge and the consequent unmooring of a communal vocabulary.
Further, though Eliot does identify his moment as uniquely anarchical in “Ulysses, Order,
and Myth,” Spears Brooker is, I think, too hasty in accepting these claims at face value. Eliot
appeals elsewhere to authors who responded in their own ways to conditions akin to those he
ascribes to the early twentieth century. He contrasts Dante with Lucretius, for example, by
suggesting that “Dante had the benefit of a mythology and a theology which had undergone a more
complete absorption into life than those of Lucretius.”49 The lack of a unifying frame that Spears
Brooker claims underwrites Eliot’s appeal to a mythical method seems analogous, if not entirely
then at least partially, to the conditions under which Lucretius produced De Rerum Natura. Writing
from within a culture that had not absorbed the philosophy that animates his poem, Lucretius is

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 8. One may, again, treat Eliot’s appeal to the mutual unintelligibility of various sciences
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of Marxism as a practice of cultural critique. These both are again distinct from the nebulous use of the term Marxism
that is deployed as an object of fear in the American political arena. This equivocity further results in the terms being
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left to articulate a vision of life animated by this philosophy in his work.50 If Lucretius appears to
Eliot to be at a disadvantage compared to Dante, then Blake is hamstrung. Where Lucretius writes
his poem “to find the concrete poetic equivalent” for a philosophical system that “is already in
existence,” Blake must supply his own.51 Despite his “capacity for considerable understanding of
human nature,” Blake’s poetry suffers, according to Eliot, because it lacks “a framework of
accepted and traditional ideas which would have prevented him from indulging in a philosophy of
his own.”52 Eliot’s discussion of Blake’s response to his poetic circumstances presents, I think, an
interesting foil to Eliot’s laudatory comments about Yeats in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth.” For
Yeats, too, endeavors to develop a mythology, and Eliot identifies Yeats as “the first contemporary
to be conscious” of the need to manipulate the “continuous parallels between contemporaneity and
antiquity.”53 Finally, Eliot does not treat Blake in isolation, though he does identify his genius as
being particularly hindered by the lack of established mythical framework. Eliot locates similar
shortcomings in the “large but insufficiently furnished apartments filled by heavy conversation”
of Milton’s “celestial and infernal regions” and the “historical thinness” of the Puritan
mythology.54
Joyce, then, in pursuing a mythical method that “has the importance of a scientific
discovery,” does not in fact intervene in an unprecedented cultural situation.55 According to the
account that Eliot develops through The Sacred Wood, societies can be more or less suffused with
a dominant ideological framework, regardless of whether it is theological, philosophical, or

The ramifications of Eliot’s discussion of Lucretius and Dante will receive more extensive treatment in the next
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mythological.56 Cultural conditions can be more or less chaotic, and the modern absence of a
unifying or ubiquitous mythology is not itself an absolute novelty. It is neither apocalyptic nor
ahistorical, as Spears Brooker seems at times to maintain, following the suggestion of Eliot in his
more polemic pronouncements. Rather, the various forces that contribute to the anarchy of
contemporary experience – the proliferation of scientific vocabularies, the untethering of words
from their traditional meanings, disenchantment with religious belief – all result from the interplay
of historical forces. Indeed, the moment of chaos that Eliot addresses in “Ulysses, Order, and
Myth” appears to be one of many such moments, and Joyce participates in a tradition of responses
to anarchic situations.57 Nevertheless, even if the conditions into which Joyce intervenes are not
unprecedented, they are particular.58 The novel form, which developed in response to a different
set of cultural demands, “will no longer serve,” according to Eliot, and new forms are needed that
can impart order to the specific mode of chaos the confronts Eliot and his contemporaries, thereby
making “the modern world possible for art.”59 Specifically, he claims that the mythical method is
uniquely capable of achieving this result.60
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Eliot’s appraisal of Joyce’s method in Ulysses, and particularly his claim that this method
treads a path that should be followed, clarifies Eliot’s own use of myth as an organizing force in
The Waste Land. The mythical method addresses a specific problem regarding the possibilities for
literary production in modernity. According to Eliot, this mythical method is uniquely capable of
resolving a tension inherent to the process of artistic production. This method simultaneously
promises to provide a form capable of structuring the work of art without compromising that
work’s capacity to reckon with modern conditions resistant to a single unifying order. This sense
of social chaos is the result of myriad historical developments, such as an increasing sense of
disappointment in religion as well as a proliferation of technical vocabularies and methodologies.
One the one hand, the breakdown of established unifying ideologies results in the lack of an
established formal structure of thought or art. One the other, however, to the extent that Eliot
identifies this sense of social chaos with the proliferation of scientific fields, frameworks of
understanding, and definitions of accepted terms, the contemporary anarchy to which the mythical
method responds also manifests as a cacophonous overdetermination. The Waste Land’s
fragmented structure effects precisely this simultaneous sense underdetermination and
overdetermination. The poem resists a unified narrative, and this resistance manifests not only in
the absence of a distinct protagonist but also in the jarring transitions in setting. The first section
of the poem, “The Burial of the Dead,” transitions from reminiscences of Munich to a desert,
“where the sun beats, and the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,” to the memory of a
Hyacinth garden, then to the fortunes of “Madame Sosostris, famous clairvoyante,” and it
culminates finally on London Bridge.61 The allusions that suffuse each stanza of the poem seem
to exacerbate its resistance to unity by destabilizing the already ephemeral sense of place and time.
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Thus, in the final stanza of “The Burial of the Dead” the fog of war hanging over London appears
to be simultaneously a response to the first World War and the Punic wars.62 Just as concepts and
words have lost their definitions, according to Eliot, so do events and references in The Waste
Land become untethered from their historical contexts. The poem, then, captures both the absence
of a shared pattern of thought and the overdetermining proliferation of definitions that Eliot
associates with his historical situation. His appeal to the mythical method, though, promises to
unify the poem’s material into an intelligible whole in the face of seemingly terminal
fragmentation. Attempting to discern the poem’s interplay of unity and chaos requires first,
however, a more extensive investigation of the mythical material that Eliot claims structures the
poem. It requires a turn to the Grail legend as it is articulated by Jessie Weston in From Ritual to
Romance.
II. Searching for Order in the Grail Legend
II.1. The Contours of Eliot’s Debt
Though he does not describe it in detail, Eliot gestures in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” towards a
dilemma that confronts the contemporary artist. On the one hand, according to Eliot, a work of art
must be unified. It must have a principle of order, and this principle of order renders it intelligible
to others. On the other hand, for the artist to produce a work that is “classical in tendency,” a
characteristic that Eliot prescribes as an aesthetic value, the artist must do “the best one can with
the material at hand,” which they “must simply accept.”63 If this material is essentially
fragmentary, as Eliot suggests the contemporary artist’s material is, then hewing to a principle of
order threatens to do a disservice to the material, while doing justice to the chaotic nature of the
material could undermine the coherence of the artistic production. Eliot heralds Ulysses as the

62
63

Eliot, The Waste Land, 69–75.
Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 478.

120

product of Joyce’s discovery of a new method capable of resolving this dilemma. Joyce, in this
account, does not organize Ulysses according to a principle of order internal to the material of the
work itself. Rather, Joyce employs an external order to give structure to the material at hand.64
Eliot describes his own practice in The Waste Land in very similar terms. He claims that
he derives “the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism” of the poem from Jessie
Weston’s From Ritual to Romance. Indeed, he claims that Weston’s work is so integral to the text
that From Ritual to Romance “will elucidate the difficulties of the poem much better than [his]
notes can do.”65 As one of the central difficulties of the poem is precisely its fragmentary structure,
Eliot’s note seems to suggest that Weston’s work on the Grail legend promises to coordinate the
disparate material. Thus, in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” Eliot identifies Joyce as the progenitor of
a method strikingly similar to his own.66 Yet, though “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” articulates the
problem that the mythical method addresses, the methodological parallels between The Waste
Land and Ulysses obscure even as they illuminate. For, while Ulysses uses the Odyssey to structure
the narrative of the text, The Waste Land frustrates attempts to discern a narrative despite the
incorporation of elements of the Grail legend. Indeed, the precise contours of the methodological
analogy between Joyce and Eliot are so opaque that scholars even dispute whether Eliot actually
employs the material of the Grail legend in any significant capacity. So, while the appeal to Joyce
illuminates the general promise that myth represents for Eliot, an account of the mythical elements
in The Waste Land requires a more extensive investigation of the specific material that Eliot

To the extent that Eliot describes this method as “manipulating the continuous parallel between contemporaneity
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incorporates into the poem. It calls for an explication of Weston’s work on the Grail legend. Such
an explication is impossible, however, without first considering Weston’s own engagement with
Frazer’s work on fertility rituals.
When Eliot cites James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough as “another work of
anthropology” to which he is “indebted in general,” he does not merely highlight second influence
for The Waste Land.67 He rather invokes a tradition of scholarship, and he establishes that The
Waste Land is engaged with that tradition. Indeed, as I have already noted, Weston presents From
Ritual to Romance as itself not only inspired by but also as a continuation of the project inaugurated
by Frazer in The Golden Bough. Weston makes use of Frazer’s methods in her endeavor to explain
the origin of the Grail legend, and she further argues that the Grail legend is, in fact, the “confused
record of a ritual, once popular, later surviving in conditions of strict secrecy.”68 It is, she claims,
the record of a ritual associated with the nature cults catalogued by Frazer. Thus, grappling with
the effect of From Ritual to Romance upon The Waste Land requires a preliminary investigation
into the project undertaken by Frazer and continued by Weston.
In The Golden Bough, James George Frazer endeavors to explain the origin of a ritual
involving the priest of the grove of Aricia, located near the village of Nemi in Italy. In this grove
devoted to Diana of the Wood, “there grew a certain tree round which at any time of the day…a
strange figure might be seen to prowl…He was a priest and a murderer; and the man for whom he
looked was sooner or later to murder him and hold the priesthood in his stead.” 69 Though Frazer
notes that “this strange rule has no parallel in antiquity,” he argues that parallels can be found in
other cultures.70 From the existence of these parallels, Frazer identifies a set of conditions that, if
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met, would suggest an explanation for the origin for the practice of the priesthood at Nemi and that
therefore guide the methodology of The Golden Bough. If Frazer can show “that a barbarous
custom, like that of the priesthood at Nemi, has existed elsewhere,” and if he “can detect the
motives which led to its institution” and “prove that these motives have operated widely,” and,
finally, if he can prove that “these motives were actually at work in classical antiquity” then, he
claims, he can “infer that at a remoter age the same motives gave birth to the priesthood at Nemi.”71
Thus, Frazer pursues a survey of rituals from various traditions that contain features analogous to
the central elements of the worship of Diana at Nemi in order to identify the structure of a potential
shared monomyth.72 By reconstructing this fundamental practice, Frazer hopes to answer two
central questions: “first, why had the priest to slay his predecessor? And second, why, before he
slew him, had he to pluck the Golden Bough?”73
A full account of the material Frazer adduces to reconstruct his monomyth is well beyond
the purview of this chapter. Indeed, the practices that Frazer appeals to are so varied, both in their
in specific features and their temporal and geographical locations, that such an attempt would risk
devolving into a mere reproduction of the litany of practices chronicled in The Golden Bough
itself. Yet, a crucial structural element shared by the myriad practices assembled by Frazer is a
commitment to a sympathetic logic. According to this sympathetic logic, the behaviors or
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conditions of individuals are reflected in their environment.74 For example, “in Thüringen, the man
who sows flax carries the seed in a long bag which reaches from his shoulders to his knees, and he
walks with long strides, so that the bag sways to and fro on his back.”75 In turn, the flax crop is
meant to sway to and fro in the breeze. Similarly, Frazer argues that a set of rituals honoring
Adonis, which involved the rapid cultivation of crops in small “gardens of Adonis” followed by
their collective consignment to the sea, operated according to the same sympathetic logic.76 The
rapid growth of “wheat and barley in the gardens of Adonis was intended to make the corn shoot
up; and the throwing of the gardens…into the water was a charm to secure a due supply of
fertilizing rain.”77 Frazer claims that the rites of the sacred grove participate in precisely this logic.
In cases involving the priest of the grove, and again Frazer adduces multiple analogous versions
of similar practices, the health of the priest secures the health of the grove itself. In the personage
of the priest, the capacities of priest, king, and god combine, though various traditions place
different degrees of emphasis on the individual aspects of this tripartite figure. This priest-king
guarantees “the continuance and orderly succession of those physical phenomena upon which
mankind depends for existence.”78 When the priest-king begins to convalesce, this enfeeblement,
too, manifests in the land. Thus, “this man-god must be killed as soon as he shows symptoms that
his powers are beginning to fail, and his soul must be transferred to a vigorous successor before it
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has been seriously impaired by the threatened decay.”79 Here, then, is the answer to the first of
Frazer’s questions. The priest of the grove must be killed and replaced to ensure that the priest
remains continually virile, and, consequently, to ensure that the land manifests his vigor.
In her attempt to determine the origins of the Arthurian Grail legend, Weston adopts
Frazer’s method of collating a specific object of investigation with analogous material in order to
discern the contours of a more originary account capable of unifying the variety of evidence.
Further, Weston claims that her own investigation into the Grail legend revealed a striking
“resemblance between certain features of the Grail story, and characteristic details of the Nature
Cults described” by Frazer.80 Weston, then, does not merely adopt Frazer’s method. She also
further develops his catalogue of fertility rites and suggests another path along which the
sympathetic logic of those rites evolved. Weston identifies seven “main features of the Grail
story—the Waste Land, the Fisher King, the Hidden Castle with its solemn Feast and mysterious
Feeding Vessel, the Bleeding Lance and Cup,” as well as a host of accidental yet consistent features
that she claims also serve an explanatory function, such as the trial of the hero at the Chapel
Perilous.81 Weston’s overarching argument engages with two prominent attempts to account for
these symbols, neither of which, she claims, is successful. One interpretive tradition relies “upon
the undeniably Christian-Legendary elements, preponderant in certain versions, to maintain the
thesis that the Grail legend is ab initio a Christian, and ecclesiastical, legend, and to analyse the
literature on that basis alone.”82 The other identifies the central elements as fundamentally
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folkloric, and argues on this basis that “while the later versions of the cycle have been worked over
by ecclesiastical writers in the interests of edification, the story itself is non-Christian, and Folklore in origin.”83 Weston claims that these competing schools of interpretation fail because, though
each can explain certain central features of the Grail legend, neither can offer a comprehensive
account. Weston argues further that this failure to provide a comprehensive genetic account results
from a longstanding but pernicious trend in Grail scholarship. The prevailing methodology
encourages scholars to pull the legend “into little pieces, selecting one detail here, another there,
for study and elucidation.”84 Dividing the story and treating the pieces individually creates the
conditions under which proponents of a school of interpretation can be satisfied with an analysis
that accounts for some features but not others.
From Ritual to Romance exhibits a number of methodological flaws, not the least of which
is a selectiveness with respect to the material that Weston criticizes in the competing schools of
interpretation. Jonathan Ullyot captures Weston’s methodological inconsistency, for example,
when he notes in The Medieval Presence in Modernist Literature: The Quest to Fail that “Weston
repeatedly claims that she is not concerned with the earliest form of the Grail story, but the source,”
which allows her to “disregard the order in which the Grail texts were written.”85 Yet, he argues
that this methodological commitment is self-undermining insofar as her methodology “is
obviously contingent on whether her version of the earliest form of the Grail story is correct.”86
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comprehensive perspectives.
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Assessing the strength of Weston’s account is not my primary concern in this chapter. Rather, I
am more interested in identifying specific features of Weston’s account that are, on the one hand,
continuous with the work of Frazer and, on the other, aid in the interpretation of The Waste Land.
First, Weston adopts Frazer’s method of assembling fragmentary evidence in the service
of constructing a hypothesized progenitor of that evidence. Thus, there is a methodological
continuity between The Golden Bough and From Ritual to Romance. Further, Jewel Spears
Brooker argues convincingly that Eliot himself makes use of this method in the structure of The
Waste Land.87 This shared method is not the only point of continuity between Frazer, Weston, and
Eliot. Frazer highlights a sympathetic logic that underwrites the rituals he catalogues, ultimately
identifying it as an explanation for one of his organizing questions about the ritual murder at the
grove of Aricia. Weston, in turn, highlights this same logic as fundamental to the hero’s quest in
the Grail legend. The wasting of the land is sympathetically linked to the infirmity of its king. In
curing the king, the hero restores the land. This sympathetic logic at the heart of the Grail legend
reinforces Weston’s methodological approach insofar as it establishes a link to the fertility rituals
explicated by Frazer, suggesting a ritual rather than literary or ecclesiastical origin for the legend.
Thus, by incorporating the features of the Grail legend catalogued by Weston, particularly the
ailing king and the wasted land, The Waste Land participates in a tradition suffused with this
sympathetic logic. Finally, though From Ritual to Romance is in many ways continuous with The
Golden Bough, it presents a crucial point of departure. Though Weston attempts to locate the origin
of the Grail legend in the practice of the fertility rites of nature cults, she investigates source

despite its flaws, Weston’s work is more rigorous than it is typically given credit for being. His defense is not entirely
convincing, though the criticisms leveled against Weston are not entirely convincing either. Ultimately, From Ritual
to Romance seems to me to be methodologically compromised but not without valuable insights.
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itself.
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material that has already transitioned from social ritual to literary tradition.88 Weston, then,
articulates a vision of a distinctly literary tradition suffused with the sympathetic logic of a prior
social practice. By integrating the symbolism of the Grail legend into The Waste Land, rather than
the diverse material from Frazer, and in appealing primarily to Weston and only secondarily to
Frazer in his notes, Eliot offers an intervention into this literary, rather than anthropological,
tradition.
II.2. The Incorporation of a Mythical Logic
Because of this multiplicity of textual continuities, when Eliot identifies From Ritual to Romance
and The Golden Bough as influences on the structure and symbolism of The Waste Land, the
precise nature of this influence remains opaque. Indeed, Eliot’s appeals to Weston and the mythical
method have beguiled scholars since Eliot’s notes were formally appended to The Waste Land.
Eliot himself later acknowledges the obscurity of his tribute to Weston when he laments that his
notes, and particularly his appeals to the Holy Grail and Tarot cards, have led scholars astray.89 In
“The Case of the Missing Abstraction,” Jewel Spears Brooker neatly responds to one of the
primary errors committed by scholars in their attempts to account for Eliot’s inclusion of the Grail
legend in The Waste Land. These interpretations, extrapolating from Joyce’s use of the Odyssey as
a source of narrative structure, claim that Eliot uses the Grail legend “as a background myth” and
that “this myth provides a shadow plot and shadow hero.”90 While the fragmented structure of The
Waste Land resists attempts to discern a narrative in it, these interpretations treat Weston’s analysis

Weston’s work at the border between ritual and romance, rite and legend, highlights a fluidity between the social
conditions and their reflections in literary traditions. In the next chapter, I will pursue an investigation of Eliot’s
engagement with the reciprocal effects of social conditions and literary productions.
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of the Grail legend as a narrative template to which The Waste Land can be forced to conform.
Thus, “analogous to the crafty adventurer Odysseus as a hero, we have the blind prophet
Tiresias.”91 Spears Brooker identifies Grover Smith as the proponent of “the canonical version of
this interpretation,” and in fact Smith offers multiple versions of this narrative reading of The
Waste Land. In T.S. Eliot’s Poetry and Plays, as Spears Brooker notes, Smith organizes the plot
of the poem around the Grail quest. 92 By contrast, in “The Making of The Waste Land,” he suggests
that Eliot uses the symbols of the Tarot to “introduce a set of contemporary characters
corresponding more or less to those figuring in the Grail legend, and…portraying them in cameo,
to compose a fantasia of Eliot’s emotional life.”93 On this reading, Eliot privileges the actors of
the Grail legend over the quest itself.94 Nevertheless, Smith persists in deriving a plot in which
those actors participate. More recently, Jonathan Ullyot has endorsed a similar reading in the
service of his more ambitious claim that The Waste Land is designed to revitalize ancient fertility
rituals, thereby ascribing to The Waste Land the role of Weston’s knight gallant at a metatextual
level.95
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These attempts to read The Waste Land according to the narrative template of the Grail
quest all seem to make an illicit assumption about Eliot’s application of the mythical method. They
seem to assume that if a myth is structured narratively, and a contemporary work of art is informed
by that myth, then the contemporary work will be narrative as well. Eliot’s appeal to Joyce as a
practitioner of this method obscures the matter insofar as Eliot lauds Joyce precisely for
establishing a narrative parallel between the Odyssey and the contemporary material of Ulysses.96
Yet one work of art can be informed by another without actually adopting its form. Attempts to
map the Grail legend onto The Waste Land necessarily end up contorting the text to conform to
structure that it does not organically exhibit. The Waste Land does not clearly identify a
protagonist, for example, and the contours of a quest cannot be derived from the text itself. As
Spears Brooker notes, Smith’s attempt, for example, “to fill in the missing links in his hero’s quest
for the Holy Grail underpins a conspicuously discontinuous work with a narrative structure.”97
These attempts are unconvincing. They fail to grapple with the formal challenges of the poem
insofar as they simply import a structure external to the poem in order to resolve the difficulties it
creates.
Spears Brooker argues that these attempts to map the narrative of the Grail legend onto The
Waste Land do not fail merely because they are “sidetracked by a spurious plot and a nonexistent
hero.”98 She claims, rather, that they make a more fundamental error regarding the identification
of Eliot’s precise debt to Weston and Frazer. Drawing a distinction between the content of the
material that Weston and Frazer explore, namely the Grail legend and fertility rituals, and the

Ullyot commits a blunder. This blunder can be dismissed along the same lines as Smith’s. I will, however, devote
significant attention to the problematic elements of Ullyot’s thesis later in this chapter.
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method Weston and Frazer both employ to carry out their investigations, Spears Brooker argues
that most scholars of The Waste Land have been “misled by Eliot’s choice of the word ‘mythical’”
in his mythical method.99 This mistake leads them to investigate mythical content for clues that
will unlock the poem. Instead, she claims, “a careful reading of the Ulysses review shows that he
really was referring to method, and that he was using ‘mythical’ in his own way, as a near-synonym
for ‘scientific’ or ‘comparative.’”100 Thus, she suggests that Eliot’s mythical method is not
mythical at all. Instead, when he acknowledges “his debts to Frazer and to Weston, Eliot directs
his readers to the great mythmakers of his day and calls attention to their method.” 101 According
to this account, the structure that Eliot inherits from Weston is actually the methodological practice
of collecting and arranging fragments in order to derive an ideal abstraction capable of clarifying
them. Eliot does not, according to Spears Brooker, adopt Frazer’s method wholesale. Spears
Brooker identifies one main distinction between Eliot’s mythical method and the comparative
method upon which it is based. While Frazer and Weston must reconstruct the hypothesized
monomyth capable of illuminating their quarries, in a work of art developed according to Eliot’s
mythical method, the abstraction is “selected by the artist and constructed collaboratively with
individual readers.”102 Unlike the anthropologist, who searches for the monomyth, the artist
supplies the explanatory structure.
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Spears Brooker claims that her account does more than simply clarify the contours of the
relation between Eliot’s method and Frazer’s. It also illuminates the way in which this method
resolves the aesthetic dilemma that Eliot presents in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth.”103 The conditions
of this dilemma suggest that art is impossible in the crisis of modernity because, on the one hand,
a work of art must be internally unified, while on the other, it must do justice to the contemporary
material to which it responds. Spears Brooker claims that, on her account, the mythical method
“solves the chaos-unity dilemma by allowing the coexistence of surface chaos and subsurface
unity,” and she identifies six central features of this method.104 In a work organized by Eliot’s
mythical method, “unity does not derive from the sequential relation of part to part,” nor does it
derive “from the reference of the work to an abstraction preexistent in culture and shared by the
artist and his audience.”105 Rather, unity results from “reference to an abstraction chosen by the
artist and brought to his work.”106 The abstraction does not unify the text at the “surface of the
work, which to be true to history must consist of juxtaposed fragments.”107 Rather, “disunity exists
on the surface and unity beneath the surface,” and “allusions work to help generate the framework
which supports and unifies the surface.”108 Finally, Spears Brooker claims that the “reference point
myth exists only as an abstraction,” with the result that “each reader of The Waste Land will
construct a variant of Frazer’s monomyth, a variant that will be refined and changed with each

This feature of Spears Brooker’s account is a marked advantage compared to interpretive attempts to organize The
Waste Land according to the narrative structure of the Grail legend. As Spears Brooker notes, these accounts of Eliot’s
use of the Grail Legend cannot explain how it is supposed to resolve this dilemma (Spears Brooker, Mastery and
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reading.”109 Thus, the unity-disunity dilemma is resolved through a bifurcation of the poem.
Superficial disorder gives way to an organizing abstraction.
Spears Brooker’s account of the debt Eliot owes to Frazer’s method is compelling in many
ways. Spears Brooker clearly captures a motivating tension in the poem and identifies a formal
continuity between Eliot’s poetics and the anthropologists he cites in the headnote to The Waste
Land. Further, her distinction between the material that Frazer and Weston address and the method
that they employ helps illuminate the shortcomings of competing accounts of Eliot’s mythical
method. Attempts to reckon with the fragmented structure of The Waste Land surely benefit from
an appreciation of Frazer’s methodology in The Golden Bough. And, indeed, Spears Brooker’s
analysis of the onus this aesthetic form places on the reader offers an interpretive avenue into an
unwieldy text. Spears Brooker’s distinction between content and method, however, also embroils
her account in shortcomings that result from an overemphasis on an allusive method at the expense
of the effect of the allusions employed. Spears Brooker ultimately treats the myths marshaled by
Eliot as ciphers. They perform the formal function of providing an abstract unity to the text in
whose service they are marshaled, but their effect upon the text is otherwise negligible or at least
negotiable. I maintain this one-sided concern depends upon an equivocation regarding the method
Eliot employs and results in a distortion of Eliot’s engagement with Weston.
Spears Brooker appeals to a chain of methodological analogies to ground her claim that
“many interpreters have been misled by Eliot’s choice of the word ‘mythical’” to describe the
method he heralds in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” because “he was really using ‘mythical’ in his
own way, as a near-synonym for ‘scientific’ or ‘comparative’ or ‘inductive.’”110 The first of these
analogies links the method that Eliot enjoins in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” with the investigative
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approach adopted by Frazer in The Golden Bough. Frazer’s method, Spears Brooker correctly
notes, is comparative, though his material is mythical. Spears Brooker therefore commits Eliot to
the same conceptual slippage that she accuses his interpreters of. If Spears Brooker is right, Eliot
substitutes the material for the method. Further, Spears Brooker suggests that “Frazer’s method,
then, more or less duplicates Darwin’s.”111 She claims that Frazer’s approach is “roughly
analogous to the method of the scientist who constructed the imaginary ancestor of the horse.”112
Thus, Spears Brooker maintains that when Eliot lauds the mythical method as having the
“importance of a scientific discovery,” he is actually identifying it as “a term for the scientific
method as transformed by its application in the arts.”113
This chain of inferences strikes me as speculative at best and question begging at worst.
Though Frazer’s comparative method surely provides a powerful hermeneutic tool for illuminating
the fragmentary structure of The Waste Land, its relevance to the method structuring Ulysses, one
presumably shared by The Waste Land, is less assured. The assumption that Eliot’s debt to Frazer
can straightforwardly be identified with the method he ascribes to Joyce requires, on the one hand,
committing Eliot to the category error of mistaking material for method and, on the other, eliding
the description of the mythical method that Eliot himself presents in the review of Ulysses. For the
method that Eliot claims “others must pursue after” Joyce involves “manipulating a continuous
parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity.”114 Through the chain of inferences of Spears
Brooker’s account, this description transforms into the belief in an “original unity of human
consciousness and the continuous evolution of that consciousness from prehistory to present.”115
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The synchronic expression of a “parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” in Eliot’s
account becomes a diachronic process of evolution.116 Eliot’s appeal to a vision of social reality
organized through a structural and enduring parallel becomes instead an exercise in the historical
reconstruction of discontinuous fragments.117
Spears Brooker’s elision of the parallel between antiquity and contemporaneity expressed
through the mythical material marshaled in literary texts results in the prioritization of Frazer’s
method over Weston’s investigation of the Grail legend. Indeed, though Eliot cites Weston first in
the headnote to The Waste Land, the investigations of From Ritual to Romance seem to disappear
from Spears Brooker’s account entirely. The Waste Land is, however, definitively ensconced
within the literary tradition elaborated by Weston, insofar as that tradition provided “not only the
title, but the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism” of the poem.118 Further, though
Eliot cites Frazer as a secondary inspiration, he clarifies that Frazer’s influence extends to the
material incorporated into the poem, as “anyone who is acquainted with these works will
immediately recognize in the poem certain references to vegetation ceremonies.”119 Eliot here cites
a debt to Weston and Frazer that extends beyond the methods they share. Their influence on the
Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” 478. My claim that a parallel between antiquity and contemporaneity can be
synchronic may seem counterintuitive. In the following chapters I will argue extensively that Eliot’s poetics in The
Waste Land depend upon an understanding of the continued existence of the past into the present. This endurance
entails that the parallel is not merely continuous but also, in some sense, simultaneous.
117
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hermeneutic avenues, particularly with respect to The Waste Land’s incorporation of the Grail Legend.
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poem manifests in the symbols incorporated into the work, symbols implicated in a tradition of
fertility rituals. An investigation of The Waste Land’s deployment of a mythical method analogous
to Joyce’s must be able to account not merely for Eliot’s appeals to Frazer’s methodological
innovations but also for the ceremonial symbols incorporated into the poem from Weston’s
investigations into the Grail legend.
Though The Waste Land resists the narrative structure that would permit the Grail legend
to serve as a plot device, in the way the Odyssey provides a frame for Ulysses, the incorporated
elements of the Grail legend nevertheless provide a structure to the poem. The poem’s title
announces the debt to the Grail tradition, and the second stanza elaborates upon this debt. The
depiction of a wasted land, “where the sun beats, / And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket
no relief, / And the dry stone no sound of water,” suggests a kinship between the environment of
the poem and the blasted earth that necessitates the quest of the Grail.120 The final section returns
once more to this wasted land, appealing to both the Fisher king and the mad king Hieronymo in
the final lines of the poem.121 Between these clear references to the problem that motivates the
Grail quest, the wasted land and the ailing king, the poem incorporates incidents from the stories,
such as the meeting with death at the chapel perilous, and symbolism of mysterious provenance,
such as the Tarot deck.122 No hero embarks upon the journey to cure the king and restore vitality
to the land. But the symbols incorporated into the poem invest it with their own logic, a
sympathetic logic according to which the wasting of the land, the ailing of the king, and the
destitution of the inhabitants are reflections of the same condition. Thus, the depictions of sterile
erotic love in “The Fire Sermon” are wedded to images of decay. The speaker remarks, for
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example, upon “white bodies naked on the low damp ground / and bones cast in a little low dry
garret.”123 The repetition of “low” obscures what minimal distance separated the scene of
copulation from the scene of decay. Similarly, the undeath of the crowd that “flowed over London
bridge” in “The Burial of the Dead” resonates with the “dead sound” echoes by Saint Mary
Woolnoth “on the final stroke of nine.”124 The waking death of London’s inhabitants finds
expression in their environment.
Though attempts to use the Grail legend to identify a narrative in The Waste Land run
aground on the poem’s fragmented form, their failures do not entail that the material incorporated
from Weston’s investigation plays no role in structuring the poem. These symbols invest the poem
with the sympathetic logic that animates their tradition, a tradition that The Waste Land participates
in through its engagement with them. This animating logic organizes the poetic fragments. The
seemingly disparate juxtaposition of an abstract, barren landscape with social interactions
characterized by miscommunication and sterility are revealed, within the logic of the vegetation
ceremony, to be manifestations of the same malady. The land suffers because of the ailing, or
malpractice, of the people. The people suffer because the land wastes.
III. Sympathetic Logic and the Loss of a World
III.1. Escaping History into Myth
I have argued that The Waste Land’s incorporation of imagery derived from the Grail legend
establishes it as part of the tradition of fertility rituals within which that legend is embedded. Eliot
does not merely adopt a comparative method from the work of Weston and Frazer work, as Spears
Brooker claims. He also imbues the poem with the imagery that those anthropologists interrogate.
Figures central to The Waste Land, from the image of the wasted land itself to the personage of
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the fisher king, are integral to the Grail legends that Weston chronicles. Further, Weston argues
that these legends themselves participate in a more ancient tradition. This tradition, traced and
explicated by Frazer, is animated by a sympathetic logic according to which the health of the land
is tied to and preserved by those living upon it. With its incorporation of these symbols, The Waste
Land intervenes in this tradition and is thereby invested with its sympathetic logic.
Jonathan Ullyot and Robert Lehman present complementary accounts that reckon with
Eliot’s incorporation of mythical material into The Waste Land. Lehman argues in Impossible
Modernism: T.S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and the Critique of Historical Reason that Eliot appeals
to myth as a cohesive force in The Waste Land. According to Lehman, Eliot conceives of history
and myth in oppositional terms. History, for Eliot, is fundamentally degenerative, while myth
provides the promise of cohesion precisely because it is, in some sense, outside of time. Eliot’s
mythical method, then, offers an alternative to the chaotic overdetermination of his moment by
integrating a timeless framework that resists the degenerative historical impulse towards anarchy.
While Lehman builds this argument concerning the general function of myth by appealing to the
variety of mythical material scattered throughout The Waste Land, Jonathan Ullyot adopts a similar
conceptual framework to make a much more specific argument. He claims that Eliot appeals to
Weston’s account of the Grail legend in order to recover the pre-logical perspective inherent to
this ritual tradition. In doing so, Ullyot seems to suggest that Eliot appeals to this tradition, and
particularly its sympathetic logic, as a livable response to the dissolution of a shared contemporary
worldview. According to Ullyot, when confronted with the weakening hegemony of the Christian
perspective, in Spears Brooker’s terms, or the entropic force of history, in Lehman’s, Eliot
endorses myth itself as a substitute. Poetry allows us to recover a shared cultural vision by simply
retreating into a mythical past.
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Ullyot’s account of The Waste Land is not particularly defensible because it commits Eliot
to a poetics of return that he resists throughout his critical corpus, even in the passages to which
Ullyot appeals. I will argue, however, that precisely these deficiencies in Ullyot’s account
illuminate a serious challenge to the legitimacy of The Waste Land’s response to a modern cultural
landscape marked by alienation. If the mythical method ultimately entails a straightforward
endorsement of a mythical perspective, then it amounts to precisely the retreat from reality that
Georg Lukács associates with modernist literature. Such a retreat from reality could have profound
implications concerning the possibility of a shared objective reality, a concern Lukács investigates
in The Destruction of Reason. Further a complementary historical critique becomes relevant,
insofar as the specific mythic structure that Eliot appeals to in The Waste Land was deployed to
devastating effect by the Nazi party, which raises cause for concern about the felicity of appealing
to fertility rites to recover a sense of a shared social totality. This concern is, indeed, amplified by
Eliot’s own flirtations with fascism and his antisemitic leanings. In the face of these potentially
damning critiques, I will argue that Eliot’s mythical method does not promote a retreat from
reality.125 Rather I will claim that the mythical structure invoked in The Waste Land serves to
illuminate a more fundamental and objective epistemological framework. The fertility rites
incorporated into The Waste Land through the Grail legend raise the problem of the relation
between individuals and their world, a problem that the poem also invokes through a reference to
F.H. Bradley’s engagement with the problem of solipsism. Though the poem employs the mythical
logic of the Grail legend as a formal device capable of organizing the poem, the structure this logic
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imparts reveals a problematic that is not grounded in myth at all. The mythical problem of a wasted
land resolves into the epistemological problem of the loss of a shared world.
In the chapter “Myth” from his Impossible Modernism: T.S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and
the Critique of Historical Reason, Robert Lehman illuminates Eliot’s appeal to myth in The Waste
Land by interrogating the contrast Eliot draws between myth and history. Myth, Lehman argues,
names for Eliot “first of all, an interruption of the narrative of literary modernism.”126 Indeed, myth
appears throughout the chapter as an interruptive force, not merely of the “narrative of literary
modernism” but of the vicissitudes of history more generally. The appeal to myth serves Eliot’s
aim of establishing “in The Waste Land a moment or a space outside of the historical world that
The Waste Land describes, one from which this world might be ordered, controlled.”127 Myth, on
this account, fulfills the role that Eliot proclaims for it in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” because it
offers a vantage that is not subject to the logic of decay that Eliot, according to Lehman, associates
with literary history. Lehman reads the opening lines of The Waste Land, with their allusions to
Chaucer and to Whitman, as an instantiation of the poem’s commitment to a historical vision of
cyclical decay. Chaucer initiates a revolution in English verse, and Whitman represents the
repetition and conclusion of that revolution. Despite the poem’s appeal to the cyclical changing of
seasons, “Whitman is not only the repetition of Chaucer’s verse revolution,” as could perhaps be
expected of a historical cycle of renewal.128 Rather, “he is, in some sense, the latter’s falling to
waste.”129 And so, “the poem thus presents the coadunation of a closed, cyclical process—the
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repetition of the seasons and the repetition of literary-historical moments—with a degenerative
process.”130 As a poetic production, The Waste Land, too, is embroiled in the temporal logic of
degeneration.
Lehman argues that the rejection of a narrative method in favor of a mythical method
promises an escape from this cyclical decay. Myth, according to Lehman “imposes a vision of
history absolutely incompatible with narrative presentation; one that ‘lacks a truly temporal
dimension’; one for which ‘historical time does not exist’; and so one that refuses the before and
after on which accounts of literary tradition depend”131 By rejecting a narrative method for a
mythical one, then, Eliot seems to be suggesting that order can be imposed on the anarchic
conditions of modernity through the imposition of an extra-temporal vision. Indeed, Lehman
claims that Eliot’s adoption of bricolage facilitates the development of this extra-temporal
perspective. Insofar as he “cuts lines from Webster or Baudelaire free from their textual or historic
contexts,” Eliot “cuts this narrative’s joints, denies the progressive continuity of its moments.”132
This process establishes a dilemma for Eliot, one that Lehman claims is fundamentally
unresolvable. If The Waste Land is to invoke myth as an alternative perspective freed of the
historical cycle of degeneration, then it must itself escape that cycle. But as a work of art, The
Waste Land already exists as a created object. It is bound to the history.

Waste Land must include all of literary history as a final moment. C.D. Blanton offers a more compelling account of
The Waste Land’s project of including history in his Epic Negation, which emphasizes the fluidity of the poem’s
borders. According to his argument, which I will discuss further in the next chapter, the poem includes history while
remaining, itself, a part of history. This possibility remains open for Blanton because history is not, according to his
account, treated as a degenerative force to be escaped.
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Though Lehman concludes that “Eliot can try to affirm both history and myth in The Waste
Land” but cannot “really bring them together,” his account captures the appeal of a retreat from
history. This sense of a retreat from history is, I think, heightened by Lehman’s focus on rupture
over continuity. Lehman presents myth and history as occupying incommensurable positions in
Eliot’s imagination, which leads him to claim that, if Eliot’s critical work is “on the side of
continuity,” then The Waste Land “is on the side of rupture.”133 Just as Lehman identifies the
boundary between myth and history to be fixed, the site of rupture, so too does he identify such a
sense of rupture within the notion of history itself. By ascribing to Eliot a position according to
which literary history is merely a process of degeneration that concluded with Whitman, Lehman
identifies the modernist’s situation itself as one of rupture. Both of these appeals to rupture elide
Eliot’s engagement with historical and literary continuity. They require Lehman to treat Eliot the
poet and Eliot the critic as discontinuous figures. Yet Lehman also acknowledges that Eliot’s
engagement with myth involves a greater concern for continuity than he allows. Tiresias, for
example, is a mythical figure who seems to exist in the poem “both inside and outside of history,”
insofar as he is “a literary-historical allusion, having passed through the hands of Homer,
Sophocles, Ovid, and Dryden before being taken up by Eliot himself.”134 It is not clear to me that
such a nuanced engagement with Tiresias is possible within a framework that treats the boundary
between myth and history as fixed. Though this feature of Lehman’s account results, I think, in
inconsistencies and a failure to recognize the poem’s appeals to continuity in spite of rupture, I
maintain that the account generally raises the important problem of whether Eliot appeals to myth
as an alternative to history.
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In the chapter entitled “Jessie Weston and the Mythical Method of The Waste Land,” from
The Medieval Presence in Modern Literature: The Quest to Fail, Jonathan Ullyot suggests more
emphatically than Lehman that Eliot marshals myth as an alternative to degenerate historical
conditions. A poem that, in Lehman’s account, carefully and unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile
myth with history becomes in Ullyot’s interpretation a call to retreat into ritual. Ullyot associates
the unifying promise of Eliot’s appeal to myth with his development of Weston’s work on the
Grail legend. Like Spears Brooker, Ullyot argues that Eliot’s deployment of From Ritual to
Romance is fundamentally methodological, but the methodology that Ullyot derives is radically
distinct from the comparative method that Spears Brooker explicates. Ullyot identifies Eliot’s
mythical method as a methodology of return. He claims that “for Eliot, the only way to make the
modern world possible for art was for literature to return to its anthropological roots: its primitive
and ritualistic nature.135 Not only does Ullyot claim that Eliot enjoins the artist to return to the
“primitive and ritualistic nature” of poetry, but he claims that in doing so the “job of the artist is
to unearth the pre-logical mentality.”136 Confronted with “the Waste Land of contemporary life,”
the poet is charged with “revivifying the contemporary activities” by returning to the practice of
“poetry as ‘primitive’ and poetry as a reflection of a pre-logical mentality.”137 Ullyot does not
sufficiently explicate what this pre-logical mentality entails, opting instead to focus on its emotive
function.138 It is, for him, a source of life, a source of energy. I have argued already in this chapter,
however, that Weston and Frazer both articulate a conceptual framework animating the rituals that

Ullyot, The Medieval Presence in Modern Literature, 54. Here the contrast between Spears Brooker’s account and
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they investigate and that Eliot integrates into The Waste Land. This mentality is grounded in a
sympathetic logic according to which the health of the land is identified with and causally tied to
the health and behavior of its inhabitants.139
The specific structure of Ullyot’s argument is, I think, deficient. Ullyot does not
sufficiently attend to the copresence of past and present in Eliot’s appeals to a privileged poetic
engagement with the “primitive.” Because he fails to recognize this temporal dimension to Eliot’s
poetics, he too easily ascribes to Eliot a poetics of return. Eliot consistently rejects the notion that
poetry can be relevant simply by returning to previous forms. And I find no reason to believe that
appealing to the destruction of established forms to return to a prior, pre-logical perspective
somehow legitimizes an analogous poetics of return. Ullyot’s account, therefore, strikes me as
committing Eliot to precisely the forms of classicism that he rejects. Ullyot simply replaces a
commitment to an established classical cannon with the fetishization of a pre-logical, “primitive”
mentality.140 Despite its problems, however, Ullyot’s account brings an important question into
relief regarding the attitude that Eliot adopts toward the mythical material he incorporates into The
Waste Land.141 On the one hand, Eliot may endorse myth as a straightforward alternative to the

Ullyot obliquely references Weston’s appeal to fertility rituals, claiming that the attempt to locate a fertility ritual
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passage from the Perlesvaus,” thereby eliding Weston’s appeals to a sympathetic logic (Ullyot, The Medieval Presence
in Modern Literature, 73). Though the evidence she adduces is not uniformly compelling, Weston does not merely
appeal to one passage to ground her claim. She establishes myriad links to the tradition of rituals explicated by Frazer,
from parameters the quest itself to the symbols of the Tarot. Ullyot’s elision on this front allows him to appeal to the
more generalized incorporation of a pre-logical feeling rather than the specific logic explicated by Weston and Frazer.
140
As Ullyot notes, Eliot certainly adopts an imperialist, and at times particularly cringeworthy, stance throughout his
works, including his dabbling in anthropology. I do not mean to contest this. Indeed, I think Ullyot himself downplays
these problematic aspects of Eliot’s criticism, despite acknowledging them (Ullyot, The Medieval Presence in Modern
Literature, 55–56). I object, however, to the way in which Ullyot’s account reduces Eliot’s appeal to myth to this
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contemporary moment he identifies as anarchic. This endorsement may manifest as the attempt to
abscond to a timeless perspective, as Lehman suggests, or as an attempted return to a pre-logical
mentality, as Ullyot does. I maintain that reading The Waste Land as a straightforward appeal to
myth as a viable alternative to a disappointing world-historical moment commits the text to a
problematic position that should, I think, be regarded with suspicion. Indeed, reading the text in
this way renders it subject to the challenges to modernist literature and its theoretical foundations
posed by Lukács. After articulating these challenges, which I take to be damning, I will develop
an alternative account of the function of mythical material in The Waste Land, one that neither
elides the significance of that material nor commits the poem to a tacit endorsement of it as a
prospective ground for communal life.
If Eliot endorses an earnest return to the mythical logic grounding a tradition of vegetation
ceremonies, then The Waste Land seems to exhibit the precise retreat from objective reality that
Georg Lukács claims characterizes modernist literature. In addition to offering a scathing critique
of such a retreat from reality, Lukács traces the grim historical trajectory of appeals to fertility
myths of just the sort Eliot employs in The Waste Land. This history offers grounds to treat with
suspicion any potential appeal to fertility ceremonies as a panacea for the crisis of modernity. In
“The Ideology of Modernism,” Lukács associates modernist literature with a commitment to the
human condition as fundamentally alienated. This commitment, in turn, results in a “disintegration
of personality” that is “matched by a disintegration of the outer world.”142 With this disintegration,
“distortion becomes as inseparable a part of the portrayal of reality as the recourse to the
pathological.”143 Though Lukács acknowledges that modernist authors “often rightly” present life
in capitalist modernity as “a distortion (a petrification or paralysis),” he claims that the modernist
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tendency is to “present psychopathology as way of escape from this distortion.”144 When the
relation between individual subjects and objective reality fractures, a state of affairs reminiscent
of the conditions Eliot describes in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” pathology and distortion become
the only apparent recourse. Reality dissolves and yields to fantasy. The desire to escape from a
historical logic of degeneration fosters a yearning to retreat into the mythical logic of
environmental sympathy.
In the chapter on “Pre-Fascist and Fascist Vitalism,” from The Destruction of Reason,
Lukács further articulates the ideological trajectory from the philosophical denial of objective
reality to a retreat into politically motivated mythmaking.145 Lukács identifies Ludwig Klages as
the vanguard of this retreat. In Klages, the Vitalist commitment to subjectivity, which acquires a
particularly polemical tone, “no longer constituted a simple nihilistic negation, but an about-turn
into direct myth” with an explicit “epistemology of his new doctrine of myths.”146 Lukács does
not merely trace the ideological ramifications of the retreat from objective reality into mythical
fantasy. He also acknowledges the historical development of this line of thought, particularly as it
finds expression in the self-conscious mythologizing of the Nazi party. Lukács highlights more
specifically the Nazi deployment of mythical language identifying a land with its people by
appealing to the life or health of each, which is precisely the mythical structure that organizes The
Waste Land. Lukács argues that the ideologues of German fascism cultivated a mythology focused
on the dichotomy of life and death. They inherited this dichotomy from the radicalized version of
the Vitalist philosophical framework found in Klages, among others.147 This mythical dichotomy
Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism,” 33.
One may claim that “denial of objective reality” is too strong a phrase. Yet, according to the logic that Lukács
traces, the commitment to a subjective principle above the objective quickly dissolves the distinction between
objective and subjective, resulting in a purely subjective universe.
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was used, in the first place, to distinguish the Nazi political framework from competing political
orientations. Thus, Lukács claims that in Baeumler, “vitalism comes in, ‘with a virile people the
soldier’s life represents a life-form.’ The ideal of the ‘political soldier,’ the S.A. and the S.S. man,
was therefore life incarnate, in contrast to the fossilized bourgeois world.”148 A nexus of
equivalencies develops. Life, myth, the paradigmatically German, and the virile are held in contrast
to the dead, the fossilized, the sterile, the historical, and, ultimately, the “insufficiently” German.149
In Lukács’ account, this equivalence reaches its apogee in the work of Alfred Rosenberg.
Following the racial essentialism of Stuart Houston Chamberlin, and, according to Lukács,
simplifying it for mass consumption, Rosenberg claimed that “no nation was racially unitarian, not
even the German.”150 Further, “from this it followed that the dominance of the higher-ranking,
purer race (the Nordic) needed safeguarding by every possible means.”151 This dominance,
however was not cast simply as political dominance. Rather, the demand for the dominance of the
Nordic race was presented in the mythical language of sanguinity. Thus, “the day that Nordic blood
runs completely dry, Germany would fall apart and go to the wall in chaos.” 152 The health of
Germany was presented as depending upon the presence and dominance of Nordic blood, which
was carried by the National Socialist movement.153 By enshrouding the political aspirations of the
Nazi party in the mythology of race purity, Rosenberg seemingly legitimized violence on a mass
scale. He “extracted from racialism’s reactionary theory of inequality all of the barbaric
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consequences possible, and took them to bestial extremes.”154 Through this sanguineous version
of the fertility myth, Hitler was able to claim that “Germanization can only be practiced on the
land itself, and never on human beings.”155 Lukács derives from this claim the conclusion that “the
German Reich ought to expand, conquer fertile lands and expel or wipe out their population.”156
In this way, a fertility logic analogous to that appealed to in The Waste Land was used to explicitly
justify the suppression of political dissent, the militaristic expansion of the nation, and the
extermination of great swathes of the population.
The Waste Land is clearly not responsible for the Nazi mobilization of a similar mythical
structure.157 Lukács’ arguments, though, offer cause to further interrogate the suggestion that
Eliot’s mythical method entails a proposal to escape from history into myth. If Eliot endorses a
retreat into myth, then The Waste Land becomes a legitimate target of Lukács’ claim that modernist
literature entails the denial of objective reality. Further, advocating such a retreat entails that all
narratives, as Lukács shows, take on the aspect of myth. Myth ceases to function as a force capable
of imposing order on history and making it possible for art. Instead, history is annihilated, and
myth is installed in its place. Since the retreat entails a denial of the relation to objective reality
against which to compare the narratives, they all appear equally valid. 158 This final turn results in
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the possibility, or inevitability, that a mythical framework serves insidious ends, just as the logic
of fertility ritual was used to justify Nazi expansion.
III.2. Resolving Myth into Reality
I maintain that Eliot marshals the Grail legend as neither as an alternative to history nor an ancient
ritualistic possibility to which we must return. Rather, The Waste Land employs the sympathetic
logic of the Grail legend to reveal an epistemological reality. In revealing this epistemic structure,
the poem leverages myth but moves beyond it. Myth operates as an organizing principle that brings
a more fundamental reality into view, and, as such, should not be the treated as itself a reality
endorsed by the poem. The final section of The Waste Land signals this transition from the
mythical to the epistemological. In a stanza that captures the breakdown of communication
characteristic of all of the poem’s interactions, the speaker remarks “I have heard the key / Turn
in the door once and turn once only / We think of the key, each in his prison / Thinking of the key,
each confirms a prison / Only at nightfall, aethereal rumors / Revive for a moment a broken
Coriolanus.”159 The image of the prison evokes personages throughout the poem, such as the
speaker who, when approached by their beloved who had returned from the Hyacinth garden,
“could not / Speak,” “was neither / Living nor dead” and “knew nothing / Looking into the heart
of light, the silence.”160 The interlocutors of “A Game of Chess,” too, are trapped in their own
prisons of misunderstanding despite the presence of a companion, while the depictions of sexual
union in “The Fire Sermon” all result in some form of isolation.161 Not only does the prison stanza
capture the sense of isolation that manifests throughout the poem, but, as Eliot clarifies in the notes,
it also invokes F.H. Bradley’s account of the relation between the individual and the world. In
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doing so, it establishes an epistemological parallel to the mythical relation between individual and
land incorporated into the poem through the Grail legend.
I maintain that Eliot’s engagement with F.H. Bradley reveals that, instead of simply
endorsing a retreat into myth, The Waste Land employs this sympathetic logic to illuminate the
structure of a shared world. Particularly, Eliot’s dissertation chapter concerning the problem of
solipsism clarifies his understanding of the relationship between the individual and the world. In
doing so, it reveals how the existence of a shared world depends upon the individuals who relate
to it. The shared world is neither a stable nor given existent. Rather, it is intended by individuals
with distinct perspectives. To the extent that the individuals interpret their world in broadly the
same way, they can be said to share a world. But, when their points of view are not commensurable,
their worlds fracture. This framework attempts to resolve the problem of solipsism by suggesting
how disparate points of view can, in fact, be unified. The problem does not entirely disappear,
however, as the world is always at risk of disintegration. Thus, the appeals to a sympathetic logic
do not endorse a mythical connection between the people and the land. Rather, they speak to an
epistemological reality in which the existence of a world depends upon those who share it.
The sixth chapter of Eliot’s Knowledge and Experience, “Solipsism,” endeavors to address
a problem that arises from the previous chapters, each treating a dimension of knowledge in the
philosophical framework of F.H. Bradley. The conclusions of the previous chapters, indeed,
necessitate a treatment of the problem. For Eliot has argued that “there is no other object than that
which appears, and its appearance as an object gives it, in an absolute sense, all that objectively it
could possibly mean.”162 To be an object is simply to appear to an individual consciousness, and
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objective reality is reality as it appears to that individual. From this, Eliot draws the further
conclusion that “beyond the objective worlds of a number of finite centers, each having its own
objects, there is no objective world.”163 For the purposes of this discussion, the term finite center
may be understood to refer to an individual.164 Because the objective world appears as the horizon
of experience for an individual consciousness, it cannot be taken for granted that a single external
reality unifies the frames of multiple finite centers, or even that other finite centers exist. This
brings Eliot to the main questions of the chapter: “how do we yoke our divers worlds to draw
together? how can we issue from the circle described about each point of view? and…how can I
know that there are other points of view, or, admitting their existence, how can I take any account
of them.”165
Eliot’s response to these questions depends upon his account of identity. A shared world
arises through the recognition of identity by multiple individuals. These individuals come to
“interpret [their] own experience as the attention to a world of objects, as [they] feel obscurely an
identity between the experiences of other centres and [their] own.”166 In some sense, this response
to the problem of solipsism is rather straightforward. We “issue from the circle described about
each point of view” by recognizing that, within our point of view, objects appear which seem to
engage with a world that is identical to ours.167 Through this recognition, we enter into a shared
world. Yet, Eliot specifies that “the identity between one man’s world and another’s does not
consist, as we are readily led to believe, in one world which is the world of right perception, and
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which is, apart from being known, exactly what it is when we know it.” 168 The identity of these
shared experiences of the world does not refer to an external reality that transcends those
experiences, and against which they can be judged true or false. Rather, the identity of the world
is, in some sense, agreed upon by the individuals. To the extent that their “points of view are
essentially akin,” they engage with the same world.169 This is because the nature of identity is such
that when we recognize an identity, “an identity is intended, and it could not have been
intended…unless it was there; but its being ‘there’ consists simply in the intention, and has no
other meaning.”170 The identity exists because it is recognized.
On the one hand, this argument results in a technically sufficient response to the problem
of solipsism. I know there are other finite centers because they appear in my world and behave in
such a way that I can recognize them as similar to myself.171 Similarly, I recognize that we share
a world because I observe those finite centers behaving in ways that suggest an identity between
the worlds of their experience and my own. This entails that “there are two (or more) worlds each
continuous with a self, and yet running in the other direction – somehow – into an identity.”172 On
the other hand, however, the ideal nature of this identity entails that the shared world is volatile.
In order “to come to intend an identical world,” we must “adjust our behavior to that of others and
co-operate with them.”173 Eliot engages primarily, though not exclusively, with the positive
formulation of this account. Insofar as disparate points of view recognize an identity between their
objective worlds, they may be said to inhabit a shared world. Yet Eliot also recognizes that such
an identity cannot be assumed. It must rather be won through labor. Through “adjusting our
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behavior to that of others and in co-operating with them we come to intend an identical world.”174
Further, because we “come to intend” this identity, conditions could arise such that we cease to do
so. In this case, the threat of solipsism would return, and the objective world would potentially
disintegrate into myriad worlds of experience. In this sense, the health of the world is determined
by the health of its inhabitants, instantiating epistemologically the sympathetic logic of fertility
rites. The ability of individuals to accommodate each other’s perspectives, their openness to
communication and interaction, preserves their world. Furthermore, this determination is
reciprocal. As individuals become alienated, they cease to inhabit a shared reality. In this sense,
the health of the world and the health of its inhabitants are inextricable.
Eliot’s appeals in The Waste Land to the fertility rituals of The Golden Bough and From
Ritual to Romance need not be taken as endorsement of a mystical connection between the land
and the people living on it. Though they invest the poem with a sympathetic logic, this logic is not
a straightforward re-inscription of the fertility rites explicated by Frazer and Weston. Rather, the
appeal to the sympathetic logic develops a poetic representation of an epistemological relation.
The health of the world does, in fact, depend upon the health of those in it, because a shared world
exists only insofar as there is an established identity between the worlds of disparate individuals,
an identity won through shared work. When, in the conditions of social transformation and
philosophical, social, or religious crisis, such an identity cannot be preserved, the shared world
risks disintegration. As individuals become increasingly alienated and locked in separate spheres
of experience, objective reality suffers. Indeed, when the problem becomes critical, as described
in The Waste Land for example, a shared objective reality seems to cease to exist entirely. Thus,
The Waste Land incorporates a sympathetic logic that structures the poem, but it employs this
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mythical logic to articulate the breakdown of a more fundamental epistemological reality. The
myth, then, structures the work of literature. Imbued with this framework, however, the work of
literature subsequently transforms its mythical element to reveal the importance of human
connection for the maintenance of a shared world.
The Waste Land’s transformation from sympathetic logic to epistemic problematic
illuminates the operation of Eliot’s mythical method. Eliot presents the mythical method as a
literary form capable of navigating the competing demands of artistic creation in historical
conditions characterized by fracture. While art must, according Eliot, be unified and organized, it
must also adequately reflect the historical conditions that give rise to its production. Thus, for
Eliot, the modern artist must strike a tenuous balance between the order demanded by the work of
art and the simultaneous overdetermination and lack of unifying framework exhibited in the
modern historical context. Myth provides a means for resolving this tension by offering established
and relatively stable forms around which to structure the disparate and seemingly
incommensurable material that the modern artist must manipulate. The forms provided by myth
may be narrative, such as the stages in Odysseus’ journey that structure Ulysses, but they need not
be. Indeed, The Waste Land does not incorporate a narrative mythical element at all. Rather, it is
organized around the sympathetic logic that animates the ritual tradition in which, according to
Weston, the Grail legend participates. Further, the mythical method does not, and cannot, entail
the mere application of an ancient form to contemporary material, for the form must be adequate
to the material that it shapes. Myth is thus deployed to illuminate a parallel between the antique
and the contemporary. This parallel, further, ultimately renders legible contemporary conditions
that had previously seemed too anarchic to be recognized.
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Thus, The Waste Land exhibits the revelatory promise of myth. Myth can function as a tool
to illuminate realities otherwise obscured in social conditions characterized by overdetermination.
When the meanings of words, events, or ideas become overburdened with incommensurable
meanings, myth can serve a coordinating function. It brings those overdetermined terms into a
stable, though temporary, arrangement, one that facilitates a vision of the underlying and enduring
relations. The myth, then, does not operate as an end in itself. It does not offer a refuge from chaos
to which we can simply retreat. Rather, the mythical method succeeds to the extent that it resolves
the myth into a more fundamental reality. Adopting this inherited framework, inhabiting this
antique vision, ultimately allows us to see our own world anew. It does this not by casting a veil
of enchantment over a fallen world, nor by freeing us from the vicissitudes of history. Rather it
organizes our vision around constellations of cultural material already available to us in our own
historical moment, allowing some features to shine brighter and revealing their latent connections.
It thereby provides a framework with which to orient our vision, a structure around which to shore
the fragments of a chaotic moment, and the foundation for the synthesis of a shared world.
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A VISION OF SYNTHESIS
HISTORICAL SENSE AND THE RECOVERY OF CONNECTION IN THE WASTE LAND

Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that The Waste Land presents a vision of failure. The
poem depicts a social reality characterized by isolation and fragmentation. The dissolution of the
social totality is reflected in the desolation of the landscapes described in the poem, while the
overwhelming sense of social dissolution is reinscribed in the fragmentary form of the poem itself.
I originally identified the condition depicted in The Waste Land as a state of alienation, which I
defined as the individual experience of a breakdown of the social totality. In the second chapter of
this project, I further specified the poem’s explication of this condition. I argued that Eliot invests
The Waste Land with a sympathetic logic derived from fertility rituals, most immediately the Grail
Legend. According to this sympathetic logic, the conditions of a people are reflected in the land
upon which they live. Thus, the wasting of the environment in the poem can be understood as a
result of the behavior of the personages that populate it. By incorporating this sympathetic logic,
the poem simultaneously internalizes a principle of unity, as demanded by Eliot’s conception of
the work of art, while giving voice to anarchic social conditions that resist unified representation.
I have argued that, instead of endorsing this vision of reality as an inescapable fact, The
Waste Land takes it up as a problem to be worked upon. I suggested that an investigation of the
sympathetic logic structuring the poem provides insight into the sense of alienation that suffuses
it, maintaining that The Waste Land deploys this sympathetic logic to identify a more fundamental
epistemological problem concerning the possibility of inhabiting a shared world. According to the
epistemological framework that Eliot develops through his engagement with Bradley, the
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existence of a shared world depends upon the mutual recognition among individuals that they
intend the same field of objects. So long as this recognition holds, they may be said to inhabit the
same world. But if their perspectives cease to align, the world they share disintegrates. The
preservation of a world depends upon the shared capacity to synthesize perspectives.
If The Waste Land offers a response to the condition of alienation that it diagnoses, then it
must offer an account of how to “yoke our divers worlds to draw together” and “issue from the
circle described around each point of view.”1 In this chapter, I will argue that Eliot identifies in
The Sacred Wood a capacity for synthesis that intervenes in the problematic developed through
The Waste Land’s incorporation of a sympathetic logic. He identifies this capacity as historical
sense, describing it as involving “a perception not only of the pastness of the past, but of its
presence” and “a feeling that the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole
of literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”2
Elsewhere in his corpus Eliot appeals to historical sense as granting the ability to integrate material
from vastly different contexts into a new perspective. In the opening section of this chapter I offer
an analysis of Eliot’s notion of historical sense, explicating in particular Eliot’s appeals to the ways
in which it synthesizes perspectives. Drawing on the work of C.D. Blanton and Piers Gray, I attend
to the pressure in Eliot’s thinking to pursue increasingly comprehensive perspectives, illuminating
the philosophical problems motivating Eliot’s appeal to historical sense as well as relevance of
this concept to Eliot’s work in The Waste Land.
Though I agree with Gray and Blanton on many accounts, I argue that in they both exhibit
an overwhelming focus on Eliot’s appeal to an ideal order and the sense in which this appeal forces
a renegotiation the limits of the text. I maintain that they overlook the ways in which traces of the
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past reconfigure the social relations presented within the poem itself. In the second section of this
chapter, I pursue a reading of The Waste Land that emphasizes the changes effected in the poem
by a past that endures. I attend to the poem’s use of allusion and repetition to foster connections
between isolated personages in disconnected vignettes. I appeal, in particular, to the two
appearances of Philomel, arguing that her inclusion in the poem calls attention to structures of
violence that silence the characters in the scenes in which she appears while also establishing
connections between seemingly disconnected victims of violence. I argue, thus, that The Waste
Land appeals to Eliot’s notion of historical sense to synthesize perspectives and restore the
possibility of connection, thereby offering an alternative to the vision of alienation developed in
the opening chapters of this project.
In the final section of this chapter I address the concern that, even if The Waste Land is
designed to cultivate historical sense in its reader, adjustments to the relationship between text and
author or text and reader are incapable of reckoning with the totalizing sense of alienation
presented in the poem. I argue that formal elements of The Waste Land, in addition to Eliot’s
capacious account of history, elide the borders between text, author, reader, and context. I
ultimately argue that, through its dissolution of the boundary between text and context, The Waste
Land imbues historical sense into the literary tradition, suggesting a far more comprehensive
response to the loss of a world than the limited relationship between text and reader might permit.
I. The Synthetic Potential of Historical Sense
In The Sacred Wood, Eliot identifies a capacity for synthesis that promises an alternative to the
myopic tendencies of modern social experience. These tendencies include the stultifying modes of
classicism that mummify the past by merely cataloguing it and the rapid specification of scientific
fields of study into subfields, which makes it “difficult for anyone to know whether he knows what
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he is talking about or not.”3 The social implications of this analytic circumscription of perspectives
dominate the social interactions of The Waste Land and manifest in the loss of a shared world.4 In
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot introduces this synthetic capacity, which he identifies
as historical sense, as a necessary condition for the cultivation of “Tradition,” itself a prerequisite
for the creation of enduring works of art.5 Because of the limited scope of this discussion, Eliot
only obliquely captures the juxtaposition of this synthetic power with those analytic tendencies
critiqued elsewhere. Nevertheless, as he does in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” Eliot draws a
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate approaches to his object. His description of an
illegitimate approach to tradition as “following the ways of the immediate generation before in a
blind or timid adherence to its successes” resonates with his description of a mummying classicism
from the Ulysses review.6 In both problematic cases, the past is treated as a reified monument with
no meaningful relation to the present. By presenting his account of tradition in opposition to this
reifying tendency, Eliot implicitly suggests a response to the greater complex of fragmenting
forces, which include the social anarchy and mummifying classicism of “Ulysses, Order, and
Myth,” the scientific specificity identified in The Sacred Wood, and the social isolation of The
Waste Land. The substance of his account of historical sense, however, amplifies this
juxtaposition, for with his appeal to historical sense, Eliot identifies a capacity in its possessor to
integrate disparate material, facilitating an understanding that coordinates seemingly
incommensurate perspectives. In doing so, Eliot identifies a capacity that promises to intervene in
the epistemological problem of the dissolution of a shared world that organizes The Waste Land.

Eliot discusses the mummification of history in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” while the specification of modern
science is a theme he returns to throughout The Sacred Wood, receiving particular attention in “The Perfect Critic”
(Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 8).
4
The justification for this claim constituted much of the argument of the second chapter of this dissertation.
5
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 40.
6
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 40.
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I.1. Historical Sense and a Vision of Order
In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot defines historical sense as “a sense of the timeless
and of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together.”7 More specifically, it
“involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence” and “a feeling that
the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of literature of his own
country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”8 Because Eliot
identifies this capacity as “historical sense” and appeals to a vast literary history in its explication,
he may give the impression that this characteristic he appeals to as a prerequisite for any serious
artist is little more than an encyclopedic knowledge of history. The hyperliteracy of Eliot’s own
poetry may, in fact, reinforce this impression. On this deflationary reading of historical sense, Eliot
may be taken as enjoining the artist to study the work of previous artists and to memorize the
chronology of historical events. While an understanding of history, both literary history and a
history more generally, is certainly a necessary condition for the quality Eliot describes, reducing
Eliot’s appeal to historical to a matter of historical knowledge would be a mistake. Eliot explicates
the notion of historical sense in language that appeals to an awareness of relations rather than an
awareness of facts.9 Historical sense is a recognition of the ways in which the past remains present.
It entails a sensitivity to the enduring effects of historical events. Not only does historical sense
involve an awareness of the relation between past and the present, but it also entails the recognition
of a complex network of relations, an ideal order that connects the entire history of texts and events
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I will complicate this claim momentarily with a discussion of Eliot’s concern regarding the possibility of establishing
historical facts, which he inherits from Bradley. Though the epistemological issue that motivates Eliot’s appeal to
historical sense involves problems pertaining to the possibility of knowing history, I nevertheless maintain that Eliot
prioritizes an awareness of relations over an awareness of facts in his explication of the concept in The Sacred Wood.
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in addition to including the present moment.10 Historical sense, then, is a quality that requires a
knowledge of history but that cannot be reduced to knowledge. It is more fundamentally a
relational attunement to an enduring past. It is a feeling of the past’s continued relation to and
influence on the present, as well as a perception of the present’s situation within a vast network of
historical relations.
Though the language of feeling central to this initial formulation seems to suggest that the
simultaneous order depends upon the artist who perceives it, Eliot clarifies that the order is not
dependent upon the poet. Before the poet’s intervention, “the existing monuments form an ideal
order among themselves, which is modified by introduction of the new (the really new) work of
art among them.”11 Though it does not depend upon the artist, this pre-existing order is, however,
altered by their efforts. When a new work of art is produced, “the whole existing order must be, if
ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the
whole are readjusted.”12 Here again, a tension manifests between the vision of an artist capable of
perceiving the order and the enduring quality of the order itself. That the order “must be…altered”
suggests the conscious activity of an agent external to it. That the “relations, proportions, values
of each work…are readjusted,” however, seems to be the passive result of the inclusion of a new
entity in the structure. This tension expresses the dual capacity of the artist as one who both
perceives the order and intervenes in it. Indeed, the prominence of this tension in Eliot’s
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So far, I have only engaged with historical sense as a concept pertaining to the production of literary texts. I will
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explication suggests an avenue for illuminating the problem that motivates Eliot’s poetic and
critical methodology.
In T.S. Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development 1909–1922, Piers Gray argues that
Eliot’s commitment to the perception of an ideal order is grounded in an epistemological
framework derived from Bradley.13 According to Gray, Eliot presents historical sense as a tool for
developing an absolute perspective, thereby resolving the Bradleyan problem of the
incommensurability of points of view. Though various versions of this problem appear throughout
Bradley’s corpus, and throughout Eliot’s engagement with it, Gray traces the formulation relevant
in this context to Bradley’s account of history. Bradley argues that the identification of a historical
fact is problematic because the perception of a fact is inevitably grounded in an individual
perspective. Yet, without the ability to identify individual facts, a framework for historical
knowledge remains elusive. The possibility of knowledge, then, is foreclosed. Bradley’s account
of historical knowledge demands a totalizing absolute perspective. Because this absolute
perspective includes all other perspectives, because it must be comprehensive, it is capable of
separating fact from limited point of view. Eliot, in articulating his account of historical sense,
develops a program for aesthetically addressing Bradley’s problem. Historical sense facilitates an
awareness of the relations between perspectives, thereby expanding the scope of a given point of
view. Eliot’s work, however, does not merely employ his own historical sense, but rather
thematizes it. To illuminate this point, C.D. Blanton argues in Epic Negation that The Waste Land
functions as an element of Eliot’s larger poetic project, his curation of The Criterion. With this
interdisciplinary work, Eliot attempts to imbue history into a work of poetry, thereby satisfying
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The appeal to this epistemological motivation is, I think, well defended. Despite its explanatory value, I will
ultimately argue that Gray overemphasizes the ideality of the structure, thereby eliding the continued effect of the
historical upon lived experience. Indeed, this latter aspect of historical sense is precisely what I will attempt to establish
in the second section of this chapter.
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Pound’s definition of epic as “a poem including history.”14 Eliot achieves this by creating a text
that perpetually extends beyond itself by self-consciously appealing to other works. The text, then,
becomes explicitly intertextual, and this intertextuality establishes the historical order that Eliot
appeals to in his account of tradition. The Criterion appears to be an attempt to cultivate the
absolute perspective. Not only is it an attempt to invigorate poetry with history, but it is, further,
an attempt to make history possible.15
In their explications of Eliot’s account of tradition, both Blanton and Gray appeal
extensively to order as the impetus for the operation of historical sense. Historical sense is a tool
for recognizing and presenting an ideal structure and, as such, it grounds the possibility of a
totalizing account of history. This is, I think, generally correct. Yet this emphasis on a structure
that remains a regulative ideal ultimately fails to capture the synthetic possibilities of historical
sense for the individual perspective. Similarly, in grounding his account of Eliotic tradition in the
Bradleyan epistemological framework, Gray fails to capture the social and ethical dimensions of
Eliot’s appeal to history. Granted, Eliot does rely heavily on the language of structure and order in
“Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Yet in his “Note on Ezra Pound,” Eliot presents historical
sense as a thoroughly integrative capacity. It does not simply perceive the relations between
historical elements. Rather, it synthesizes these elements and their relations into a new perspective.
It facilitates the commensurability of disparate points of view. This integrative capacity illuminates

Blanton, Epic Negation, 3. Blanton is quick to note that what Pound means by “including history” is relatively
impoverished compared to the operation of Eliot’s historical sense. A “poem including history” appears, in this
treatment, to be merely a poem treating historical content, and that which is historical is by necessity temporally
removed. A poem manifesting historical sense, conversely, is infused with the sense of the past as present.
15
Considered against the epistemological background developed by Gray, this project is necessarily doomed to fail.
The absolute perspective only functions because it is beyond the individual perspective, but this is precisely what
renders the individual pursuit of it a tragic errand. The poetic historical sense is necessarily always in flux and,
therefore, cannot be complete.
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the effect that, according to Eliot, the present exerts upon the past. It is precisely this capacity that
promises a response to the loss of a shared world.
Eliot’s “A Note on Ezra Pound,” published in To-Day in 1918, appeals to the concept of
historical sense to articulate what he takes to be the particular value of Ezra Pound’s work. Pound’s
“knowledge of history,” according to Eliot, extends beyond his “extensive knowledge of literature”
or his “particular passion for and minute knowledge of Provençal.”16 Rather, his view of history
includes “a perception of our position relative to the past, and in particular the poet’s relation to
poets of the past.”17 The dual emphasis here on the relative position and the particularity of the
poet mirrors the framework of “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” As in “Tradition and the
Individual Talent,” the concern for relation reveals a preoccupation with order. Eliot presents this
vision of order in terms identical to those used in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” when he
identifies this sense of relations as involving “an organized view of the whole course of European
history from Homer.”18 Yet Pound’s historical sense is not merely a vision of an ideal order or an
intimate knowledge of the relations between its parts. His sense of history entails also “a perception
of the relation of these periods and languages to the present, of what they have that we want.”19
This latter point is framed rather unfortunately and betrays the appropriative dimension of Eliot’s
eurocentrism, a concern that I will address below. The claim productively suggests, however, that
historical sense as Eliot defines it does not merely attain a panoptic view of related historical events
or perspectives. Rather, the poet possessed of historical sense synthesizes those perspectives,
incorporating “what they have that we want” and integrating the material into a new point of
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view.20 This new point of view, further, also engages with present conditions. In doing so, it
mediates between the historical and the contemporary, the past and the present. It does not merely
draw a relation between them through the introduction of a new work of art. Rather, it merges
these perspectives into one, coordinating disparate historical points of view and contemporary
material in the service of a new poetic intervention.
Eliot’s claim that the sense of history entails “a perception of what they have that we want”
raises a host of problems. Yet it also reveals a productive, if not entirely untroubling, tension in
Eliot’s thought. The claim is immediately problematic because it seems to align Eliot with an
appropriative vision of Europe as a colonial force. World history appears in this phrase to be a
newly discovered continent to be explored and conquered. This impression is reinforced by the
reception of Eliot as a representative of a thoroughly conservative poetics and further bolstered by
some of his own work, particularly his immature poetry, which is infused with a racism that is
smug in its superiority.21 The claim is also troubling because it presents cultures as bounded
wholes. Indeed, these two aspects are fundamentally connected, for the sense of smug cultural
superiority depends upon a rigid distinction between cultures. The dependence on a distinction
between “us” and “them” reifies each into a fixed category. The appropriative attitude expressed
in the phrase seems to be undergirded by the belief that material could be taken from a particular
context without fundamentally altering either the culture from which it was taken or the culture
into which it is being transposed. It seems that an element can simply be lifted from one discrete
whole and dropped into another, as if cultures are merely containers for historical material.

Eliot, “Note on Ezra Pound,” 750.
The “King Bolo” poems are the most egregious examples of this racist strain in Eliot’s poetry, though they are
certainly not exhaustive of Eliot’s problematic attitudes. In tracing the productive tension expressed by this statement
I do not intend to defend Eliot’s racism. Rather, I suggest that the poetic argument of The Waste Land is, itself,
fundamentally opposed to this position. Thus, I hope to develop the unifying promise of a position articulated by Eliot
while acknowledging that the theoretical consequences of such a position may condemn him.
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Taken in isolation, the commitment to the completeness of cultures which underwrites the
appropriative model of an engagement with history re-inscribes at a cultural level the challenge of
solipsism raised on an individual level in the previous chapter. Cultures on this model are
irrevocably distinct. They operate according to different configurations of ideological and
historical relations, and therefore they instantiate alternative perspectives. Ultimately, according
to the Bradleyan epistemological position endorsed by Eliot, this entails that they cannot truly
communicate, as they lack a shared framework for understanding. Crucially, however, throughout
The Sacred Wood Eliot employs an articulation of culture that reveals the one-sidedness of this
expression in the “Note on Ezra Pound.” In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot describes
the traditional order as “complete before the new work arrives,” but he also notes that “for order
to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly,
altered.”22 Culture is, of course, a more capacious term than tradition. Eliot treats it in an analogous
manner in The Sacred Wood, however, gesturing to the ways in which the culture of a specific
time or place will adjust to accommodate novel elements.23 Though Eliot suggests that cultures
are bounded and complete in the “Note on Ezra Pound,” his account of tradition reveals that this
completeness is not absolute. A culture may be complete insofar as it seems to offer a unified
perspective, but this perspective adjusts to accommodate new material. The relations within it are
perpetually shifting. This tension between the bounded self-sufficiency of individual cultures and
their capacity to reorganize around the intervention of novelty forms the crux of Eliot’s argument
in his speech “The Good European,” addressed to the general assembly of the Alliance française
in 1951.24 In this speech, Eliot argues that the cultivation of a pan-European culture depends upon
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the organic promotion of relations between individual European cultures. Here, Eliot affirms the
bounded nature of individual cultures, but he does so in order to promote their synthesis within a
larger integrated whole. Eliot appeals to precisely this capacity of culture to form new wholes
already in the “Note on Ezra Pound” when he identifies the historical work of art as a synthesis of
past and present points of view. This synthesis facilitates the organization of increasingly
comprehensive perspectives.
This consideration of the one-sidedness in Eliot’s claim that historical sense involves a
sense of “what they have that we want” reveals that the experience of historical sense minimally
contains two elements.25 On the one hand, the poet works to attain a vision of disparate
perspectives separated by time, place, and language, as well as of their relations to each other,
cultivating a sense of order. These disparate perspectives are, both in the individual’s vision of
them and internally to themselves, complete wholes. And, indeed, even throughout the process of
cultural exchange, they remain complete as new material is absorbed and reorganized into everexpanding structures. This aspect of historical sense encourages Eliot to speak of cultures as
discrete entities. Thus, he appeals to “the mind of Europe,” or analogously the French and English
cultures in “The Good European,” as a monolithic entity, though he also recognizes that it is “a
mind which changes.”26 On the other hand, in the work of art, the poet integrates these
perspectives, synthesizing them with contemporary material in the service of a new perspective
that is infused with the others. This new perspective does more than just reproduce an existing
order, though even this would be better than the rote reproduction of classical forms. It brings
seemingly incommensurable perspectives together, altering their relations to each other and to the
present. In doing so, it reconfigures them. It creates a new whole. Thus, cultures simultaneously
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appear to be discrete and in flux, internally complete yet ever expanding and capable of integrating
diversity.
I.2. Expanding the Limits of Historical Sense
Eliot’s account of historical sense, then, is not merely a normative account of poetic production.
Nor is it simply the aesthetic articulation of a response to Bradley’s epistemological puzzle
concerning the possibility of accessing historical facts. Instead, it also offers a solution to ethical
dimension of the epistemological problem expressed in The Waste Land as a crisis of fertility. This
crisis, I have argued, is an articulation of Eliot’s concern regarding the inability of individuals to
accommodate each other’s perspectives. People, according to Eliot, have become increasingly
trapped in their own points of view, and this has resulted in the loss of a shared world. Throughout
his corpus, Eliot presents this crisis in different registers. He appeals to a state of anarchy in
“Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” and this appeal acquires renewed force through Eliot’s incorporation
of Herman Hesse’s Blick ins Chaos into both The Waste Land and the first volume of The
Criterion.27 Eliot repeats this appeal to epistemic distance in both the first and last essays of The
Sacred Wood. In the first, he argues that scientific language has become so specified that words
no longer retain their meanings across contexts and that this specification results in a loss of
accurate self-understanding. In the last, he introduces the world of Dante by comparing Dante’s
shared social reality to the modern state of dissolution.28 Historical sense demands the perception
of the ideal order comprising the relations between all works of art, both within a narrowly defined

The simultaneous allusion to and inclusion of an essay from Blick ins Chaos in The Criterion grounds Blanton’s
argument that The Waste Land should, in fact, be read as a part of the more comprehensive poetic project of The
Criterion.
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Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 8, 135. Eliot both begins and concludes his engagement with Dante by appealing to the
relative poverty of the contemporary experience. In the final lines of the essay, Eliot suggests that “when most of our
modern poets confine themselves to what they had perceived, they produce for us, usually, only odds and ends of still
life and stage properties; but that does not imply so much that the method of Dante is obsolete, as that our vision is
perhaps comparatively restricted” (Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 145).
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cultural tradition and external to it, as suggested by Eliot’s appeal to the incorporation of Chinese
material in Pound’s poetry. The recognition of this ideal order suggests a restoration of the
connection between individual perspectives, as it demands the recognition of their interdependence
as well as an understanding of the ways in which individual points of view fit into, and constitute,
an organized whole. Further, in addition to articulating this vision of order, the poetic intervention
integrates these disparate perspectives. With this process of integration, the work of art suggests
that the gap between individuals can be bridged and a shared world may be recovered.
Though the synthetic capacity of historical sense is crucial to Eliot’s account of poetic
production in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” the broader social effects of this power are
made less explicit. Though I maintain that the function attributed to historical sense in that essay
suggests a response to the social crises outlined elsewhere, Eliot does not address these social
concerns in his explication of historical sense itself. Historical sense is, in Eliot’s account, certainly
necessary for the aspiring poet. Yet, perhaps a comprehensive vision of the “simultaneous
existence and…simultaneous order” of “the whole of literature of Europe from Homer” seems less
beneficial to one who does not wish “to continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year.”29
While the framework in which Eliot presents his explication of historical sense is restricted to the
activity of poetic production, the notion itself does not demand such a narrow application. Indeed,
because of the way in which, according to Eliot, the material for poetry changes with social
conditions, the historical sense relevant to the poet cannot fully be disentangled from a more
capacious understanding of history.30

29

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41, 40.
Though I will argue in this chapter that his critical and poetic practice complicates, and even elides, distinctions
between various modes of cultural expression, Eliot does not assent to the homogeneity of all expression. In his essay
on Dante in The Sacred Wood, Eliot identifies poetry as uniquely adequate to presenting a vision of life in contrast to
a philosophical account (Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 144). As I will argue in the second section of this chapter, Eliot
marshals this poetic capacity to distill a vision of lived experience in The Waste Land to juxtapose two radically
distinct perspectives, one animated by historical sense and one devoid of it. Further, recognizable poetic devices, such
30

169

Just after presenting his definition of historical sense in “Tradition and the Individual
Talent,” Eliot elaborates upon the “relation of the poet to the past.”31 In this discussion, Eliot
addresses the material that the poet takes up in her work. He claims that the poet “must be quite
aware of the obvious fact that art never improves, but that the material of art is never quite the
same.”32 Eliot’s association of this poetic material with the mind of Europe, “a mind which
changes” and which, in this development, “abandons nothing en route,” lends credence to
interpretations that would restrict the value of historical sense to explicitly poetic arena. 33 For it
may seem at first that the mind of Europe appears simply to be the ideal order of existing literary
monuments.34 Such an interpretation would result in an extremely hermetic account of literary
production. The material that informs the work of art is the mind of Europe. The mind of Europe
is an ideal order, perpetually in flux because “for order to persist after the supervention of novelty,
the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered.”35 As such, the material for art is
“never quite the same.”36 If the material of art is simply the ideal order of previous works, and
historical sense provides the ability to engage with the material of art, then historical sense truly
seems of limited value. It certainly seems incapable of addressing a more general epistemic
condition.
Such a narrow account of Eliot’s appeal to tradition fails to engage with the complexity of
literary production. Elsewhere in The Sacred Wood, Eliot suggests that an appreciation for the
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material of art cannot be restricted simply to previous artistic works.37 In “Imperfect Critics,” Eliot
critiques George Wyndham for failing to consider the effects of the cultural environment on
literary production in his explication of Elizabethan literature. He argues that Wyndham neglects
“what is the cardinal point in criticizing the Elizabethans: we cannot grasp them, understand them,
without some understanding of the pathology of rhetoric.”38 Eliot here acknowledges that a
sufficient understanding of Elizabethan literature is impossible without a proper understanding of
the historical conditions of its production. For “rhetoric…was endemic, it pervaded the whole
organism; the healthy as well as the morbid tissues were built up on it.”39 This critique of
Wyndham’s failure to engage with historical context in his criticism appears in Eliot’s own attempt
to contextualize Wyndham himself. Eliot argues that accounts of Wyndham that treat him simply
as a Romantic fail to capture Wyndham’s complete submersion in Victorian culture. Indeed, in
order to chart “the mind of George Wyndham,” Eliot claims, “the key to its topography is the fact
that his literature and his politics and his country life are one and the same thing.”40 As such, “we
can criticize his writings only as an expression of this peculiar English type, the aristocrat, the
Imperialist, the Romantic, riding to hounds across his prose, looking with wonder upon the world
as upon a fairy land.”41 Wyndham’s work cannot be detached from its historical context, and,
further, that immediate context is implicated in a more extensive complex of historical relations.42
A properly historical understanding of Wyndham, then, cannot be restricted to his particular
literary interests. It must instead take into account the forces that shaped those interests and the
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particular prejudices revealed by his tastes. It must account for his position in a broader historical
situation, as well as the ways in which his work both responds to and reinscribes that situation.
Eliot, in the final essay of Tradition and the Individual Talent, employs a similar
methodology to explicate the richness of Dante’s poetic project. In this essay, Eliot addresses a
series of problematic approaches to Dante’s Comedy, all of which are akin in their commitment to
the analytic extraction of poetic material from material deemed to be contaminant. Paul Valéry,
for example, suggests that a rigid distinction must be maintained between poetry and philosophy,
and that attempts to combine the two are doomed to fail.43 Dwight Sidgwick attempts to isolate
Dante’s poetry from his teaching in order to “improve our understanding of Dante as a ‘spiritual
leader’”44 Landor similarly bifurcates Dante into poet and prophet, as he “deplore[s] the spiritual
mechanics and finds the poet only in passages where he frees himself from his divine purposes.”45
Eliot argues that all of these approaches to Dante commit a fundamental error insofar as they
attempt to quarantine distinct elements of Dante’s Comedy that must actually be understood in
conjunction with each other. For, he claims, “Dante had the benefit of a mythology and theology
which had undergone a more complete absorption into life” and, with them, “philosophy is an
ingredient, it is a part of Dante’s world just as it is a part of life.”46 Approaching Dante requires,
then, an understanding of the way in which his poetic vision is infused with his philosophy, and
further demands a recognition of the historical conditions facilitating such an infusion. Similarly,
critiques, such as those offered by Sidgwick, of passages in which “the preacher and the prophet

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 135–136. Eliot uses Valéry’s critique of philosophical poetry to frame the “Dante” essay,
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are lost in the poet,” miss their mark insofar as they identify “something which is certainly not
‘lost in the poet’, but is part of the poet.”47 These critics all overlook the unity of Dante’s poetic
vision. They fail to understand that “the vision is so nearly complete…the significance of any
single passage, of any of the passages that are selected as ‘poetry,’ is incomplete unless we
ourselves apprehend the whole.”48 This whole is a manifestation of the relationship between the
individual poet and the historical situation of the poet’s activity. The infusion of the world with
philosophy, theology, and mythology, the political turmoil, and his participation in it, all constitute
fundamental elements of Dante’s vision. For, as Eliot enjoins, “no vision of life can be complete
which does not include the articulate formulation of life which human minds make.”49
These examples clarify that, for Eliot, the application of historical sense cannot engage
with a model of tradition that is taken to be comprised narrowly of works of art. The historical
material of “whole of literature of Europe from Homer” far exceeds the mere production of literary
works. One may object that, by applying historical sense in this way, Eliot actually reduces
historical relations to a form of literary text. He renders complex networks of forces discrete and
accessible to interpretation, much like poems are.50 Were Eliot’s works of poetry themselves
discrete wholes, this critique would have purchase. Eliot’s use of bricolage and the way he
marshals this technique to demand critical engagement from the reader erode the clear boundaries
of the text. The Waste Land calls attention to its own historical overdetermination and implicates
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the reader as one of many forces structuring its meaning.51 Thus, if Eliot seems to reduce context
to text in his critical work, his poetic practice highlights the extent to which text and context both
inevitably resist the temptation to treat them as discrete and inspectable wholes. Perhaps the work
of literature incorporates historical material, converting it to a kind of source text. In doing so,
however, it also exhibits its own status as a historical artifact that is implicated in the same forces
that it represents. Rather than merely reduce the historical to the literary, Eliot’s account of
tradition expresses the dynamic interplay of social forces, themselves bound in networks of
historical relations. An awareness of the presence of the past demands a vision of this extensive
matrix of historical forces.
Historical sense, then, is the capacity to perceive the simultaneous order formed among
discrete historical perspectives. In addition to including the perspectives themselves, this capacity
illuminates the relations between them, as well as the various forces conditioning those relations.
Finally, in articulating this order, historical sense synthesizes these disparate historical positions
into a unified vision. It integrates them, bringing in new material, and through this integration it
facilitates a mutual intelligibility that had previously seemed impossible. Individuals and
discourses that seemed trapped in hermetic and incommensurable worlds are revealed as
participating in a shared web of causal forces, affecting each other, if only imperceptibly. Thus,
the perspective of the present reorganizes the past, and the operation of the past is recognized as
permeating the present. Historical sense reawakens the possibility of a shared social reality and
promises to alleviate the crisis central to The Waste Land. The fulfillment of this promise, however,
does not find expression in Eliot’s critical corpus. Rather, the transformative power of historical
sense manifests in The Waste Land itself.

Eliot’s elision of the boundaries between text and author, text and reader, and text and context will be treated more
extensively in the third section of this chapter.
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II. The Recovery of Voice in The Waste Land
Throughout The Sacred Wood, Eliot appeals to the concept of historical sense and argues for its
power to illuminate the object of one’s interest, be that a text or an individual. He develops this
argument both through an analysis of the notion of historical sense and through its performative
application to specific poetic and critical figures. He further identifies the effects of an absence of
historical sense, suggesting the poverty of the point of view that lacks this quality. In these
explications and applications, however, Eliot does not articulate the operation of historical sense,
much less the experience of the individual possessed of it. He argues that historical sense promises
to synthesize perspectives, but he presents neither this synthesized point of view nor an exploration
of the synthetic experience. Indeed, he frequently approaches historical sense through its absence,
lamenting the paucity of historical connections made by the figures he investigates. Thus, historical
sense operates as something of a cypher in The Sacred Wood. It is central to the text but is striking,
too, in its absence. Eliot offers a clue about the cause of this seeming omission in his discussion
of the dichotomy between philosophy and poetry in “Dante,” where he suggests that discursive
forms can limit the treatment of their objects. As such, he intimates that a more complete
investigation of historical sense demands a return from Eliot’s purely theoretical critical work to
his poetry itself, for poetry is the medium in which a philosophical worldview can be expressed as
a vision of life.
II.1. The Poetic Presentation of a Vision of Life
As part of is interrogation of the status of philosophical poetry in “Dante,” Eliot identifies what he
takes to be the difference between philosophical and poetic expression. He suggests that
philosophical and poetic activities cannot properly “be carried out at the same time.”52 They cannot
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be accomplished simultaneously because, though philosophy and philosophical poetry both
engage with ideas, they engage with these ideas in very different forms. The philosopher, Eliot
claims, “is trying to deal with the ideas themselves,” and engages with them “as a matter for
argument.”53 The philosophical poet, by contrast, tries “to realize ideas,” and does so when the
idea “has reached the point of immediate acceptance, when it has almost become a physical
modification.”54 Philosophical discourse engages with ideas in order to define them rigorously and
test their validity. Philosophical poetry interrogates these ideas as they interact with lived
experience. In the Divine Comedy, Eliot claims, there are passages that present the “pure exposition
of philosophy,” but in these passages “we are not studying philosophy.”55 Rather, “we see it, as
part of the ordered world.”56 The philosophical material both organizes and animates the poetic
vision. It grounds “the articulate formulation of life” without which the production in the reader of
an emotional state is “nothing whatsoever.”57 This distinction between the analytic exposition of
a philosophical framework and the poetic presentation of a vision animated by philosophy
illuminates Eliot’s engagement with historical sense in The Sacred Wood. As a work of criticism,
The Sacred Wood is not the proper medium, according to Eliot, in which to articulate a complete
account of the effects of historical sense. Rather, Eliot’s critical project accommodates the
explication of historical sense and the application of it as a criterion of aesthetic judgment. An
“articulate formulation of life” grounded in historical sense is not in the purview of criticism but
is rather a poetic project. I intend to argue that this is precisely the project of The Waste Land.
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In Epic Negation, C.D. Blanton argues that The Waste Land participates in a larger poetic
project animated by historical sense. Blanton argues that the intertextuality of The Waste Land
dissolves the boundaries of the poem. The text participates in the critical project of Eliot’s editorial
work in The Criterion, and The Criterion simultaneously extends the poem’s borders. Through
this process of accretion, the historical connections of the poem become increasingly complex and
The Waste Land becomes a poem infused with history. Though Blanton provides an illuminating
account of The Waste Land’s intertextuality, particularly in his articulation of the way in which
the text appeals to historical sense by demanding it of the reader, he does not sufficiently engage
with the function of historical sense within The Waste Land itself. Indeed, by focusing on the
coordination of The Waste Land with historical material external to it, Blanton treats the poetic
deployment with historical sense as a formal project. The Waste Land exemplifies the application
of historical sense and invites the reader to follow the example. It identifies the web of historical
connections that can be drawn by integrating disparate historical sources into the dynamically
expanding Criterion. In tracking this formal dimension of Eliot’s poetic project, and by
emphasizing the ways in which The Waste Land obscures the borders of its own textuality, Blanton
overlooks the extent to which the poem engages with history in the presentation of a vision of life.
Blanton’s account of history in the poem emphasizes the externality of The Waste Land’s sources,
illuminating the poem’s coordination of them. This emphasis on coordination obscures the effects
that those historical sources have upon the vision internal to the poem itself. The poem neither
merely includes history nor organizes it, but rather the poem articulates the transformative power
of historical sense through the presentation of an account of life activated by it.
In what follows, I intend to explicate this transformative power of historical sense as it
appears within The Waste Land. Indeed, I will argue that the poem does not simply present a single
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vision of life animated by historical sense, for the historical conditions of modernity foreclose the
possibility of presenting a straightforwardly unified perspective, according to Eliot.58 Rather,
insofar as historical sense operates as a synthetic faculty capable of unifying perspectives, it
appears in The Waste Land juxtaposed against the chaotic experience of fragmentation. The poem
thus contains competing visions: one dominated by alienation and one that is capable of integrating
perspectives and forging meaningful relations between individuals. To construct this argument, I
will analyze two scenes from The Waste Land in which the mythical figure of Philomel appears.
These scenes both depict breakdowns in interpersonal communication. In isolation, they seem to
reinforce the sense of social fragmentation that dominates the poem. Indeed, scholars often appeal
to these passages to ground their claims that The Waste Land is a text that endorses an account of
the fundamentally alienated character of modern experience. The scenes superficially evoke a
vision of life according to which individuals remain trapped in their own perspectives, alienated
from each other and ultimately themselves. I maintain that the appearance of Philomel in the poem
frustrates this ubiquitous interpretation in multiple ways and in doing so reveals the transformative
operation of historical sense. First, a sensitivity to the appearance of Philomel reveals that
interpretations identifying alienation as an essential, and as such static, feature of modern life fail
to appreciate the way in which these scenes depict acts violence that silence their victims. By
silencing their victims, these individual acts of violence participate in historical structures of
violence and oppression. One of the features of these structures is their capacity to obscure
themselves and, in doing so, disguise oppressive conditions as unremarkable. Thus, because the
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acts of violence obscure themselves within structural conditions that facilitate and sanction such
violence, victims’ expressions of suffering, which manifest in the poem as frantic anxiety and
estranged indifference, are made to seem like alienated responses to a natural condition. By
incorporating Philomel, herself brutally silenced and ultimately transformed, into the poetic
landscape, the poem illuminates the capacity of violence to render its victim voiceless. The song
of Philomel results from a savage attempt to silence her in order to keep her brutal violation secret.
It originates as a response to an act of violence that endeavors to mask itself, and this origin unites
Philomel with the characters for whom her song cries out. Not only, then, does the appearance of
Philomel uncover acts of silencing that would remain hidden, but it also subverts the sense of
isolation cultivated by those acts. Her song awakens a sense of the endurance of the past in the
present. It coordinates the experience of characters throughout the poem and across time.59 In doing
so, it suggests the possibilities of historical sense, and, further, it articulates a vision of life attentive
to it. Philomel makes her initial appearance in the poem in a painting, but she is not reduced merely
to a “withered stump of time.”60 Rather, she sings into the poem, coordinating scenes and
characters. Thus, through a mythical song, an echo of the past, violence is exposed, and voices are
restored. Alienation in The Waste Land, taken by many to be inescapable, is overcome through
attentiveness to the song of the nightingale.
II.2. The Past Sings into The Waste Land
The majority of the second section of The Waste Land, entitled “A Game of Chess,” details a failed
conversation between two partners. On its surface, the conversation fails because the interlocutors
are incapable of hearing each other. The female speaker poses a series of questions throughout the

In this respect, Eliot claims in his notes that “all the women” in the poem “are one woman,” just as all the male
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passage which, despite their increasing urgency, elicit literally “nothing” from her partner. She
accuses this partner of thinking nothing, seeing nothing, remembering nothing.61 As if to affirm
her accusation, the man responds to this series of challenges with the cryptic “I remember / Those
are pearls that were his eyes”62 His response negates her question entirely and, in doing so, seems
to confirm her accusation. He engages her with unseeing pearls for eyes, the unseeing eyes of
“Phlebas,” “the drowned Phoenician sailor.”63 The connection between the male figure in “A
Game of Chess” and the drowned sailor further amplifies the sense of his inability to engage with
his interlocutor. In the fourth section of the poem, “Death by Water,” the pearls that were Phlebas’
eyes have ceased to focus on “the gulls, and the deep sea swell / And the profit and loss.” 64 The
fleeting concerns of Phlebas’ life appear meaningless in the face of the permanence of death, and
the final lines of the section caution the reader to remember the fate of Phlebas, suggesting that
even in life his eyes were no less blind than they are beneath the waves. The male speaker in “A
Game of Chess” manifests precisely this blind lack of attention, as he negates the woman’s plea
for genuine response. Mirroring Phlebas’ misplaced concern for “profit and loss,” he listens to “O
O O O that Shakespeherian rag” rather than the call of his interlocutor. 65 Through his unseeing
sight, the man reveals that he is incapable of engaging meaningfully with her. The scene presents
a simple, but total, breakdown of intersubjectivity. According to accounts that take this
representation of the breakdown of intersubjectivity to affirm a fundamentally alienated human
condition, the evacuation of character responsible for frustrating this interaction is not limited to
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the male speaker. Indeed, the woman’s exaggerated manner of speech belies its own mode of
alienation, as Michael Gillum and Susan Colón both highlight.66 Thus, the two interlocutors appear
to be so thoroughly trapped in their private perspectives that they fail to engage meaningfully with
one another, and indeed, this incapacity for intersubjectivity seems inevitable.
A detail in the description of the room in which this conversation takes place, however,
frustrates the attempt to take this scene simply as the depiction of a failed interaction. In the
background, “Above the antique mantel was displayed / As though a window gave upon the sylvan
scene / The change of Philomel, by the barbarous king / So rudely forced.”67 The juxtaposition of
the myth of Philomel with the interaction between the two characters in “A Game of Chess” calls
for the scene be reassessed with an attentiveness to voicelessness and suffering, as well as to the
sightlessness that allows that suffering to go unacknowledged. With the story of the brutal
silencing of a woman’s cries in mind, the male speaker’s contributions to the conversation appear
more troubling. He registers her concerns as “nothing, again nothing” or simply refuses to
acknowledge them at all.68 In response to her question “What are you thinking? What thinking?
What? / I never know what you are thinking. Think.”69 The man cryptically asserts “I think we are
in rat’s alley / where the dead men lost their bones.”70 His simple refusal to acknowledge her voice
undermines the perceived legitimacy of her expression and, simultaneously, elicits an
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amplification of the anxiety in her tone. Despite her heightened anxiety, her contributions remain
ignored, exacerbating the degree to which her subjectivity is nullified.
The poetic descriptions of the scene reinforce the reification of the woman and the
evacuation her subjectivity. Thus, the elision of her voice is also effected at the formal level of the
poem. When the woman speaks, she is not identified as the speaker. Rather “her hair / Spread out
into fiery points / Glowed into words, then would be savagely still.”71 This use of synecdoche
aligns with Eliot’s deployment of the device to convey a sense of alienation throughout his early
poetry, as Gillum notes.72 Yet the reification of the woman is exacerbated with the use of the word
“glowed” to describe her speech, as her words are not the only glowers in the scene: “The Chair
she sat in, like a burnished throne, / Glowed on the marble.”73 The verbal repetition equates the
woman, or more precisely her speaking-hair, with a gaudy armchair. From human body part, she
is further reduced to a decorative object. These descriptive objectifications intensify the male
speaker’s nullification of his female interlocutor. And so, despite her attempts at self-assertion,
with each non-sequitur and each negation, the man reduces her to a piece of the scenery. She
becomes just another “withered stump of time” depicted upon the walls, “leaning out” into the
room.74 Against the literal backdrop of Philomel’s brutal silencing at the hands of a male relative,
the negation of the woman’s concerns becomes tinged with violence. This ceases to be a case of
mere miscommunication. Rather, by ignoring her, the man renders the woman voiceless. He
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participates in the violence of Tereus, though admittedly in a less gruesome way. Yet while the
woman suffers this process of reification, rendering her an object among objects, the “inviolable”
voice of Philomel leans out into the room crying “jug jug to dirty ears.”75 Philomel protests the
negation of the woman, even as this negation frustrates the woman’s capacity to speak for herself.
A more radical depiction of the effacement of female subjectivity occurs in the subsequent
section, “The Fire Sermon.” “The Fire Sermon” presents a series of failed sexual encounters. The
most extensive of these is narrated by the blind prophet Tiresias who experiences the scene as a
vision. The vision follows a “typist home at teatime” as she prepares for her date with “A small
house agent’s clerk, with one bold stare / One of the low on whom assurance sits / As a silk hat on
a Bradford millionaire.”76 The date seems at first to be wholly uncharacteristic of the passion
suggested by the title of the section. After dinner, the typist is “bored and tired” and the clerk
“Endeavours to engage her in caresses / Which still are unreproved if undesired.”77 This apparent
apathy reaches its zenith in the stanza post-coitus, after the departure of the clerk. The typist is
“Hardly aware of her departed lover” as she remarks briefly to herself “Well now that’s done: and
I’m glad it’s over” before smoothing “her hair with automatic hand” and putting “a record on the
gramophone.”78 As in “A Game of Chess,” the language of the poem objectifies the female
participant, her “automatic hand” is juxtaposed with a gramophone, seeming to suggest a voluntary
abdication of voice to the machine.79 Gillum claims that these manifestations of indifference are
“tonally at variance” with the title of the section, “The Fire Sermon,” and its final line, “burning
burning burning.”80 “The poetry,” he claims, “depicts a cold and shabby automatism, and ‘burning
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burning’ etc. becomes, if anything, ironic.”81 Ultimately, Gillum concludes that this section is “a
testament to apathy,” and this apathy is a manifestation of the fundamentally alienated vision
characteristic of Eliot’s poetry. With this assessment, I vehemently disagree. For Philomel
reappears just before Tiresias’ vision, and the repetition of her cry reveals in this scene a force far
more sinister than indifference. A mere ten lines separate Tiresias’ vision of the typist from
Philomel’s reappearance in the poem. Rather than appearing in a description of the scene, however,
Philomel sings into the poem itself, explicitly lamenting her experience of sexual violence. She
sings “Twit twit twit / Jug jug jug jug jug jug / So rudely forc’d. / Tereu,” and just as her previous
appearance demanded attentiveness to the silencing enacted in the scene upon which it
commented, Philomel’s cry “so rudely forc’d” prefigures The Waste Land’s nearest approximation
to a romantic encounter and alerts the reader to the violence hidden in it.82
The poetic meter of the middle portion of Tiresias’s vision, which recounts the tryst itself,
announces its importance. Though most of The Waste Land is composed in free verse, with only
occasional rhyme and no discernible metrical pattern, once this date begins, the poem adopts the
sonnet form. This is, in fact, one of only two sections in the poem in which something like a sonnet
appears. The intervention of metrical regularity in the stanza calls the reader’s attention to the
significance of the passage, while the sonnet form employed activates expectations regarding its
substance. Indeed, in marshalling the traditional relation between the sonnet form and seduction,
a tradition explicitly referenced in the first stanza of “The Fire Sermon” with the invocation of
Marvell’s “To His Coy Mistress,” this passage seems to develop further the romantic theme of the
section.83 Yet a pair of troubling details appears within this sonnet itself, problematizing its status
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as an expression either of love or of merely evacuated passion. First, while the form of the passage
may be romantic, the diction is definitively not. The language of the sonnet is overwhelmingly
violent. In the first stanza, the young man “endeavors to engage her in caresses,” suggesting the
prelude to a military advance.84 The second stanza realizes this presaged violence. “He assaults at
once” and “encounters no defense.”85 In a poetic aside, which occupies the space of the scene’s
erotic consummation, Tiresias notes that he has “foresuffered” this experience.86 The language of
the sonnet belies its romantic form, emphasizing the violence of the encounter.
Here, a skeptical reader may respond that, if the interaction is violent, the woman herself
seems unaware of it. As Gillum notes, apathy is the emotion most directly attributed to her
throughout the scene, and she seems to express this apathy twice in the sonnet.87 The advances are
“unreproved if undesired” and the young man “makes a welcome of indifference.”88 Yet the
sonnet’s representation of her voice renders this deflationary account of the scene untenable.
Tiresias’ vision begins and ends with the young typist. She is the content of his prophecy. When
the young man arrives, however, the focus of the scene shifts. Suddenly, this house agent’s clerk
becomes the subject, and the typist is presented through his eyes. The claim that “the meal is ended,
she is bored and tired” is the result of his guesswork (“the time is now propitious, as he guesses”).89
The possibility that the woman is not interested in sex with him remains hypothetical. His advances
are “unreproved, if undesired,” leaving open the possibility that they could be both.90 The young
man’s vanity, which “requires no response,” frustrates a straightforward interpretation of the
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woman’s “indifference.”91 In a scene that is ostensibly focused on the young typist, her voice is
excised from the poem at precisely the moment in which her testimony would be valuable. She is
rendered speechless. Worse perhaps than in the case of the woman in “A Game of Chess,” who is
transformed into an object among other objects, the young typist is elided entirely. Her voice is
evacuated from the scene, leaving only the young man’s myopic vanity and aggression.
The appearance of Philomel exerts a complex effect on the scenes in which she appears. I
have suggested already that the allusions to Philomel prepare the reader to recognize subtle
expressions of violence in situations that appear anodyne. But her story also exposes the way in
which that apparently unobjectionable condition is a function of the violence itself. For, central to
each of these accounts – the myth of Philomel, the story of the typist in “The Fire Sermon,” and
the reification of the woman in “A Game of Chess” – is the surgical removal of the female voice.
Philomel’s tongue is cut from her mouth. The woman’s voice is systematically relegated to the
background. The typist is removed entirely from the scene of her own assault. Attendant upon the
violence inflicted against women is the tactical elimination of their capacity to speak on their own
behalf. When the victims are deprived of the ability to communicate their experiences, only the
narrative of the violent party remains. Thus, Tereus maintains for a time his status as king, the
clerk can present an act of sexual violence as a mutual arrangement, and the male speaker in “A
Game of Chess” gets the final word. By illuminating these acts of violence, then, Philomel’s
appearance not only calls attention to the act of silencing, but also exposes the power through
which structural violence obscures itself. She illuminates both the acts and the more pervasive
power structures in which they participate. Furthermore, in doing so, the appearance of Philomel
highlights the historical contingency of the estranged condition experienced by the characters in
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these scenes.92 The violence in these scenes is perpetrated by individual figures, and these figures
participate in specific structures of oppression. The specificity of the agents, along with the active
quality of their violent interventions, disrupts the sense of a universal and permanent condition of
alienation. The solidarity communicated by Philomel’s appearance in the poem shows that these
structures of oppression can be resisted, and this very fact belies the suggestion that their effects
are an essential feature of experience.
This dual unmasking of violence and its capacity to obscure itself does not exhaust
Philomel’s complex effect upon the poem. By asserting herself into disparate scenes in the poem,
she establishes connections between seemingly unconnected events. In doing so, she begins to reestablish relations for characters in the poem who have been effectively isolated. In “A Game of
Chess,” the male speaker’s negations of the female speaker isolate her and, in doing so, transform
her into an object. She is evacuated of self and ceases to connect to others. She becomes a thing.
Similarly, the violent self-assertion of the house agent’s clerk overcomes the subjectivity of the
typist. She concludes the scene in a condition similar to that exhibited by the woman in “A Game
of Chess.” She is alone and objectified, her voice transferred to the gramophone. Yet, despite the
ways in which their experiences impose isolation, the appearance of Philomel offers a restoration
of connection. With her song, Philomel connects to each of them, her story blending with theirs.
And, through her, the women relate to each other.93 The capacity for an intersubjectivity cultivated
through solidarity appears. Philomel, an echo of the past, cries out for them, victims like herself.
And in her cry, she gives voice to those whose have been rendered voiceless. With this gift, their
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voices are transformed, becoming more human through the intervention of the inhuman, more
present through the operation of the past, and singing together though alone.
By illuminating structures of violence that silence their victims, and in establishing
connections between those silenced, the appearance of Philomel in The Waste Land delineates two
opposed visions of life and the role of historical sense in it. According to one vision, the vision
traditionally ascribed to the poem itself, individuals appear to be fundamentally estranged from
each other and incapable of interpersonal relation. Alienation is an irremediable condition, and it
is irremediable because it is natural. This vision treats the past like a mere “withered stump of
time” upon the walls.94 It is simply an adornment, inactive and ultimately inconsequential. The
alternative vision suggests that the voices of the past never actually recede and that they are capable
of illuminating nascent connections between individuals in the present. Attunement to these voices
restores the capacity for interpersonal relation. The poem does not simply articulate these two
opposed visions, juxtaposing them against each other. Rather, through its account of the tendency
of violence to silence its victim and thereby obscure its operation, the poem suggests a contest
between them concerning the precise issue of historical sense. For the work of making violence
appear inconsequential and natural necessarily entails the effacement of the historical conditions
that made that violence possible.95 It entails severing the historical connections that coordinate the
experiences of victims, uniting them in solidarity. Conversely, a vision attuned to connections
established by historical sense and invested in the work of integrating perspectives will necessarily
expose those structures of violence that thrive so long as they remain hidden.
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III. The Operation of Historical Sense
The Waste Land, I have argued, contains a vision of life animated by historical sense, and it
juxtaposes this vision against the alienated experience of a life from which this attentiveness to
history is absent. This juxtaposition illuminates the capacity of historical sense to reveal the ways
in which structures of alienation elide their own historical conditions. Not only does historical
sense have the capacity to expose the structures of violence that perpetuate the experience of
alienation, but it also appears capable of integrating perspectives, thereby alleviating the conditions
of alienation that it reveals. Phlebas the Phoenician, the blind prophet Tiresias, and Philomel all
effect this integration of perspectives within the poem, while Eliot argues for it in his “A Note on
Ezra Pound.”96 Yet, while Eliot explicates the structure of historical sense and argues for its
importance in his prose work, and while he presents an account of the possibilities of a life
animated by historical sense in The Waste Land, a lacuna remains at the heart of the account. The
analysis so far does not include an account of how historical sense is developed, nor does the
analysis account for the role of poetry in its cultivation.
I maintain that Eliot’s prose materials and the structure of The Waste Land itself both
suggest the complex mechanism by which historical sense is developed. The Waste Land is not
merely a vision of life animated by historical sense. It is also a vehicle for historical sense’s
cultivation. The poem both identifies alienation as a dominant force in modern society and also
intervenes in the cultural structure of that society in order to alleviate this condition. An
investigation of the mechanism by which The Waste Land is capable of having such an effect
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involves three relations, each operating in conjunction with the others.97 Of these relations, the
most specific is that between the poet and the text. The text, in this capacity, works as a vehicle
for the cultivation of the poet’s own historical sense. It serves as the tool with which the poet
pursues, according to Eliot, the complete perspective that promises release from the Bradleyan
prison of limited perspective. This developmental account, according to which the poet cultivates
historical sense through the production and revision of the poem, is at odds with the catalytic model
of poetic production that Eliot develops in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” I will argue,
however, that Eliot’s own methodology, as well as other passages in The Sacred Wood, necessitate
a reappraisal of the limits of this catalytic model, thereby preserving the capacity of the creative
process to cultivate a sense of history.
Nevertheless, even this developmental account of poetic production is extremely limited
insofar as it restricts its analysis to the author and the text. While composition is one way to
cultivate historical sense, Eliot does not present it as the exclusive, or even a necessary, means by
which historical sense is developed. A more complete investigation of the operation of the poem
demands an attentiveness to the relationship between the poem and the reader. Such an
investigation is, indeed, necessitated by the chains of allusions built into The Waste Land, as these
allusions implicate the reader in the synthesis of a poetic vision. While an account of the effect of
the poem upon the reader expands the scope of the poetic intervention, it, too, remains incomplete.
In his critical work, Eliot conveys a sensitivity to the interaction between the individual and
culture, articulating the ways in which the culture shapes the individual and the effect the
individual can have upon culture in return. Thus, the two limited interactions between text and
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author and text and reader must be contextualized against the complementary relations between
the text and the culture within which it appears and the culture and the individuals that it produces.
The interplay of forces in this network of relations reveals the full scope of the intervention effected
by the work of poetry while also eliding the boundaries between reader, text, and history. Indeed,
the breadth of the intervention effected by the poem depends precisely upon the mediating role
that it plays between individuals and cultures, a role which is facilitated by the expansion of poetic
scope.
III.1. The Limits of the Catalytic Model
In the second section of “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot appeals to the metaphor of a
catalyst to explain the artist’s relation to the poetic product. Eliot employs this metaphor to
explicate his claim that “the progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, continual extinction
of personality.”98 Rather than create a poem as an expression of her individual personality, Eliot
claims that the mature poet operates as a “medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at
liberty to enter into new combinations.”99 He claims the poet is like a filament of platinum in the
presence of oxygen and sulphur dioxide. When the gasses are mixed without the platinum present,
they remain inert. With the platinum present, however, they react to form a new sulphurous acid,
while the platinum remains unchanged. The mind of the poet, then, will “digest and transmute the
passions which are its material,” but “the man who suffers and the mind that creates” remain
separate.100 Though Eliot’s metaphor of the catalyst powerfully articulates the importance of
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considering the work of poetry independent of the personality of the poet, it presents both the poem
and the poet in static, and I will argue misleading, terms.
The catalytic account of poetic production suggests that the poet remains unchanged
through the composition. The poet assembles the disparate material that is transmuted into the
finished poetic work, but, like the piece of platinum, subsists unaltered throughout the process.
Similarly, once the poem is complete, it is simply a finished product, and the process comes to a
distinct conclusion. The material for the reaction is exhausted, and the poetic process begins anew.
Appealing again to this model, Eliot gives the impression that this process of production is itself
rather quick.101 The cultivation of the necessary elements may take time, but Eliot distinguishes
this process from the act of literary production itself. He suggests that the “poet’s mind is in fact a
receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there
until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together.”102
Though he does not explicate Eliot’s use of the catalyst metaphor in T.S. Eliot’s Intellectual
and Poetic Development 1909–1922, Piers Gray depends on a model of poetic production that
seems to accept the assumptions underwriting the catalytic metaphor. Building his account of
Eliot’s poetic project around Bradley’s problem of historical knowledge and the need for an
absolute perspective, Gray argues that Eliot seeks “through language to make realizable here and
now that demand for the Absolute.”103 Eliot’s poetic aim, according to Gray, is to develop a work
of art that attains “an absolute degree of coherence which is also an absolute degree of
comprehensiveness.”104 The poetic work promises to overcome the alienating incommensurability
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of perspectives by unifying those perspectives into a complete and coherent point of view. The
finished poem is supposed to present this point of view, and in writing poetry, the poet attempts to
create this single, unified work. This demand that the point of view be presented by the discrete
poetic work, which aligns with the catalytic model of poetic production, necessitates Gray’s
conclusion that The Waste Land inevitably fails to present the unifying perspective that it
pursues.105 For, if “the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered” after the
“supervention of novelty,” then even if an individual poem were capable of presenting a complete
vision of the existing order, its production would necessarily alter that order, demanding a new
perspective.106 The discrete work of art cannot itself present a complete and comprehensive
historical perspective because that history is perpetually in flux and is, indeed, altered by the work
of art itself.
Eliot’s account of the poet’s development of historical sense, as well as his own poetic
practice, suggests that this catalytic model presents too static an account of the relations involved
in poetic production. The disruption of this static account necessitates a reappraisal of Gray’s
conclusion that Eliot’s poetic project inevitably ends in failure. For, when the relation between
poet and text is understood as a dynamic interaction, the possibility develops that the totalizing
vision is not contained in the poem. Rather, in composing the poem, the poet actively develops
historical sense, working towards the cultivation of her own totalizing perspective.
Though Eliot, in likening the poet to a catalyst in a chemical reaction, indicates that the
production of a poem occurs immediately and leaves the poet relatively unchanged, his account of
Gray’s use of early drafts of The Waste Land to justify his conclusion that the poem is a tragical satire similarly
suggest an embrace of the catalytic model, as the drafts themselves are transmuted into the final product. Though the
appeal to the earlier drafts acknowledges that the creation of the poem is not instantaneous, the attempt to draw
conclusions about the finished work from the form of the earlier drafts suggests a teleological account of poetic
production. The drafts are stages on the way to a finished product, intermediate attempts at formulating the unifying
vision.
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the development of historical sense presents a radically divergent sense of poetic production.
Rather than emphasize the stable relationship between the poet and the poem, and the poet and the
past, in his explication of historical sense Eliot appeals more consistently to a persistent
development. He insists not only that the poet “must develop a consciousness of the past,” but also
that “he should continue to develop this consciousness through his career.”107 If the poet pursues
the formulation of an absolute perspective, Eliot seems to acknowledge that this perspective cannot
be contained within a single poetic work. Rather, because the past is constantly in flux and contains
limitless perspectives, the integration of these perspectives into a unifying vision is necessarily an
ongoing project. In Epic Negation, C.D. Blanton makes a compelling case for considering Eliot’s
poetic production in precisely these developmental terms. Like Gray, Blanton argues that Eliot
orients his poetics around the concept of order as a concept capable of “naming the way in which
language adjoins fragmented parts to some all-encompassing system that constitutes and
conditions them, admitting no essential difference between an aesthetic sphere and any other.”108
For Blanton, Eliot’s engagement with order operates analogously to Gray’s account of the pursuit
of an absolute perspective.109 Blanton’s account diverges from Gray’s radically and productively,
however, in its presentation of the limits of the poetic work. Blanton argues that The Waste Land
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should be read in relation to the journal in which it first appeared, The Criterion, a journal curated
by Eliot himself, because “the more obvious poem establishes a technique that enables the larger
review to do ‘poetic’ work.”110 A limited reading of The Waste Land as a discrete poem may
provide insight into the method that Eliot employs, but this method permeates Eliot’s larger project
of which The Waste Land operates as merely a part. Thus, “with its swirl of voices and endless
borrowed texts, the review concretizes and answers the formal idea first posed by The Waste
Land.”111 In “making good on Eliot’s redefinition of poetic composition as an editorial labor,” The
Criterion dissolves the boundary between poetic and critical production. The Waste Land
crystallizes the method of the journal, while the journal pursues the unifying order promised by
The Waste Land.
Blanton offers the example of Eliot’s engagement with Herman Hesse’s Blick ins Chaos to
illuminate the extent to which Eliot’s method obscures the boundary between The Waste Land and
The Criterion, the poetic and the critical. The final section of The Waste Land, “What the Thunder
Said,” contains as passage in which, in Blanton’s words, the section “resolves itself into a synthetic
major chord and reclaims the poem’s earlier sequence of Baudelairean allusions in another key.”112
The passage depicts “hooded hordes swarming / Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked earth /
Ringed by the flat horizon only.”113 Eliot only explicitly identifies the inspiration for these lines
when he publishes the annotated version of The Waste Land two months after its initial appearance
in The Criterion.114 Yet already in this initial appearance, Eliot suggests his indebtedness to
Hesse’s Blick ins Chaos through the inclusion of Hesse’s review of “Recent German Poetry,”
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separated from The Waste Land by only one contribution (“The Victim” by May Sinclair).115 “The
reference,” Blanton notes, “was already there even before Eliot added his notes, etched into the
order of The Criterion.”116 The passage of Blick ins Chaos quoted in Eliot’s notes to The Waste
Land further amplifies the textual resonances between The Waste Land and The Criterion, for
Hesse appeals to Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov.117 The second piece in The Criterion’s first
issue is a version of the “Plan of the Novel ‘the Life of a Great Sinner’” by Dostoevsky, translated
by S.S. Kotoliansky and Virginia Woolf.118 Thus, the annotations to The Waste Land signal an
indebtedness to Hesse, who appears within The Criterion and who also alludes to Dostoevsky,
who also appears in The Criterion. The poem calls attention to its position within the larger critical
edifice of the journal, while simultaneously coordinating the various elements of that larger work.
The poem “does not merely allude, that is, thereby reinforcing its own language with that of other
texts, but systematically externalizes the essential functions of poetic language, ranging from the
sensuous order of sound to the intelligible order of meaning.”119 In doing so, the poem ceases to
operate as a self-contained unit, but incorporates and fuses with the material around it. It calls
attention to its place within the ordered vision of the critical enterprise. Because the boundary
between the poetic and the critical already dissipates with the poem’s initial appearance in The
Criterion, the border of the text continues to expand with the subsequent editions of the journal.
The work of the poem does not end with its publication. The poem does not appear completed, the
result of an immediate catalytic reaction. Rather the poem accretes material over time, forming an
ever more complex and complete vision of historical order. In its perpetual expansion, the work,
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both critical and poetic, manifests the ever-developing historical sense of the poet/curator. This
expanding work of art serves as one means by which one can cultivate “the consciousness of the
past” and “continue to develop this consciousness” over the course of a lifetime.120
Blanton offers a compelling argument for considering The Waste Land as a part of the
critical project initiated with The Criterion, and thus as a text with borders that are under perpetual
renegotiation. His explication of the chains of intra-textual reference reveal the extent to which the
allusive structure of The Waste Land exceeds the mere inclusion of textual references within the
poem. These arguments render the restriction of an analysis of The Waste Land to the published
text untenable. Because the catalytic model of poetic production, presented by Eliot himself and
tacitly endorsed by Gray in his explication of the poem, depends upon a restrictive account of the
limits of the text, Blanton’s analysis reveals the extent to which Eliot’s poetic practice does not
align with the model that he presents in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Blanton’s analysis
falls short, however, in its overemphasis on the expansion of limits of the text at the expense of a
recognition of the effects this process of accretion has on the text itself. In framing Eliot’s poetics
around the problem of a comprehensive structure, Blanton makes the same mistake as Gray of
reading Eliot’s poetics as a strictly formal enterprise. Both scholars emphasize the formal pursuit
of a comprehensive vision without engaging the content or experience of that vision. Further, while
Blanton clearly articulates the means by which The Waste Land extends beyond itself through the
expansion of The Criterion, he does not explicate the complementary movement through which
the expansion of the text adjusts the significance of the narrowly defined poem. Thus, each point
in the chain of allusions attendant upon the reference to Blick ins Chaos not only expands the scope
of the poem but also enriches the content of that original passage. Through this process, the image
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of “hooded hordes / Swarming over endless plains” acquires the content of a specific critique of
European decadence, bolstered by an appeal to Dostoyevsky that, through Woolf’s translation,
extends beyond Hesse’s more singular focus on The Brothers Karamazov.121
Blanton’s explication of the expanding lattice of allusions in The Waste Land does not
merely highlight the ongoing cultivation of the poet’s own historical sense. Blanton’s account
additionally illuminates the extent to which the poem demands the development of this capacity
in the reader as well. The Waste Land and The Criterion certainly supplement each other through
networks of allusions and textual juxtapositions. The texts systematically withhold, however, the
significance of these allusions and the chains of inference linking them. Even the short series of
notes that Eliot appends to The Waste Land seems to conceal with its explanations. As Blanton
notes, though Eliot “credits ‘sylvan scene’ (l. 98) to Milton,” he makes no mention of the “softer
strains of Gascoigne (‘The Steel Glass’), Milton (‘O Nightingale’), and Keats (‘Ode to a
Nightingale’)” that “are lurking, along with a stronger doubled echo of Coleridge.”122 Eliot’s notes
signal that the reference to Philomel is derived from other sources but does not signal the extent to
which that allusion is overdetermined. The poem leaves the work of tracing these networks of
allusions to the reader.123 Further, even when Eliot identifies the provenance of his textual
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insertions, his notes rarely suggest the significance of those allusions within the structure of The
Waste Land. When Eliot identifies individual sources, he leaves the reader with the task of
developing an understanding of those sources in their own context and in their relation to the
surrounding poetic material. The reader must reckon with the definite ways in which the past
material shapes the present poetic text. This is precisely the work of cultivating historical sense.
Yet, just as Blanton’s explication of the lattice of allusions in The Waste Land and The Criterion
emphasizes the referential structure formed through the series of allusions without fully engaging
with the effect that this structure exhibits upon the meaning internal to the poem, his account of
the reader’s implication in the excavation of the referential network fails to fully reckon with the
effects of the poetic vision upon the reader. Blanton explicates the work that the poem demands of
the reader but does not engage with how this work alters the reader’s experience of the poem.
Indeed, the work of tracing the chains of allusions contained in the poem does not alone facilitate
the development of historical sense or the integration of perspectives. Rather, the reader must unify
that excavated system of allusions into a vision of life and must, further, inhabit that vision.
III.2. Engaging Historical Sense in the Reader
The constellations of allusions in The Waste Land demand a tremendous degree of historical
literacy from the reader, as Blanton convincingly argues and as The Annotated Edition exemplifies.
Eliot’s notes call attention to this demand for literacy both in their presence and in their absence.
Eliot provides examples of the requisite attention to minute detail with his references to some
seemingly insignificant material in his notes appended to the poem.124 Conversely, however, Eliot
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passes over some clearly allusive material without a remark, requiring the reader to identify the
source independently.125 The historical literacy required to trace these networks of allusions does
not alone, however, entail the possession of historical sense. Historical sense requires not only the
encyclopedic knowledge of poetic references to nightingales, for example, as such knowledge in
isolation barely surpasses an awareness of the sylvan scene painted in the background in “The
Game of Chess.” Historical sense requires an attunement to the endurance of the past. It calls for
a recognition of the relevance of Philomel’s brutal silencing by Tereus to the scene at hand. It
demands attention to the circumstances in which “still she cried, and still the world pursues, ‘Jug
Jug’ to dirty ears.”126
A pair of formal elements of the poem cultivate precisely such an attention to the enduring
operation of the past. Within the poem, the repetition of lines and images from previous sections
forces the reader to maintain an awareness of those earlier passages while engaging with the
present material. At the level of textual production, the bricolage technique wrests phrases from
their original contexts and arranges them into a new textual artifact. Thus, the poem itself
instantiates the continued relevance of the historical material to which it appeals, providing an
explicit example of one way in which the past exerts an influence on the present. In both cases, the
poem invigorates historical material, material that perhaps has receded from view into a reified
existence akin to that identified in the essay on Joyce, by bringing it into new contexts. 127 The
poem confronts the reader with the allusive material’s historical status while also calling attention
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to its present relevance. Thus, these techniques enjoin the reader adopt a way of seeing that is
animated by historical sense.
The distinction between sedimented language and speech, drawn by Maurice MerleauPonty in The Prose of the World, illuminates poem’s transition from fostering the reader’s
historical literacy to cultivating historical sense.128 Sedimented language, Merleau-Ponty explains,
“is the language the reader brings with him, the stock of accepted relations between signs and
familiar significations without which he could never have begun to read.”129 In his development
of this notion of sedimented speech, Merleau-Ponty generally employs it at the most basic level of
the received meanings of words. Thus, in the example of Stendhal’s “Rossi the revenue man,”
which Merleau-Ponty develops extensively in this discussion, Merleau-Ponty knows “what a rogue
is” and can therefore understand what Stendhal means “when he says that Rossi the revenue man
is a rogue.”130 Yet, Merleau-Ponty clarifies that individual words and expressions are not the only
units of speech that become sedimented, for sedimented speech also includes “the literature of the
language,” and thus “it is also Stendhal’s work once it has been understood and added to the
cultural heritage.”131 The historical material that The Waste Land incorporates in its deployment
of bricolage is precisely this “literature of the language,” which is already understood and “part of
the cultural heritage.”132 Yet, in rearranging “the already available signs and significations,” the
language of The Waste Land becomes speech insofar as it “transfigures each of them, so that in
the end, a new signification is secreted.”133 Speech, according to Merleau-Ponty, “is the effect
through which [the author’s] own language comes to life in the reader’s mind, henceforth for the
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reader’s own use.”134 The previously understood “sighs, short and frequent,” from the fourth canto
of the Inferno attain new significance in juxtaposition with the poem’s appeal to Baudelaire’s
“Unreal city,” especially as they are both brought into relation with the horde of shambling London
commuters.135 And indeed the city, itself a sedimented signifier, appears anew through the
perspective of the poem as it is imbued with the infernal and unreal attributes of the allusive
material.
Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between sedimented language and speech illuminates The
Waste Land insofar as it highlights the extent to which works of literature transform the language
that they employ. This transformation, further, entails that an engagement with the allusions and
repetitions structuring The Waste Land must provide an account not of the historical material they
call upon but also of the new signification generated through the inclusion of this material in a new
context. Engagement with the poem demands attention to the ways in which the poem brings the
past into the present and the ways in which the present inclusion alters the significance of the past.
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of literary language reveals how the operation of the language of The
Waste Land itself forces the reader to adopt a perspective of historical sense.
The demands that The Waste Land makes upon the reader ultimately result in the
dissolution of the boundaries between the reader and the text. The structure of allusions alone
already intimates such a dissolution. The reader must determine which resonances to trace and
must further determine the limits of chains of allusions. Thus, while the networks of allusions
facilitate a textual accretion over time in the form of the Criterion, as Blanton argues, they also
implicate the reader in establishing the borders of the text. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, further,
suggests the dissolution of the boundary between text and reader at the level of literary language
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itself. The revitalization of language in literary speech does not merely render a new signification
from sedimented language, it also facilitates the process by which the author’s “language comes
to life in the reader’s mind.”136 Yet, by awakening the author’s language in the mind of the reader,
the literary work allows the reader to assume the author’s thoughts.”137 It brings the reader “within
the imaginary self and the internal dialogue of the author,” and, moreover, renders this dialogue
available for the reader’s use and, indeed, transforms it into part of the reader. Thus, through the
dissolution of the boundaries between text, reader, and author, the organon of the development of
the author’s historical sense facilitates the cultivation of this sense in the reader, as well.
The elision of the distinction between reader and text is already suggested by both the
method of bricolage and the operation of poetic language, yet the text of the poem itself further
effects this dissolution. The Waste Land twice addresses the reader explicitly. The first time it does
so, in “The Burial of the Dead,” the address functions both to challenge and disorient the reader.
The speaker of the poem confronts the reader, asking “what are the roots that clutch, what branches
grow / Out of this stony rubbish?”138 It responds immediately, answering “Son of man / You cannot
say or guess, for you know only / A heap of broken images.”139 In this challenge, the disconnected
vignettes of the poem appear to be an indictment of the limited vision of the reader. In the last of
addresses to the reader in “The Burial of the Dead,” the speaker of the poem promises to restore
the reader’s vision in light of the previous challenge. It offers “to show you something different
from either / Your shadow at morning striding behind you / Or your shadow at evening rising to
meet you.”140 It promises to “show you fear in a handful of dust.”141 Though this stanza
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incorporates the reader into the poem, it does so in such a way that preserves the critical distance
of the reader. The poem speaks to the reader as an external agent, one whose vision is woefully
incomplete. It offers to remedy this incompleteness, though the tone of the offer is perhaps more
foreboding than it is genuine. But even the remedy would preserve the reader’s position as an
external interpreter. The vision that could become more complete is a vision of The Waste Land
itself.
When the poem addresses the reader again in its penultimate section, “Death by Water,”
the effect of the address fully incorporates the reader into the poem, thereby eliding the border
between text and reader. Though it is the shortest section of The Waste Land by far, it unifies
multiple chains of allusions that appear throughout the poem. Beyond simply incorporating the
reader into the poem in this small passage, the echoes of other sections effect a much broader
diffusion of the reader into the text. “Death by Water” describes the decomposition of “Phlebas
the Phoenician, a fortnight dead” as “A current under sea / picked his bones in whispers.” 142 Not
only do the sinews of Phlebas unspool, but his memory seems to as well. For “as he rose and fell
/ He passed the stages of his age and youth,” and he “forgot the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell
/ And the profit and the loss.”143 In the final stanza of the section, however, the focus shifts from
Phlebas’ immediate condition to his fate, a fate that is shared by all. The poem enjoins “Gentile or
Jew / O you who turn the wheel and look to windward / Consider Phlebas, who was once as
handsome and as tall as you.”144 The poem forces the reader to confront her own mortality and, in
doing so, recognize her ultimate identity with the dead Phoenician. Taken alone, this stanza serves
as a memento mori. Its status as such connects it to the poem’s first address to the reader, as well
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as to the pseudo-sonnets at the beginning of “The Fire Sermon,” which both invoke Marvell’s “To
His Coy Mistress.”145
“Death by Drowning” does not merely develop the theme of death’s omnipresence, which
appears throughout the poem in various ways. Rather, it manifests the vision prophesized in the
opening section of the poem by “Madam Sosostris, famous clairvoyante.”146 In “The Burial of the
Dead,” Madam Sosostris offers a tarot reading to an unidentified interlocutor. Though she speaks
cryptically of “the Lady of the Rocks, / The lady of situations,” and “the man with three staves,”
her reading both begins and ends with imagery that anticipates the penultimate section of the
poem.147 First, she identifies the reader’s card as “the drowned Phoenician sailor,” and the reading
ends with a warning to “Fear death by drowning” before it segues into a vision of the following
section.148 In addition to presenting a vision that anticipates the “Death by Drowning” section,
Madam Sosostris, herself, anticipates the appearance of Tiresias in “The Fire Sermon.” Like
Tiresias, Sosostris foresees the substance of the poem. Further, functioning as a mirror of Tiresias,
the character from whom the name Sosostris is taken is, like Tiresias, “throbbing between two
lives.”149 The prefiguration of Tiresias in the fortune teller reinforces Eliot’s claim that Tiresias “is
the most important personage of the poem,” one who has a vision of “the substance of the
poem.”150 As a mirror of the prophet, Sosostris reinforces the sense in which “the two sexes meet
in Tiresias.”151 The chains of references and repetitions that foster connections between the
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seemingly disparate sections of the poem thus frustrate an attempt to isolate the address to the
reader in “Death by Water.” While the address to the reader in “Death by Water” dissolves the
reader’s critical distance from the poem by appealing to the reader’s ultimate identity with the dead
Phoenician, the connection to the vision of Madam Sosostris incorporates the reader into the poem
more generally. Recasting the reader as an object of the poetic vision, which finds completion in
the figure of Tiresias, the appeal ultimately integrates the reader into the entirety of the poem,
implicating her in a vision animated by historical sense.
Eliot’s commitment to the ongoing labor of both the author and the reader, as well as the
poetic techniques that blur the boundaries between them, illuminates the capacity of The Waste
Land to cultivate historical sense in individuals. The author’s sense of tradition continues to deepen
as the work, in this case both The Waste Land and The Criterion, expands to include new material
and new connections. The attentive reader, too, develops historical sense, as the allusive structure
of the poem demands that the reader do the labor of reconstructing the historical network of the
poem. Further, as the reader works to synthesize the seemingly disparate elements of the poem,
she begins to inhabit a vision of reality animated by historical sense. This vision suggests not only
the formal, organized structure of the poem, itself a vision of the structure of Eliot’s tradition, but
also the capacity of this sense of tradition to restore connections between isolated individuals.
Through these relations to the author and the reader, the text intervenes in the individual experience
of alienation. In cultivating the historical sense of the individual, the text develops her capacity to
integrate perspectives into a more unified vision, thereby bridging the seemingly endless gulf
between disparate points of view.
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III.3. Dissolving the Borders of Text and Context
The problem identified by The Waste Land, and developed elsewhere in Eliot’s corpus, however,
is not fundamentally an individual problem. The sense of alienation that permeates The Waste
Land is societal. The epistemological crisis that renders points of view incommensurable appears
in the first stanza of the poem as a crisis of the land itself, as the “sun beats / And the dead tree
gives no shelter, the cricket no relief / And the dry stone no sound of water.”152 This desolate
imagery appears again in the final stanza of the poem, only it identifies more specifically a
distinctly European historical trajectory in the “Falling towers” of “Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
/ Vienna London.”153 The prospect that a poem could address this pervasive condition of radical
isolation by animating the historical sense of individual readers or poets appears hopeless. The
Waste Land itself gestures towards the experience of those possessed of historical sense but lacking
interlocutors. The blind prophet Tiresias “foresuffers all” in the poem but does so from outside of
the action of the text.154 His capacity for vision simultaneously binds him to and distances him
from the personages in the poem. The individual possessed of historical sense may be capable of
synthesizing points of view. Surrounded by those that do not acknowledge the unifying force of
such a perspective, however, this capacity may throw the individual back into a state of radical
isolation. While the expression of alienation at the societal level in The Waste Land frustrates,
perhaps, an attempt to locate the effect of the work primarily in the relations between the text and
the author or the text and the reader, this same feature underscores the importance of Eliot’s
account of the relationship between the author and her cultural environment. Throughout The
Sacred Wood, as well as in other works of criticism, Eliot exhibits an attentiveness to the way in
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which a culture organizes the experience of those within it. Eliot also acknowledges the capacity
of works of art to alter the contexts in which they appear. This dually conditioning relationship, in
which culture and individual exert formative effects upon each other, suggests a framework for
understanding The Waste Land’s response to the condition of alienation that it diagnoses.
Eliot’s analysis in “Imperfect Critics” suggests the extent to which a work of art can be
informed by the cultural conditions in which it is produced. Indeed, Eliot’s commitment to this
formative relation transcends individual historical periods, as he claims that “an understanding of
Elizabethan rhetoric is as essential to the appreciation of Elizabethan literature as an understanding
of Victorian sentiment is essential to the appreciation of Victorian literature and of George
Wyndham.”155 Eliot’s attentiveness to the ways in which the cultural context shapes the works of
art produced within it manifests, as well, in his treatments of Blake and Dante. Dante, Eliot notes,
“had the benefit of a mythology and theology that had undergone a more complete absorption into
life than those of Lucretius.”156 Because Dante writes in a culture with, according to Eliot, a
ubiquitous philosophical and theological perspective, he is capable of dealing with philosophy “as
an ingredient, it is part of Dante’s world as it is a part of life.”157 Eliot describes Blake’s genius,
by contrast, as lacking a “framework of accepted and traditional ideas which would have prevented
him from indulging in a philosophy of his own.”158 He explicitly blames the shortcomings of Blake
as a poet on “the shortcomings of the environment which failed to provide what such a poet
needed.”159 Eliot offers an aside in “The Conceit in Donne and Crashaw” about John Donne’s
relation to his own context that further evidences this formative relation between culture and poet.

155

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 26.
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 138.
157
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 138.
158
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 134.
159
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 134.
156

208

In fact, it suggests a narrative trajectory. In his analysis of Donne’s “The Relique,” Eliot notes that
“the analogy of the impermanence of graves to the fickleness of women is an association of ideas
peculiar to Donne’s idiom.”160 Not only is this analogy peculiar, but Eliot proposes that “it
indicates that something was beginning to go wrong with civilization about that time” because
“there is something ominous when such very dissimilar thoughts and feelings become yoked in
one poem.”161 The cultural conditions of dissolution, in which a unified theoretical framework is
in the process of disintegrating, fosters poetry in which passion “fades into the play of suggested
ideas.”162 Along with his accounts of the formal techniques of these poets, Eliot traces a parallel
narrative of the cultural conditions to which these techniques respond.163
In addition to acknowledging the extent to which cultural conditions guide the sensibility
of the poet, Eliot also highlights throughout The Sacred Wood the capacity of the artist to exhibit
an effect upon her culture. This effective reflexivity is most pronounced, perhaps, in Eliot’s claim
concerning Philip Massinger that “every vital development in language is a development of feeling
as well” and in Massinger this development “is not a development based on, or resulting from, a
new way of feeling” but rather “seems to lead us away from feeling altogether.”164 This evacuation
of feeling, Eliot later notes, is precisely the characteristic that renders Puritanism hideous because
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“Puritanism itself became repulsive only when it appeared as the survival of a restraint after the
feelings which it restrained had gone.”165 Massinger marks a development of feeling through,
according to Eliot, the evacuation of it, and this evacuation of feeling manifests in developments
within Puritan culture. Eliot makes a more explicit suggestion of the cultural effects produced by
works of art in his account of the Romanticism of George Wyndham. For, while Wyndham is a
manifestation of a particular form of Victorian imperialism, Eliot ponders whether “it might be of
interest to divagate from literature to politics and inquire to what extent Romanticism is
incorporate in Imperialism; to inquire to what extent Romanticism has possessed the imagination
of Imperialists, and to what extent it was made use of by Disraeli.”166 Though Eliot sadly does not
pursue this inquiry, the language of incorporation and possession suggests a strong formative
influence. This reflexivity is captured in Eliot’s account of Wyndham himself. For just as much as
he was a critic marked by his status as “Gentry,” Wyndham was also an imperialist aristocrat
formed by his education in Romanticism.167 Just as his country life “riding to hounds” should not
be set aside when considering his critical work, Eliot suggests that his Romantic outlook cannot
be detached from a consideration of his political career.168 Here, Eliot clearly suggests that works
of art can exert significant influence upon their cultural environment.
According to Eliot’s account, the poem’s role in the cultivation of historical sense is thus
overdetermined by the poem’s relationships to a host of other forces. These relationships are
themselves complicated by the extent to which Eliot’s poetic and critical practice dissolves the
boundaries between their poles.169 The distinction between text and context blurs through Eliot’s
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use of allusion and textual accretion. The distinction between reader and poem blurs as the poem
demands that the reader coordinate those allusions, engaging in the archeological recovery and
reorganization of the poetic vision. Through this process, the reader traces the chains of allusions
and synthesizes them into a coherent whole. Yet the reader’s own point of view is inevitably woven
into this process, and the perspectives of the reader and the text are integrated into each other.
Similarly, as a cultural artifact, the poem is a product of specific social conditions. It develops out
of these conditions and responds to them. The poem also, however, exhibits effects upon the
culture from which it develops. These effects range from the imperceptible reorganizations of
tradition that occur with the supervention of novelty to the orientation of cultural movements, as
with Eliot’s suggestion of the Romantic influence on the imperial outlook. The dissolution of these
borders between text and context, text and reader, and text and culture establishes new formative
relations between the poles in these dichotomies. The capacity of the work of art to cultivate
historical sense, then, exceeds that of the operation of poetry in any of these individual
relationships. The poem might excite historical sense in the reader, who adopts a new perspective
on her own culture. Or perhaps the poem, either through its immediate influence on culture at large
or through its effect upon individuals, orients that culture to historical sense. The culture then may
develop into a social context in which members are instilled with an appreciation for the endurance
of the past, and this facilitates the capacity to accommodate multiple points of view. Most
importantly, though these processes can be isolated in theory, they are always co-implicating,
changes in individuals necessarily effecting changes in culture and changes in culture altering the
significance of texts.
These myriad and interconnected textual relations are, in fact, suggested in Eliot’s
definition of historical sense. They are contained at the heart of The Sacred Wood. The author who
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has labored for historical sense writes with “not merely with his generation in his bones, but with
a feeling that the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole literature of
his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”170 The vision
of this simultaneous order cannot be myopically focused simply on the individual works of
literature, for it must also recognize “that the material of art is never quite the same.” 171 The
complex web of dissolving relations between past works of art, the conditions that informed them,
and contemporary conditions that serve as artistic material all inform a piece of literature imbued
with historical sense. The work of the artist is shaped, in part, by the “mind of Europe.”172 Yet the
work of the traditional artist alters this structure. It reorganizes the relations between the
components. It shifts the conditions of the society in which it appears. It is integrated into the mind
of Europe. And through its integration, it participates in the formation of subsequent generations
of individuals and artists. These complementary facets of the relationship between the artist and
her environment suggest the mechanism by which The Waste Land may ameliorate the alienated
condition that it diagnoses. It is, indeed, capable of facilitating in its readers a vision of life
animated by historical sense. But its status as a cultural artifact extends the force of its effects
beyond the individual relation of reader to text. The Waste Land reorganizes the structure of
historical elements around their enduring presence. It has the potential to imbue the mind of Europe
with a cultural expression of historical sense. According to Eliot, the text that is an expression of
historical sense both is animated by a cultural tradition and reorganizes that tradition through its
appearance. Because, with its intervention, it is incorporated into the pre-existing traditional order,
the historical sense directing the production of the text is incorporated into that order, as well. The
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tradition, itself, becomes invested with a sense of the endurance of the past in the present. The
Waste Land promises not only to facilitate the integration of perspectives for individual readers.
Rather, through the activation of historical sense at a cultural level, it facilitates the integration of
perspectives and the recovery of a shared world. By self-consciously thematizing historical sense,
by injecting an awareness of the saturation of the past in the present into its culture, The Waste
Land has the potential to create the environment in which it can be read.
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THE TEMPORALITY OF HISTORICAL SENSE AND THE PROMISE OF MEMORY

Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that The Waste Land presents two competing visions of
modern life. In one of these visions, the poem identifies a condition of alienation that dominates
the cultural landscape, foreclosing the possibility of interpersonal connections. This alienated state
manifests in nearly all of the poem’s vignettes, but it also resonates in the poem’s systematic
allusions to the Grail legend and the tradition of fertility rituals of which that legend is a part.
According to the sympathetic logic enshrined in this tradition, the health of the land reflects the
health of the people living on it. The unhealthy condition of the people manifests in the aridity of
their world. I have argued that, rather than applying this sympathetic logic literally, The Waste
Land marshals it poetically to identify the epistemic consequences of the alienated condition
diagnosed by the poem. When individuals lose their capacity to engage with each other, their
shared world disintegrates. Indeed, within the poem, the failures of communication are often
accompanied by the sense that the interlocutors occupy radically divergent perspectives with
incommensurable experiences of the world. I have argued that the poem does not merely present
this alienated condition as an irremediable state that entails the inevitable dissolution of the social
fabric. Rather, the poem also contains a vision of life infused with the historical sense that Eliot
appeals to throughout The Sacred Wood. Historical sense operates as a capacity to synthesize
perspectives and, in so doing, promises to recover the possibility of a shared world. In addition to
articulating the synthetic capacity of historical sense, the poem’s use of allusion and repetition
engage the reader in the process of cultivating the attention to history that the poem enjoins.
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The historical sense to which Eliot appeals in The Sacred Wood, the historical sense that
animates the poetic vision of the recovery of a shared world, depends upon the capacity to
recognize the enduring action of the past within the present. Indeed, by enjoining a recognition of
the endurance of the past, Eliot’s notion of historical sense seems to require a reconceptualization
of time itself. Eliot does not, however, explicate the nature of the past’s endurance, nor does he
argue for the veracity of his appeal to it. The legitimacy of this account of historical sense is not
Eliot’s quarry in the essay in which it is introduced. Nor is the poetic form of The Waste Land
adequate to the analytical explication and justification of this historical sense, as Eliot makes clear
in the essay on Dante. The primary evidence that Eliot offers in favor of historical sense is, in fact,
the fecundity of its application. Attention to historical sense illuminates the literary tradition, as
well as one’s relation to it, and further facilitates the synthesis of perspectives required for
intersubjective experience. Yet these promised fruits of historical sense depend upon, rather than
justify, the account of temporality assumed by the appeal to the past’s endurance.
If the past does not endure as Eliot suggests in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” then
the shared world that The Waste Land promises through its application would, in fact, be built
upon an illusory foundation. The recovery of a shared reality would amount to a retreat into a
collective fantasy. Such a retreat into fantasy is precisely the charge leveled against modernist
literature by Georg Lukács. Modernism, he claims, abandons all commitment to the interrogation
of objective reality, taking refuge instead in untethered subjective fantasy. According to Lukács,
this is the inevitable consequence of modernism’s commitment to alienation as essential to the
human condition. Thus, if the account of temporality implicit in Eliot’s appeal to historical sense

215

is illusory, then The Waste Land does not promise to overcome alienation. Instead, it proposes to
escape from the experience of radical isolation through the cultivation of a shared fantasy.1
In order to defend my claim that The Waste Land presents a legitimate response to the
condition that it diagnoses, I will argue that a coherent temporal framework underwrites Eliot’s
account of historical sense. Eliot unfortunately does not himself articulate this framework. Nor
indeed does he identify explicitly the radical reorientation to time demanded by his appeal to, and
application of, historical sense. In this chapter, I will argue that the account of historical sense
presented by Eliot in The Sacred Wood implicitly contains the necessary conditions of the temporal
account operative in The Waste Land. In the first section of this chapter, then, I will identify these
conditions. Further, I will investigate Eliot’s juxtaposition of historical sense against approaches
to history that he describes as deficient. I will argue that this juxtaposition reveals the challenge
that historical sense poses to traditional linear temporal frameworks. Acknowledging that Eliot
does not engage with particularly compelling examples of linear temporality in his development
of historical sense in The Sacred Wood, in the second section of the chapter I will consider the
possibility that a more robust linear temporality could meet the conditions of historical sense. In
particular, I will consider the account of history presented by F.H. Bradley, whose work
significantly influenced Eliot. Though a Bradleyan temporal framework seems capable of meeting
the necessary conditions of Eliot’s appeal to tradition, the operation of historical sense in The
Waste Land reveals that even a robust linear model cannot fully account for the endurance of the
past as demanded by Eliot. Thus, I claim, Eliot’s account of historical sense demands a complete

1

One may initially be inclined to argue that such a collective fantasy would, at least, be preferable to the experience
of radical alienation diagnosed in The Waste Land. I maintain, however, that the admission that this shared perspective
is won through the rejection of reality renders the position untenable. For once veracity is abandoned as a condition
for the success of an account, any shared perspective becomes legitimate so long as it is powerful enough to warrant
assent. I take the ramifications of this condition to be self-evidently problematic and, further, implicitly identified in
the argument of the second chapter.
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reconceptualization of temporality. In the third section, I will argue that Henri Bergson, by whom
Eliot was also profoundly influenced, offers in his investigation of memory an account of time that
meets the conditions needed to ground historical sense. I will identify the features of the
Bergsonian temporal framework that can provide the theoretical ground for Eliot’s account, and I
will locate these features within the larger Bergsonian system. In doing so, I will articulate the
breadth of the reorientation demanded by Eliot’s account of historical sense.
I. The Temporal Ground of Historical Sense
In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot does not articulate the conceptual ramifications of
the historical sense that he asserts is “indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet
beyond his twenty-fifth year.”2 Indeed, at the end of the text, he notes that “this essay proposes to
halt at the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism, and confine itself to such practical conclusions as
can be applied by the responsible person interested in poetry.”3 Here Eliot self-consciously limits
the scope of his analysis to the elements of historical sense that facilitate its application in poetry
and criticism. He is not concerned with the demands that this precondition for poetry makes upon
our understanding of time itself. Yet the account of historical sense that Eliot develops clearly
entails such theoretical conditions, even if the essay’s purview does not extend to their explication.
For example, Eliot reformulates his central claim that historical sense involves an awareness “not
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence” when he claims that it should come as no
surprise that “the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the
past.”4 This reformulation suggests a mutual causal or directing relation between past and present,
though it leaves opaque the precise relation of the terms. Additionally, Eliot deems an argument
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Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 40.
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 49.
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for this suggested relation between past and future unnecessary. For he claims that “whoever has
approved of this idea of order, of the form of European, of English literature,” will not find the
reciprocal interaction of past and present preposterous.5 Nevertheless, despite this claim that his
notion of historical sense should be uncontroversial, Eliot takes care to distinguish his account of
tradition from other prevailing uses of the term. This juxtaposition of historical sense against
deficient modes of engaging with the past, found both in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and
“Ulysses, Order, Myth,” delineates the contours of the necessary temporal framework. Further,
though Eliot does not fully explicate the conceptual ramifications of his appeal to historical sense,
the structural elements of his account nevertheless suggest the conditions that must apply for an
account of temporality to accommodate the reorientation to time that he endorses.
Eliot identifies two primary features of historical sense that have significant implications
for the structure of temporality assumed by this orientation to the past. Each of these features
specifies the manner in which the past persists in the present. The first specification appears as part
of the explanation of the past’s endurance. According to Eliot, the author possessed of historical
sense “writes with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it
the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a
simultaneous order.”6 As I noted in the previous chapter, the appeal to a “feeling” of this
simultaneous order suggests that it may depend upon the artist. Eliot clarifies, however, that the
“existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves,” and as such, they do not depend

5

Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41.
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41. Many excellent Eliot scholars emphasize precisely this passage in “Tradition and the
Individual Talent.” C.D. Blanton’s account, in Epic Negation, of Eliot’s editorial methodology draws upon this idea
of an accretive structure. In T.S. Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development: 1909–1922, Piers Gray articulates the
centrality of this notion of simultaneous order to The Waste Land. In the previous chapter, I aligned myself with their
accounts in many ways, though I indicated that the accounts were insufficient in their failures to accommodate the
specific vision of the poem itself. These deficiencies belie the extent to which these scholars have privileged this
structural element of historical sense over the developmental aspect, to which I will turn shortly.
6
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upon any individual’s awareness of this order.7 The past, then, perpetually endures in an ideal
structure of relations that conditions the significance of new material.8 This structure is in perpetual
flux, and thus the past itself is not static but “is modified by the introduction of the new (the really
new) work of art.”9 Eliot’s emphasis on the ideality of this structure, and on the labor involved on
the part of the artist to attain a vision of it, gives the impression that the past operates as a
superstructure. It seems to exist apart from the world of actuality, yet it is accessible as an ideal
aesthetic object.
Eliot complicates this impression of pure ideality, however, when he employs the
metaphorics of memory to illuminate the persistence of the past.10 He juxtaposes the private mind
of the artist with “the mind of Europe – the mind of his own country.”11 Eliot seems to prioritize
this mind of Europe above the individual mind of the artist. Yet, even in doing so he treats them
as analogous entities. Like an individual, the mind of Europe changes, and this change “is a
development which abandons nothing en route, which does not superannuate either Shakespeare
or Homer or the rock drawing of the Magdalenian draughtsmen.”12 The past is not merely an ideal
order over and against the present. Rather, the present is an expression of the “development,
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Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41. I have already established that the ideal order does not depend upon any individual
perspective of it. Here I am interested less in the nature of the ideal order than in the present reality with which this
order endows the past.
8
Here the intervention in this structure is a new work of art, but I have previously argued that Eliot’s poetic practice
disrupts the firm distinction between works of art and historical developments more generally.
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“Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41.
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The Bergsonian account of time that I will appeal to in response to the conditions established in these passages will
call into question whether the appeal to memory is, in fact, metaphorical. Ultimately, I will suggest that it is not, and
in the final chapter of this dissertation I intend to develop a more expansive account of memory grounded in Eliot’s
Bergsonian framework. As these are both points that need to be further developed, I will initially treat this description
as metaphorical.
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Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 42. Despite Eliot’s Eurocentric formulation of this claim, I argued in the first section of
the previous chapter that the pressure of his account of historical sense actually necessitates an appeal to increasingly
comprehensive wholes. Artificially restricting the account of tradition to “the Mind of Europe” undermines the
synthetic power that promises to facilitate shared perspectives and reinscribes the alienated conditions described in
The Waste Land at a cultural, rather than individual, level. So, while Eliot formulates his account in Eurocentric terms,
I maintain his account actually depends upon a more capacious understanding of tradition that is not bound by arbitrary
spatial limits.
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Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 42–43.
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refinement perhaps, complication certainly” of the ideal structure of the past, identified as the mind
of Europe.13 The present is the continuation of this development. Thus, the ideal order of tradition
is immanent to, and indeed constitutive of, the present. Eliot does not set the two radically apart.
Rather, he claims that the difference “between the present and the past is that that the conscious
present is an awareness of the past in a way and to an extent which the past’s awareness of itself
cannot show.”14 Thus, Eliot’s account of tradition does not merely demand a temporal framework
that permits the endurance of the past as an ideal order that can be reflected upon. It also appeals
to the continuity of this ideal order with the present, such that the past develops into and expresses
itself through the present.
These paired descriptions of historical sense establish three main conditions that an account
of temporality must accommodate if it is to be capable of grounding historical sense as expressed
in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” First, Eliot’s initial description of historical sense
straightforwardly establishes that this account of temporality must permit the endurance of the past
as an ideal order, as well as the past’s endurance independent of the artists who engage with it.
Second, though the existence of this order is independent of the artists who work upon it, the
account further specifies that the ideal order and the relations between the terms that constitute it
must be affected by the intervention of the present.15 Finally, Eliot’s subsequent appeal to the
developing mind of Europe entails that the account of temporality must accommodate and account
for the past’s preservation in and immanence to the present, insofar as the present is the continuing
development of the past.
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Though these conditions alone do not provide a particularly robust delineation of the
conception of time that underwrites his account, Eliot appeals to deficient models of engaging with
tradition in order to illuminate his notion of historical sense more clearly. The juxtaposition of
historical sense with these insufficient alternatives brings the temporal conditions of his account
into sharper relief. Further, not only does the contrast with these deficient approaches to tradition
more clearly illuminate the necessary elements of a framework capable of grounding historical
sense, it also reveals the extent to which this framework demands a radical reorientation to
temporality. This radical reorientation becomes necessary, I will argue, because at the root of
Eliot’s critiques is an implicit rejection of linear models of time along with the assumption of
time’s passage that underwrites them.
When Eliot introduces the notion of historical sense, he positions it between a pair of
alternative approaches to tradition. Though Eliot caricatures both of these accounts, the ways in
which he does so illuminate the contours of his own position. Thus, though I think there may be
limited value in reading his critiques with an eye to their argumentative force, I maintain they are
nevertheless worth considering because of the elements of historical sense they bring into relief.
Eliot first notes a tendency, when praising a poet, to “dwell with satisfaction upon the poet’s
difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors; we endeavor to find
something that can be isolated in order to be enjoyed.”16 This approach to criticism considers the
past only in order to identify the ways in which the artist in question has injected novelty into it.
Because this approach identifies “what is individual, what is the particular essence of the man”
with “those aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else,” it elides the relation
between the artist and a tradition of other artists, as well as the artist’s relation to the network of
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cultural forces conditioning that tradition.17 Thus, the contemporary artist becomes an atomic unit,
separated from a past that comprises myriad analogous units. Further, because the value of a work
of art is identified with its novelty, the introduction of new artistic material renders prior
productions obsolete. They become objects to be admired, perhaps, but they are no longer relevant
to contemporary circumstances.18 Eliot does not criticize this fascination with novelty simply for
attending to the new dimensions of a literary work or for juxtaposing contemporary works of art
against prior productions. Indeed, Eliot clarifies that evaluating an artist requires setting him “for
contrast and comparison among the dead.”19 The deficiency, then, is neither the impulse to
compare nor an interest in novelty. Instead, it is the attempt to atomize the work of art into a
discrete unit that is detached from networks of historical relations and whose identity is defined
exclusively by its novel elements. The failure arises through the elision of the simultaneous order
in which the contemporary work participates and through which it attains its significance. 20 The
attempt to detach the present work from the past evacuates it of its identity.
The second deficient tendency against which Eliot positions historical sense initially
appears antithetical to the first. Eliot claims that, instead of championing the pure novelty of artistic
works, this impulse follows “the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid
adherence to its successes,” and he clarifies that this approach to tradition “should positively be
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discouraged.”21 This approach does not reify the past in order to escape it. Rather it pursues the
repetition of established forms in order to preserve the present as a mere continuation or repetition
of the past.22 This repetitive engagement with tradition fails because it does not acknowledge that
“the material of art is never quite the same.”23 The repetition of traditional forms, then, necessarily
entails ignoring the alteration of the conditions to which art responds. In this way, the mode of
tradition that slavishly repeats traditional forms closely resembles the classicism that turns “away
from nine-tenths of the material which lies at hand” and selects “only the mummified stuff from a
museum” that Eliot derides in “Ulysses, Order, Myth.”24 In these cases, the approach to past forms
reifies them, preserving them as objects detached from or even preferable to present conditions.25
Rather than dismiss this unchanging past as irrelevant to the present, as Eliot’s imagined
interlocutor exclusively concerned with novelty does, this repetitive approach to tradition retreats
into an ossified formal structure and elides the perpetual development of cultural conditions. The
two deficient approaches to tradition identified by Eliot take opposite evaluative stances towards
the past. Yet these opposing critical stances fail to meet the standard of historical sense in
complementary ways.26 The first deficient approach to tradition elides the enduring relevance of
the past, focusing instead on the interruption of novelty. The second denies the demands that the
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present makes upon the past and the perpetual development of the conditions to which art responds,
retreating instead into ossified conventions. The former attempts to escape from a past that it deems
static and decrepit, while the latter attempts to render the past static in order to evade the everchanging demands of the shifting present.
Though these two attitudes appear contradictory, with one disparaging the past and the
other attempting to preserve it, they are nevertheless grounded in the same orientation to history
as unchanging and removed from the present. The excessive concern for novelty appeals to
precisely this sense of the past’s irrelevance to justify its elision. The mummified classicism
reveres ossified historical forms and attempts to retreat into them as a static refuge from the
demands of a dynamic present. This shared orientation, further, reveals a more fundamental
commitment to the operation of time as passage from present into past. The present moment passes
away, ceases to exist, and becomes past. The past is unchanging precisely because it has ceased to
be and is fixed in a linear sequence of moments. This sense of passage amplifies the impulse to
detach the past from the present by emphasizing the moment’s extinction as time progresses. Thus,
distance comes to characterize the relationship between past and present, and this sense of distance
facilitates the reification of history. The first deficient approach to tradition attempts to hasten the
passage of time, identifying passage with progress. Not only does the present moment recede into
the past, but as soon as it has done so it is deemed deficient in comparison to the new present. The
second approach implicitly endorses the notion of passage first insofar as it treats tradition as a
collection of relics to be preserved or objects to be inherited and then again insofar as it identifies
passage as an enemy to be resisted. The past recedes, but its relics remain as bulwarks against the
chaos of change.
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These deficient approaches to history fail precisely because of their shared commitment to
the passage of time, and the insufficiency of the notion of temporal passage reveals the extent to
which Eliot’s account of historical sense demands a radical reorientation to temporality. With his
explication of historical sense, Eliot does not merely identify the necessary conditions for a
satisfactory understanding of tradition. The implications of Eliot’s rejection of time as passage
extend well beyond the approaches to tradition that Eliot caricatures and juxtaposes with historical
sense, for the notion of time as passage is fundamental to linear models of temporal progress. The
representation of the present moment as a point on a line depends upon a conception of present as
perpetually passing away. In order for a new moment to become actual, in order for change to
occur, the present must fade into the past and cease to exist. Indeed, the linear spatialization of
time requires conceiving of the past as left behind in order to represent the present moment as
making way for the future.27 Thus, if one of the necessary conditions of historical sense entails the
rejection of accounts of time dependent upon its passage, then the conditions of historical sense
also demand the adoption of a nonlinear temporal framework. The temporal framework that
grounds Eliot’s account of historical sense must, then, account for the endurance of the past as an
independent ideal order. It must accommodate the intervention of the present into this ideal order.
And it must also recognize the immanence of the past in the present, insofar as the present is
conditioned by and an expression of the past from which it develops. Further, this account of
temporality cannot be grounded in a commitment to the passage of time, and thus it must exhibit
a non-linear structure.

Alia al-Saji provides a helpful primer on this model of time, which she refers to as the “standard” account (Al-Saji,
“The memory of another past,” 204). She describes the structure I have referred to as passage as “the chronological
succession of instants,” and this description grounds her distinction between the standard account and a model capable
of accommodating “the actual passage of time” (Al-Saji, “The memory of another past,” 204, 205). Despite these
differences in vocabulary, the model she develops as standard aligns with what I present here and supplements my
somewhat more cursory account.
27
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II. F.H. Bradley as a Possible Guarantor of Tradition
Eliot does not, of course, present historical sense as an explicit rejection of linear temporality.
Rather, he positions historical sense between two alternative approaches to tradition which, I have
argued, fail precisely because of their assumptions about the nature of time as passage. Eliot does
not present these alternatives as particularly nuanced positions, and they are clearly adduced in
order to be rejected. Because Eliot presents these alternatives as straw men, one might object that
Eliot’s critique engages rhetorically with accounts of tradition grounded in a naïve approach to
linear temporality. They endorse a false dichotomy between a present that exists and a past that
has simply expired. They do not acknowledge the enduring impact that elements of the past can
have upon subsequent moments. Nor do they fully recognize the endurance of entities through
time. Instead, they isolate artifacts from historical moments, ossifying them and fixing their
significance in the no-longer present. One might suggest that the conditions of Eliot’s historical
sense may still be satisfied by a linear account of temporality if this linear temporality exhibited
more nuance in its engagement with the persistence of objects through time. According to such an
account, the past may indeed recede out of existence, but the effects of the past persist beyond the
moment of their instantiation. These effects may be concrete objects, such as the works of art with
which Eliot concerns himself in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” or they may be ideal
frameworks, such as political or cultural structures. Events may be consigned to the past, but they
retain their significance for the present through the endurance of the effects they have produced.
Thus, the literary tradition may be said to persist as an ideal order insofar as the works that
comprise that tradition are accessible. Further, the production of new literary artifacts adjusts this
order, and the significance of each object comprising it is adjusted accordingly. F.H. Bradley offers
an account of history that seems to endorse precisely such a linear model of temporality in The
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Presuppositions of Critical History, but this model is grounded in a more robust ontological
structure. This structure, in turn, bolsters elements of the account capable of underwriting the
temporality of historical sense, especially given Eliot’s indebtedness to Bradley’s epistemological
framework. Bradley’s account of history thus promises to illuminate the extent to which a linear
account of temporality might meet the conditions of historical sense.
In The Presuppositions of Critical History, Bradley endeavors to determine the status of a
historical fact and the conditions under which a historian can appeal to the testimony of a historical
witness. Bradley’s assumptions about the nature of time dictate the necessity of this investigation,
for the difficulty of establishing a historical fact arises precisely because of the inaccessibility of
the past. Throughout The Presuppositions of Critical History, Bradley refers to the past as dead.
An event “perishes as soon as it arises.”28 It recedes into the past, becoming inaccessible such that,
as an original fact, it “can never be recalled…cannot repeat itself, and we are powerless to repeat
it.”29 The event passes and dies. The task of history, he claims, is “to breathe the life of the present
into the death of the past” by attending to the testimony of witnesses to that past.30 This testimony
can only truly be brought into contact with the present if an identity or analogy between the
perspectives of the witness and the critic can be established. Only, that is, when the world of the
historical witness can be established as commensurate with the world of the critic can the account
of the witness become the material for a critical history. So, while the event itself dies as soon as
it occurs, with the present ever receding into the past, traces of this event are recorded as historical
testimony. When this testimony can be reconciled to the perspective of the present, it is brought
into present consciousness and synthesized into the order of historical facts. The past continues to
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exist in the present insofar as a record of it persists, assuming that the record is commensurable
with the perspective of the critical historian. The historian is charged with evaluating this
testimony, identifying what is reliable, and synthesizing it into a “continuous whole” by filling in
the gaps left in the record.31 The past, then, only seems to endure in the present through its
persistence in objects, testimony and artifacts, and the ideal order created from these relics depends
entirely upon the perspective of the present minds who work upon them.
Bradley adopts the limited vantage of the historian in The Presuppositions of Critical
History, but his discussions of time elsewhere in his corpus establish that this is an incomplete
perspective. From the view of the present, the past is dead except to the extent that its relics can
be accommodated to present awareness. In Appearance and Reality, however, Bradley explicates
the reality of time as manifesting in a multitude of temporal series contemporaneous with each
other in the Absolute. Though the former account depends upon a temporality of passage according
to which the present flows into the past and is annihilated, Bradley suggests in Appearance and
Reality that “the direction, and the distinction between past and future, entirely depends on our
experience.”32 From an Absolute perspective, all possible temporal series are co-actual, which
ultimately entails the coexistence of all events. Bradley appeals in the Principles of Logic to the
ubiquitous metaphor of a river to articulate the relationship between the limited perspective of
passage and the Absolute perspective of coexistence. According to this metaphor, time flows like
a stream, and we are “in total darkness hung over…and looking down on it.”33 The stream is
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illuminated “right under our faces,” and this illuminated portion “ceaselessly widens and narrows
its area, and shows us what passes away on the current.”34 The illuminated water represents the
current moment, but the stream carries this water into the darkness and out of view. Because we
are suspended above the stream, anything that passes through our field of vision is irrecoverable
once it enters the “utter darkness” beyond the light of the now and the comparably dimmer light
of the immediate past and future.35 Though only a miniscule portion of the stream is visible to us
at any given time, the stream itself does not cease to exist when it passes beyond the illuminated
area. It becomes imperceptible, but it continues to flow. With this metaphor, Bradley appeals to a
temporality of passage while simultaneously affirming the endurance of the past. Time passes. The
present recedes into the past and eventually becomes inaccessible to us as experiencing subjects.
Yet the past continues to persist from a totalizing Absolute perspective, which perceives at once
the continuity of the whole of existence.
Taken together, Bradley’s articulations of a linear temporality seem to approach satisfying
Eliot’s necessary conditions for historical sense. The appeal to an Absolute perspective affirms the
endurance of the past, while the stable flow of the river suggests that the past persists in an ideal
order. The account of testimony from The Presuppositions of Critical History supplements this
account by affirming the limitations of the individual perspective, for which the present is rendered
extinct as soon as it becomes past, while also explaining how we can continue to access a past that
appears dead. Though we cannot adopt the Absolute perspective for which all of time exists
simultaneously, we do have access to the past through the testimony of its contemporaries as
preserved in artifacts. This testimony provides us with a more expansive view of the order of the
past than we have access to alone. Further, though the artifacts themselves do not change, their
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place within the ideal structure is perpetually modified by the intervention of new events and
through their accommodation to the perspectives of subsequent historians.36 Thus, this linear
account of temporality accommodates the first two conditions of historical sense. It can account
for the endurance of the past for our limited perspectives by appealing to the preservation of
historical artifacts while also affirming the continued existence of the past within an Absolute
perspective. From the limited perspective, these artifacts can be understood as constituting an ideal
order. Further, this ideal order would, of course, be altered by the intervention of new material.
The limited account of critical history cannot accommodate the criterion that the present manifests
as the continued development of the past and that this development leaves nothing behind, for this
account explicitly entails the radical separation of the past from the present in the past’s extinction.
The Absolute perspective, however, is compatible with this condition. For the entire stream of time
is continuous, and no part of it can be left out of the totalizing point of view. Though gaps are
inevitable with respect to historical testimony, this Absolute point of view, which cannot in fact
be adopted by the individual, does not contain gaps. The present, then, is the development of the
past, but even as the present itself passes it is not left behind. Thus, a linear temporal framework
grounded in a Bradleyan idealism appears capable of satisfying the conditions of historical sense
as Eliot outlines it in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” and it seems Eliot does not necessarily
enjoin a complete rejection of linear temporality.37

The shift in emphasis from the past itself to the events or artifacts of the past marks a departure from Eliot’s claim
that, according to his account of historical sense, “the past is altered by the present as the present is directed by the
past” (Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 41). The proponent of a linear temporal grounding for historical sense may respond
that “past” is being used loosely in this context and includes its enduring effects. I propose, however, that the
systematic attribution to Eliot of a conflation between the past and its effects is a necessary consequence of this linear
model. The past must be reified in order for endurance to be ascribed to it. Thus, Eliot’s appeals to the past must be
re-interpreted as referring to its substantive effects.
37
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criterion was derived from the analogy between European culture and a mind. If the significance of this analogy is
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While Eliot leaves opaque the precise contours of the past’s enduring effect upon the
present, The Waste Land articulates a number of ways in which history persists. Historical material
appears in the speech of personages throughout the poem as these various speakers give voice to
a past preserved in individual memory. Historical voices also speak into the poem of their own
accord, interrupting the pattern of vignettes. Further, the voice of the poem’s abstract speaker,
distinct from any contextualized personage, registers its own historical perspective by coordinating
various passages throughout the poem with historical events long past. The poem’s incorporation
of these various modes of historical intervention offers insight into the operation of the ideal order
to which historical sense appeals. For if, as I have argued, The Waste Land is a poem animated by
historical sense, and indeed designed to activate this sense in the reader, then that historical sense
should support the operation of the past that manifests in the poem. If, then, a linear account of
temporality promises to ground historical sense, it must also be capable of underwriting the poem’s
deployment of historical material. I have suggested that a roughly Bradelyan account of time may
be able to accommodate the conditions of historical sense. I maintain, however, that it is incapable
of accounting for the breadth of the past’s effects in The Waste Land. The appearance of historical
material in the poetic setting or in appeals made by individual personages may be generally
commensurable with linear temporal frameworks, and the voice of the abstract poetic speaker may
be taken to represent something approaching an Absolute perspective, as articulated in Bradley’s
account. Yet the irruption of historical voices into the fabric of the poem itself resists the
limitations of this linear temporal framework.
One example of the poem’s incorporation of the past appears in the stanzas of “The Fire
Sermon” spoken by the Thames sisters. Here, the personages of the poem give voice to the past.

minimized, Eliot’s claim that tradition “abandons nothing en route” becomes less demanding (Eliot, The Sacred Wood,
42). It simply becomes a statement of Eliot’s commitment to new works of art not invalidating their predecessors.
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This incorporation of the past in the voice of a character seems commensurate with linear
temporality.38 Eliot notes that the first Thames sister’s lament that “Highbury bore me. Richmond
and Kew / Undid me” echoes La Pia’s address to Dante in Purgatorio.39 Here, the sister
recontextualizes her own situation by appealing to the past. With this appeal, the sister imbues her
lament of seduction and loss with the spiritual aimlessness of purgatory. A speaker in “The Burial
of the Dead” analogously gives voice to the past when he addresses a compatriot. The speaker
calls out to an acquaintance, addressing him as “‘Stetson! / ‘You who were with me in the ships at
Mylae.’”40 With its references to Austrian nobility and appeals to blooming corpses, “The Burial
of the Dead” invokes the context of the First World War throughout the section.41 Yet here, the
speaker elicits the weight of a history of conflicts between world powers by appealing to the First
Punic War. Just as the Thames sister does with her invocation of Dante in “The Fire Sermon,” the
speaker here actively incorporates the past into a description of the present. By substituting Mylae
for the Somme, the speaker burdens the exchange with an extensive history of war. The
substitution invests the unsettling reference to the “corpse you planted in your garden last year”
not only with the significance of the casualties of the contemporary conflict but also with a
millennia-long history of war dead.42 In this passage, a personage in the poem draws the relation
between past and present. The substitution seems to be effected by the memory of an individual
character, and the relation does not need to have preceded its identification by a speaker. These
appeals to the endurance of the past seem reconcilable with a linear temporality. Individuals draw
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connections between the present and a past that exists as a written record. The present relates to
the past only insofar as the individual draws upon relics of the past to make the connection.
The appeal to historical events as analogous to, or even continuous with, contemporary
events also appears at the level of the poetic abstract in “What the Thunder Said.” Here, an
individual personage in the poem does not give voice to the relation in a specific context. Rather,
a disembodied speaker establishes an identity between “Falling towers / Jerusalem Athens
Alexandria / Vienna London / Unreal.”43 The description of these collapsing cities as “unreal”
hearkens back to the “The Burial of the Dead,” with its reference to Mylae and its description of
London as an “Unreal city.”44 Drawing the connection between these episodes of collapse from
the vantage of the abstract poetic speaker establishes the connection as independent of the
individual perspectives that give voice to it elsewhere. Further, Tiresias’ appearance in “The Fire
Sermon” firmly establishes that the enduring connection of the past to the present is independent
of any individual perspective that cognizes that connection. Tiresias presents his vision of the
violet hour from a position outside of the action of the poem itself. Tiresias experiences the action
of the poem, but he does so from a historical perspective. He “foresuffers” the events of “The Fire
Sermon” just as he “sat by Thebes below the wall / And walked among the lowest of the dead.”45
With Tiresias’ intervention, the past is given its own perspective on the present. The past does not
merely persist in the present as an order of connections to be intuited. The appearance of Tiresias
grants this ideal order its own relation to the present along with a capacity to facilitate connections
between the present and the past.
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Philomel appears twice in The Waste Land, and the contrast between these appearances
reveals the dimension of the past’s endurance in the poem that cannot be accounted for according
to a linear temporal framework. I have argued that her repeated appearance reveals connections
between characters in the poem who are violently silenced.46 By revealing these connections,
Philomel illuminates the capacity of historical sense to integrate perspectives and restore the
possibility of empathy. The figures whose voices are excised from the poem attain a shared voice
in the song of Philomel, and this shared voice connects them across contexts. Philomel’s
appearance in the poem is not uniform, however, and the discrepancy in the form of her appearance
suggests an endurance of the past that is not tethered to objective representation. When Philomel
first appears in “A Game of Chess,” she participates in the scene as a decorative fixture of the
environment. A representation of Philomel’s transformation is displayed “Above the mantel… /
As though a window gave upon the sylvan scene.”47 The depiction of Philomel is just one of many
adorning the room, as “other withered stumps of time / Were told upon the walls.” 48 The
connection between Philomel and the scene in which she intervenes arises from the graphic
representation of Philomel within the setting of the scene itself. Here, the past is preserved through
the visual reproduction of a literary tradition. Further, the poem presents the representation of
Philomel in terms analogous to those used to describe the deficient approach to classicism in
“Ulysses, Order, and Myth.” Philomel appears among “other withered stumps of time” that adorn
the room, and these various scenes mingle discordantly with “standards wrought with fruited vines
/ From which golden Cupidon peeped out” and a “colored stone / In which sad light a carved
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dolphin swam.”49 The room displays a collection of reified moments, preserving them in and for
the present. And though the characters in the scene are inattentive to these vestiges of the past,
Philomel still cries “‘Jug, Jug’ to dirty ears.”50 The artistic reproduction of these scenes invests the
poetic present with historical significance. Were the characters in the scene possessed of historical
sense, they would perhaps be attentive to the enduring relevance of Philomel’s song, which echoes
into the space because it is artistically reproduced.
While Philomel’s appearance in “A Game of Chess” is commensurate with the linear
temporal framework’s dependence upon the preservation of the past in objects, her intervention in
“The Fire Sermon” departs radically from this model. In “The Fire Sermon,” Philomel does not
appear as an artificial feature of the environment. Instead, Philomel intervenes directly into the
poem. “A Game of Chess” appeals to a visual reproduction of Philomel’s transformation, which
necessarily leaves her song assumed. In “The Fire Sermon,” Philomel’s song, “Twit twit twit / Jug
jug jug jug jug jug / So rudely forc’d / Tereu,” occupies its own stanza.51 It interrupts the sequence
of vignettes, commenting upon them but not as an object in the scene. The voice of Philomel,
operating as a vehicle for the ideal order of tradition, reveals that the past persists in the present as
an active force. Philomel does not merely exist in representations. Her song interrupts the poem,
intervening in the poetic present. The poem seems to suggest, then, that tradition persists alongside
the present, engaged with it but not immediately part of it. Philomel’s continued activity, free of a
dependence upon her objective representation, resists the limitations of the linear temporal
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framework. The contrast between Philomel’s active intervention and passive representation in the
poem disrupts the attempt to accommodate Eliot’s account of tradition to a linear temporality.
Instead, it entails the need for a non-linear temporal framework capable of grounding the
possibility of interaction between past and present that does not depend upon representation or
production.
Philomel’s intervention in the poem marks an irruption of the past into the present that does
not depend upon the reification of the past in artifacts. Indeed, such irruptions occur throughout
The Waste Land, and they are presented at diverse vocal registers. For example, in “The Fire
Sermon,” the “Weialala leia / Wallala leialala” of Wagner’s Rhine-maidens punctuates the song
of the three Thames sisters.52 As the song of Philomel connects women who are silenced in the
poem, the song of the Rhine-maidens establishes connections between figures who are undone
along the river Thames.53 As Philomel does in her second appearance, the Rhine-maidens sing
directly into the poem. They are neither represented in the environment nor is their song put in the
mouth of a speaking figure. Indeed, only the song itself appears.
The poem describes the intervention of the past in the present, then, in at least five different
ways. The past is represented in the environment of the poem itself through artifacts as “withered
stumps of time” that are “told upon the walls.54 The voices of the past intervene directly into the
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poem, as Philomel and the Rhine-maidens do in “The Fire Sermon.” Personages in the poem
invoke the past, either consciously or unconsciously establishing a continuity between their
circumstances and historical events. These connections are also drawn in the abstract realm of the
disembodied poetic voice. Finally, the poem grants tradition itself a perspective, establishing that
the connection between past and present is not merely a function of the present’s relation to the
past. The account of the past’s endurance in products that is supported by a linear approach to time
can account for the depiction of Philomel and the individual awareness of the past. The poem
juxtaposes these straightforward modes of the past’s endurance, however, with the assertion of
historical relations in the ideal space of the poem’s disembodied speaker, the perspective of
tradition itself in the character of Tiresias, and the direct irruption of traditional voices into the
poem. A Bradleyan account of linear temporality can perhaps accommodate the first two of these
alternative modes of the past’s endurance by attributing them to the totalizing perspective of the
Absolute. Time passes linearly for each individual perspective, but from the perspective of the
Absolute, all moments are contemporaneous. Thus, Tiresias or the abstract poetic speaker can
appeal to the copresence of historically disparate events. However, the irruption of historical
voices, such as those of Philomel and the Rhine-maidens, into the poem itself is incommensurate
with even a Bradleyan account of linear time. As such, these manifestations of the past reveal that
Eliot’s historical sense demands a significant reorientation to time. The promise of historical sense
as capable of grounding the synthesis of a shared world thus depends upon a nonlinear
conceptualization time. Eliot does not, however, provide an account of the temporal framework
that The Waste Land enjoins a reorientation to. The poem suggests that a linear account of
temporality is insufficient, but it does not offer an alternative. Similarly, “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” identifies the criteria that an account of temporality would need to meet in order
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to accommodate Eliot’s appeal to tradition, but it does not explicate the contours of this account.
The response to the condition of alienation suggested by The Waste Land thus contains a lacuna
that must be filled, or else it risks falling into incoherence.
III. Memory as the Foundation for Historical Sense
Henri Bergson develops an account of temporality in Matter and Memory that satisfies all three
conditions necessitated by Eliot’s notion of historical sense. Through an investigation of memory,
Bergson develops an account of the relationship between the past and the present that illuminates
the structure of the past’s endurance. The articulation of this relationship depends first upon
Bergson’s rejection of the temporality of passage, which identifies being present with existence.
Bergson highlights the contradictions inherent in temporalities of presence, and in doing so he
facilitates the disruption of the identity upon which they depend. This argument offers grounds for
the rejection of the temporality of passage, making explicit an argument that Eliot provides only
obliquely. To bolster his critique, Bergson develops a distinction between the virtual and the actual.
This distinction illuminates the continued operation of the past even after it has ceased to be active
in the material present. Thus, by articulating a capacious account of existence that includes both
the virtual and the actual, Bergson lays the groundwork for an account of temporality that satisfies
the first criterion required by Eliot’s account of historical sense. Bergson marshals this account of
the relationship between the virtual and actual to investigate the operation of memory. Memory,
according to Bergson, preserves the entirety of an individual’s past in myriad configurations. In
experience, these organizations of memory rally to accommodate memory to the present
circumstances. In doing so, they render the present meaningful, but they also incorporate the
present into the structure of memory itself, effecting a reorganization of the planes of memory.
Thus, the account satisfies the second condition of historical sense, which demands the recognition

238

of the effect of the present on the structure of the past. Finally, with its emphasis on individual
character as the synthesis of one’s entire past, Bergson’s account of memory emphasizes the
perpetual intervention of the past in the present. The past continues to act, and it does so through
us. With this, the account satisfies the third condition of historical sense.
III.1. The Existence of the Past and the Deficiencies of Linear Temporality
A basic tenet of Bergson’s account in Matter and Memory is that perception, as we experience it,
does not occur without the intervention of memory. He claims that “perception is never a mere
contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which complete
it as they interpret it.”55 In order for a perception to elicit choice, we must bring it into relation
with similar experiences.56 And, indeed, Bergson claims that “complete perception is only defined
and distinguished by its coalescence with a memory-image.”57 Without the contribution of
memory, perception would amount to immediate nervous responses to an undifferentiated sensory
field. The memory-images that complete the perception are, themselves, implicated in the structure
of pure memory, which preserves virtually all our conscious states. The preservation of these states
allows them to participate in perception by becoming the memory-images that complete sensory
experience. Pure memory, then, at once is the condition for the possibility of perception and never
available to perception. For in order to be brought into consciousness, the memory must become
actual. It must leave the plane of pure memory. Jay Lampert captures the tension implicit in this
account of the role of memory in perception nicely when he claims that “while the availability of
pure memory means it exists simultaneously with present perception, the two forms of engagement
with events are not on a commensurable time scale. Memories are virtually available, but do not
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exactly exist in actual time.”58 The virtuality of memory means that it “still exists in the present,
but not in the way the actual is present.”59 Bergson appeals to an attempted recollection to
illuminate this appeal to the virtual existence of memory. He claims that, when we try to recollect
something, we “detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in
general, then in a certain region of the past.”60 At this point, he claims, “our recollection still
remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude.” 61
But the recollection comes into focus, and as it does, it begins to “imitate perception” and “passes
into the actual”.62 The virtual plane of pure memory is always present but never actual. This appeal
to the unconscious presence of the past, however, is counterintuitive. Denying Bergson’s appeal
to a virtual plane that, by definition, can never enter conscious experience, one might object that
if the past is no longer actual, it cannot exist. Bergson endeavors to defend his appeal to a virtual
plane of memory that safeguards his account of perception by illuminating the misconception
concerning the notion of existence at the heart of this objection. In doing so, he dispels confusion
concerning what existence entails and justifies the share of the virtual in it.
In the third chapter of Matter and Memory, Bergson identifies what he claims to be a
common misconception regarding the definition of existence. Existence, he maintains, depends
upon two conditions that manifest “both at the same time but in different degrees.”63 These
conditions are often taken to apply exclusively to mental or material entities, which results,
Bergson argues, in an artificial circumscription of the category of existents. By recovering the
appropriate relation between these two conditions, Bergson offers justification for his appeals to
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unconscious psychic material, thereby providing a theoretical grounding for the appeals to the
endurance of the past that he makes throughout Matter and Memory. Furthermore, his critique of
this misunderstanding regarding existence illuminates the general framework against which
Bergson positions his account of memory. Though Bergson addresses various positions throughout
the text that he argues are problematic, he does not consistently unify these positions into a single
framework. His discussion of existence, however, reveals a misunderstanding shared by many of
these isolated and seemingly antagonistic positions.64 It also suggests a problematic temporal
framework central to them, a temporality of presence, and in so doing promotes a synthesis of the
positions to which Bergson responds.65 This temporality of presence resembles the linear
temporality that I have argued Eliot implicitly critiques in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.”
While this alignment does not entail a transmission of ideas between Bergson and Eliot, Bergson’s
illumination of the contradiction inherent in these deficient positions provides the theoretical
grounds for dismissal that Eliot leaves latent. I further maintain that this alignment also suggests
the possibility for Bergson’s positive account of memory to fill the lacunae left by Eliot’s
reluctance to entertain metaphysical questions in his development of historical sense.66
Throughout Matter and Memory, Bergson appeals to the unconscious endurance of the
past. In the first chapter, for example, Bergson introduces the notion of pure memory, which never
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appears in consciousness, and in the beginning of the third chapter he further develops this theme.67
In his account of recollection in the second chapter, Bergson specifies that “the whole of
memory…passes over into each of these circuits” which join perception to memory images.68 Yet,
the whole of memory is not consciously activated in each act of recollection. Thus, memory must
endure unconsciously.69 Bergson acknowledges the controversial status of his appeal to
unconscious existence, however, and he endeavors to clarify the notion of existence in order to
bolster his account.70 Existence, he claims, “appears to imply two conditions taken together: (1)
presentation in consciousness ; and (2) the logical or causal connection of that which is so
presented with what precedes and with what follows.”71 These conditions always appear together,
but they appear in varying proportions. Thus, when “we are dealing with external objects it is the
connection which is perfect, since these objects obey necessary laws; but then the other condition,
presentation in consciousness, is never more than partially fulfilled.”72 Conversely, while for an
internal state the “presentation of consciousness is perfect,” the “connection is less close, and the
determination of the present by the past…has not the character of a mathematical derivation.”73
Despite the attribution of both conditions to external and internal existents alike, Bergson identifies
the temptation to treat existence as an equivocal term that attributes “to external objects on the one
hand, and to internal states on the other, two radically different modes of existence, each
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characterized by the exclusive presence of the condition which should be regarded as merely
preponderating.”74 Thus, the existence of an external object depends solely upon the spatial series
that conditions it, while the existence of an internal state is reduced to one’s conscious awareness
of it. When the existence of internal states is taken to depend exclusively upon their presentation
in consciousness, then their departure from conscious awareness effectively obviates their
existence. According to such an account, unconscious memory would lose its claim to reality as a
result of the bifurcation of the notion of existence. Because of this flawed appeal to the bifurcation
of existence, unconscious memory seems not to partake of the series of causal connections. And,
by definition, it seems not to appear in consciousness. Bergson claims that this illusion “vitiates
our conception of mind by casting over the idea of the unconscious an artificial obscurity,” and
thus he suggests it must be dispelled for a more comprehensive account that acknowledges the
universal co-occurrence of both conditions of existence.75
Bergson’s argument in this passage appears damningly question begging.76 Bergson
introduces his discussion of existence in order to clarify his account of the preservation of memory
in an unconscious state. He defines existence according to two conditions and argues that the two

74

Bergson, Matter and Memory, 190. Though Bergson does not acknowledge it, his account of the two conditions of
existence, which never appear in isolation, complements his account of pure memory and pure perception as regulative
concepts. Like the two conditions of existence, pure perception and pure memory can be conceptually analyzed,
though they always co-occur. This parallel structure invites the temptation to read pure matter as a manifestation of
the condition of causal connection and pure memory as a manifestation of conscious awareness, but the unconscious
status of pure memory forecloses this extension of the structural similarities in the accounts.
75
Bergson, Matter and Memory, 191.
76
Suzanne Guerlac, who offers a comprehensive explication of Matter and Memory in Thinking in Time: An
Introduction to Henri Bergson, glosses this passage as an appeal to experience, which Bergson does offer. In doing
so, she circumvents the charge of begging the question by weakening the force of the argument. She claims Bergson
“argues that we need to pay more attention to the structural similarities between domain of objects that present
themselves to us simultaneously in space and series of successive states that develop in time” (Guerlac, Thinking in
Time, 147). Bergson, she suggests, adduces the structure of character as a temporal order analogous to the order of
space. By appealing to a single example, however, Guerlac elides the extent to which Bergson attributes some degree
of causal connection to all internal states. This formulation of the argument, furthermore, does not sufficiently address
the contradictions that, according to Bergson, result from a denial of the dual character of existence. Nor does it do
justice to the role that this argument regarding existence plays in establishing the legitimacy of the unconscious and
in rejecting the attempt to locate memory in the brain.

243

conditions must co-occur despite the temptation of intellect to erect a barrier between them. He
argues that this temptation must be resisted, and the co-occurrence must be acknowledged, because
treating the two conditions in isolation undermines the nascent account of memory by denying the
possibility of unconscious existence. Thus, Bergson appeals to the unconscious in order to justify
the definition of existence that is adduced as evidence of the unconscious.77 This argument does
not appear in isolation, however. Rather it functions as a pivot which reveals the connection
between two fundamentally flawed accounts of memory that depend upon this mistaken definition
of existence. Considered together, these arguments absolve Bergson of the charge of question
begging. They also illuminate the contradictions inherent to accounts of temporality that deny the
existence of the past, such as linear temporal frameworks.
Prior to offering his definition of existence, Bergson discusses the problems that arise from
the denial of the unconscious existence of memory. When we “imagine ourselves unencumbered”
by our memories, which “inasmuch as they are past, are so much dead weight that we carry with
us,” we “shut off time behind us as it flows.”78 In so doing, we deny existence to our memories
except for when they affect us in the present. When a memory comes to affect us, according to this
account, it “produces on us the effect of a ghost whose mysterious apparition must be explained
by special causes.”79 Bergson thus argues that, if the existence of an internal state depends upon
its presentation in consciousness, the disappearance and reappearance of memories in
consciousness entails their destruction and subsequent generation ex nihilo. Assuming that
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generation without cause is impossible, such an account cannot stand. Bergson’s definition of
existence suggests another way in which memories can persist, however, even according to an
account that posits the radical separation of the two components of existence. If memories are
located in physical space, they would participate the series of causal connections.80 Thus Bergson
notes that “we are so strongly obsessed by images drawn from space, that we cannot hinder
ourselves from asking where memories are stored up.”81 The popular response to this question
involves locating memories in the brain, but Bergson argues that this response is insufficient and
ultimately self-contradictory. Given the assumption that “the past survives in the form of a memory
located in the brain, it is then necessary that the brain, in order to preserve the memory, should
preserve itself.”82 This result, Bergson argues, entails that the brain, and by extension material
reality in general, participates in duration in precisely the capacity that was denied to memory. For,
if memories are located in the brain, and if the brain is part of material reality and “constitutes,
with all the rest of the material universe, an ever renewed section of universal becoming,” then
Bergson claims it follows “that the universe dies and is born again miraculously at each moment
of duration, or you must attribute to it that continuity of existence which you deny to
consciousness, and make of its past a reality which endures and is prolonged into the present.”83
Attempting to situate memories in brain matter results in universalizing the problem that Bergson
identified with associationism. For the memory to persist in order to be actualized, either the past
must endure into the present or the past is reinstantiated ex nihilo.84 The latter option, as before, is
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taken to be intolerable. Thus, even if memories are located in the brain, the past must continue to
exist. In this case, however, the past endures for “the totality of the states of the material world,”
rather than just for individual psychical states.85 Positioned between these two arguments, the
account of existence appears somewhat less question begging. When the existence of internal
states depends exclusively on their presence in consciousness, then the phenomenon of memory
seems to demand spontaneous generation and destruction. The attempt to preserve memory by
locating it in matter results either in the same spontaneous generation or in the re-inscription of the
past’s endurance at a universal level. The alternative accounts of existence that Bergson entertains,
which both identify a divide between the characteristics of existence, cannot account for our
capacity to recall past experiences. Indeed, even if these competing accounts are not exhaustive of
the alternative positions, Bergson’s analysis reveals how the radical division is responsible for the
failure to account for memory. So long as internal states only exist insofar as they are present to
consciousness, memory will necessarily be relegated to the sphere of the miraculous. 86 Thus, in
order accommodate the experience of memory, existence must be taken to entail both conditions
in all cases, “though they may be unequally fulfilled.”87
Because of its function as a premise in his arguments rejecting both associationist and
materialist accounts of memory, Bergson’s account of existence has both an affirmative and a
negative aspect. The affirmative component of Bergson’s definition is that establishes a framework

assumptions that he addresses with this series of arguments, space appears “to preserve indefinitely the things which
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for existence that can accommodate the capacity of memory to manifest previous internal states.
It does so by affording those internal states a share of existence even when they are not present to
consciousness. Thus, Bergson’s development of this account of existence establishes not only
continued existence of the past but also the legitimacy of unconscious existence, which is a
necessary condition for the past’s endurance. These arguments also have the negative effect of
bringing into relief the general temporal framework to which Bergson responds throughout Matter
and Memory. Bergson identifies a pair of confusions that condition this problematic approach to
time. One is the failure to recognize the co-occurrence of both conditions of existence, thereby
restricting subjective experience to what appears in consciousness at any given moment. The other,
which complements the first, is the failure of “emphasizing the differences and, on the contrary,
of slurring over the resemblances, between the series of objects simultaneously set out in space
and that of states successively developed in time.”88 The obfuscation of this similarity promotes
the exclusive recognition of the series of physical objects. Space appears to “preserve indefinitely
the things which are there juxtaposed, while time in its advance devours the states which succeed
each other within it.”89 The conjunction of these positions begins to illuminate the temporal
framework that Bergson rejects in this discussion. In “The memory of another past: Bergson,
Deleuze and a new theory of time,” Alia al-Saji neatly captures this deficient “standard account”
of “time as the chronological succession of instants in consciousness, as an irreversible and linear
progression of psychological states.”90 This account appeals to a “longitudinal or flat temporality,
one composed of threads that run horizontally between its successive points – time becomes a
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line.”91 Time, according to this framework, proceeds along a linear trajectory. It flows as series of
discrete moments, and the passage into each new moment destroys the previous one.
Bergson’s argument for a more comprehensive definition of existence, then, entails a
rejection of this standard account of time. Bergson offers various other arguments against facets
of this standard account. His engagement with Zeno’s paradoxes, for example, reveal the errors
that develop from the attempt to identify the moment as the fundamental unit of time.92 Bergson
also argues against the standard account by identifying that account’s intolerable consequence that
“the present, under different aspects and in different degrees of intensity, takes over the whole of
time.”93 Thus, memories appear within the framework as a diminished form of sensory experience,
the past seeming to be merely a diminished present, eliding the difference in kind between memory
and perception. The arguments concerning existence, moreover, also illuminate a number of
crucial points of alignment between Bergson’s account of memory and Eliot’s account of historical
sense. Indeed, these arguments provide a conceptual groundwork for the critiques that Eliot leaves
implicit in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” By affirming that the past continues to exist even
after it has faded from consciousness, Bergson satisfies the first of the necessary conditions of
historical sense derived from “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Bergson supplements the
account, however, by articulating why the past must endure and suggesting the manner in which
it does.94 The arguments clarifying this definition furthermore reveal the incompatibility of the
past’s existence with a linear account of time. Thus, like Eliot, Bergson marshals his arguments
for the past’s endurance against a linear temporal model. These arguments also illuminate the
extent to which the deficient accounts of tradition against which Eliot juxtaposes historical sense
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are in fact implicated in the failures of linear temporality. The impulse to uphold novelty as the
sole arbiter of value reifies as an aesthetic criterion the vision of time that “in its advance devours
the states which succeed each other within it.”95 Conversely, the account of tradition that prescribes
the repetition of tired literary forms attempts, like the materialist seeking memories in the brain, to
preserve the past by locating it in objects, “the mummified stuff from a museum.”96 Bergson’s
arguments, in fact, strengthen Eliot’s critical position. These arguments do not simply reveal that
the deficient modes of temporality identified by Eliot are grounded in a linear temporality. They
present the stronger case that these deficient accounts of tradition fail because, like linear models
of temporality, they are fundamentally incoherent. The account of existence developed by Bergson
thus satisfies the first condition of historical sense, illuminates the extent to which Eliot’s deficient
accounts of tradition depend upon a linear temporal framework, and bolsters Eliot’s critical stance
by revealing the incoherence of these accounts, necessitating their rejection.
III.2. Bergson’s Cone of Memory and the Ideal Order of the Past
With his articulation of a more capacious definition of existence than the standard account of
temporality can accommodate, Bergson establishes a theoretical foundation for the claim that the
past endures with the present. His argument does not clarify the mode of the past’s existence,
however. Nor does it explicate the precise relation between the present and the past. In a
subsequent discussion in the third chapter of Matter and Memory, Bergson develops the figure of
the cone of memory. This model specifies the operation of memory and articulates its interaction
with the present. This account of memory suggests that the past endures in myriad, simultaneous
configurations. Each configuration is represented as a plane of memory, and these planes of
memory organize the past according to different degrees of expansion and contraction, facilitating
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constellations of relations that can be called upon in perception to clarify one’s present experience.
Not only does the figure of the cone appeal to the past’s manifestation in planes of ideal order, it
further figures the ceaseless introduction of the present into the structure of the past. This perpetual
introduction of the present into the structure of the past effects the reorganization of the planes of
memory. Though prominent accounts of Bergson’s analysis of the cone of memory emphasize his
appeals to an intentional leap made by the subject between planes of experience, thereby
encouraging a sense of discontinuity between past and present and between different planes of
memory, Bergson’s account of the circuitous investment of the past into the present reveals the
extent to which present experience is always conditioned by the past. Furthermore, Bergson’s
appeal to the structure of character suggests a stability of the ideal order of the past that is elided
by an overemphasis on discontinuous subjective leaps. A synthesis of these elements of Bergson’s
framework reveals the extent to which his account of memory satisfies the necessary conditions of
a temporality capable of grounding Eliot’s historical sense. The cone of memory figures an ordered
existence of the past simultaneous with the present, while the appeal to character suggests an
underlying stability and uniformity to this order. These accounts, further, articulate the ways in
which the present is perpetually incorporated into the past. Finally, the analogy of the circuit
establishes that the present is always invested with memory. The present and past do not exist in
separate hermetically sealed realms. Rather, they interpenetrate, mutually determining one
another.
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Figure 1 – Bergson’s Cone of Memory97
Bergson uses the figure of the cone to schematize the relationship between the past and
present in the third chapter of Matter and Memory. According to this figure, “my actual
representation of the universe” is depicted as a plane, P.98 This plane not only corresponds to the
world of relations between external objects, but it also represents the present configuration of that
world of external relations. The “shifting plane of experience” is in perpetual flux, constantly
moving into the future.99 Because this shifting plane represents the universe of external relations,
I, the subject, am included among the points on this plane. Thus, the point S “indicates at all times
my present” as it “moves forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P
of my actual representation of the universe.”100 This point is a “connecting link between the things
which act upon me and the things upon which I act – the seat, in a word, of the sensory motor
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phenomena.”101 It is also the connecting point between the plane of external relations and the
“totality of the recollections accumulated in my memory,” which is represented by the inverted
cone SAB.
The base of this cone represents the plane of true memory, which “retains and ranges
alongside of each other all our states in the order in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place
and consequently marking its date.”102 This form of memory persists at a remove from the plane
of material actuality, and the distance renders the plane of true memory purely virtual. 103 The
virtuality of the plane of true memory does not entail a diminished existence. Rather, it establishes
the endurance of true memory beyond the scope of conscious awareness or material presence. For
a memory located on the plane of true memory to become conscious, “it is necessary that it should
descend from the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking
place.”104 The cone of memory, then, is a dynamic psychic structure. The entirety of one’s past is
preserved virtually and arranged in an ideal order. These memories traverse the vertical dimension
of the cone, descending to the point, S, of subjective awareness. The image of the body at S thus
presents “to ineffective, that is, unconscious, memories, the means of taking on a body, of
materializing themselves, in short of becoming present.”105 Bergson claims that memories
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typically do not enter at random into conscious experience.106 Rather, present experience issues an
“appeal to which memory responds, and it is from the sensory-motor elements of present action
that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.”107
In his analysis of Bergson’s account of the cone of memory in Simultaneity and Delay, Jay
Lampert adopts a skeptical stance regarding the felicity of the image Bergson adopts and raises
concerns about the clarity of Bergson’s use of the diagram. He presents Bergson’s cone of memory
as a figure of volume. According to Lampert, “the cone represents an overall volume of memories,
to which new present growths add.”108 The point of the cone extends downward in space, stretching
the cone out and creating the sense of an increase in volume. This sense of increasing volume in
the memory cone is particularly pronounced in Bergson’s initial presentation of the image, which
only includes SAB without A’B’ and A’’B’’. There Bergson speaks of the “summit S” moving
“forward unceasingly” while the cone SAB itself represents “the totality of recollections
accumulated in my memory.”109 This presentation of the model emphasizes the sense of voluminal
increase which Lampert appeals to as problematic. It also invites the confusion that Lampert
highlights regarding whether “AB represents our first infant memories, or instead represents the
broadest range of all our memories.”110 Lampert leaves this question to discuss the operations by
which virtual memories are brought into the present, but I maintain that these initial points of
confusion are integral to the ultimate challenges Lampert brings against Bergson’s account of
memory.
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According to Lampert’s reading of Bergson, memories are brought into contact with the
plane of actuality through three related operations. The first he describes is oscillation, through
which “the memory cone vibrates and items slide down through the interstices, the way a treat
filters through a gumball machine to the chute.”111 The second function is generalization, the
operations of which “organize past events into structures relevant for the present.”112 Through this
process of generalization, an individual memory loses “its original specificity and regain[s] a
different specificity by moving through the memory cone, circulating through other memories
while we are not paying attention.”113 According to the third function, “the whole cone is pressed
down onto the present, like a Bodum coffeemaker.”114 I am ultimately less concerned with
Lampert’s treatment of this third method, as I maintain that the problems he raises result from
misunderstandings revealed in the first two functions of memory. Lampert claims that Bergson’s
account of the actualization of memory fails to sufficiently account for “how particular pasts can
be picked out at particular present moments” and “how a single specific memory can play a larger
role in the present than others.”115 Specifying this concern, he appeals to a series of questions, such
as “if memories circulate in a convection oven, how could I keep straight which memories were
formed simultaneously with others, that is, which events happened when I was twenty years old
and which when I was thirty?” and “When I drive a car, how do I follow the highway rather than
reminisce about childhood toys?”116
I maintain that Bergson provides a more satisfying answer to these questions that Lampert
gives him credit for. Indeed, these points of confusion seem to me to arise from a shortcoming in
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Lampert’s reconstruction of the cone of memory. While there does seem to be some ambiguity
regarding the precise contours of the metaphor when Bergson initially presents the image, his
further specifications of the model clarify the points of confusion that Lampert raises. These
clarifications, further, complicate Lampert’s account of the operations through which memories
are actualized, mitigating some of the concerns with which he concludes the chapter. Lampert
highlights an ambiguity regarding the status of the base of the cone, AB. He suggests that it could
“represent our first infant memories, or…our broadest range of memories.”117 The suggestion that
it could represent our baby memories seems to follow both from Bergson’s claim that the whole
cone SAB represents “the totality of recollections accumulated in memory” and from the appeal
to the forward motion of the summit, S.118 This would suggest that more recent memories are
closer to the summit while the distant plane AB contains ones earliest memories. Treating the cone
in this way leads naturally to the claim that generalization occurs through memories floating
through each other as through a convection oven. And, further, if the sequence of memories is
preserved vertically in the cone, this floating required for generalization would result in the
possibility that one could no longer distinguish between memories from their twenties and
memories from their thirties, as they would all be dislocated and jumbled about.
When Bergson further develops the image of the cone by adding the intermediate planes
A’B’ and A’’B’’, he clarifies the articulation of the cone and eliminates the ground of this
confusion. The plane AB does not simply represent one’s earliest memories. Rather, at the base of
the memory cone, “all the events of our past life are set out in their smallest details.”119 If I am
correct when I maintain above that this plane represents the plane of true memory, then not only
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does it contain all of the events of our lives, but it arranges them in chronological order. 120 If this
is the case, it resolves Lampert’s problem regarding how we keep track of memories that happened
in our twenties and memories that happened in our thirties. The operation of generalization does
not, in fact, disrupt the order of one’s memories, as this order is preserved in AB. According to
this account, the intermediate planes of memory do not contain distinct memories more or less
proximate to the summit of action. Rather, they contain “so many repetitions of the whole of our
past life,” and “each section is larger or smaller according to its nearness to the base or to the
summit.”121 Again, Bergson invites confusion by appealing to the planes’ proximity to the seat of
action, but he clarifies that this proximity is actually a matter of generalization. The infinite planes
of the past “take a more common form when memory shrinks most, more personal when it widens
out.”122 He offers the example of hearing a word in a foreign language to illuminate this point.
When I hear a word in another language, I may think “of that language in general or of a voice
which once pronounced it in a certain way.”123 Thinking of the language in general is more
proximate to the summit because attending to the word with a concern for the language prepares
my response. My memory of the voice which once pronounced it a certain way is, of course,
included in this more condensed plane, but it is not identifiable because it is suffused with many
other experiences of the language. Conversely, if I attend to the memory of the voice of the person,
I adopt a “mental disposition” nearer to the pure image.124
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These infinite planes do not just repeat the whole of memory according to different levels
of generality or specificity, they can also be “cut up, in [their] own way[s], into definite
parts…each of them being characterized by the particular kind of dominant memories on which
the other memories lean as on supporting points.”125 Two planes may be nearly identical, or
perhaps identical, with respect to their degree of tension, but they may be organized around
different key memories. Finally, Bergson claims that the selection of which memory is actualized
at any given point occurs through a process of translation and rotation. Memory itself “responds
to the appeal of the present state” by “contracting more or less, though without dividing, with a
view to action” and by turning “towards the situation of the moment, presenting that side of itself
which may prove most useful.”126
Bergson’s claim that memory itself selects how to present itself to the point of action may,
ultimately, leave his account embroiled in the problem of “how particular pasts can be picked out
at particular present moments,” particularly with respect to the mechanism of selection. 127 I think
an example, however, may help illuminate this operation by clarifying the dynamic interaction
between my present character, itself the synthesis of my entire past, and the cone of memory. 128 I
imagine I am an athlete preparing in the moments before a competition against a rival in an
elimination tournament. Thinking reflectively and tactically, I try to prepare for specific situations.
As I do, a relatively expansive plane of memory, in which specific game situations are identifiable,
approaches the summit of actualization, and game situations organized around the nexus of the
rival I am facing rotate to enter my field of awareness. I lose focus, however, and begin to worry
about my response under pressure. Now a more contracted, general plane comes into view, and
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the memories that come into focus are organized around important games. Perhaps I believe that I
choke in high-pressure situations, and so a similarly general plane now appears with a slightly
different organizational field, one in which my failures in important moments operate as the foci.
Finally, the game starts, and I rely upon the most contracted plane of my general skills, built up
over years of training, joins the summit. In these cases, memory responds to my lived state, whether
that state involves discrete action, like playing the game, or a more reflective activity like preparing
or worrying. There is a dynamic exchange between my conscious awareness and the operation of
memory that responds to the needs of the present. This account may not eliminate the problem
entirely, as memory is still afforded a degree of agency that it may not be able to theoretically
sustain. But it does seem to helpfully complicate and, I think, alleviate some of Lampert’s concerns
which, I have argued, result from a faulty representation of Bergson’s memory cone.
In his explication of the cone of memory, Bergson emphasizes the perpetual alteration of
the network of external relations. The plane of actuality “moves forward unceasingly,” and carries
the present experience of the individual along with it.129 Bergson appeals to this incessant
development of the present to challenge temporal frameworks that prioritize presence. Reversing
the central tenet of temporalities of presence, Bergson suggests that “nothing is less than the
present.”130 The present, according to Bergson, is always in flux. It is “the invisible progress of the
past gnawing into the future.”131 The point of actuality in the cone of memory is, then, a point of
perpetual change. Crucially, Bergson argues that the present is fundamentally inaccessible as this
point of flux. Only as experience is integrated into the structure of memory does the present enter
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perception. Thus, Bergson claims, “every perception is already memory.”132 In experience, the
past provides the context that renders the present legible. Because of this, the present is already
past as soon as we become conscious of it.133 Through this process by which the present is
contextualized by the past and integrated into the structure of it, the present effects a perpetual
reorganization of the plane of memory. Thus, the temporal framework that Bergson synthesizes in
the cone of memory fulfills the second condition demanded by historical sense. For the past does
not simply exist alongside the present, the two operating along parallel trajectories. Rather, the
present as experienced is always already part of the structure of the past, and in becoming part of
this structure, the present alters that past, “even if imperceptibly.”134
III.3. The Operation of the Past in the Present
With the representation of memory as a cone with myriad planes of contraction and expansion,
Bergson gives the impression that memory is preserved at a remove from present experience.
Indeed, Alia al-Saji identifies the relationship between past and present under this schema as that
of “different planes of being, related and articulated in coexistence.”135 These planes of being
coexist, but they do not bleed together as past and present do according to a linear temporal
framework.136 Rather, their coexistence manifests a continuity “that holds within itself the seeds
of its own discontinuity and differentiation.”137 The past and the present coexist, but they do so at
distinct ontological registers. The present may be integrated into the structure of memory. Indeed,
as Bergson argues, present experience is impossible without this integration already having taken
place. But the planes of memory themselves are represented in the image of the cone as being
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separate from the experienced present. This representation risks reinscribing the sense that the past
that is removed from the present, even as Bergson employs the metaphor to articulate the
simultaneous endurance of the past in multiple configurations. Bergson’s use of the cone of
memory to explain active recollection reinforces this sense of separation, which manifests most
clearly in one of Bergson’s early descriptions of recollection, presented before his argument for
the existence of the past and the introduction of the cone of memory.138
When trying to “recover a recollection,” Bergson claims, “we become conscious of an act
sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves first in the
past in general, then in a certain region of the past.”139 Bergson’s claim that recollection entails
detachment and replacement suggests a degree of separation of the past from the present. Deleuze
amplifies this sense of separation when he identifies this passage as the foundation of his analysis
of the leap. Emphasizing Bergson’s appeal to recollection as a relocation that occurs “at once,”
Deleuze explicates this passage as suggesting that, in recollection we “leap into the past as into a
proper element.”140 Deleuze heightens the sense of spatial discontinuity by drawing an analogy to
Bergson’s account of perception. He claims, “in the same way that we do not perceive things in
ourselves, but at the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place where it is in itself,
and not in our present.”141 In order to recollect, on this account, we must remove ourselves from
our present experience and leap into the past. When attempting to recall something, in fact, we
make multiple leaps, into different planes of the past. Each is separate from the others, and all are
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separate from the present. The past, under the auspices of the leap, seems to resemble a pool that
contains recollections and into which one dives, “as into a proper element,” to recover them. 142
This emphasis on the leap into different configurations of the past suggests a sense of separation
that renders the past inert. The subject jumps into various planes of the past, but the past itself
seems not to intervene in the present. If Bergson’s account of the existence of the past in memory
were restricted simply to this model of recollective memory, the articulation of the cone of memory
and the leap into planes of the past would suggest that the Bergsonian framework cannot
accommodate Eliot’s third temporal criterion for historical sense. Though the past endures in an
ideal, or virtual, order, and though the present becomes part of this order, effecting its
reorganization, the past remains at a remove from and fails to intervene actively in the present.
Rather, if the past is to be activated, the subject must leap into it.
With his appeal to the leap as a model for understanding recollective memory, Deleuze
obscures the metaphorics that Bergson himself uses to illuminate his appeal to detachment and
replacement. Rather than frame the recollective moment of replacement as a leap, Bergson claims,
and Deleuze acknowledges, that it is “a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a
camera.”143 Focusing a camera does not result in the abandonment complete abandonment of one
element of the picture in the photograph for another, as the metaphorics of the leap suggest.
Instead, when we focus a camera, we bring various elements contained in the frame into relief and
we let others fade into obscurity, though they do not disappear from view.144 Similarly, when we
attempt to recall something specific, we do not abandon the present entirely but instead shift our
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focus to the operation of memory. This operation, further, does not begin with the attempt to recall
but is, rather, ongoing. The moment of recall simply permits material from the past to enter into
conscious awareness. The focus shifts, and the material comes into view. According to this
photographic model of recollection, we do not leap out of the present, “leaving psychology
altogether,” and leap into the “proper element,” the “ontological element,” of the past.145 We
cannot make this leap because we are already in that element. It already surrounds us, just as
background details are already captured in the frame of the camera before the focus is adjusted to
clarify them.146
In his essay “Do Sheets of Past Exist,” Jay Lampert offers an analysis of Deleuze’s appeals
to sheets of the past in his reading of the film Citizen Kane. Though this investigation does not
engage explicitly with Bergson’s appeal to the metaphor of the camera, I think it nevertheless
offers insight into the operation of that metaphor within the account he develops.147 In his essay,
Lampert interrogates Deleuze’s claim that “the flashbacks in Citizen Kane (1941) are the world’s
first ‘sheets of past,’ the first cinematic pure-past direct time-images,” which are “images of time
independent of action, in which the past is not merely a former present but also the whole past coexists contemporaneously with the present.”148 Lampert identifies three ways Deleuze locates
sheets of past in Citizen Kane. I am only interested here in the third, in which the film employs “a
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deep-focus image” with “different planes of depth on view at the same time, each of which could
represent a different time period.”149 Lampert explicates “the ‘Susan’s suicide attempt’ scene” as
the “very best example of depth of field in relation sheets of past.”150 When Kane enters the room
in which Susan has attempted suicide, he does so “still thinking that Susan will be his opera star,
but he arrives in a foreground where that has already not been the case for some time.” 151 In the
scene, according to Deleuze, “a succession of [Susan’s] failed performances collapses
simultaneously in to one result.”152 So, when Kane crosses the room from the door to Susan’s
body, he moves simultaneously through space but also through sheets of time. The scene
supposedly captures movement, in the present, through a variety of experiences, “the succession
of failed performances,” that lead to her attempted suicide. Thus, the scene is meant to capture the
contemporaneity of the past as a conditioning field of a present image.
Lampert, it should be noted, argues that the scene ultimately does not achieve the effect
that Deleuze appeals to. Though, he claims the theory is great, he fails to see it operating in the
scene as Deleuze claims.153 For the purposes of my argument here, I am not particularly concerned
with whether Citizen Kane makes use of sheets of the past. The point I am interested in is way in
which the notion of sheets of the past can be used to explicate the temporally conditioning effect
of focus. For Bergson’s metaphor of the photograph seems to employ metaphorics that resonate
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with the analysis Deleuze develops.154 The past accompanies the present virtually, out of focus, so
to say. It is, on the one hand, accessible through the operation of memory, figured as a refocusing
of the lens to a different depth. On the other, however, that past is also present as a force that
conditions the present, similarly to how the past Kane traverses from the door, where he “enters
still thinking that Susan will be his opera star,” to the foreground “where that has already not been
the case for some time,” contains the series of failures that led to this moment.155
Bergson’s analysis of the experienced present, introduced in the midst of his argument for
the endurance of the past, clarifies why the metaphor of the camera is more appropriate to his
account of detachment and replacement than the more radical appeal to an ontological leap. As it
appears to us in experience, the present is always already integrated into the structure of the past.
Bergson employs a circuit analogy to illuminate this point. The pure present, he claims, is merely
“the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.”156 The present is a state of perpetual
flux, and as soon as it can be cognized, “it is already past.”157 Instead, what we experience as the
cognized present “consists in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements.” 158 These
elements, further, are supplemented by memory as soon as we perceive them. Memory “reflects
upon the object [of reflective perception] a growing number of suggested images – sometimes the
details of the object itself, sometimes concomitant details which may throw light upon it.” 159 To
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synthesize the myriad sensory data, memory supplements that data with similar images. The
present, then, is already integrated into the structure of memory, and by necessity this entails that
the whole of memory is implicated because “it is the whole of memory…that passes into each of
these circuits” that supplement the image.160 Thus, the present from which we detach in the act of
recollection is not distinct from the past. Though the planes of memory may be ontologically
discontinuous from each other, and from the experienced present, they are nevertheless all
simultaneously woven into the present moment, a moment which is itself already integrated into
the structure of the past. Analogously, though the view through a camera lens delineates different
depths more or less clearly, the elements at those various depths all condition whatever is in focus.
Deleuze’s “leap into being” emphasizes the ontological discontinuity of past and present, virtual
and actual, and in so doing it suggests a separation between the two foreclosed by Bergson’s
metaphorics.
The past does not merely intervene in the present through the process by which memory
conditions present experience and the objects that appear in it. The past also intervenes through
the action of the subject, for Bergson describes the character of the individual as “the synthesis of
all our past states.”161 When confronted with a decision, we approach it with the entirety of our
past, and this synthesis manifests not only in the way that memory employs the past to illuminate
the situation at hand but also in the personality that comes to bear upon it. In this case, the mind
organizes “the totality of its experience in what we call its character…[and] causes it to converge
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upon actions in which we shall afterwards find, together with the past, which is their matter, the
unforeseen form which is stamped upon them by personality.”162 We can recognize our decisions
as our own because they originate in the entirety of our past.163 With each of our choices, then, our
past accompanies us. It intervenes actively in our present through us, for at a fundamental level we
are this past.164
Conclusion: The Ontological Ground of Memory
With his account of memory, Bergson articulates a model of temporality that satisfies the criteria
of Eliot’s historical sense. This framework, further, draws distinctions that bolster Eliot’s account
of historical sense by filling lacunae left by Eliot’s reluctance to follow his inquiry into the territory
of metaphysics in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Not only does Bergson’s account of
memory accommodate the existence of the past, but Bergson argues for the necessity of the past’s
endurance and further draws the distinction between virtual and actual existence that explains how
this endurance is possible. With this, Bergson provides a theoretical edifice capable of
underwriting the first condition of Eliot’s historical sense. The past endures. Further, Bergson
argues that the present is integrated into the structure of this enduring past, meeting the second of
Eliot’s criteria, while also explaining that the present must be synthesized into the past in this way
in order for experience to occur at all. Because consciousness cannot experience the pure present
as it passes, experience can only become conscious as it is integrated into the framework of
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memory. As it is integrated, however, this new experience reorganizes the structure of memory,
which rotates and expands to answer the call of the present moment. Thus, Bergson’s account of
memory clarifies that Eliot’s second condition of historical sense, which holds that the present
alters the structure of the past, is in fact a transcendental necessity. Finally, in addition to
articulating the structure by which the past endures while the present is integrated into it, Bergson
further illuminates the effect that the past has upon the present. The past intervenes in the present
as memory rallies to supplement perception, creating the context that renders perception
meaningful, while it also manifests through the choices we make. For these choices arise from
character, which is, itself, a synthesis of the entirety of our past experiences.
Though it satisfies the conditions necessary for grounding Eliot’s appeal to historical sense,
the applicability of Bergson’s account of memory to the operation of the past in The Waste Land
is less obvious. Much of Matter and Memory is devoted to the operation of the memory of an
individual. In the account of the cone of memory, for example, memory organizes an individual’s
experiences into structures of the past maintained at varying levels of tension. Bergson adduces
the figure of the cone of memory to account for how an individual can recall specific memories
given the virtual existence of the past. The past may endure, but so far it seems to do so only for
discrete individuals. An account of individual memory may promise to illuminate passages in The
Waste Land in which particular characters give voice to allusive material, though employing
Bergson’s account of memory in this way would risk simply psychologizing the personages of the
poem. That the first Thames sister appeals to Dante’s Purgatorio may offer insight into the
character of the Thames sister, but this alone does not entail the synthetic perspective promised by
historical sense. Attending to the endurance of the past for individual figures instead threatens to
re-inscribe the sense of isolation, as within this framework the world of each individual may be
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considered the product of their own specific experience, radically distinct from any other’s.165
Further, if the past is understood as enduring only for the one who remembers, this framework
ceases to account for the irruption of historical voices directly into the poem. The songs of
Philomel and the Rhine-maidens appear illegible except as instantiations of authorial memory.166
Thus, though Bergson’s account of memory in the third chapter of Matter and Memory satisfies
the temporal conditions of historical sense that Eliot outlines in “Tradition and the Individual
Talent,” its interrogation of the individual seems to render it inadequate as a grounding framework.
When applied to the poem, this emphasis on the individual obscures rather than illuminates,
because it promotes a degree of psychological characterization that the poem thoroughly resists.
Though Bergson argues for the enduring existence of the past and develops his account of
memory through investigations of functional or pathological individual mental processes, he does
not circumscribe his account within the realm of personal experience. In the final chapter of Matter
and Memory, Bergson adduces his account of memory to address the relationship between mind
and body presented in the introduction as the central problem of the book.167 In doing so, Bergson’s
investigation shifts from its primarily psychological scope and addresses distinctly ontological
concerns. This ontological turn in Bergson’s argument reveals that Bergson’s conclusions
concerning the continued existence of the past do not merely hold for an experiencing human
subject. Rather, the persistence of the past is a shared feature of all things, though they exhibit

In the next chapter, I will consider two poems that Eliot composed prior to The Waste Land, “Rhapsody on a Windy
Night” and “Gerontion.” In these poems, individual memory operates as a force that divorces the subject from a shared
reality. I will there argue that Eliot conceives of an enduring past as insufficient for producing the synthetic perspective
promised by historical sense if that past endures only for the individual. I will argue, further, that The Waste Land
attributes the durational account of memory to cultures. The past endures independently of specific individuals who
remember.
166
Considered in this light, the cultivation of historical sense seems merely capable of developing the type of
perspective that makes the composition of poems like The Waste Land possible. It becomes necessary for anybody
that wants to “continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year,” but appears irrelevant for anybody who is not
interested in writing a particular sort of poem (Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 40).
167
Bergson, Matter and Memory, vii.
165

268

infinitely varied relations to the enduring past. Bergson anticipates this variety of relations in his
discussion of character, for the notion of the “synthesis of all our past states” in character develops
to account for the identity of all things, even mere material objects. The endurance of the past,
then, is a universal phenomenon. Further, this articulation of identity according to a temporal
framework establishes connections between the durations of individual entities, eliminating the
threat of a myopically insular account of memory and offering a more robust foundation for
historical sense.
Though Bergson delimits his account of memory as a function exclusive to humans, he
does not restrict the endurance of the past in the same way. He highlights this distinction in his
discussion of dogs’ capacity for recognition. He notes, “it is possible that vague images of the past
overflow into the present perception” or even “that its entire past is virtually indicated in its
consciousness.”168 Despite the past potentially being preserved in the dog’s consciousness
virtually, however, Bergson denies that the dog detaches itself “from the fascinating present,”
which he suggests is a precondition for an act of recall memory.169 The past continues to exist for
the dog, but this past is “rather lived than thought.”170 Bergson further develops this distinction
between a lived synthesis of the past and the specific access to the past offered by memory in the
fourth chapter of Matter and Memory, where he discusses the relation of material objects to
memory. Matter does not exhibit memory. Indeed, Bergson identifies pure perception, which is
“the lowest part of memory – mind without memory” as “part of matter.”171 Nevertheless, he
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suggests that matter imitates memory “in its own way.”172 Matter “repeats the past unceasingly,
because, subject to necessity, it unfolds a series of moments each of which is the equivalent of the
preceding moment and can be deduced from it.”173 Thus, he claims, “the past is truly given in the
present” and it is necessary “that the past should be acted by matter.”174 Just as “the whole of our
past psychic life…reveals itself in our character,” the past of material objects manifests in their
present existence.175
An infinite variety of degrees of tension exists between the repetition of the past in the
present characteristic of the “infinitely relaxed duration of extension” and the preservation of the
entirety of the past in memory.176 Indeed, according to this account, each entity exhibits its
complete past according to its own rhythm of duration, its own degree of tension. By identifying
the past of an individual as fundamental to its identity, however, Bergson radically expands the
scope of that individual’s past. For the past of any individual includes relations to others whose
identities are conditioned by their own pasts. This incorporation of relation into the construction
of identity establishes connections to other pasts within the being of an individual. Thus, as al-Saji
notes, “durations are mutually implicating for Bergson,” each expanding out to include all others
in a unified whole.177 This mutually implicating character of duration illuminates Deleuze’s claim
that, for Bergson, “the idea of a virtual coexistence of all levels of the past, of all levels of tension,
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is thus extended to the whole of the universe…everything happens as if the universe were a
tremendous memory.”178 Just as each plane of memory contains the whole of one’s past at a
specific degree of tension and oriented around specific “dominant memories on which other
memories lean as on supporting points,” the duration of each individual opens out to include the
entirety of the past at its own degree of tension and oriented around defining relations.179
Rather than delimit the endurance of the past as the private persistence of the history of an
individual, Bergson appeals to his account of duration as foundational to identity. In doing so, he
reveals that the past of any individual exhibits connections to the pasts of others insofar as those
others appear in the past of the individual and are, themselves, instantiations of their pasts. This
interconnection of durations entails that the enduring past of any individual is, in fact, the past of
the world organized around a particular perspective. Within this past hum the rhythms of the
durations of other entities, each exhibiting their own degrees of tension and their own organizations
of the past.180 This ontological dimension of Bergson’s account of memory reveals that it is, in
fact, capable of underwriting historical sense as a force for the synthesis of perspectives. The
historical connections drawn in the poem need not be reduced to acts of memory effected by
characters within the poem or by the author, for the existence of the past is not restricted to the
history of a given individual. Instead, the entire past endures, and it is instantiated at varying
degrees of durational tension. The irruptions of the songs of Philomel and the Rhine-maidens
appear, in light of this account, as traces of the past available to all characters in the poem as parts
of their own histories. Philomel and the Rhine-maidens are, then, parts of those characters. Their
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voices persist as elements preserved in each personage’s history, even if these voices are elided.
Similarly, the totalizing perspectives of the abstract poetic speaker and Tiresias become legible as
articulations of a Bergsonian universal memory.181
Bergson’s account of memory, then, fulfills all the conditions of historical sense and can
accommodate the various modes in which The Waste Land depicts the enduring operation of the
past. According to this framework, the past continues to exist beyond the moment of its presence.
Not only is each present moment integrated into this enduring past, but this integration is necessary
for experience to be possible at all. The past conditions the appearance of the present. Furthermore,
the past intervenes in the present through the operation of individuals, who are, through their
character, “the totality of their past experience.”182 Yet the past does not merely persist as an
expression of personal history. It also opens onto the myriad pasts of other individuals, human and
non-human, each with their own memory and durational rhythm. The past that is preserved for
each is, in fact, the past of the whole world oriented around a particular set of relations. Thus, this
account of memory can account not only for specific characters’ articulation of historical
awareness in The Waste Land, but it can also accommodate the intervention of historical voices
that transcend any individual perspective. The ability of this account to do so, however, depends
upon the ontological turn that establishes the mutually implicating character of durational
identities. Without this aspect of duration, memory ceases to promise the synthesis of perspectives.
Despite being heavily indebted to Bergson, however, Eliot rejects precisely this ontological
structure of the Bergsonian framework. Eliot himself seems to indicate the inadequacy of
Bergsonian memory as a ground for historical sense, potentially damning his own account.
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ELIOT’S CRITIQUE AND THE RESITUATION OF DURATION

Introduction
I have argued that Bergson’s treatment of memory can serve as a theoretical ground for Eliot’s
notion of historical sense. A crucial component of Bergson’s explication of memory involves the
investigation and critique of the impulse to represent time as linear. Further, this critique itself
offers a theoretical framework that illuminates the responses to deficient modes of history that
Eliot presents throughout his corpus. Eliot’s intellectual relation to Bergson, however, is
characterized neither by happy coincidence nor straightforward adherence. Despite a period of
intense engagement with Bergson, Eliot comes to adopt an increasingly critical stance toward the
philosopher, particularly in the years preceding the composition of The Waste Land. For example,
Eliot explicitly pans Bergson in “The Possibility of a Poetic Drama,” the essay that follows
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” in The Sacred Wood. The criticisms of Bergson that Eliot
raises in his prose do not present a comprehensive account of Eliot’s grounds for dismissing
Bergson, and in some cases his barbs fail almost entirely to hit their mark.1 Though his prose
critique of Bergson does not substantially address the issue of temporality, a sequence of poems
written between 1910 and 1920 reveal a far more nuanced engagement with a roughly Bergsonian
account of memory. I maintain that this sequence of poems chronicles Eliot’s examination of the
subjective experience of duration as a force for personal transformation. The series of poems
suggests the contours of an argument that illuminates the precise grounds on which Eliot seems to
reject the productive possibilities of durational memory. Because these poems articulate the
contours of Eliot’s quarrel with Bergson, they also illuminate the possibility that Eliot does not

The argument against Bergson presented in “The Possibility of a Poetic Drama,” for example, more or less simply
an ad hominem attack that belies an uncharitably disdainful stance.
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endorse a total rejection of the Bergsonian framework. Ultimately, in fact, I will argue that The
Waste Land presents a further stage in the development of Eliot’s poetic engagement with
Bergsonian duration. With this step, Eliot does not abandon Bergson’s account of temporality
entirely. Rather, he provides duration with a new ontological ground that preserves the priority of
space, to which Eliot is committed, while also locating the foundation of memory beyond the
individual consciousness. In marshalling historical sense, The Waste Land identifies culture itself
as a durational structure. Thus Eliot seems to develop a duration that transcends the individual but
does not structure all of reality. He mediates between the materialism and idealism that, he claims,
are the only recourse for Bergsonian philosophy. In doing so, he develops an account of individual
identity that simultaneously preserves the integrity of the subject while also establishing an
essential connection between that subject and all others.
I. Eliot’s Challenge to Bergson and the Priority of Quantity
Eliot’s most extensive prose engagement with Bergson’s thought survives in a paper prepared for
presentation before the Harvard Philosophical Club during the 1913–1914 school year.2 At the
beginning of the paper, Eliot identifies three lines of critique that he intends to pursue in his
appraisal of Bergson. Each challenge identifies a problematic aspect of a single text in isolation,
though Eliot’s pursuit of these challenges involves comparing the conclusions of Time and Free
Will, Matter and Memory, and Creative Evolution and highlighting apparent contradictions
between them. With respect to Time and Free Will, Eliot challenges “the antithesis of extrinsic and
intrinsic multiplicity.”3 Subsequently, Eliot argues that the attempt “to occupy a middle ground
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between idealism and realism” in Matter and Memory ultimately fails.4 The final avenue of critique
challenges “the nature of matter in Creative Evolution” and “its relation to consciousness.”5
Though Eliot initially pursues these challenges as separate lines of inquiry, he clarifies that they
all participate in a single argument. For the attempt “to mediate between idealism and realism”
fails, Eliot claims, precisely because Bergson fails to recognize his own commitment to the priority
of quantity.6 Further, the unfulfilled promise of a position mediating realism and idealism results,
according to Eliot, in a fundamentally incoherent account of material existence. Thus, the appeal
to a mediating position is central to Eliot’s critique, and Eliot argues that Bergson’s failure on this
front embroils him in a dilemma. Because, Eliot claims, the middle ground between realism and
idealism cannot be maintained, either the realist or idealist tendencies must prevail. Though he
expresses some sympathy with the possibilities latent in the realist thrust in Bergson’s philosophy,
Eliot dismisses it rather summarily, arguing that it is untenable due to the insufficiency of
Bergson’s attempt “to deduce consciousness from motion” and to account for the relation between
those two elements of his account.7 He claims that, if Bergson intends to maintain an ontological
pluralism, duration cannot operate as the final reality in his framework.8 He argues that quantity is
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prior to quality, even in Bergson’s appeals to the contrary, and thus the Bergsonian duration, which
depends on pure qualitative motion, must be grounded in a foundational reality of external relations
if he is to maintain a commitment to a pluralist realism. Eliot sees another avenue open to Bergson,
the embrace of an account of duration grounded in an idealism that appeals to absolute identity.
Eliot’s arguments throughout this article are uneven in quality. They illuminate, however, the
problem that Eliot perceives in the Bergsonian philosophical framework. More importantly, they
highlight the tension that, I will argue, motivates Eliot’s poetic engagement with Bergson. Indeed,
an attentiveness to the role of this tension illuminates the intervention signaled by The Waste Land,
an intervention which promises to resolve the antinomy that Eliot constructs.
I.1. Space as Equiprimordial
In the first part of his argument, Eliot critiques Bergson’s essential distinction between qualitative
and quantitative multiplicities. Bergson appeals to this distinction to ground his argument in Time
and Free Will that spatialized representations of time do not accurately reflect the lived experience
of it. Bergson develops this distinction further in Matter and Memory, appealing to it as an
ontological rather than psychological dichotomy. Quantitative multiplicity is characterized by
discrete elements arranged in space. This space can be a realm of real extension, or it can be the
ideal realm of number.9 When time is represented as a linear progression of discrete moments, it
is conceived of as a quantitative multiplicity. By contrast, a qualitative multiplicity is continuous,
lacking discrete parts. Bergson argues that we experience time fundamentally as a qualitative
multiplicity. Our conscious states are not isolable. Instead, they bleed into each other. 10 Bergson
appeals to the hypnotic effect of a ticking clock as an example that illuminates this appeal to the
experience of time as a qualitative multiplicity. When we refer to the passage of a minute, we note
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that “a pendulum, beating the seconds, has completed sixty oscillations.”11 When we consider the
minute in this way, Bergson argues, we lay the sixty strokes of the pendulum out next to each other
in imagined space to count them. But in doing so, we cease to “think of sixty strokes which succeed
each other,” considering instead “sixty points on a fixed line.”12 If we assume this spatialized
representation of the minute and attempt to think of the experience of the succeeding seconds, “we
will be compelled to think of each oscillation to the exclusion of the recollection of the preceding
one” because “space has preserved no trace of it.”13 If we grant this model of the experience of
time’s passing, however, Bergson claims we encounter difficulty when we try to account for the
soporific effect of the ticking clock. Considering each oscillation in isolation, we struggle to
explain why the later swings of the pendulum make us increasingly sleepy when the earlier ones
did not. This difficulty is resolved, Bergson claims, when we consider the succession without
spatializing the passing moments. In this case, we recognize that when we hear each successive
stroke of the pendulum, we “hear one in the other, each permeating the other and organizing
themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative
multiplicity.”14 Each new stroke alters the experience of the whole series, such that “the increase
of stimulation is taken up into the preceding stimulations.”15 And, further, this “whole produces
on us the effect of a musical phrase which is constantly altered in its totality by the addition of
some new note.”16 Each stroke of the pendulum, then, is not experienced as a repetition of the
same sound, but rather as a qualitative development of the whole sequence. The series becomes
hypnotic because the “sounds combined with one another and acted, not by their quantity as
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quantity, but by the quality which their quantity exhibited, i.e. by the rhythmic organization of the
whole.”17
In Matter and Memory, Bergson expands on this account of qualitative multiplicity,
identifying it as the structure of reality itself. The material universe does not comprise organically
distinct elements. Rather, a continuous field of images surrounds us on all sides, and we spread
out a spatialized network beneath this field, allowing distinctions to be made. We encounter a
“moving continuity…in which everything changes and yet remains.”18 Crucially, the continuity
between the qualitative multiplicity that organizes experience and the qualitative multiplicity of
this field of images preserves the connection between the individual, identified as a special image
among images within this field, and the world around it. Throughout his work, Bergson identifies
these qualitative multiplicities as primary, while quantitative multiplicity appears through the
posterior operation of intellect.
In his critique, Eliot analyzes a few of the paradigmatic examples of qualitative multiplicity
presented by Bergson. Yet he returns consistently to the same conclusion. Despite Bergson’s
claims to identify pure qualitative multiplicities, Eliot argues, his examples always entail number
in some capacity.19 Because Eliot grants Bergson’s premise that enumeration necessarily entails
spatialization, as the objects counted are implicitly set against each other in imagined space for
comparison, he argues that Bergson’s attempts to establish pure qualitative multiplicity ultimately
import the quantitative multiplicity of space. Eliot first addresses Bergson’s attempt to identify
qualitative multiplicity in emotions. For example, Bergson claims that we do not originally
recognize desire as a magnitude. Rather, we become aware of a deep passion “by perceiving that
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the same objects no longer impress upon [us] in the same manner.”20 The desire itself is not greater
or lesser. Rather it “permeates a larger number of psychic elements, tingeing them, so to speak
with its own color.”21 Bergson further illuminates the experience of varying intensities of emotion
through a discussion of joy. We are inclined, he notes, to attribute to joy a scale of intensity. In
doing so, however, we mistake “several characteristic forms of inward joy, all of which are
successive stages corresponding to qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states.”22
Eliot argues that Bergson depends here upon number to make his qualitative distinction. Though
we do not necessarily count the psychic states implicated in the different manifestations of joy,
“we can tell whether, for example, our joy pervades all the impressions which we receive in the
course of the day or whether any escape from its influence.”23 Thus, Eliot argues, even though
Bergson claims to have identified a pure qualitative state, “his means of distinguishing” between
the manifestations of joy “is still numerical.”24 Eliot applies slightly different iterations of this
critique to the various examples of pure emotion that Bergson adduces, finding number in each of
them.25 Eliot suggests that Bergson seems “to give away his case” when he notes that “of the two
kinds of multiplicity…the first, only contains number en puissance.”26 Eliot maintains that by
admitting that number applies in potential to qualitative multiplicity, Bergson undermines “any
essential difference between the nature of the physical world, for science, and the world of
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introspection.”27 Eliot then concludes that if number applies to both modes of multiplicity there
cannot be an essential distinction between them. There is “only one, the space type.”28
Eliot’s claim that the essential distinction between qualitative and quantitative multiplicity
ultimately reduces to a single field, a field to which number applies in varying degrees, proves
foundational for the ontological argument that he develops through the rest of the article. This
claim, however, lacks sufficient explication and defense. Eliot suggests that the identification of
number as a potential attribute of qualitative multiplicities necessarily implicates those
multiplicities both in number and in space. Yet he does not explain why this should be the case,
particularly given Bergson’s acknowledgement that, when we deal with multiplicities whose terms
are counted or “are capable of being counted…we think then of the possibility of externalizing
them in relation to one another, we set them out in space.”29 The actualization of a qualitative
multiplicity’s potential for enumeration is an act of reflective consciousness. Indeed, in each of the
examples in which Eliot identifies an illicit appeal to number, Bergson himself acknowledges the
difficulty of engaging theoretically with pure qualitative multiplicities. Following his investigation
of desire, for example, Bergson notes that “this wholly dynamic way of looking at things is
repugnant to the reflective consciousness, because the latter delights in clean cut distinctions,
which are easily presented in words, and in things with well defined outlines, like those which are
perceived in space”30 Eliot’s argument seems to treat the claim that number is applicable to
qualitative multiplicity en puissance as an essential description of the multiplicity itself. Bergson’s
own engagement with the potential enumeration of qualitative multiplicity throughout Time and
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Free Will suggests instead that his appeal to this potential enumeration is primarily a description
of the activity of reflective consciousness. In itself, qualitative multiplicity is fundamentally pure
of number. As the object of reflective investigation, this multiplicity becomes enumerated and
spatialized. Where Eliot suggests an essential attribution of the experience, Bergson admits only
the subsequent operation of a reflective intellect.
Despite Eliot’s paucity of argumentative justification, M.A.R. Habib manages to illuminate
the elided assumptions that ground the objection to the two types of essentially distinct
multiplicities.31 Habib’s analysis reveals how a contradiction between the positions articulated by
Bergson in Time and Free Will and Creative Evolution, which Eliot identifies in a previous
argument, informs this ultimate rejection. Habib notes that, according to Eliot’s account at this
point in the essay, developed almost exclusively through appeals to Time and Free Will, “the
difference between the numerical status of material objects and that of conscious states is the
difference between immediacy and mediation.”32 The experience of a spatial, quantitative
multiplicity engages with number immediately. This is because, Bergson argues in the second
chapter of Time and Free Will, space is “the material with which the mind builds up number, the
medium in which the mind places it.”33 Bergson concludes that, “from the beginning, therefore,
we must have thought of number as of a juxtaposition in space,” and this conclusion grounds his
further claim that, insofar as matter is treated as extended in space, number applies to it
immediately.34 On this account, when we engage with material objects, we “localize them in
space.”35 Thus, if we want to count them, “no effort of the inventive faculty or of symbolical

Habib, “Bergson Resartus and T.S. Eliot’s Manuscript,” 46.
Habib, “Bergson Resartus and T.S. Eliot’s Manuscript,” 46.
33
Bergson, Time and Free Will, 84.
34
Bergson, Time and Free Will, 85.
35
Bergson, Time and Free Will, 85.
31
32

281

representation is necessary; we have only to think them, at first separately, and then
simultaneously, within the very medium in which they come under our observation.”36
Conversely, “number applies to conscious states only through our artificial refraction of
them through a spatialized language.”37 Bergson offers the example of listening to the chimes of a
bell. When listening to the bell I may “retain each of these successive sensations in order to
combine it with the others and form a group which reminds me of an air or rhythm which I know.”38
In this case the sounds of the bell are experienced but not counted. Counting the chimes, on the
other hand, requires separating them, “and this separation must take place within a homogeneous
medium in which the sounds, stripped of their qualities, and in a manner emptied, leave traces of
their presence which are absolutely alike.”39 They must, in short, be represented symbolically in
space. This is precisely the sense in which number applies to conscious states in potentiality. Habib
highlights that in the account developed in Creative Evolution, however, “it is the same movement
which creates distinct concepts in the mind and distinct objects.”40 Eliot notes that, in describing
this movement, Bergson appeals to “movements, without things which move.”41 Yet, Eliot argues,
this is “just the permeation which we are told is the character of the mental, not of external states.”42
Habib locates the missing step in Eliot’s argument when he asks “if the separation of concepts on
the one side and of material objects on the other is something that develops simultaneously, how
can Bergson claim that number characterizes only one of these terms.”43 Number, it seems,
originally applies both to conscious states and material objects en puissance. The contrast between
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the experience of material objects as already numerically differentiated and the interpenetrating
states of consciousness cannot, for Eliot, reveal an essential difference between quantitative and
qualitative multiplicity. Thus, Eliot claims “the numerical way of thinking is at least as original a
mental characteristic as the interpenetrative.”44 Insofar as Bergson grants that the numerical way
of thinking depends on spatialization, Eliot’s appeal to the originality of numerical thinking entails
an appeal to the cooriginality of spatial thinking. This introduces, for Eliot, the problem of space
in Bergson’s framework, and this problem plays a central role in Eliot’s arguments that Bergson
fails to offer an account capable of mediating between realism and idealism.
I.2. Eliot’s Ontological Critique: Space That Is Non-Space
Eliot’s arguments here, crucially, do not address the legitimacy of Bergson’s description of
qualitative multiplicity or, consequently, his account of duration. Eliot does not challenge, for
example, Bergson’s account of the power of aesthetic experience to evoke a series of
heterogeneous emotions. Indeed, Habib notes that Eliot’s account of the “objective correlative”
closely resembles, and perhaps owes much to, Bergson’s investigation of aesthetic experience.45
Eliot merely contests that the qualitative development of emotional states somehow, if only
potentially, entails number and consequently extension. Thus Eliot specifies that, though he grants
that Bergson demonstrates “sufficiently that sensation is not measurable,” he doubts that sensation
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is “ever pure from extension.”46 Insofar as he grants that sensation is not measurable, Eliot seems
to cede to Bergson that internal sensation may primarily be understood in terms of a qualitative
multiplicity. He simply, and crucially, adds the caveat that this qualitative multiplicity entails
number.47 Eliot concludes that in the experience of duration in which moments interpenetrate, “it
is only as the moments do not wholly interpenetrate that we can be said to have change at all.”48
The interpenetration of states or moments is possible, but it cannot be complete. Similarly, “there
can be the passage of states, but there must be real states to pass.” 49 Though he takes it to be
definitive, Eliot’s rejection of Bergson in this argument is not complete. He targets a distinction
central to Bergson’s ontological account, particularly as it appears in Creative Evolution. In
developing this argument, however, Eliot leaves much of Bergson’s investigation into the
experience of memory untouched. Insofar as he critiques Bergson’s ontological distinctions
without undermining the psychological investigation of memory, Eliot preserves the possibility
that a durational account memory could provide the conceptual foundation for his poetic practice.
In fact, I will argue in the following sections that a central feature of Eliot’s poetic work in the
1910’s involved an interrogation of a fundamentally Bergsonian account memory in light of the
ontological conclusions of this essay. Ultimately, I will conclude that by identifying duration as a
feature of cultural history, The Waste Land disrupts the dilemma that Eliot elicits through his
critique of Bergson’s prioritization of qualitative difference. The Waste Land, then, responds to
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the arguments adduced in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” by identifying an alternative
ontological field in which to ground memory.
Eliot’s aim in this argument is not to not fully dismantle Bergson’s account of internal
experience, including memory. Rather, Eliot marshals the disruption of hierarchical delineation
between qualitative and quantitative multiplicity to challenge the ontological framework that this
dichotomy serves. Eliot targets in particular the claim that Bergson offers a position capable of
mediating between realism and idealism.50 For Bergson, this claim to provide a mediating position
between realism and idealism safeguards the relation between the durational experience of the
individual and objective reality. Bergson presents the centrality of this appeal most forcefully in
the final chapters of Matter and Memory, where he identifies duration as an essential feature of
material existence as such.51 If this mediating position becomes untenable, Eliot suggests that
memory turns out to be a force of alienation rather than authenticity. The pair of poems “Rhapsody
on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion” present complementary, damning investigations into the
effects of a submersion in memory when the accompanying mnemonic framework does not
guarantee a connection between the self and external reality. Eliot’s critique of Bergson may not
undermine his descriptive account of the experience of memory at all. Insofar as it targets the
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ontological feature of Bergson’s framework that guarantees intersubjective experience, however,
this critique challenges the viability of appealing to Bergson’s account of duration to ground the
temporality of historical sense, which is meant to preserve a shared world by synthesizing
perspectives.
Bergson claims to mediate between realism and idealism by appealing to a continuous
“extensity prior to space.”52 This continuous extensity includes all material things, including “the
center of real action which is represented by our body.”53 Conscious perception “indicates, in the
aggregate of things, that which interests my possible action upon them.”54 In order to do so, it
artificially renders a homogeneous ground and delineates their contours in space. Bergson claims
that this continuous extensity mediates between idealism and realism by positing an external reality
that is continuous rather than divisible as we find it in perception. This position departs from
realism by denying that concrete extension is “an external reality which is multiple and divided.”55
It aligns with idealism in acknowledging “that every reality has a kinship, an analogy, in short a
relation with consciousness,” but it rejects the gulf created by a distinction between appearance
and reality.56 Rather, because “images outrun perception on every side,” the relation between
‘phenomenon’ and ‘thing’ is…merely that of the part to the whole”57 Crucially, because this
continuous extensity is prior to space, it depends upon the legitimacy of Bergson’s pure qualitative
multiplicity. Qualitative multiplicity must be prior to quantitative multiplicity in order for
homogenous space to operate “like an infinitely fine network which we stretch beneath material
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continuity in order to render ourselves masters of it.”58 Without the grounding field of pure
qualitative extensity, there is nothing under which consciousness can extend this spatial network.
Yet, this is precisely the point that Eliot takes pains to reject in his first series of arguments.
Qualitative multiplicity is never pure. “The deeper ego,” he claims, “yet holds external relations
en puissance, and…this multiplicity, expressed necessarily in terms of numbers, is meaningless if
the terms be not interpreted as to some extent external to each other.”59 The grounding field, the
field of reality that guarantees the continuity between perception and its objects, turns out to be
“neither space nor non-space” and, further, Eliot concludes that “it cannot be regarded as
selbständig.”60 In Eliot’s analysis, the theoretical edifice tasked with mediating realism and
idealism ultimately falls into contradiction, damning the account.
According to Eliot, the untenability of Bergson’s attempt to mediate realism and idealism
embroils him in a dilemma. He must commit to one camp or the other. His account cannot
accommodate both, nor can it successfully resolve the antinomy. Eliot captures the centrality of
relation to this dilemma when he claims that “the crux of the affaire Bergson” is “his attempt to
invest with the title of reality this middle territory which is neither space nor non-space.”61 With
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the rejection of Bergson’s mediating concept of tension, Eliot argues that the account must commit
to the ultimate reality of space, resulting in the priority of quantitative multiplicity and external
relations, or it must fall back on a thoroughgoing idealism that instantiates a commitment to
internal relations.62 If, in the latter case, all entities are actually unified in an all-embracing absolute
perspective, then their identities are conditioned through their relations to each other within it.63
If, on the other hand, the tension is resolved by grounding the system in a realist framework that
prioritizes space, then the structure of the physical world ceases to exhibit a durational quality.
Under this account, duration becomes primarily a structure of individual consciousness. With his
argument that Bergson is ultimately caught in this dilemma between realism and idealism, internal
and external relation, Eliot does not dispute the psychological legitimacy of Bergson’s account of
individual experience. Rather he problematizes Bergson’s attempt to situate that account of
experience within a framework committed to motion as an ontological principle.
In this essay, Eliot betrays a proclivity for engaging with dichotomies, particularly the
dichotomy between realism and idealism, as reified positions. By this I mean that he seems to
accept the legitimacy of the antinomy between realism and idealism, and this leads him to frame
Bergson’s appeal to a mediating position as offering a “middle ground” between the two.64 In one
sense, this is not entirely inaccurate. When Bergson summarizes his conclusions he notes the points
that he “concede[s] to idealism” and the points where “we seem to return to realism.”65 But I
maintain that suggesting that Bergson balances realism and idealism in this way does not capture
the full fecundity of the position he develops in Matter and Memory. Though Bergson does, in his
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conclusion, identify the elements of his account that align with the various tenets of realism and
idealism, he does not merely carve out a position by cherry-picking from both camps or by
positioning his account between them. Instead he presents his project as a much more fundamental
intervention that resolves the dispute by disrupting the problem that frames it. As Heath Massey
succinctly captures it, Bergson’s “strategy is to show, as he did with the free will debate, that the
opposing sides—realism (or materialism) and idealism—share common assumptions and habits of
thinking that are the source of the debate over the relationship between mind and body.”66 Bergson
does not, then, simply locate a middle ground between the two oppositional frameworks. Rather
he disputes the problematic assumption “common to both sides of the debate, namely that
‘perception has a wholly speculative interest,’” and in doing so claims to undermine the foundation
of the debate itself.67
When Eliot engages with Bergson’s claims to mediation, however, he does not seem to
take seriously this negative, ground clearing aspect of Bergson’s project. He instead grants the
legitimacy of the dichotomy between realism and idealism, and then appraises Bergson’s account
in light of these contrasting positions. Thus, as a result of the inconsistencies or difficulties he
identifies in Bergson’s framework, Eliot claims Bergson must retreat to one of these alternatives.
This argumentative structure is anticipated already in the title of the essay, “Inconsistencies in
Bergson’s Idealism,” which risks begging the question by framing Eliot’s investigation as a
treatment of Bergson as an idealist. Eliot’s proclivity to operate with fixed categories manifests,
too, in his concern with ultimate realities, as when he claims that the necessary result of the
discussions in Matter and Memory is that “homogeneous space can be only an extrinsic relation
set up inside an intrinsic relation. It is perfectly real; and in another aspect an inferior grade of
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reality.”68 Eliot’s tacit commitment to the dichotomy between realism and idealism further shines
through when he challenges “where again, is the reality–in the consciousness or in that which is
perceived? Where is the one reality to subsume both of these, and can we or can we not know
it?”69 Eliot returns to the question of where to locate reality, seeming to suggest it must be fixed
somewhere, and he commits to locating it in one side of the antinomy, a problem that Bergson
suggests arises precisely from the desire to treat consciousness as speculative. In doing so, he
ignores Bergson’s warning from the opening chapter of Matter and Memory, that “to ask whether
the universe exists only in our thought, or outside our thought, is to put the problem in terms that
are insoluble, even if we suppose them to be intelligible.”70 Eliot may surely contest Bergson’s
claim that this way of framing the problem is insoluble. Yet an argument that endeavors to reveal
the inconsistencies in Bergson’s thought should, presumably, attempt to do so with a sensitivity to
the theoretical landscape articulated by Bergson himself. This lack of sensitivity leads Eliot, I
think, to underappreciate the full force of Bergson’s philosophical approach.
The endorsement in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” of the dichotomy between
realism and idealism, a dichotomy Bergson rejects the foundation of, reinforces the impression of
an absolutizing tendency in Eliot’s thought which has appeared throughout this dissertation.
Indeed, Eliot’s pressure to embrace absolutes will become a force motivating the poetic
interrogation of memory in the second part of this chapter. Like Bergson, Eliot does attempt to
mediate this tendency. But unlike Bergson, who articulates the mediating position by dissolving
the dichotomy into which it intervenes, Eliot more consistently attempts to hold his oppositions in
a state of productive tension. He develops this attempt at mediation through tension most
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powerfully in his image of the “still point of the turning world” in Four Quartets.71 In the third
section of this chapter, I will argue along these lines that The Waste Land intervenes in the
problematic that Eliot derives from his engagement with Bergson by establishing tradition as the
field that maintains this productive tension between his absolutizing realist and idealist sympathies.
In discussing the alternatives he proposes as theoretical redoubts for the Bergsonian system
in light of its failure fulfill its mediating promise, Eliot suggests that Bergson’s account has “latent
possibilities for a materialism.”72 He seems to see potential in appealing to a field of external
relation. Yet he ultimately positions himself against “the realistic side of the doctrine” finding it
both “(1) inconsistent with [Bergson’s] view of space and (2) unsatisfactory in its account of
consciousness.”73 Instead, Eliot suggests that a defense of Bergsonism must resolve the dilemma
by committing fully to the idealist horn. He proposes a reformulation of the Bergsonian framework
that develops the “suggestions – more than suggestions, of leading toward the absolute” into a
“Bergson Resartus.”74 Rather than posit this absolute as a dynamic force, regardless of whether
that dynamism is identified with motion, life, or duration, this “Bergson Resartus” appeals to “a
duration of pure identity.”75 In this identity, “which is the point of completely internalized
relation,” matter, as the “externalization of consciousness,” would cease to be.76 Thus, the absolute
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identity would provide a grounding field that makes a world of external relations possible by
rendering them, “from the point of view of reality, intrinsic as well.”77 Just as the reification of
external relation divorces the duration of the individual from a similarly durational objective
reality, this reformulation of the absolute threatens to sever the connection between the individual
experience of duration in memory and the durational identity of the ultimate reality. In this
reformulation, memory retains “that power of using everything that is apposite in one’s past
experience to bear on the present moment” but it loses the promise of connecting the individual to
the all-encompassing perspective because the absolute outstrips the perspective of any
individual.78 Individual experience continues to be characterized by heterogeneous, qualitative
difference, but reality no longer is. Rather, from the perspective of the absolute, “nothing
essentially new can ever happen,” because in it “A is so completely B, and B so completely A, that
there is nothing to say about either.”79 Internal relation collapses into absolute identity, and this
absolute identity is divorced from individual experience.80 With his appeal to a Bergsonism
reformulated to embrace identity, an appeal couched in Bradleyan terms, Eliot anticipates the
commitment to Bradleyan idealism that orients the rest of his philosophical career. Nevertheless,
Eliot’s early poetic corpus thematizes the problem of identifying the ontological ground of an
individual existence steeped in memory that is outlined in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.”
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II: The Failure of Memory Without Mediation
In his prose work composed after “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism,” Eliot adopts an
increasingly acerbic and casually dismissive stance towards Bergson that suggests a rather flippant
engagement with his position. In a review of G.W. Cunningham’s A Study in the Philosophy of
Bergson from 1916, Eliot excoriates Bergson for his “neglect of previous philosophers,” claiming
that “if, as Bergson says, consciousness is directed towards the past, then Bergson is the most
unconscious of philosophers.”81 This critique is hardly defensible to say the least. In The Sacred
Wood, Eliot’s derision is in full view. He attributes the popularity of Bergson’s philosophy to
“precisely what is not clear, but to what is an emotional stimulus.”82 Eliot’s dismissive tone in
these comments has encouraged scholars to treat Eliot’s break with Bergson in the
“Inconsistencies” essay as final. Jewel Spears Brooker, for example, suggests that Eliot’s
conclusion that Bergson fails to make good on his promise to “resolve these antinomies” between
“intellect and feeling and between mind and body” precipitates his rejection of Bergson for the
more robust idealism of Bradley.83 Indeed, Spears Brooker describes this turn from Bergson as a
“collapse of Eliot’s enthusiasm,” and a “dialectical swing from enchantment to disillusionment.”84
Though he acknowledges a number of Bergsonian elements that Eliot incorporates into his prose
work, M.A.R. Habib also reads “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” as the inauguration of a
thoroughly antagonistic relationship. Rather than organize this antagonism around the dichotomy
of realism and idealism, as Spears Brooker does, Habib suggests that Eliot comes to identify
Bergson with a strain of Romanticism, which he disdains.85 Habib argues that the stance Eliot

Eliot, “A Review of A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson,” 436.
Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 55.
83
Spears Brooker, T.S. Eliot’s Dialectical Imagination, 28–29.
84
Spears Brooker, T.S. Eliot’s Dialectical Imagination, 29.
85
Habib, “Bergson Resartus and T.S. Eliot’s Manuscript,” 54–55.
81
82

293

adopts in this essay develops in his later work into a comprehensive rejection of Bergsonism
grounded in a “Catholicism whose intellectual affiliations went back to Aristotle and Aquinas.”86
With their emphasis on conversions, these accounts present Eliot’s intellectual development as a
series of discontinuous leaps. Frustrated with Bergson, Eliot throws himself into the absolute
idealism of Bradley. Disillusioned with the irreconcilable distance of the absolute, Eliot adopts the
stance of a skeptical relativist.87 Finally, Eliot makes his final conversion to Anglicanism.
The emphasis that these scholars place on Eliot’s conversions, however, elides the
continuity of the problematic relationship between self and world that organizes a pair of poems
composed in the decade preceding the composition of The Waste Land. More crucially, by casting
the rejection of Bergson as total, these accounts of Eliot’s periodic development obscure the
response that The Waste Land presents to this enduring problematic. These poems, “Rhapsody on
a Windy Night” and “Gerontion,” present stages in a psychological investigation that complement
the progression of Eliot’s critique of Bergson.88 The former interrogates the experience that results
from a Bergsonism that fails, as Eliot argues, to mediate between realism and idealism and lands
instead in a materialism. “Gerontion” subsequently presents a perspective grounded in an absolute
idealism akin to Eliot’s proposal of a Bergson Resartus, one heavily inflected by Eliot’s
engagement with Bradley. These poems trace the ramifications of Eliot’s theoretical critique of
Bergson for the individual. According to the account of experience developed through these
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poems, the individual perspective within a Bergsonian framework does not discover a world
characterized by increasing richness through the conscious submersion in the life of memory.
Rather, these poems suggest that the Bergsonian play of memory at best throws an enchanting veil
of fantasy over reality, inhibiting action. At worst, the investigation of the individual consciousness
viewed within the framework of a Bergson Resartus in “Gerontion” reveals a perspective fully
detached from the world and evacuated of content. Despite differences in tone and scope, these
poems present the past as a force that erects a barrier between the self and external reality. In doing
so, they develop poetically an argument left open in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” That
essay concluded with a disjunction. If space is not, as Bergson claims, posterior to duration, and if
the attempt to mediate between realism and idealism by appealing to a qualitative tension
consequently fails, then the durational account of memory must be grounded in either a materialist
realism or an absolute idealism.89 The poems argue that in either case, the past operates as a force
of isolation. Regardless of whether one grounds duration in a realism or an idealism, the poems
suggest, the result is the same. The past divorces us from the world around us, foreclosing the
possibility of genuine connection. Thus, “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion” seem to
develop a deeply pessimistic perspective. Either memory does not operate according to the account
of duration explicated by Bergson, which is an account of memory, I have suggested, that Eliot is
reluctant to abandon, or the individual experience conditioned by memory is fundamentally
alienated.
I will conclude, however, that Eliot does not ultimately endorse this pessimistic antinomy.
Instead, in the final section of this chapter, I argue that The Waste Land presents an alternative to
the dichotomy Eliot establishes in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion,” and that this
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alternative suggests a response to the problems that Eliot claims disqualify Bergson’s theoretical
framework. To briefly forecast my argument, The Waste Land depicts the isolation of individual
consciousness as a ubiquitous modern characteristic. As I have noted throughout this project, the
personages of the poem are evacuated of identity and paralyzed by inaction. In this, they closely
resemble the characters of these poetic responses to Bergson’s philosophy. As I have also argued,
however, The Waste Land does not merely rearticulate this account of alienated perspectives at a
social level. Rather it appeals to historical sense as a response to this condition. And despite the
continuity, for example, of the representations of the speaker in “Gerontion” and the characters in
The Waste Land, the two poems present radically different accounts of the operation of history.
For, while history operates as an isolating force in “Gerontion,” The Waste Land, I will argue,
posits it as a durational field that guarantees the possibility of intersubjectivity.
The argument I am constructing, then, traces the development of Eliot’s engagement with
a specific problem arising from his critique of Bergson. I do not maintain that the poetic visions
Eliot presents in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” “Gerontion,” and The Waste Land all exhibit a
single unified account. Nor do I claim that the first two supply a solution to the problems raised in
the “Inconsistencies” essay, though I will argue that The Waste Land does. I maintain instead that
the poems explore the consequences of Eliot’s seeming acceptance of Bergson’s psychological
account of duration, on the one hand, and simultaneous rejection his ontological framework on the
other. In “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism,” I have noted, Eliot suggests two possible
theoretical redoubts to retreat to in light of what he takes to be the failure of Bergson’s mediating
position between realism and idealism. In that essay, however, Eliot does not fully interrogate
either of these positions. “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion,” composed at opposite
ends of the 1910’s, each explore one side of this dichotomy between materialism and absolute

296

idealism. Each, further, finds its side of the dichotomy lacking. I argue that the sequence amounts
to a destructive dilemma. Eliot proposes two possible ways to ground durational experience given
his conclusions in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” The two poems under consideration
determine that both alternatives result in alienation. Thus, Eliot seems provisionally to be left with
the conclusion that alienation is inescapable. Finally, I argue that The Waste Land offers another
step in this diachronic argument by offering a poetic vision that promises to resolve the problem
that unites “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion.”
II.1. “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and the Enchantments of Memory
Eliot’s most explicit poetic engagement with the Bergson’s philosophical framework occurs in
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” which Eliot wrote before “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism”
and arguably while he still identified as being committed to a Bergsonian perspective.90 The poem
follows the path of a single speaker walking home through a city between the hours of midnight
and four o’clock. The twisting alleys invite the speaker to lose himself, and the journey through
the city doubles as an investigation of the free play of the speaker’s consciousness. A Bergsonian
attentiveness to the fluidity of conscious experience and the interplay of past and present
characterizes the speaker’s meandering. The environment itself participates in the speaker’s
submersion into memory, as “whispering lunar incantations / dissolve the floors of memory / and
all its clear relations.”91 Piers Gray suggests that “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” straightforwardly
endorses Bergson’s account of memory. The poem, he claims, suggests “an ironical triumph of
human consciousness that its richest life thus appears in a state of apparent inactivity,” pure
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memory being identified in Gray’s reading with the unconscious.92 Thus, the poem traces “with
deliberate precision the movement of ‘life’ towards unconscious life.”93 Gray does, however, note
the suspicions expressed in the poem towards this richness of unconscious life. For, though
Bergson suggests that memory serves to prepare action, the poem presents memory inhibiting the
speaker.94 Ultimately, on Gray’s reading, the speaker resolves this tension between perception and
memory, between action and the inhibiting force of the unconscious, by “seeking the ultimate
escape into solitude.”95 The speaker ascends the stair, brushes his teeth, and goes to sleep. He
willingly submits to the domination of the unconscious.
Though Gray’s reading of the poem helpfully emphasizes the continuity between
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” in which the inhibition
precipitated by memory is amplified into paralysis, its characterization of the relation between the
speaker and his environment is not entirely successful. Gray accepts too readily that the speaker
actually engages with the world as it is rather than with the world of his own imagination. In Gray’s
reading, memory throws up confused reminiscences, it disorients the speaker, inhibiting action.96
Gray does not, however, question the speaker’s engagement with the world itself. In his reading,
the speaker continuously reconfigures his environment through the operation of memory. Despite
this reconfiguration, the speaker remains embedded in the world. He simply fails to interact with
the entities in it, observing instead the free play his imagination engages in with respect to them.
To the extent that this presents an account of ironic success, it does so within a purely idealist
framework. The characters of these poems engage with a reality that is filtered through their
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experience of it, an experience that is invariably colored by memory. Yet, the things in themselves
remain elusive. In “Eliot’s First Conversion: ‘Rhapsody on a Windy Night’ and Eliot’s Critique of
Bergson,” Jewel Spears Brooker convincingly argues that memory does not merely function in the
poem to inhibit action. To make this argument, she draws on the distinction between realism and
idealism that dominates Eliot’s engagement with Bergson. In contrast to Gray, who reads the poem
as presenting a single coherent narrative, Spears Brooker argues that the poem presents the same
night’s stroll according to two different perspectives, “one that is dialogic and prioritizes space,
and one that is narrative and prioritizes time.”97 By following the trajectory of these juxtaposed
perspectives, the speaker of the poem “tests the Bergsonian hypothesis for overcoming
psychological and metaphysical dualism.”98 Spears Brooker formulates this hypothesis as claiming
that, by “conceiving of matter…as neither a thing nor an idea, but rather as a series of overlapping
images…the intellect will melt into consciousness, leading to a transcendence of the divided
self.”99 While Eliot tests the plausibility of Bergson’s claim to mediate problematic dualisms
abstractly in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” by drawing Bergson into contradictions
regarding the logical priority of his terms, in “Rhapsody on Windy Night,” Eliot tests Bergson’s
method for resolving the dichotomy by applying it in experience. Tracing the two interpretive
tracks, Spears Brooker argues that the final line of the poem determines its ultimately pessimistic
conclusion. Despite the speaker’s attempt to bring the quantitative and qualitative, intellect and
feeling, into alignment, “the discontinuities remain painfully intact, and the ‘last twist’ is the
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recognition that this is necessarily so.”100 Thus, the poem seems to conclude that, in experience,
the method articulated by Bergson fails to fulfill its promise of resolution.101
The poem deploys repetition to evoke the sense that memory throws up a barrier between
the speaker’s internal life and the world around him. Midnight’s dissolution of “the floors of
memory / and all its clear relations” replaces the “clear relations” of space with the associative
connection of images across time.102 In doing so, it establishes the quantitative and qualitative
series that Spears Brooker uses to guide her reading of the poem. While the poem tracks the
speaker’s progress through the city on his way home, a progress marked by the “clear relations”
of a body in space measured by the regular tolling of the clock, the speaker’s reverie disrupts the
spatialized continuity of his perceived reality.103 Thus, at half past two, the speaker’s eye alights
upon a cat that “Slips out its tongue / And devours a morsel of rancid butter.”104 Mnemonic
association drives the rest of the stanza. The slipping of the cat’s tongue conjures the image of “the
hand of a child, automatic” that “Slipped out and pocketed a toy that was running along the
quay.”105 Though the speaker “could see nothing behind the child’s eye,” the image of the eye
transports him again, first to the memory of seeing “eyes in the street / Trying to peer through
lighted shutters” and then to the eye of a crab “one afternoon in a pool / An old crab with barnacles
on his back.”106 The poem signals the transports of memory through the repetition of images. The
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slipping of the tongue evokes the slipping of the hand, drawing the speaker out of his immediate
environment, and the blankness of the eye conjures the opacity of the eyes peering through
shutters, transporting him between realms of memory.
The series of associations distracts the speaker from the occasion that evokes them, and the
poem signals this distraction through the repetition of the image that memory seizes upon. This
distraction could perhaps be understood as a synthesis of the speaker’s perception of the world
with the relevant memories that interpret that perception.107 However, rather than interpret the
world, leaving the speaker engaged with it, or even simply distracting the speaker from the
perceptual catalysts for reminiscing, memory in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” effects a
potentially pernicious transformation of the speaker’s world. As Spears Brooker notes, the series
of images associated with the woman in the second and third stanzas, which both occur at half past
one, suggest that she is “diminished and dehumanized” through the speaker’s perception.108 Upon
regarding a woman standing in a doorway, memory enjoins the speaker to focus on “the border of
her dress,” which is “torn and stained with sand,” and “the corner of her eye,” which twists like a
crooked pin.”109 In order to facilitate the association of images, memory calls the speaker to reduce
the woman to parts of her body or her attire. These synechdocal images conjure memories of “a
twisted branch upon the beach,” synthesizing the sand from the dress with the twisted eye, and “a
broken spring in a factory yard.”110 The speaker reifies the woman, reducing her first into pieces
of herself and then transfiguring those pieces through the operation of memory into skeletal images
of decay and enervation.111 Conversely, in the sixth stanza at half past three, memory transforms
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the moon into one of the most active figures in the poem.112 The moon “winks a feeble eye, / She
smiles into corners. / She smoothes the hair of the grass.”113 It attains this active force through the
activity of memory, which invests the image of the moon with significance and personality. One
might object that the attribution of a winking eye to the moon does not suggest an appeal to
memory at all, but rather merely suggests the operation of the imagination. Perhaps fantasy is at
play in this passage untethered from the activity of memory with which it is associated throughout
the poem generally. I think Spears Brooker is correct, however, in identifying the operation of
memory even in this description that does not appeal to it explicitly. The speaker’s description that
anthropomorphizes the moon, arguably attributing more intentional agency to the moon than is
attributed to any individual in the poem, participates in a poetic tradition of lunar personification.
As Brooker notes, “both the sullied wench in stanza two and the cosmic cocotte in stanza five are
images mediated by literature, the former in large part by novels Eliot was reading at the time…the
latter by nineteenth century poems and songs.”114 The speaker’s description of the moon exhibits
an appeal to remembered literature that shapes his perception. Within the poetic context, this
mediating appeal to nineteenth century literature should be read as an engagement with memory
because that literary context is not on hand to the speaker in the poem. To the extent that the
speaker draws upon it, he must do so through some operation of memory.
Memory, then, exhibits seemingly converse effects upon the speaker in the poem, though
these effects elicit the same result. First, memory calls the speaker to reify his perceptions so that
they serve as the catalysts for reverie. It removes the speaker from an intersubjective reality by
converting other subjects in the world into objects. Subsequently, memory imbues the physical
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world with fantasy, investing objects with their own degree of subjectivity. Brooker forcefully
captures this second move in the poem when she draws a distinction between the internal and
external object. “The external moon,” she claims, “is a discrete material object; the moon within,
by contrast, is an aging prostitute who ‘winks a feeble eye’ and ‘twists a paper rose.’” 115 In both
cases, the poem presents memory as a barrier between the individual and his surroundings. It does
not illuminate the relation of the speaker to a world with which he is continuous. Rather, it throws
up illusions and distractions, either by calling the speaker’s attention to chains of remembered
associations that pull him from the immediate context of the poem or by drawing upon a poetic
tradition to imbue the environment with a personality. In the poem, these activities of memory
seem to inhibit action and render the speaker’s world private.
While Gray suggests that the investigation of a submersion in Bergsonian memory
developed in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” is successful, Spears Brooker more convincingly
argues that the “last twist of the knife” of the poem’s final line is an admission of defeat.116 Given
the critique that Eliot develops in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism,” the failure of the
speaker’s interrogation of memory to yield access to an intersubjective reality in “Rhapsody on a
Windy Night” appears entirely predictable. Already in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” the
Bergsonian continuity between self and world established by an ontologically privileged field of
images prior to space seems to break down. Instead, the realm of quantitative difference,
represented in the poem by the streetlamps that measure the streets and count the hours, persists
alongside the mnemonic field of qualitative multiplicity. The poem’s preservation of the
dichotomy between these two multiplicities, and its investigation of the effects of memory when
the dichotomy is preserved, anticipates one horn of the dilemma that concludes “Inconsistencies
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in Bergson’s Idealism.” The poem investigates the operation of memory under conditions in which
quantitative multiplicity is treated as ontologically prior to qualitative multiplicity. When the
operation of memory is grounded in a materialism, submersion in the qualitative multiplicity of
memory fails to bring the subject into contact with a world beyond the self. The poem suggests
that under these conditions, memory serves as a barrier to interaction with an objective reality
instead of providing the grounds for connection. The speaker of “Rhapsody on a Windy Night”
engages more extensively with his personification of the moon, an image conditioned by a
mnemonic experience of literary history, than he does with the people who appear momentarily in
the poem, people who are immediately reified and serve as the catalysts for further reveries. The
first horn of Eliot’s dilemma, namely the possibility of a durational account of memory combined
with a commitment to a materialist reality, results in memory functioning as a disruptive force. It
erects a barrier between the subject and the world, inhibiting action, dehumanizing other subjects,
and cultivating a world of fantasy.
II.2. “Gerontion” and the Seductions of History
“Gerontion” exhibits a philosophical outlook that is vastly different from the one explored in
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night.” It engages with a thoroughly idealist perspective, one that draws
significantly on the philosophy of F.H. Bradley and that resembles the vision of a Bergson Resartus
articulated in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” Nevertheless, it presents an account of the
operation of history that is strikingly similar to the conclusions concerning memory suggested by
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night.” Just as memory establishes a barrier between the poetic speaker
and the world in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” the past draws the speaker of “Gerontion” out of
his environment and into ideal realms of increasing abstraction and isolation. The attitude towards
the past shared by these two poems establishes an argumentative continuity between them, though
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this continuity is generally overlooked.117 While “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” offers a poetic
investigation of the effects of an embrace of a durational account of memory tethered to a
spatialized external reality, “Gerontion” traces the psychological ramifications of an appeal to a
durational absolute. The results are the same in both cases, and together the poems suggest an
argument that further develops the disjunction established in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s
Idealism.” If qualitative multiplicity is not ontologically fundamental, and thus, Eliot argues, the
ontological field mediating between realism and idealism fails, then the psychological experience
of duration must be grounded in the materialist or idealist elements of Bergson’s thought.
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night” suggests that the embrace of memory from within ontological
perspective that prioritizes space results in isolation and paralysis. “Gerontion” addresses the other
horn of the dilemma, but it comes to the same conclusion. From within the perspective of an
absolute idealism, memory effects a similar seduction. Thus, the poems develop the argument of
“Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” to its conclusion.
Like “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” “Gerontion” presents the internal monologue of a
single speaker. This monologue, however, does not develop with narrative coherence.118 The hours
do not toll, calling the speaker back to his surroundings. The speaker does not mark lampposts to
track his procession through memory and the empty streets. The speaker merely ruminates,
following the patterns of thought to increasing levels of abstraction. Though the poem lacks a
unifying narrative thread, Jewel Spears Brooker argues convincingly in “The Structure of Eliot’s
Gerontion: An Interpretation Based on Bradley’s Doctrine of the Systematic Nature of Truth” that
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the poem embraces a unifying logic.119 According to Spears Brooker’s account, a principle of
interior relations guides the poem. This principle entails that “all fragments of reality, all
appearances, are related to one another simply because they are all part, in the final analysis, of
one thing that is the Absolute or experience; and because experience is all-inclusive, all relations
are internal.”120 Because the identity of any object refers to the system of increasingly
comprehensive wholes of which it is a part, terminating in the Absolute, an understanding of any
individual requires an understanding of the complete system. The poem instantiates this doctrine
through the figure of nested houses. The speaker of “Gerontion” sits in “a decayed house” and is
“read to by a boy, waiting for rain.”121 The speaker is, himself, figured as a house, with his
“thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season” identified as the tenants. 122 Tracing the poem’s
telescoping logic, Spears Brooker identifies this complex network of houses, the whole network,
“Gerontion’s thoughts, his brain, his body, his house, his yard, the field, the knob or hill, Europe,”
as already latent in the first stanza of the poem.123 Each individual is located within a greater house
until the house expands to contain all of European history and even, through the poem’s fractal
pressure to include increasingly capacious wholes, all of experience. For, on Brooker’s reading,
“each of these houses is self-transcendent until the all-embracing Absolute, i.e., reality or
experience, is reached.”124 Further, just as the figure of the house expands to contain the entirety
of experience, the decayed state of the house in which the speaker sits conditions the meaning of
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all the poem’s houses. Each layer of the nested houses contains indications of its deterioration. As
Spears Brooker notes, “all of the houses are owned by a diseased and depraved predator; all of the
occupants are transients.”125 Each element of the poem attains its significance through a relation
to a larger context. Without fail throughout the poem, this larger context manifests the same sense
of decay as the part through which it is introduced.
Though she acknowledges the poem’s pressure toward increasingly expansive
perspectives, Spears Brooker does not fully grapple with the extremely troubling implications of
figuring the predatory landlord as a Jew, especially given the metonymic structure of the poem.
Spears Brooker draws complex connections between the figure of the Jew and the historical
elements woven throughout the poem, but she fails to reckon with the glaring antisemitism of a
poetic logic which suggests that “London, Antwerp, Brussels, Athens…are likewise decayed
houses owned by degraded Jews.”126 Throughout her explication, Spears Brooker frequently
identifies the terminus of this expansion of housing relations as either Europe or the Christian
church. The former context is established in the first stanza of the poem with the speaker’s
admission that he “did not fight at the hot gates,” a reference the battle of Thermopylae, and with
the stanza’s subsequent references to Antwerp, Brussels, and London.127 Thus the poem appeals
to Europe not only as a geographical entity but also as a historical inheritance, one Brooker
suggests Gerontion “immediately dissociates himself from.”128 The second stanza introduces the
Christian context with its claims that “Signs are taken for wonders,” and that “In the juvescence
of the year / Came Christ the tiger.”129 Because the nested structure of the poem reinscribes the
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relations presented in the description of the house in the first stanza of the poem in each
increasingly capacious frame, the antisemitic caricature of the Jewish landlord who “squats on the
windowsill” conditions the account of these ultimate historical houses. The logic of the poem
suggests that Europe is beholden to and undermined by sickly Jews, committing it to a
reprehensible and indefensible mythical narrative. “Gerontion,” then, is fundamentally tainted by
antisemitism. The same expansive pressure that radicalizes the poem’s xenophobic elements also,
however, ultimately annihilates the identities that render those elements legible. This annihilation
does not, of course, absolve the poem of its abhorrent features. It does not even significantly
complicate the poem’s appeals to antisemitic tropes. It does, however, more directly relate to my
quarry in this chapter. For the speaker’s relation to the past operates as the force that effects this
annihilation of identity, and this appeal to the destructive power of the past illuminates the poetic
critique of the attempt to ground the experience of duration in an absolute perspective.
Wind operates as the image of decay in the poem, cultivating a sense of the destructive
emptiness that characterizes each structure, while history appears as the force that precipitates such
destruction. “History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors / And issues, deceives with
whispering ambitions / Guides us by vanities.”130 It is not merely another house in the poem,
though it does figure as one of the most comprehensive structures. It is also an agent that seduces
the speaker with “supple confusions” whose “giving famishes the craving.”131 Like the wind,
which suggests a nothingness that is active through its invisible movements, history excites a desire
unfulfilled. Eliot’s appeals in the poem to the Bradleyan structure of knowledge here proves
illuminative once again. As Eliot summarizes the position in his dissertation, when “the only truth
is the whole truth,” that truth “which includes both knower and known, is of course
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unattainable.”132 History promises knowledge by offering the expansive context according to
which a datum may be understood. That context, however, expands to an absolute perspective that
cannot be inhabited by the individual, as it includes not only the individual but also a future that
individual does not have access to. History promises understanding, but it gives only further
fragments. In doing so, it lures us into a labyrinth of our own construction. It guides us down
“contrived corridors” and “cunning passages,” and it “Gives too late / What’s not believed in, or
if still believed / In memory only, reconsidered passion.”133 Thus, the poem unites history, the
most capacious structure identified in the poem, with the mind of the old man by presenting
historical memory as the force that guides him in his ruminations.134
Spears Brooker locates a deep irony in the construction of the poem. On the one hand, the
poem articulates a pessimistic view of history as a force that promises understanding while only
teasing, leading us into winding corridors of abstraction and isolation. On the other, “though
discursive knowledge is the destroyer in ‘Gerontion,’” the poem is “soaked in history, philosophy,
science, anthropology, and theology,” from its opening appeal to the battle of Thermopylae to the
extended engagement with a Lancelot Andrewes’ sermon on the Incarnation.135 Spears Brooker
attempts to resolve this tension by noting that “it takes an intelligent and learned person to perceive
that abstract knowledge is a malignancy consuming Western culture.”136 This claim softens the
tension by extracting Eliot’s poetic hyperliteracy from the operation of the poem itself. It seems to
suggest that the poem’s allusiveness, its incorporation of history, primarily functions as a challenge
to the reader rather than a force internal to the poem. The poem makes derisive claims about
Eliot, “Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley” 376. Spears Brooker, Mastery and Escape,
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history, but the poem includes history as an element facing the reader. This attempt to account for
the irony of Eliot’s erudition fails to fully address that the content of the poem is coextensive with
the internal monologue of the old man. The allusions are, in fact, the operation of his mind
retreating from his immediate context into realms of increasing abstraction. As the old man traces
the logic of containment to greater levels of generality, he grows increasingly detached from his
surroundings. At the beginning of the poem, he is “being read to by a boy.” 137 By the
antepenultimate stanza, however, he has “lost [his] sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch.”138 He
has “not reached conclusion, when [he] / Stiffens in a rented house.”139 The meditation on history
results in an evacuation of sense. He concludes the poem dead before his death. The other tenants
become inaccessible to him except in thought. They seem to him untethered, like dispersed
atoms.140 The integration of historical material does not simply offer the reader the key to
discerning the poem’s message regarding the dangers of abstract knowledge.141 Nor does it merely
decry the decrepit state of western culture through its metonymic logic, re-inscribing the decayed
state of the house at every level of containment in the poem, as Brooker argues. The poem
represents the effects of an attempt to use history to gain the absolute perspective that promises
knowledge. The process of drawing connections between his proximate condition and the worldhistorical situation, his structure of a “thousand small deliberations,” proves to be precisely the
force that isolates him.142
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The lack of emphasis on the effect that the old man’s musings have upon the elision of his
own identity in the poem facilitates what I take to be the major failing of Spears Brooker’s
otherwise incisive explication of the poem. Throughout her explication, Spears Brooker takes
pains to distinguish the “concrete universal that comprehends many-in-one and is arrived at by
including differences,” the concrete universal that she identifies as central to Bradleyan idealism,
from an abstract universal, which dissolves all difference into a homogeneous unity.143 She
adduces ample evidence from Eliot’s dissertation to suggest that he endorses a position that aligns
with the idealism grounded in a concrete universal, which she attributes to Bradley, but the logic
she traces in the poem seems rather to exert a pressure towards abstract unity. According to a
system that comprehends multiplicity by including difference, the individual perspectives of the
poem should retain their identity even when considered from the perspective of the Absolute. The
old man may only become fully comprehensible once the totality of internal relations that
determines his identity, and thus the universal system of relations, is brought into view, but the old
man should nevertheless remain identifiable as the distinct perspective that instantiates those
relations.144 The poetic vision expands to include increasingly capacious houses, moving from the
dry brain of the old man to the decayed house of Christ. With its pressure toward the maximally
capacious house of Bradley’s Absolute experience, the poem shifts to incorporate the whole of
human history. In doing so, it elides the distinctions between the intermediate levels. Spears
Brooker herself notes that “all of the houses are old, brittle, decayed, wind-filled, windswept; all
of the tenants, being houses also, are the same.”145 The poem further subsumes the individual parts
into the comprehensive whole through the operation of wind in the poem. Wind appears throughout
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the poem as a force of annihilation, and as each increasingly comprehensive house reveals itself
to be windswept, the elements comprising that house seem to evaporate. By the end of the poem,
the tenants who share the old man’s house, “De Bailhache, Fresca, Mrs. Cammel, whirled / Beyond
the circuit of the shuddering Bear / In fractured atoms.”146 They are blown to the wind, reduced to
minimal points of identity. In the mind of the old man, simultaneously the most and least expansive
house in the poem, the variety that is multiplied by “a thousand small deliberations” amounts to
“a wilderness of mirrors.”147 Apparent diversity merely reflects identity. The poem does, as Spears
Brooker maintains, exhibit a pressure towards an absolute perspective. Rather than preserve a
totality of difference, however, this absolutizing logic disintegrates its constituents, effecting
universal identity through annihilation.
Though “Gerontion” clearly draws upon elements of Bradley’s theoretical framework, the
poem’s ultimate appeal to an absolute perspective that annihilates distinction instead of preserving
it suggests a continuity with the position that Eliot describes as a “Bergson Resartus” in his critique
of Bergson.148 With his appeal in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” to the position of a
“Bergson Resartus” grounded in “the duration of pure identity” which makes “time the child of
space,” Eliot concludes that “in the Absolute, A is already so completely B, and B so completely
A, that there is nothing to say about either.149 The Absolute is the ground of truth, the perspective
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without which knowledge is impossible, but from this perspective “nothing essentially new can
ever happen” because the universe resolves into pure identity.150 “Gerontion” follows an
individual’s pursuit of that Absolute perspective. History guides the speaker in this pursuit,
cajoling him down the path of increasing abstraction. Instead of providing the promised
knowledge, however, history takes in the act of giving.151 The old man’s retreat into history, his
pursuit the totalizing abstract, leaves him insensate and evacuated of identity. The poem explores
the ramifications of a commitment to the absolute identity of Bergson Resartus and suggests that
this framework extracts a high price. Within an absolute idealism grounded in the “the duration of
pure identity,” memory becomes a force that seduces and destroys, leaving only a “dry brain in a
dry season.”152
With its interrogation of the effects of memory within the framework of an absolute
idealism, “Gerontion” concludes an argument that begins in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s
Idealism” and continues through Eliot’s more explicit poetic investigation of Bergsonian memory
in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night.” Eliot argues in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” that
Bergson’s account of tension, which locates the individual experience of memory within a more
expansive durational ontology, runs aground because of his failure to justify appeals to the
ontological priority of quality over quantity. Memory may indeed, for Eliot, function in the
individual as a continuous, qualitative multiplicity, and I have suggested that Eliot never explicitly
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takes issue with the Bergsonian account of memory. However, with his rejection of the priority of
quality over quantity and the attendant rejection of a durational objective reality, Eliot severs the
connection between the individual, whose experience is fundamentally temporal, from an objective
reality in which space is prior to time.153 If the Bergsonian psychological framework is to be
maintained, then the essay results in a dilemma. Either Bergsonian duration conditions individual
experience but does not characterize extramental reality, or the account of memory is situated
within a rehabilitated Bergsonian idealism grounded in a “duration of pure identity.”154 Eliot
concludes “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” without resolving this dilemma. “Rhapsody on
a Windy Night” and “Gerontion,” however, present a poetic completion of the argument that
develops a constructive dilemma with thoroughly negative consequences. Memory in “Rhapsody
on a Windy Night” inserts itself between the individual and the external world, acting as barrier to
authentic engagement with others. This has the simultaneous effects of investing the physical
world with illusory meaning and reducing other agents into objects. Without something to
guarantee the continuity between perception and its object, without a field that grounds experience,
individual memory throws up a barrier between the self and others. In “Gerontion,” the past
similarly isolates the speaker by drawing him into increasingly capacious realms of abstraction.
Abstraction, in this context, elides the distinctions that connect the speaker to a particular place,
such that “A is so completely B, and B so completely A, that there is nothing to say about either.”155
It renders him insensate. Thus, the poems resolve the dilemma that results from the rejection of
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qualitative multiplicity’s priority in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” If individual memory
appears within a material universe that is not itself durational, and if duration therefore manifests
purely at an individual level, then memory comes to operate as a destructive, paralyzing force. If
memory is grounded in an absolute durational identity, such as a Bergson Resartus, then memory
manifests as a destructive impulse towards abstraction. In either case, the past appears to operate
as the impetus for a descent into isolation and the evacuation of self. To the extent that Eliot
employs a Bergsonian account of memory, the past, either personal or world-historic, becomes a
force of inescapable destruction.
III. The Ontological Intervention of Historical Sense
Throughout “The Structure of Eliot’s Gerontion,” Jewel Spears Brooker suggests a continuity
between “Gerontion” and The Waste Land. She identifies a structural continuity between the
poems, as both present fragmentary passages that must be synthesized into a more comprehensive
vision by the reader. Citing Joseph Frank, she claims that his account of The Waste Land “is also
true of ‘Gerontion’ – it cannot be read; it can only be reread, because the whole, of which the last
lines are a part, must be in readers’ minds throughout.”156 The continuity of form identified by
Spears Brooker is, in fact, emblematic of a deeper agreement between the poems. The agreement
that Spears Brooker articulates is not merely formal but rather tonal and philosophical, as well.
She locates a “general grimness in ‘Gerontion’” that is “directly related to a despondency regarding
the history of Western civilization.”157 And she claims that this despondency, a response to
dissolution of the “intellectual structures that had undergirded the Western mind for centuries,”
found “consummate expression in The Waste Land.”158 In many respects, The Waste Land does
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amplify the poetic vision expressed in “Gerontion.” In addition to its more extensive deployment
of a formal method that marshals allusive fragments to implicate the poem in a contextual
superstructure, The Waste Land further develops the image of atomistic dissolution contained in
the final stanzas of “Gerontion.” The isolation suggested by the image of “De Bailhache, Fresca,
Mrs. Cammel” whirling “Beyond the circuit of the shuddering Bear / In fractured atoms” manifests
throughout the interactions of The Waste Land.159 The world of The Waste Land is populated by
gerontions who are blind to each other and incapable of connection. Each of us is the old man, The
Waste Land seems to suggest. Having lost our capacity for “sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch,”
we are fundamentally unable to “use them for…closer contact.”160 Where “Gerontion” merely
suggests through analogy that the evacuation of the old man is a shared condition, The Waste Land
explicitly universalizes it.
In emphasizing these points of alignment between The Waste Land and “Gerontion,”
however, Spears Brooker overlooks a fundamental philosophical difference between them. The
distinction between the poems’ appeals to the past necessitates a reappraisal of their suggested
tonal alignment. In “Gerontion,” as in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” memory effects the isolation
of the poetic speaker. Following the seductions of history results in the speaker adopting an
increasingly abstract perspective that elides his own individuality and that of those around him.
The pursuit of a totalizing perspective capable of legitimizing truth results in the dissolution of the
old man. He becomes just another atom carried upon the destructive winds that blow at every level
of the poem. In The Waste Land, however, I have argued that memory exerts the opposite effect.
The characters most akin to the old man, those who seem to be “dull heads among windy spaces,”
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are precisely the ones most detached from memory.161 The male speaker in “A Game of Chess” is
accused of knowing nothing, seeing nothing, and remembering nothing.162 The violence Tiresias’s
vision at the violet hour in “The Fire Sermon” is most effectively erased when the typist dissociates
from memory, “smoothes her hair with automatic hand, / And puts a record on the gramophone.”163
I have argued that an attentiveness to the endurance of history, a mode of historical memory,
actually disrupts the sense of isolation exhibited throughout the poem. Historical sense, a
sensitivity to history not dissimilar to that employed by the old man in “Gerontion,” operates in
the poem as a force that cultivates empathy instead of isolation. The Waste Land does not merely
universalize the alienating forces explicated in “Gerontion,” as Spears Brooker suggests. Instead,
it offers a response to that poem’s vision of isolation, and it does so by responding to the
philosophical problems that guide “Gerontion.”
The redeployment of memory as a capacity for cohesion rather than fragmentation in The
Waste Land reveals the intervention marked by Eliot’s account of historical sense in the argument
against Bergson developed in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism,” “Rhapsody on a Windy
Night,” and “Gerontion.” “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism” results in a dichotomy between
a purely subjective account of memory and the grounding of Bergsonian duration in an Absolute
of pure identity instead of a dynamic ontology of change. “Gerontion” and “Rhapsody on a Windy
Night” explore the ramifications of each of these positions and finds them lacking. The poems
suggest that memory has the effect of isolating and paralyzing individuals under both frameworks.
With his account of historical sense in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot disrupts this

Eliot, “Gerontion,”16.
Eliot, The Waste Land, 122. The interlocutor’s response may perhaps be seen as an expression of memory, for he
repeats a line from Ariel’s song in The Tempest, a line that is repeated elsewhere in the poem (125, 48). The memory
suggested by the male speaker, however, appears partial, and its fragmentary quality gives the sense of confirming
rather than refuting his interlocutor’s challenge.
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dichotomy. He explicates an account of history that is grounded, I have argued, in a broadly
Bergsonian account of temporality, but he grounds this account neither exclusively in the
individual perspective nor a transcendent Absolute. Rather, he identifies historical sense as an
individual relation to “the mind of Europe – the mind of his own country” which changes, and
through this change “abandons nothing en route.”164 With this analogy between the mental
structure of the individual and the historical development of Europe, Eliot assigns a durational
structure to culture itself. In doing so, he establishes an intersubjective and accessible ground for
individual memory, thereby resolving the dilemma established in “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s
Idealism.”165 Rather than present memory merely as an organizing force in the individual psyche
or refer it to the operation of an absolute perspective, The Waste Land resituates memory within
the domain of culture. Individual memory is not a radically private temporal experience. Nor is it
grounded in a totalizing and eternal absolute. Instead, Eliot develops an account according to
which the experience of an individual in a society is shaped by a vast network of historical forces,
which persist despite being past. Thus, Eliot claims that the critical corpus of Wyndham, for
example, appears as a manifestation of the historical circumstances that conditioned Victorian
aristocratic culture. Those forces, further, manifest themselves both in his writing and his person.
In The Waste Land, the violence perpetrated against Philomel, whose brutalization includes the
removal of her voice, haunts the poem’s other depictions of the silencing of women, while a history
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of violence spanning back to the “ships of Mylae” invests the corpse buried in Stetson’s garden
with the significance of generations of war dead.166 The interruption of the poem by voices from
the past suggests the extent to which that past persists alongside and is accessible to the present.
These voices of the past may be remembered and acknowledged, as in the speaker’s appeal to
Mylae, or they may cry out to be heard, as do Philomel and the Rhine-maidens. Regardless,
however, we ourselves are implicated in the network of relations that includes those voices. We
respond to those echoes whether we are aware of it or not, and our experiences alter their
significance in turn.
By relocating the ground of duration to within culture, Eliot resolves the problems that
arise from Eliot’s rejection of quality’s priority “Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism.” The
rejection of the priority of quality at an ontological level undermines the intersubjective ground of
memory. Individual submersion in memory ceases to open out onto a world of which the subject
is merely a continuous part. Rather, Eliot claims, the primacy of number as a category establishes
a universe of external relations, cordoning the self within a private mental universe. With the
appeal to a durational account of culture, Eliot establishes a durational ground that coordinates
subjects. This ground does not depend upon the absolute priority of quality over quantity, for it is
ontologically posterior to space. The history to which Eliot appeals develops through interaction
and, given his emphasis on textual production, language.167 Though culture is not ontologically
primary in the sense that matter is, it nevertheless coordinates the perspectives of disparate
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individuals. Insofar as they participate in it, it constitutes part of them.168 Because of this, it
facilitates the process by which the individual interrogation of memory opens onto an
intersubjective field.169 The investigation of the history that conditions individuals, constituting a
facet of their existence, reveals relations to the other individuals of which that history forms a part.
Thus, the typist in “The Fire Sermon” and the female interlocutor in “A Game of Chess” are related
to each other through their shared relation with Philomel. Memory, according to this account, does
not appear as a barrier between the self and the world, as it does in “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,”
because individual memory is grounded in and continuous with a more expansive durational
structure that includes others.
While Eliot’s account of historical sense grounds the individual experience of memory in
a mediating durational culture, it also manages to do so without exhibiting the problems that
ultimately damn his tentative attempt to ground memory in the ideal Absolute of a Bergson
Resartus. That ideal Absolute promises to provide an ontological ground capable of preserving
intersubjective relations. It does so, however, by positing an absolute perspective that resolves all
difference into a totalizing identity. Thus, in “Gerontion,” the old man’s seduction by history
results in the complete evacuation of his identity. The dissolution of personal identity results
because the absolute durational identity circumscribes all of time and, thus, “A is already so
completely B, and B so completely A, that there is nothing to say about either.” 170 From the
restricted perspective of the individual, identity may not seem to collapse. But the individual
perspective is grounded in the more fundamental Absolute, and from that ontologically prior
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vantage the distinctions are revealed to be illusory. With his appeal to tradition, Eliot resituates the
ground of duration within time and reaffirms the reality of difference. Because Eliot maintains a
commitment to the ontological priority of quantity, he seems to emphasize the reality of material
existence as more fundamental than the ideal determination of identity from within a durational
perspective. Material entities are defined, in the first place, by their external relations, their material
compositions and their locations in space. The commitment to the reality of these external relations
preserves the identities of the entities even as they are implicated in a system of internal relations
within the durational structure of tradition. Though she is related to Philomel, and through her the
other victims of sexual violence in The Waste Land, the typist from “The Fire Sermon” maintains
an identity apart from those other characters. She occupies a specific space in the poem. Her
identity is conditioned by and expresses itself in relations that originate within a durational,
historical structure, but these relations do not resolve into an absolute identity.171
Eliot’s account of historical sense, then, appeals to a durational ground that reestablishes
connections between discrete perspectives without resolving them into an absolute identity. The
distinction between external and internal relations, which Eliot derives primarily from Bradley,
illuminates the ramifications of this account regarding the ontological status of both the individual
and the cultural reality of which she is a part. Eliot appeals to the distinction between internal and
external relations in his engagement with Bergson and, as Spears Brooker argues, the doctrine of
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internal relations is integral to the operation of “Gerontion.”172 M.A.R. Habib articulates the
distinction, along with the role it plays in Eliot’s argument, in his “Bergson Resartus and T.S.
Eliot’s Manuscript.” When relations are understood to be external, they are not considered to be
constitutive of the entities that partake in them.173 The entities themselves are independent of each
other and of the relation itself. This understanding of relationality applies most straightforwardly
to location in space. Objects occupy given points in space, and they may be closer to or further
away from each other, but the coordination of their relative locations does not identify anything
essential about the objects themselves. This account of relations crucially preserves the essential
individuality of entities that enter into relations. A doctrine of internal relations, by contrast, posits
the relation itself as essential to all members that participate in it because “the relation is not
external to the entities but helps define them.”174 Yet, Habib notes, “if relations are all internal, all
entities are ultimately connected and reality must be defined as an absolute which embraces
everything,” and further, “such a point of view would be both idealistic and monistic.”175 Because
the identity of any given entity depends upon its relations to others, whose identities further depend
on subsequent networks of relations, knowledge of any thing requires a panoptic perspective on
the whole system of relations, and this perspective becomes associated with the ultimate reality.
Distinctness becomes subsumed into a unity.
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Eliot identifies internal relation as ontologically prior in the philosophy of Bergson, and
Eliot’s engagement with the ontological priority of internal relation continues into his poetic
investigation of absolute idealism in “Gerontion.” With his articulation of historical sense in The
Sacred Wood, Eliot identifies a field of internal relation that is posterior to space, which grounds
external relation. The field of internal relations is cultural rather than ontologically original. By
decoupling the realm of internal relations from an absolute reality, Eliot preserves the ontological
integrity of individual entities. They retain their distinctness. Rather than identify reality with a
totalizing perspective, retreating into the absolute and pulling “the ladder up after him,” Eliot
returns “to lay [his] head upon a stone.”176 This position endorses the feeling expressed in “The
Relativity of Moral Judgment” that “what we call the physical universe represents something much
more real and more permanent than all our structures of thought.”177 Yet, though it suggests that
the physical universe is fundamentally most real, the articulation of historical sense does not reduce
the structure of reality to pure external relation. Instead, it posits a durational realm of internal
relations that transcends the individual. Within this structure of internal relations comprising
tradition, discrete individuality opens out onto a continuous network of mutually determining
relations.178 This realm establishes relations to an enduring past, such that one can write with the
feeling that “the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature
of his own country has simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”179 Further,
regardless of whether one cultivates historical sense, this structure of historical relations finds
expression in the culture of a given place and time and, further, conditions the development of
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those raised within it. Individuals themselves thus appear to be both products and authors of the
entire history that has developed into their contemporary moment. Within this history, they are
essentially connected to all other individuals as parts of a transcendent whole.180
Individuals thus exhibit dual identities.181 They are, on the one hand, ultimately delineated
by their corporeal existence. They are radically separated from each other, inhabiting bodies that
can interact but that give rise to private worlds of experience. Simultaneously, however,
individuals are born into a culture that transcends them. This culture exhibits a durational
temporality, always changing but in such a way that “it abandons nothing en route.”182 The past
persists, expressing itself in the present cultural moment, while historical developments
reconfigure the past in turn, altering its significance. This durational structure also characterizes
the individual experience of memory, such that the past persists not only in cultural organization
but also in the psyche of each participant in it. The past of the individual is not merely preserved
as personal memories, but it is preserved in the character of the individual, finding expression in
every moment. This past includes the cultivation of attitudes and values integral to the cultural
environment, and thus the past of the culture becomes integral to the individual as well.
Conversely, the individual intervenes into the cultural situation, and the culture shifts, “if ever so
slightly,” according to the actions of those who participate in it.183 Thus, the individual is
incorporated into a vast history that endures and, as part of this history, exhibits relations to all
other entities across time. Further, as it is integrated into her character this history becomes
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constitutive of the individual. And so, the identity of the individual depends in part upon her
relations to all other things, relations preserved in culture itself.
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CONCLUSION

I. Two Visions of Social Reality
The Waste Land, I have argued, presents two radically divergent visions of social reality. On its
surface, the poem represents modern life as fragmented. This sense of fragmentation manifests in
the poem’s depictions of interactions between individuals as well as in the form of the work itself.
The Waste Land’s assemblage of pieces of quoted material ripped from their original contexts and
its resistance to a linear narrative confront the reader with a disjointed representation of social
experience. Not only does the poem cultivate a sense of fragmentation, but this sense of
fragmentation is also accompanied by an overwhelming sense of failure. Miscommunications
predominate, revealing individuals’ failures to accommodate themselves to perspectives other than
their own. Even when personages in the poem seem to interact, they nevertheless fail to actually
respond to each other. The frantic locution of the female speaker in “A Game of Chess,” for
example, is met merely with a litany of “nothing” and nonsense in return. 1 The poem frequently
adopts a second person mode of address, simultaneously implicating the reader in the interactions
while also denying them a voice. The speaker in the final stanza of “Burial of the Dead” cries out
in the second person to Stetson, who never responds, causing the reader to recede into the hordes
undone by death who nevertheless shamble through the “Unreal City.”2 The characters in the poem
are so incapable of connection, in fact, that they are able only to “connect / Nothing with nothing.”3
In this sense, the account of social relations articulated in The Waste Land seems to further develop
one of the concluding images of “Gerontion,” in which “De Bailhache, Fresca, Mrs. Camel,” the
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tenants who share Gerontion’s house, “whirled beyond the shuddering Bear in fractured atoms.”4
Like the tenants in “Gerontion,” the personages in The Waste Land scatter about like isolated
atoms, despite their apparent proximity. They are incapable of bridging the gulf that separates their
perspectives, incapable of making “closer contact” even in their most intimate moments.5
According to this vision of failure, individuals are trapped in atomistic worlds. The
personages depicted in the poem are unable to understand each other. Their miscommunications
are typically characterized by a silencing that elides the presence of the other entirely. In Tiresias’
vision at the twilight hour, the appearance of the “young house agent’s clerk” is accompanied by
the excision of the scene’s protagonist from the passage.6 They are unable to make connections.
They are thoroughly and ineluctably isolated. In a pivotal passage at the end of the poem, with a
shift from the first-person singular to the first-person plural, the speaker of the poem universalizes
the condition of being locked in a solipsistic prison. “We think of the key, each in his prison,” the
speaker claims, “thinking of a key, each confirms a prison.”7 The confines of our own perspectives
appear inescapable. This passage implicates us as readers in the atomistic social reality that
predominate the poem’s descriptions. Thus, the poem seductively invites us to embrace this vision
of radical isolation as inevitable. These interpersonal failings are further reflected in the poem’s
descriptions of a landscape characterized by a breakdown of the seasonal cycles of death and
rebirth. Growth does not give way to decay, later to result in new growth. Rather, corpses
themselves are described as sprouting and blooming, while symbols of fertility are replaced by
symbols of pestilence.8 Nymphs no longer attend to “summer nights” along the Thames.9 In the
Eliot, “Gerontion,” 69–71.
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wake of their departure, only rats remain, rattling bones with their slimy bellies.10 This seasonal
disruption finds its starkest expression in the descriptions of a sterile landscape from the first and
last sections of the poem. In this arid land, “the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,”
and the poetic speaker promises to show the reader “fear in a handful of dust.”11 This “arid plain”
offers only disintegration, as “Jerusalem Athens Alexandria / Vienna London” resolve into an
identity of destruction.12 Everything is reduced to the rubble of a wasted land. Thus, the poem
seems to suggest that history itself is degenerative, and, in fact, terminally so. Not only does the
arc of time bend toward destruction, but the anarchy that predominates is the irrevocable terminus
of this trajectory.
I have argued that the poem does not in fact endorse this vision of failure as an inescapable
reality. Rather, the poem presents the fracturing of the social reality into atomistic perspectives as
a diagnosis of a historically contingent development. To the extent that the poem presents this
development as contingent rather than an eternal condition, it rejects a commitment that Lukács
suggests is paradigmatic of modernist literature. The Waste Land, I argued, presents this diagnosis
through its incorporation of a structuring logic derived from the Grail legend. According to this
sympathetic logic, the condition of the environment is taken to reflect the behavior and condition
of the people living upon it. The wasting of the land is a manifestation of a sickness endemic to its
inhabitants. In the legend, the knight gallant embarks upon a search for the Grail with a dual
purpose. The recovery of the Grail is meant to restore the health of an ailing king and, in doing so,
reinvigorate the wasted land of his kingdom. I have argued that the poem’s appeals to symbols
from the Grail legend, such as its allusions to the chapel perilous and the fisher king in the final
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section of the poem, offer a framework that organizes the poem’s disparate descriptions into a
more unified whole. The descriptions of desolate landscapes “where the dead tree gives no shelter,
the cricket no relief / and the dry stone no sound of water” are not mere interruptions of the scenes
of social disintegration between which they appear. They are, instead, externalizations of the
fragmentation exhibited in those scenes. Considered under the auspices of the unifying logic of
the fertility ritual derived from the Grail legend, the arid and “dead mountain mouth of carious
teeth that cannot spit” is not merely a symbol but rather a further manifestation of the sterility that
conditions the social reality of the poem.13
The mythical logic of the Grail legend supplies a structure that unites the fragmented
passages of the poem, yet this feature alone does not amount to a diagnosis. Indeed, I have
acknowledged that, on its surface, the embrace of a mythical method seems to enact the precise
retreat into myth that Lukács claims characterizes the philosophical worldview underwriting
modernist literature. If The Waste Land endorses a return to myth to escape what it presents as a
universal experience of alienation, then, I have argued, it seems to embrace a flight from reality.
Such a flight from reality, further, can nevertheless have dire ramifications, as evidenced by the
deployment of a variation of The Waste Land’s sympathetic logic to horrible ends under the Nazi
regime. Against this critique, I have argued that The Waste Land raises its appeal to a sympathetic
logic to the level of diagnosis insofar as it wields this logic to articulate a more fundamental
epistemological framework. According to this framework, which can be traced to Eliot’s
engagement with Bradley, a shared world can be said to exist only insofar as the individuals within
it intend the same objects. The coherence of their intentions, further, depends upon their capacity
to unify their perspectives. When individuals become trapped within circumscribed perspectives

13

Eliot, The Waste Land, 339.

329

and communication becomes impossible, they effectively cease to inhabit the same world. This
epistemological framework transforms the sympathetic logic that unifies the disparate descriptions
in The Waste Land. The vitality of the world does depend upon and reflect the health of its
inhabitants. This connection is not, however, mythically guaranteed through appeals to a kind of
cosmic sympathy. Rather, the health of the world depends upon those in it because the world can
be said to exist only if individuals are capable of connection. The loss of the ability to synthesize
perspectives results in the alienation of individuals and the dissolution of the sense of a shared
world.
The articulation of this epistemological concern brings The Waste Land’s vision of failure
into relief. According to this vision, modern social reality is characterized by an experience of
fragmentation. Eliot presents this sense of fragmentation as a historical development resulting from
a combination of factors, including the waning influence of the Christian church as a unifying
social force and a proliferation of technical vocabularies that render interdisciplinary discourse
increasingly problematic.14 The shared frameworks that unify perspectives seem, according to this
vision, to be eroding, even at the level of language. For individuals, this sense of fragmentation
affects their capacity to communicate, leaving them trapped within limited perspectives, unable to
make meaningful connections. Their perspectives become atomic, discontinuous. This vision of
failure further suggests that the atomization of perspectives results in the dissolution of the shared
world. In The Waste Land, this dissolution appears total. The world can no longer sustain life.
Alienation is inescapable. Fragmentation is absolute.
I have argued, however, that The Waste Land presents an alternative to this vision of failure.
This alternative depends upon an awareness of the ways in which the past endures, an awareness
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grounded in Eliot’s notion of historical sense. Eliot aligns historical sense with a “perception, not
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence” and a “sense of the timeless as well as the
temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together.”15 Further, I noted that Eliot identifies this
account of historical sense with the ability to synthesize perspectives. In the artist, this capacity
enables the integration of disparate material in the service of a new, more comprehensive
perspective. It brings perspectives separated by time and place into relation with each other,
facilitating their mutual exchange. Insofar as historical sense works to synthesize perspectives, it
offers a response to the alienated condition explicated by The Waste Land’s vision of failure. For
the ability to incorporate disparate points of view into a more comprehensive whole suggests the
possibility that individual perspectives are not radically delimited. If this is the case, connections
may be developed that can serve as the ground of a shared world.
The Waste Land, I claimed, employs the formal devices of allusion and repetition to
articulate this vision shot through with historical sense. I appealed primarily to the figure of
Philomel to ground this argument, though a variety of The Waste Land’s other historical allusions
have received treatment throughout this project. Philomel appears twice in the poem, once in a
description of a painting that displays her transformation after being “so rudely forc’d” by “the
barbarous king” Tereus and once through the direct intervention of her song, “Twit twit twit / Jug
jug jug jug jug jug / So rudely forc’d / Tereu.”16 In both cases, the appearance of Philomel precedes
a scene characterized by the elision of a female voice. Further, Philomel’s relation to these scenes
calls attention to the ways in which this elision amounts to a form of violence. For the story of
Philomel is itself the story of a woman’s brutal rape and silencing. By revealing the elements of
violence that are otherwise obscured in the poem, Philomel’s song connects her to the women in
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the scenes, combating the sense of isolated reification effected through descriptions marked by
synecdoche. The repetition of the poem’s appeal to Philomel further establishes a relation between
the women through their shared connection to her song. The poem seems to suggest that the song
of Philomel echoes through history, her voice crying out at the violence against women that
continues to be perpetrated and obfuscated.
Though I argued that The Waste Land develops an alternative to the alienated condition
that it diagnoses, I also acknowledged that this vision animated by historical sense demanded an
investigation into the model of temporality that it assumes. Because Eliot’s account of historical
sense depends upon an awareness of the past’s enduring presence, it can only fulfill its synthetic
capacity if this endurance of the past does, in fact, characterize the structure of temporality.
Explicating Eliot’s account of historical sense, I argued that his presentation of the concept entails
three temporal conditions. First, the model of temporality underwriting his account must
accommodate the past’s endurance independently of the individuals who engage with it. Second,
the ideal order constituted by the past must be affected by the present. This condition manifests,
for example, when in the discussion of artistic tradition grounding his elaboration of historical
sense, Eliot claims that with the intervention of each new work of art, “the whole existing order
must be, if ever so slightly, altered.”17 Finally, Eliot’s account of historical sense demands that the
past endure not merely as an ideal order. Rather, the model of temporality underwriting this
synthetic account must accommodate the past’s endurance in the present insofar as the present is
the continuing development of the past.18
Though Eliot does not develop these conditions into a unified theory of time, I argued that
the plausibility of The Waste Land’s response to the alienated conditions it articulates depends
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upon the legitimacy of the model of temporality entailed in his account of historical sense.
Interrogating the approaches to tradition against which Eliot positions his account, I argued that
the model of temporality needed to ground the synthetic vision of The Waste Land must be nonlinear. Insofar as linear models of temporality are committed to the destruction of the present as it
passes, they cannot provide the temporal foundation for the operation of historical sense. Though
linear models of temporality can account for the survival of the past in artifacts that persist through
time, I contended that even more nuanced linear accounts cannot accommodate the full range of
ways that The Waste Land invokes the past. For while the poem, itself an enduring artifact, appeals
to a litany of historical material, it does not present its allusions uniformly. I distinguished between
allusions presented in intratextual representations, such as the painting of Philomel that adorns the
wall in “A Game of Chess”, and instances in which voices from the past are presented as
intervening directly into the poem itself, as with Philomel’s appearance and the song of the Rhinemaidens in “The Fire Sermon.”19 The account of the past’s endurance grounded in a linear temporal
framework can account, I claimed, for the poem’s appeals to intratextual allusions but it cannot
accommodate the direct appeals to echoes of the past. Finally, I considered the possibility that the
account of time developed by Bradley might satisfy the conditions of historical sense, but I
ultimately found it wanting. Bradley’s account failed insofar as it entailed a commitment either to
a temporality of passage or to the coexistence of all time, thereby foreclosing the possibility of
development integral to Eliot’s notion of historical sense.
As an alternative to these accounts, I pursued the possibility that the account of duration
developed by Henri Bergson might satisfy the temporal conditions of historical sense. This account
of duration is captured most basically in Bergson’s investigation of specific sensory experiences,
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such as the hypnotic effect of the ticking of a clock. Considered in isolation, each tick of the clock
is identical to those that came before it. If the sound of the current chime ceases to exist as soon as
it is no longer audible, the hypnotic effect of the rhythmic chiming becomes difficult to explain.
Bergson leverages this phenomenon and others like it to argue that we do not experience the
passage of time primarily as a linear motion, as the model of a timeline would suggest.20 Rather
we experience time as the ongoing synthesis of “both the past and present states into an organic
whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.”21
This analysis of duration, a temporal mode “the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one
another,” grounds Bergson’s account of memory. According to that account, which I developed
through an explication of his famous figure of the cone of memory, the entirety of one’s past
persists in an indefinite array of structures with varying degrees of compression or relaxation. We
draw upon these structures of memory to help us respond to the circumstances we encounter. For,
“memory, laden with the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the present,” and it does so
“by two simultaneous movements, one of translation, by which it moves in its entirety to meet
experience….the other of rotation upon itself, by which it turns toward the situation of the moment,
presenting to it that side of itself which may prove to be most useful.”22 Bergson argues, further,
that this structure of memory that is “laden with the whole of the past” entails that the past
continues to exist, but that its existence remains virtual until it is brought into contact with the
present. Not only does this satisfy the condition of Eliot’s historical sense that requires the
continued existence of the past, but it provides a conceptual apparatus for engaging with the
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ramifications of that demand. Finally, though Bergson primarily develops his account of duration
through an investigation of subjective experience, either of lived time or of the operation of
memory, I argued that the final arguments of Matter and Memory suggest that Bergson develops
an account that posits duration as a fundamental ontological principle. Appealing to Bergson’s
suggestion that matter imitates memory “in its own way,” I claimed that Bergson endorses a
position in which all things participate in an enduring past, even if he restricts his account of
memory to humans.23 With this turn, I claimed that Bergson’s account of duration satisfies all of
the criteria of Eliot’s historical sense and provides a promising ground upon which to develop the
temporal framework underwriting the appeal to tradition in The Waste Land.
I developed the final turn of my investigation of Eliot’s synthetic vision through an
explication of Eliot’s own engagement with the Bergson’s philosophy. I argued that Eliot endorsed
Bergson’s psychological account of duration and continued to operate with a broadly Bergsonian
psychological framework even after ostensibly rejecting Bergsonism. I maintained that Eliot
presents his critique of Bergson as a rejection of the ontological priority that Bergson affords to
duration. Eliot returns in his critique, time and again, to the problem of space and to the necessity
of ceding space a degree of ontological reality that, he claims, Bergson does not afford it. I argued
that Eliot traces the ramifications of an embrace of Bergsonian psychology along with the rejection
of Bergsonian ontology in the poems “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and “Gerontion.” In both
poems, the protagonist’s engagement with an enduring past results in his increasing isolation
within a circumscribed perspective. In The Waste Land, however, I argued that Eliot reframes
duration as a synthetic force by locating the ground of durational temporality not in individual
experience but rather in an appeal to duration as a structure of culture. The synthetic possibility of
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historical sense is safeguarded by this appeal to a culture in which the past endures. We are
informed by and participate in the cultures in which we are raised and to which we are exposed.
To the extent that we integrate elements of a culture, we come to exhibit a connection to a past that
transcends our own immediate experience and which connects us to each other. With this I
concluded my investigation of Eliot’s vision of the synthetic capacity of historical sense.
II. Identity in Tension
The final turn in my argument revealed a latent tension that has manifested throughout this project,
a tension that unfortunately could not receive a comprehensive investigation. This tension concerns
Eliot’s presentation of entities as simultaneously self-enclosed and self-transcending, and it
appears with respect to his treatment of works of art, individual subjects, and cultures in general.
By self-enclosed here I refer to the various ways Eliot describes entities as exhibiting definite
boundaries that render them distinct, and potentially radically separate, from others. This sense of
self-enclosure is theoretically grounded in Eliot’s appeal to a materialist realism, addressed in the
final chapter of this project. By self-transcending I refer to the ways in which entities are presented
as incorporating diverse elements. Through their relations, entities incorporate otherness into their
identities while simultaneously participating in the constitution of the identities of other things.
This account received theoretical justification in Eliot’s appeal to the structure of internal relations
that he suggests is a feature of duration. The underdevelopment of this tension proves particularly
lamentable insofar as it has ramifications for Eliot’s account of individual identity and for our
understanding of ourselves within his framework.
At the level of texts, this tension between self-enclosure and self-transcendence manifests
most prominently through Eliot’s concern for the principle of unity organizing a work. For Eliot,
works of art, or, at least, enduring works of art, exhibit a unifying principle that coordinates their

336

parts. The artist shapes disparate material, such as impressions, emotions, sensations, and beliefs,
into a coherent whole.24 I have argued, for example, that the sympathetic logic of the Grail legend
fulfills this organizing function in The Waste Land, shaping its fragmented stanzas and
perspectives into a more coherent vision. Unified works of art, with their principles of internal
order, intervene as individuals into the ideal order of tradition. So we may speak, for example, of
the discrete intervention and the significance of The Waste Land. Simultaneously, however, Eliot
emphasizes the extent to which texts develop from and incorporate elements of the contexts in
which they are produced, contexts that ripple out into increasingly comprehensive wholes. The
Waste Land thematizes this permeability of texts through its radicalization of allusion on the one
hand, and its integration into Eliot’s editorial project in The Criterion on the other.25 These features
render the boundaries of the poem unstable as the text is brought into increasingly expansive
networks of relations. Though The Waste Land thematizes this unbounded quality of textual
identity in a particularly striking way, I have argued that Eliot appeals to it as a fundamental aspect
of all textual production. Texts, then, seem at once to be bounded and unbounded, their identities
organized according to a principle of unity that delimits their borders while also depending upon
relations that reach beyond the limits of the texts themselves.
Eliot develops an analogous tension in his treatment of cultures, and I have argued that it
results in an internal pressure that serves as a ground for developing an immanent critique of Eliot’s
myopic and xenophobic tendencies. Eliot presents both sides of this tension in his “The Good
European,” a speech in which he promotes the cultivation of comprehensive European perspective
through the encouragement of individual national cultures. Thus, he speaks of the French national
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culture and the English national culture as distinct and circumscribed entities that may ultimately
be synthesized into a more comprehensive whole. Eliot appeals to a similar sense of delimited
cultural identity in his “Note on Ezra Pound,” where he refers to Pound’s sense of history as a
“perception of the relation between these periods and languages to the present, of what they have
that we want.”26 This language, as I noted in the third chapter, suggests a radical separation of
cultures, such that material can be simply taken from one and transplanted into another without a
more comprehensive synthesis. Finally, Eliot’s appeals to culture, for the most part, extend only
to the boundaries of Europe. Yet, while his engagements with culture often exhibit troubling
tendencies toward Eurocentrism and nationalism, the account that he develops implicitly
condemns these impulses. Because the account of historical sense developed in this project
grounds the response to alienation in the synthesis of perspectives, appeals to hermetically sealed
cultures seems to cultivate the precise conditions that The Waste Land decries. It unnecessarily
and artificially preserves an incommensurability of perspectives, undermining the project of
fostering connections. Further, because Eliot identifies culture as a durational ground in which
entire histories endure, the notion that these cultures could be isolable in the first place is dubious.
For, though a culture, such as a British or French national culture, may perhaps appear distinct in
the present, these cultures necessarily formed through an extended process of interpersonal
exchange. The history of England and the history of France are inextricably bound to each other,
just as the history of Europe and the histories of Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Americas are all
interrelated. Attention to the endurance of history in Eliot’s account of culture suggests that
seemingly distinct cultures are, in fact, implicated in structures of interrelation, which entails that
they are incorporated into each other’s identities. I maintain, then, that Eliot’s appeal to the
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importance of developing a synthetic vision entails a call to pursue intercultural dialogue and
actively engage with historical moments marked by intercultural exchange. These moments of
exchange reveal enduring points of contact at which cultures permeate and open onto one another,
forming more comprehensive wholes. And, even as we attend to the specificity of culture
suggested by Eliot’s invocation of discrete cultural frameworks, we should also acknowledge the
ways in which those cultures are nevertheless always already integrated into more comprehensive
totalities.
I have further argued that Eliot’s critiques of both Bergsonian and Bradleyan ontological
frameworks, captured most strikingly in “Gerontion,” taken in conjunction with his commitment
to durational accounts of memory and culture, result in the reinscription of this tension at the level
of individual identity. On the one hand, the identities of individuals seem to be, for Eliot, bounded
by their extension in space. We are tied to our bodies, and these bodies individuate us from each
other at a fundamental level.27 Meanwhile, our psychic existence is characterized by a durational
power of “using everything that is apposite in one’s past experience to bear on the present
moment.”28 Insofar as our characters are shaped by our experiences, experiences that necessarily
involve other people, the preservation of the past in durational memory already suggests an extent
to which the limits of the self expand to include others. This integration of others is amplified,
however, by Eliot’s appeal to culture as a ground of duration that preserves the possibility of
intersubjective experience. For with this account of culture, Eliot implicates elements of character
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in the development of tradition. His appeals to the importance of rhetoric to the Elizabethan
worldview, or to the unified mythology that infused Dante’s Italy, suggest that our patterns of
thought, for Eliot, are bound to the operation of culture.29 To the extent this is the case, the structure
of culture, and the past preserved in it, become integral parts of our selves. Our identities
incorporate this expansive network of voices, both prominent and marginal, that conditions our
tastes and beliefs, our concerns and responses. Some of these influences may be more proximate
while others are more distant, but they are all integrated in some way into our character. Further,
insofar as we, too, intervene in these shared cultures, we effect changes in them. We are integrated
into a network that transcends us even as it conditions us, and insofar as this network conditions
others, we become implicated in their development, as well. Despite the circumscribed nature of
our identities according to his seemingly naïve materialism, Eliot also develops an immensely
permeable notion of selfhood which expands to include relations to countless others and an
extensive enduring past.
Eliot’s attempt to maintain a productive tension between a bounded account of identity
grounded in appeals to internal principles of organization or physical location in space, on the one
hand, and an unbounded account of identity grounded in an appeal to the informing capacity of
structures of internal relation, on the other, strikes me in turns as extremely appealing and rather
tenuously defended. Each of Eliot’s appeals to an unbounded or self-transcending account of
identity, regardless of whether that identity is textual, cultural, or individual, depends upon his
durational account of culture. I have argued that Eliot’s attempt to locate duration at a cultural,
rather than merely individual, level is meant to preserve the synthetic capacity of historical sense.
Descriptively, I find this account of culture rather compelling. I think it provides a powerful
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framework for reckoning with the enduring effects of a past that informs us and conditions our
experience. Yet the ontological ground of this durational account of culture remains unclear. Eliot
does not explain what culture is such that it can participate in duration. At precisely this critical
point in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” he appeals to the metaphor of “the Mind of Europe”
to make his case and then, ultimately, demurs, opting instead to “halt at the frontier of metaphysics
or mysticism, and confine [himself] to such practical conclusions as can be applied by the
responsible person interested in poetry.”30 The account that Eliot develops in his critical work can
provide an appeal to the durational aspects of culture through the articulation of historical sense.
The Waste Land, further, can distill a vision of the productive possibilities of this historical sense.
But neither amounts to an argument for the veracity of this account of culture, nor can they
articulate the ontological ground upon which it rests. What culture is for Eliot, such that it can
preserve an intersubjective past, remains a cypher. While I ultimately had to stop short of
addressing this problem in the project at hand, I hope further research will illuminate the
philosophical conditions that could justify Eliot’s durational account of culture.
A problem that remains unresolved concerns the necessity of Eliot’s intervention into
Bergson’s philosophical framework. Adopting a primarily historical orientation in my
investigation, I traced the problems motivating the theoretical intervention of The Waste Land. As
I pursued this investigation, I raised doubts about the quality of Eliot’s arguments against Bergson,
but I did not linger on the ultimate ramifications that would result if Eliot’s arguments proved
unsound. Though his critiques of Bergson may have been inadequate, they nevertheless motivated
Eliot’s intellectual development. According to my account, this intellectual trajectory resulted in
the vision of historical sense articulated in The Waste Land, which was ultimately my quarry. The
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problem remains, then, of how to engage with Eliot’s vision of historical sense if it turns out to be
a response to a problem that arose from a misguided critique. To reject his position outright on
these grounds would commit the genetic fallacy. However, we may still wonder about the promise
of pursuing this account.
I do not have the space here, at the end of this project, to develop the answers to these
questions fully, but I can signal my suspicions. Eliot’s account of culture seems, to me, to be robust
enough to safeguard the synthetic capacity of historical sense but not duration tout court. A more
substantial definition of culture and an explanation of its ontological ground seem necessary to
account for its durational elements. Further, I think Eliot fails to successfully call the Bergsonian
ontological framework into question. His critiques of Bergson do not take seriously Bergson’s
claims about the limitations of discursive language, resulting in frustratingly uncharitable
articulations of the positions he rejects. Though Eliot, like Bergson, is concerned with mediating
apparent oppositions, his tendency to hold oppositions in a productive tension is ultimately not as
satisfying as Bergson’s attempt to address more fundamental problems motivating the apparent
antinomies. I suspect that Bergson’s ontological account is ultimately more promising than Eliot’s
intervention in response to its imputed shortcomings. It seems to me, however, that Eliot’s account
nevertheless offers insight insofar as it illuminates durational structures that Bergson does not
investigate so thoroughly and, furthermore, insofar as it explicates their ethical ramifications.
Additionally, though Eliot rejects Bergson’s ontological framework, I think Bergson’s account is
capable of accommodating Eliot’s account of tradition because it appeals to a structure of duration
that is prior to culture. Finally, I see value in Eliot’s account because it allows us to consider the
ethical ramifications of an intersubjective field of duration without necessarily becoming
immediately embroiled in metaphysical speculation, though this speculation is ultimately
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necessary. Appealing to culture rather than metaphysics shifts the framework of the discussion,
providing a concrete focus for the pursuit of an intersubjective field. It allows us to join him, for a
time, as he returns to earth to “lay [his] head upon a stone.”31
III. Inhabiting the Vision of Historical Sense
The generally historical orientation I have adopted in this project has admittedly resulted in a
lacuna regarding the ultimate plausibility of Eliot’s intervention into the Bergsonian ontological
framework, a lacuna that further research will hopefully supplement. However, The Waste Land’s
development of a vision animated by historical sense offers, I think, an alternative way to approach
the problem of discerning the value of Eliot’s account. By presenting a vision that attends to the
endurance of the past, the poem invites us to consider whether inhabiting this vision enriches our
experience. Further, by employing an allusive intertextuality that necessarily overdetermines the
text to develop this synthetic vision, The Waste Land demands the cultivation of historical sense
as a condition of engaging with the poem. It does not merely invite us to consider the effects of
inhabiting its synthetic vision, it provides the tools for cultivating the requisite attunement to
tradition. The poem presents this vision as a response to social conditions marked by fragmentation
and isolation, and it endorses an attention to the echoing voices of the past as a force capable of
synthesizing disconnected perspectives. Engaged with on its own terms, rather than through the
question of an ultimate metaphysical ground (which I admit nevertheless lingers), the poem
establishes the conditions of its own success. The Waste Land locates the value of its appeal to
tradition in the capacity an engagement with that tradition has to foster connections and enrich our
intersubjective experience. If inhabiting this vision proves to reinforce a sense of alienation or
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social fragmentation instead of bringing perspectives into closer contact, then we may reconsider
whether pursuing its ultimate ontological ground is a worthwhile endeavor.
Considered according to this criterion of perspectival enrichment, I maintain that The
Waste Land offers a number of promising interventions. I think one of the most promising features
of the account of tradition developed in this project is the emphasis it places on the sense in which
tradition is always changing. The significance of any work or any event, and even the horizons of
the tradition itself, are perpetually being renegotiated. This more capacious account of tradition
provides a framework for responding to attempts to wield mythologized appeals to a monolithic
tradition as a reactionary defense against the integration of differing perspectives into the fabric of
a society. The productive force of the account of historical sense at the heart of The Waste Land is
its recognition that the intervention of novelty is as essential to the operation of history as the
endurance of the past. Diversity is therefore built into the notion of tradition as an organizing
principle. Attempts to reify the past, such as appeals to an unchanging and monolithic national or
cultural identity, commit to the deficient mode of temporality derided by Eliot in “Tradition and
the Individual Talent” and “Ulysses, Order, and Myth.” They fail to recognize that, as a function
of its capacity for integration, the tradition to which they appeal cannot be frozen and fixed. The
appearance of differing perspectives in a cultural framework necessarily alter it, if only slightly.
Rather than cede the notion of tradition to reactionary cultural voices, the account of historical
sense articulated by Eliot contests the very concept to which those voices stake their claim and
offers a framework for wielding their cherished concept against them.
In addition to offering a framework for responding to reactionary appeals to a monolithic
tradition, I maintain that the vision of historical sense developed in The Waste Land suggests a
productive model for engaging with literary and historical traditions. By treating those traditions
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as perpetually under negotiation, the account of historical sense resists the competing impulses to
treat the literary tradition as an established and enduring canon and to eliminate problematic voices
from that canon or to eliminate the notion of a canon entirely. For, on the one hand, Eliot’s appeal
to the endurance of the past challenges us to consider whether voices could actually be eliminated
from the tradition, even if such a course of action were deemed desirable. If the whole past persists,
we cannot expect to eliminate the effects of a voice simply by excising it from our account of
tradition. Its influences, the web of relations into which it intervened and which further developed
around it, continue to condition our present reality even if we cease to attend to them. On the other
hand, the perpetual renegotiation of tradition also calls into question the impulse to treat the canon
as a constellation of fixed stars that we use to appraise the value of new works of art. Insofar as
the intervention of novelty rearranges the whole ideal order that preceded it, historical and literary
developments allow us to reassess the relative contribution of canonical figures. We may consider
whether their significance is altered in light of our own shifting self-understanding.
The legacy of Joseph Conrad is, I think, illuminating in this respect, for Conrad has enjoyed
a troubling and troubled reception. As a voice critical of the colonial project, Conrad offers some
extraordinarily evocative and damning depictions of life under colonial regimes. As a
contemporary of the executors of that project and a product of the imperial mindset, Conrad also
endorses some of the most reprehensible features of that very same imperial project. Simply
consigning the work of Conrad to obscurity would, I think, render us insensible to the influence
he had upon subsequent literary figures. More importantly, it could deafen us to ways in which the
colonial situation described by Conrad continues to echo in our contemporary circumstances. The
horrific accounts of colonial rule articulated by Conrad provide powerful tools not only for
assessing his own complicity in the racist imperial worldview but also for considering the lingering
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traces of that worldview in, for example, the operation of the police state. I do not mean to suggest
that Eliot’s model of historical sense is the only framework capable of cultivating nuanced
approaches to a problematic and contentious literary tradition. However, to the extent that it
suggests a method for engaging with the enduring effects of the tradition and the conditions that
informed traditional authors while simultaneously facilitating the reappraisal of those same
figures, this vision of historical sense seems, to me, to provide a method for productive engagement
and immanent critique. This critical approach is, in fact, precisely the method I have adopted with
respect to the tension between the pressure in Eliot’s account to incorporate diversity and his
problematic, and at times repugnant, Eurocentrism.
I started this project in the wake of a police officer’s murder of Tamir Rice, a black child
who was playing with a toy gun. Now, as the project draws to a close, the country is being wracked
by protests over the refusal to bring significant charges against the police officers who murdered
of Breonna Taylor, another person of color. Meanwhile, the government is advocating an
educational curriculum that minimizes the role of violence against, and enslavement of, people of
color in the founding of the United States. The vision of historical sense developed in this project
offers a framework for attempting to reckon with just how immeasurably tragic these events are.
For each time the state murders a person of color, a litany of voices echoes out from the past. These
voices are deafening – I am undone by them. A chorus of lives sacrificed in the name of industry
calls to us when protests over these deaths are condemned for the resultant destruction of property.
When we attend to these voices, we may come to understand the enduring legacy of the violence
they suffered. We may recognize the transformation and preservation of the structures of law and
belief that legitimated their abuse. Finally, Eliot’s vision of historical sense further articulates the
danger of attempting to silence these voices once more, of denying them and of deafening

346

ourselves to them. For in attempting to silence these voices, by excising slavery and genocide from
our understanding of this country’s history, we destroy the ground of our mutual understanding.
We undermine the foundation that allows us to recognize ourselves and connect with others. We
ravage our world and render ourselves senseless, able only to “connect / Nothing with nothing.”32
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